Psychological Knowledge for Teaching Critical Thinking: the agency of epistemic activity, metacognitive regulative behaviour and (student-centred) learning

Abstract

This study considers the case of a tutor whose students repeatedlyevidenced significantly superior critical thinking in summative assessment. For the purpose of surfacing appropriate pedagogical action to promote critical thinking (Bassey, 1999),{Bassey, 1999 #16;Bassey, 1999 #16}the singularity of one tutor's reported pedagogical practice was explored through focus-group discussion. Qualitative analysis of the data, theoretically informed by phenomenography, suggested that the tutor'sreported practice, when compared with that of two peers, revealedclear pedagogical intentions to be necessary for teaching critical thinking; and that these intentionscan be explained through the literatures on epistemic activity, metacognitive regulative behaviour and student-centred learning. It is argued that a synthesisedunderstanding of the literature that explores the nature and purpose of critical thinking - as outlined in the first part of this paper -is a prerequisite for constructing domain-specific pedagogical intentions for developing learners' critical thinking,and that it is this extensive psychologically informed knowledge base which attenuates the risk of educationally important aspects of learning being overlooked. (De Corte, 2000).

Keywords

Metacognition; Critical Thinking; Higher Education Pedagogy; Student-Centred Learning, Variation Theory

Critical thinking – what it is and why it matters

Critical thinking is a broad and diffuse construct which is understood variously (Abrami et al., 2008). The Delphi Committee (Facione, 1990) characterised critical thinking ascognitive skills (each with corresponding subskills) and affective dispositions (to ensure the use of these skills outwith instructional settings); a characterisation which continues to resonate in much of the critical thinking literature. The realisation that knowledge can be the object of discussion, has varied uses and may be judged valuable or worthless according to agreed rules of enquiry is fundamental to the development of critical thinking. Such critiquing of knowledge invokes the use and development of psychological tools such as reading,writing and social interactions;which allow us to make meaning, form concepts, construct representations and be aware of self; and through their power we can distance ourselves from an immediate situation to consider alternative responses or ways of proceeding, so that we need not be 'slaves' responding directly to environmental demands (Säljö, 1995).

There is little dissent from the view that the capacity for critical thinking is a valuable outcome of education (Kuhn, 2009; Kuhn & Udell, 2007; Magno, 2010). Being able to think critically allows persons to avoid pseudoscientific thinking (Halpern, 1998) and to further their own conceptual understanding (Bereiter, 2002; Kuhn & Udell, 2007). In our pluralistic knowledge age of increasing amounts of freely available information of unknown provenance, and ill-defined problems which defy algorithmic solution, the intellectual capital of critical thinking is a necessary resource (Angeli & Valanides, 2009; Zohar & Peled, 2008). Indeed, critical thinking is considered to be a crucial aspect of the competence which citizens need to participate in daily life and society(Johanson, 2010; Ten Dam & Volman, 2004). In a recent global ideas marketplace run by theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2010), the top priority for action to take in education was to teach people to think; and that teaching to this end was preferable to teaching to standardised tests.Nevertheless,students in higher education find critical thinking very demanding(Flores, Matkin, Burbach, Quinn, & Harding, 2011; Kuhn & Udell, 2007). Not only is demonstrating critical thinking the most challenging dimension of argumentation (a social practice with the potential to make thinking explicit) but such guidance as students are given to exercise critical thinking is often unspecified and, when explicitly mentioned as a requirement, is generally stated in vague terms(Andrews, 2007; Davies, 2008).

Metacognition: its important strategic and epistemic components

The perceived importance of critical thinking hasresulted inmany pedagogical interventions, the effects of which are viewed as mostly positive. Howeverwhilethe relative superior effects of general and infusion approaches are contested(Abrami, et al., 2008; Angeli & Valanides, 2009), others argue(Kuhn, 2009; Kuhn & Udell, 2007; Magno, 2010; Ten Dam & Volman, 2004; Zohar & Peled, 2008)thatskilldevelopment of itself is insufficient, pointing to the importance of metacognitionincritical thinking.

Monitoring one's thinking processes, checking on progress towards appropriate goals, ensuring accuracy, and balancinglikely costs and benefits of expending time and mental effort are generally agreed to be essential elements of metacognition.A range of studies demonstrate that the more persons are aware of their thinking processes as they learn and the more that this is made an explicit feature of instruction, the more able learners are to control goals, behavioural tendencies, and attention(Huff & Nietfeld, 2009; Zimmerman, 2008; Zohar & Peled, 2008). Indeed, the importance of monitoring and managing one's thinking was recognised in the original Delphi Report(Facione, 1990) under the label of self-regulation, defined as:

the self-conscious monitoring of one's cognitive activities, the elements used in those activities, and the results educed, particularly by applying skills in analysis and evaluation to one's own inferential judgments with a view toward questioning, confirming, validating, or correcting either one's reasoning or one's results (p.10)

As far back as 1998, Halpern was arguing that not only was metacognition's purpose to direct and improve thinking skills but that metacognitive monitoring required to be explicit and public to allow feedback on its effectiveness. This manuscriptoffers no conceptual distinctionfor the constructs of metacognition and self-regulation. While the psychological literature isconcerned lest careless juxtaposition of the terms (together with that of self-regulated learning) detracts from the study of self-directed activity and its role in academic development (Alexander, 2008; Azevedo, 2009), the authors here accept that there is little precise or agreed-on meaning for many of the constructs used in the educational research literature (Ball & Forzani, 2007). Consequently they also accept that while the phenomena represented by each of metacognition, self-regulation and self-regulated learning are not the same (Efklides, 2008);the commonalities of a conceptual core of learner self-awareness and intention to act offer a rationale for allowing the terms to be used interchangeably in an educational context(Dinsmore, Alexander, & Loughlin, 2008). The broad brush strokes with which metacognition is characterised in this manuscriptare grounded in the necessity of pedagogical knowledge being expansive(Merrill, 2009).

The significance of metacognition is in the learner's intention to direct mental effort to developing cognitive resources over and above those implicit in the completion of a task: what Bereiter & Scardamalia (1989)and Sinatra(Sinatra & Pintrich, 2003) call intentional learning. Intentional learning is purposeful, internally initiated cognitive activity in the service of knowledge construction and skill development, but it is not an automatic consequence of formal educational experiences; since learners may address tasks in ways that economise on mental effort and thereby avoid the additional effort through which they might become more expert. The distinction between metacognition and cognition is neither clear nor absolute but as a rule-of-thumb, cognitive activities help one to acquire, retain and transfer knowledge for task execution, whereas metacognitive activities allow one to regulate and govern task execution to ensure satisfactory levels of performance (Ku & Ho, 2010). It is the intentional (non-algorithmic) development of these metacognitive resources which constitute the furtherance of the learner's conceptual understanding, albeit that the construction of such understanding is mediated through what learners themselves understand by the idea of 'learning' and what they understand as their role in the learning process(Clark & Schroth, 2010). Being metacognitive allows one to challenge/ be critical of what is presented as 'self-evident'. Such feelings of control free individuals to consider different and more nuanced ways of judging information from the environment (Efklides, 2008). Nevertheless, metacognition is contextualised in cognition such that the strategies of planning, monitoring and evaluating both inform and are informed by, declarative, procedural and conditional knowledge. When individuals are aware of the specifics of their meta-level activity (as in being well informed about content when evaluating an argument, anticipating alternative implications of any one position when constructing an argument, or trialling methods in different conditions to see which is more fit-for-purpose) they are then in a better position to discriminate among inferences, recognise unstated assumptions, reason deductively, weigh evidence and distinguish between strong/relevant and weak/irrelevant arguments (Ku & Ho, 2010; Magno, 2010).

As well as the regulative component of metacognition through which persons manage and debug their knowledge and behaviour, there is an epistemic component(Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002); though whether the adjective is 'epistemic' or 'epistemological' continues to be a moot point(Mason & Bromme, 2010). Epistemic cognition refers to wider understandings of what knowledge is, and is at least implicitin understanding alternative solutions to problems and inchoosing one solution strategy as opposed to others (Maggioni & Parkinson, 2008; Mason, Boldrin, & Ariasi, 2010). Epistemic thinking demands reasoning as to whether a particular problem is indeed solvable (and if so, to what extent) and what a better or worse solution strategy might be (Kitchener, 1983) and thereby obviates problem solution on the basis of chance. In considering the extent of a problem's solvability and the veracity of alternative solutions, individuals draw from theirassumptions (known more formally as epistemic beliefs) of the nature and construction of knowledge.These beliefs can be understood asdevelopmental along a trajectory of knowledgebeingunderstood as absolute, as being mere opinion with everyone's equally valid, and as judgements to be evaluated on the basis of argument and evidence. They can also be understood as multidimensionalin which knowledge is viewed as some composite derived from views about the certainty, simplicity and source of knowledge together with views about the kinds of justification needed for accepting any claim (Muis & Franco, 2009). Quite how these epistemic beliefs operate is not fully clear but they would appear to influence learning both directly and indirectly (Stathopoulou & Vosniadou, 2007); invoke deeper processing(Pieschl, Stahl, & Bromme, 2008); be context-sensitive(Mason, et al., 2010); be necessary for constructing knowledge (Strømsø & Bråten, 2010) – possibly because of the their mediating effects on implicit theories of ability(Chen & Pajares, 2010) – and for the development of argumentation(Mason & Scirica, 2006).

Epistemic beliefs influence both learner and teacher. Learners’beliefsbegin as informal knowledge which may influence reasoning, knowledge or study behaviour but are susceptible to the influence of formal education(King & Kitchener, 1994; Maggioni, Riconscente, & Alexander, 2006; Peters & Kitsantas, 2010; Valanides & Angeli, 2005)through which learners can, iteratively, handle conflicting information, recognise authoritative sourcesand become more sophisticated in their reasoning(Mason & Bromme, 2010). Maturing epistemic beliefs thus exert a significant direct effect on academic achievement. But so, too, do teachers whose different beliefs about knowledge and knowing result in different understanding of specific pedagogical practices, such as which cognitive strategies better foster understanding of domain knowledge, which methods foster construction of knowledge, and which questions to ask (or not to ask)about the trustworthiness of available information(Maggioni & Parkinson, 2008). These differences are manifest in different kinds of classroom discourse that is likely to influence metacognitive processes. Furthermore, teachers'beliefs develop into conceptually coherent frameworks of claims about, and practices in, the teaching of their subject which are resistant to change(Van Driel, Bulte, & Verloop, 2007). Disciplinary differences in conceptions of teaching and learning, pedagogical differences in teaching approaches and outcomes, and the gap between learners and teachers in their respective conceptions of teaching and learning can have implications for the types of provision made for students which, in turn, may influence the extent of learners' conceptual change (Virtanen & Lindblom-Ylänne, 2010).

The Study Context

The central importance of supporting students to become critical thinkers provides the context for thisstudy. One particular module within the field of Educational Studies, Children as Learners, was designed to respond to the commonly reported phenomenon that many students, but particularly novice students (in this case first year undergraduates in a Scottish University), have difficulty in elaborating a problematised view of education. Structurally the module positioned the student as pivotal in integrating the material from weekly lectures; weekly student-led study groups; monthly tutor-led seminars;and prescribed reading in preparation for lecture, study group and seminar attendance; to prepare for an end-of-module examination. Access to theend-of-module examination was through satisfactory performance on the Core Tasks (see below). Such integration is necessary if learners are to use their new knowledge/skill in everyday life; and is enabled through personalised exemplification and public demonstration of the knowledge/skill together with peer critique (Merrill, 2009). Pedagogically, the module provided iterative opportunities for learners to:

  1. Represent their thinking externally through expressing their own ideas and justifying their views with reasoning informed by their reading
  2. Interrogate journal articles to inform their understanding of:
  3. what it means to adopt a critical stance
  4. the conventions of academic writing
  1. Integrate and record their thinking through construction and co-construction of responses to open-ended tasks
  2. Reflect on the nature of learning and the provisionality of knowledge
  3. Work collaboratively to engender learners' collective cognitive responsibility in the completion of Core Tasks (submitted for formative assessment, electronically).

The emphasis on student collaboration was underpinned by the evidence for learning achieved through interactive engagement (Kirschner, Paas, & Kirschner, 2009) which requires learners actively to complete a single, unified task that represents the shared meaning, conclusions and effort of the group as a unit (Rochelle & Teasley, 1995). What constitutes learning in collaborative work is notonly the materials and the curricula but alsothe challenges and opportunities of group interaction, particularly at solution-critical moments, which are mediated through the metacognitions of the participants who question, explain and reconcile relevant knowledge proffered by individual group members(Hurme, Palonen, & Järvela, 2006; Kirschner, et al., 2009). Successful group task completion can allow group members(Janssen, Kirschner, Erkens, Kirschner, & Paas, 2010)eachto increase flexibility and transferability in their own knowledge and skills provided the task requires problem solution(Kirschner, et al., 2009). Goodyear (2007)suggests that tasks should foster epistemic fluency: practising collectively the description, critique, argumentation and explanation of ideas(Ohlsson, 1995). As well as epistemic activity (sharing efforts to understand, identifying inconsistencies in collective knowledge, and using authoritative sources) there must also be regulative activity (such as setting goals, monitoring collaborative effort, and negotiating future courses of action). These process-related activities steer and organise the construction of corporate knowledge, through reflecting intentions to engage actively in the learning task, ensuring the co-ordination of different contributions, and furthering the beneficial effects of social interaction (Damşa, Kirschner, Andriessen, Erkens, & Sins, 2010; Hurme, et al., 2006). They also seem not unlike the negotiated elements of the Joint Problem Space, which Rochelle & Teasley (1995)argue has to be constructed and maintained if collaboration is to occur.

The impetus for the study was the observation that over three successive years, the end-of-module assessment performances amongst studentsbeing tutored by one particular person (herewith known as the Target Tutor) were significantly higher (χr2 = 77.5, df= 2, p. < .001) than the performances of students being tutored by two other tutors (herewith known as Comparison Tutors).The end-of-module assessment was student identification and selection of anew article (not one that had been suggested, prescribed or recommended) for critical analysis in terms of its theoretical underpinnings of learning, development or motivation; the authors' assumptions about children; the veracity of the evidence offered; and some situation of the article in the wider, related literature. Blind marking of assignments underwent moderation and cross-marking. Given that the cohort of students all had very similar academic entrance qualifications, that students were randomly assigned to tutorial groups and that the tutors had all been party to the design of the module, it was deduced that the variable of interest was the Target Tutor's pedagogy. A case-study was a logical approach with Variation Theory (Åkerlind, 2005; Marton, 2007) influencing the design decisions.

Conventional wisdom has it that findings from case studies are limited because generalisation cannot be established. Such 'wisdom' seems to be premised on the view that generalisation is the only criterion of scientific adequacy; and that it has only one "crude commonsense singular meaning" (Larsson, 2009) (p26). However, while generalisation based on representative random sampling can reveal rule-based typical behaviour, it cannot illuminate the apparently effortless performance which is a mark of expertise (Alexander, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2007). It was precisely the variation in the Target Tutor's account that this study sought to reveal since her account, paralleled with those of the Comparison Tutors, could illuminate critical features of difference (Marton, 2007) with the intention of suggesting, if not making plain, what might be contributing to the Target Tutor's students’ superior performance. Variation is a fundamental idea in what is now referred to as Variation Theory (Marton, 2007) which posits that a qualitative shiftin one’s understanding (as distinct from factual and/or procedural additions and/or elaborations)occurs when a phenomenon that was once taken-for-granted is seen in a new light. This discernment, ofsimultaneously experiencing the phenomenon as it was, and as it is now,signalsthat learning has taken place (Bowden & Marton, 1998). Further, learning within a formal environment is significantly enabled when the teacher situates learners to discern, and focus on, the critical aspects of variation(Booth & Hultén, 2003; Marton & Pang, 2006).Variation Theory has evolved within phenomenographic research; initially concernedwith the ways in which particular phenomenaareexperienced variously by different actors, but now further concerned with how to characterisethe different descriptions (Harris, 2011).The relevance of Variation Theory to this study is that what was being sought was not an account of the most representative tutoring experiences but of what were uncommon experiences; in order to extrapolate to other relevant pedagogical situations in which the improvement of tutoring was an aim (Flyvbjerg, 2007; Larsson, 2009; Postareff & Lindblom-Ylänne, 2008). The very singularity of the case was examined for the typicality which might be instrumental (Stake, 2003) in the practice of the Target Tutor. Specifically, the question being addressed was, 'What psychological knowledge does the tutor implicitly bring to bear when teaching critical thinking?' The question sought to elicit the variations amongst tutors in the expectations they had of, and their experiences of engagement with, students in whom they were trying to develop critical thinking. Expectations and Engagements as characterised in this study were considered to be fundamental elements of the teaching endeavour. The teacher assumes, or guides learners towards particular states of preparedness to establish common ground – Expectations - and then constitutes with learners the meaningfulness of the intended learning outcome(s) – Engagements - (Marton, 2007). As well as the data gathering described below, the academic profiles of each participant tutor, as portrayed on personal web pages, were scrutinised for educational and professional qualifications and experience.