Dr Tatiana Majcherkiewicz
The Pedagogical University of Cracow
Department of Philosophy and Sociology
email:
Dr Kaja Gadowska
Jagiellonian University
Department Philosophy
Political clientElism in Public Administration
A case study of institutional changes in the post-communist state of Poland[*]
In Poland we can still find conviction that a politician is a patron and a civil servant is a client. When a change of government takes place, certain civil servants know that their future is already decided for politicians are afraid to trust civil servants as they can politically sabotage them (Jan Pastwa, the Chief of the Civil Service Rzeczpospolita, 11 Dec. 2002).Abstract
In analysing political clientelism in public administration one should notice its institutional dimension which poses particularly serious threats to the position of the state. Especially important is the vulnerability of administration to politicization following more than forty years of its direct subordination to the communist party.
This paper is divided into two parts. The first part presents theoretical approaches to politico-administrative relations with reference to its applicability to the post-communist state. The second part focuses directly on politico-administrative relations in Poland and on the issue of whether the institutional order promotes, or rather limits, the influence of the political sphere on public administration situated below the political sphere. The communist legacy and not completed administrative reforms were preserving and promoting clientelism in public administration.
Keywords: public administration, civil service, models of politico-administrative relations, models of careers and positions in public administration, communist legacy, civil service acts, clientlism, political neutrality of civil service, spoils system.
Historical Introduction and the idea of clientelism
Since the fall of communism in Poland in 1989 there has been an economic, political and social transition leading to be formation of a free market and the introduction of democratic institutions and rules of the game. Ambitious reforms have led to a complete and successful transition in many areas. However, there have also been areas where reforms have been moderate and the transition of institutions has been limited.
Politico-administrative relations and the formation of the civil service is one of the areas, where reforms were delayed and then they proved to be lukewarm.[1] An efficient, professional and politically neutral administration is critical for the state to perform its functions. The crucial factor is preserving the political neutrality of the administration, which should serve the state rather than the partisan interests of the party in government. However, in Poland politics is over expanded, endangering the development of autonomous public administration (Kamiński 2004). Political parties aim to preserve supervision over public administration in order to subordinate it to its narrow political interests.
Due to the crucial role of the institutional setting in this article we will not concentrate in detail on an analysis of policies and actions of particular governments after the collapse of communism in 1989 but rather on institutional changes which were adopted during the transition. The article will focus on the absence of reform in the early nineties, the central administration reform and particularly on the Civil Service Act of 1998.[2] It has to be emphasized that the institutional order has not only been established by delayed reforms of the transition period but also by ‘the spirit’ of communism. The political culture of that period is still alive and it continuous to have a fundamental impact on the current state of performance and facilitates such negative phenomena as clientelism and corruption.[3]
However, let us first define the term clientelism. Clientelism shows itself in different levels in all types of societies. It occurs when individuals or groups with unequal status meet while occupying differing positions in the social hierarchy (a perpendicular dyad). When the official formalized methods of realizing specified interests or paths of access to desired resources are recognized as inadequate, then informal paths are activated. The individual occupying the higher position in a social hierarchy, i.e. the patron, is capable of offering assistance and protection to people or groups situated lower in the social hierarchy, i.e. clients. The patron expands a protective umbrella around them in exchange for specified services. The basis of clientelistic linkages is constituted by a feeling of personal loyalty and obligation, which is associated with an exchange of resources of unequal character.(Zuckerman A. 1977; Gellner E. 1977; Eisenstadt S. N., Lemarchand R. 1981). The vvoluntary character of these relations (although to some extent limited) is crucial.
In the case of Poland, one should underline the strong political pressure and fluidity of senior political positions in public administration, especially positions of director generals, (the most senior administrative positions supervising the performance of central or regional offices and responsible also for personnel policy in these institutions). The relations between the minister or regional governor (wojewoda) and director generals are, in the case of Poland, the most sensitive relations between politicians and administrative offices deciding on the neutrality of public administration or, on the contrary, the formation of clientelist-type relations.
Proposals for reforms aimed at the reformulation of relations between politics and administration officially formulated in Poland after 1989 are generally based on the classical nineteenth century model, which assumes strict separation of these areas. However, this model also assumes that public administration should be located in the organisational structure below the political sphere. In Western European countries which have experienced long and uninterrupted democratic tradition mechanisms guaranteeing the autonomy of public administration and stable and professional civil service corps were gradually formed[4]. This occurred in Western Europe at the time when Poland and many other countries in Central and Eastern Europe lost their independence.[5] Furthermore, the communist period was also a drawback, with extremely intensive politicization of administration.
Thus, in post-communist Poland, contrary to the proposed model of reforms and the situation in Western Europe, personnel policy is characterised by political purges. In 1993, for the first time since the collapse of communism a post-communist government was formed and the tendency for a spoils system after each parliamentary election was established. The senior positions in public administration are part of the spoils system.[6] Sometimes, the purges are so intensive that so-called cleaning ladies are also replaced. Official appointments have their source in political patronage instead of professional qualifications. As a result, promoted officials serve the interests of their patrons even if these oppose to the public interest. This state of affairs can promote the formation of corrupt networks in which, individualistic and partisan aims replace public ones. The type of attitudes of officials lead of distrust to state and public administration.
Recent academic literature on clientelism has begun to recognise that not only are vertical type informal relations important but analyses should also be enriched by net-analyses. Net-analysis includes both vertical (clientelism) and horizontal (cronyism) relations. Cronyism is defined as nets among cronies, who are located in senior positions and support and promote each other depending on who currently enjoys power (Waterbury 1977; Sik 1994).
In public administration cronyism leads to the appointment of family members or colleagues or for those giving favours or bribes.[7] These types of practises in Poland were addressed in research by the Anti-corruption Programme by the Stefan Batory Foundation. According to the research conducted in August 2004 the employment of kin or colleagues was not interpreted as negative by 30% of public administration employees. Moreover, the Word Bank recent report suggested that the exchange of kin employment among ministries had become popular in Poland. An extreme example of nepotism can be presented in the town of Puławy, where, among 120 local administration employees, around 30 are connected by close family ties(Krasnowska and Krzyżak, Wprost, 29 August 2004).
Clientelism and cronyism decrease moral standards. They facilitate corruption and control over the state by networks of politicians, public administration officials, businessmen, and sometimes intelligence cadres or even criminals. These type of practices lead to demoralisation of the political elite who focus on partisan interests, overlooking public ones. In the case of their administrative counterparts, the personal interest is achieved by state exploitation.
1. Between public administration and politics
Analysing challenges, which Poland and other Central and East European post-communist states have to overcome we argue that they are much more serious than those of other modern countries, in which the democratic systems have lasted without any serious interruption. In post-communist countries, in addition to the challenges of the modern and widely expanded state there have also been challenges to how to overcome the even more serious legacy of the communist past. In addition to the formation of an efficient and flexible public administration able to meet modern challenges with limited financial resources, there are additional contradictory factors, which suggest serious limitations of the new public management models in public administration in these countries. The formation of an efficient and politically neutral civil service in Poland and other post-communist countries, following more than forty years in which administration was subordinated to the communist political party, suggests the adoption of a solution based on the classical career system.
Thus, particularly important is the question of what the best model of politico-administrative relations is. Should any other factors be taken into consideration in the case of a post-communist state? In general, in relation to modern state challenges, it is worth mentioning the impact of two factors. First is the multidimensional (economic, political and social) impact of globalisation, which limits the role of national states and strengthens the importance of external actors. Second, is the decentralisation of administration and the development of self-government at local and regional levels. As part of this particular type of globalisation can be interpreted Europeanisation of administration (its values and standards, convergence of national models of civil service and similarity of tasks performed by national administration), (Rydlewski, The Polish Yearbook of Civil Service 2005 p. 13).
It is also worth mentioning that the increase in tasks and competencies performed by the modern state, leads to significant growth in the size of the administration. In consequence, the organisation of public administration is often transformed in the direction of Public Management, with a more prominent role for cooperation with private business. Jadwiga Staniszkis (2002 p.349) argues in this context that the “method of control by the state centre corrodes” as tasks and public functions have gradually been taken on by the private sector, which is difficult to supervise.
In public administration the inspiration of private business is also seen in the change of employment policy. There is a shift from the career system (work in public administration as the choice for the whole professional life) towards a position (open) system, which is also based on competition procedures. This policy should lead to the employment of managers in senior positions in public administration. At the same time, the issue of good services for citizens is raised and they are traded similarly to private business as clients.
In Poland, the usefulness of this approach for reforming public administration was advocated by Jerzy Hausner, deputy prime minister and minister of Economic Affairs and Labour (Oct. 2001 – March 2005). In his opinion, this approach is particularly attractive for Poland due to its institutional solution, where ministers, instead of fulfilling political roles are engaged in administrative actions. Ministers concentrate on their branches of the economy and there is a lack of coordination on common policy to be conducted by government. In contrast to the traditional model of the separation of politics and public administration he sees public management as the approach to enable some public functions to be performed by the private sector (Hausner 2002).
A completely different approach is presented by Kulesza and Izdebski (1999 p. 219), lawyers who were actively engaged in the nineties in the administrative reform. In their opinion, the introduction of public management in public administration, with recruitment similar to that in the private sector for shorter time spans can lead to the politicization of public administration. Similar conclusions are drawn by Randama and Viles (Kudrycka, Służba cywilna, 2002, no 4) on the basis of their comparative research in Central and Eastern Europe. The authors emphasise the danger of incompetent management of public funds, corruption and nepotism.
In the opinion of Kulesza and Izdebski, the position system, which assumes the employment in managerial positions of people who were not working in administration before promotion, created a danger of politicaiztion, posing a serious threat to post-communist Poland, in which the civil service tradition and its ethics were lost during socialism. In addition, Antoni Kaminski (The Polish Yearbook Of Civil Service 2004, p. 16)argues that although employment in public administration of contract personnel, who are directly responsible to the minister, can lead to an increase in administrative performance, nevertheless it can also increase its politicaiztion.
According to Jacek Czaputowicz, the deputy chief of the Civil Service (The Polish Yearbook Of Civil Service 2005), in Poland a mixed model exists. However, the career model predominates – there is competition for senior positions in administration and currently only people who are administrative officials can apply for those jobs.[8] Finally, it should be stressed that in the post-communist state, stability of administrative cadres, based on the classical model, is especially crucial in the nascent stage of its formation.
2. Between politics and administration: an analysis of Poland after 1989
As already mentioned, the particular vulnerability of administration to political patronage is related to its organisational structure. In countries, which have long and uninterrupted democratic traditions models of separation of both spheres were formulated, mechanism of checks and balances were developed. In the case of Poland, and this could probably also be generalised to the majority of other post-communist countries, politico-administrative relations are still in flux, and despite the formal separation of the political and administrative spheres, this division does not protect against political intervention and patronage.
It could be argued that the problem of political clientelism in Poland is strengthened by the expansion of the political sphere and the underdevelopment of public administration. Eva Etzioni-Halevy (The Polish Yearbook Of Civil Service 2004,) argues that the intensity of corruption is largely contingent on the ruling elite’s political culture and the development sequence of the system structure. The most negative is one in which the political sphere is deeply rooted. When an autonomous public administration has not been formed, political corruption is favoured by the absence of a clear delineation between administrative and political elites, which leads toconstant direct interference by political interests and party considerations in administrative activity. Thus, one can expect that a gradual strengthening of public administration has been taking place (independent of the fact of temporary and even quite intensive attempts at politicaiztion). This will lead to a more stable division of politics and administration which would guarantee just, fair and politically neutral state functioning.
The current politico-administrative state is the result of the legacy of the communist past and rather moderate efforts to reform in relation to the civil service (and public administration as a whole) as well as unexpected side-effects of changes which took place both in politics and administration after 1989. In this article we will mostly concentrate on the transition period. Nevertheless, the impact of communism even if only briefly has to be mentioned. During the communist period, the weakness of the Polish state and its alienation from the citizens were particularly strongly expressed as were its incompetence and the passivity of its administration (which was totally subordinated to the communist party). Moreover, communism also resulted in the proposals for these reforms not finding support or appreciation in society, which were also important for them to be successful.[9] The situation is also assisted by the low level of social trust to the state, the fact that citizens are not interested in monitoring how the state functions which prolongs its inefficient functioning and its politicaiztion as well as creating favourable conditions for such phenomena as clientelism, cronyism and corruption.
2.1. Transformation of the political sphere
In describing politics, particular attention should be paid to the fragmentation and fluidity of the political scene. It seems that the pathology of the political sphere affects the proper development of politico-administrative relations more than the underdevelopment of the professional civil service. At the same time, lack of government stability and political fragmentation are unfavourable for conducting long-term policy and debate on the public interest. Instead, the agenda is limited to the four-year term of parliament. The fluidity of political aims and electoral slogans predominate. Politicians concentrate on preserving their individual and partisan interests by increasing their influence over the economy and the administration (Wesołowski 2004).
Current politico-administrative relations are a result not only of conducted reforms but even more of radical and unexpected changes which took place, particularly at the beginning of the nineties. The consequence of one such unintentional event, which, however, later took the form of a rather permanent tendency, is the strong position of political actors, who officially do not perform any prominent public function and in consequence do not take responsibility for it.[10] Particularly dysfunctional for efficient political performance has been the fact that leaders of parties that has been members of successive government coalitions have stayed outside it (as have parliamentary leaders of political parties forming coalitions).[11] In consequence they distance themselves from the politics of their own government and criticize it, behaving as they do during a political campaign.