AVHS
Mitch ELE Affirmative J/F 09
I affirm. Submit means “to yield to the control of another.” The act of submission is an unlikely political move as states normally show a lack of respect for international obligations: most treaty signatories establish sovereign reservations over treaties. This is not an act of submission, as control is not forfeited to an international institution: it is retained by the state as the national government is able decide whether or not to execute treaty obligations. True submission means accepting treaty conditions as binding.
The value is justice because it is the basis of what we owe others. The criterion is promoting the equal protection of human rights.
1. All individuals should have equal access to basic human rights. No person should be deprived of rights on the based on factors that are out of their control, such as the nation in which they reside. Currently there is a vast disparity in rights protection between nations.
Andreas Follesdal [Thomas Winfried Menko Pogge, Real World Justice 2005 p. 90]
This articles aims not at adding yet another individual human right, but formulates the necessary legal precondition for the realization of basic rights, namely [is] a global legal order. Human rights are not only important claims of individuals on other individuals and on their states, but also on the institutional order in which individuals and states are to function. Furthermore, this seems to be fully in accordance with Rawls’s moral intuition, namely that a person’s prospects and possibilities in life should depend on choices that she makes for herself and on the responsibilities she accepts, but not – at least not to a large extent – on the natural and social structures into which she is born. Individuals should start with equal rights, and their societies should not give an undeserved advantage to some and an equally undeserved disadvantage to others. In our present world, the prospects of individuals are undeniably not only determined by their “social” place of birth within the national society, but also by the placing of their national society within the global order.
2. There are no morally relevant distinctions between persons because everyone is equally human thus; all lives have equal moral importance. As a result all humans deserve the protection of their basic rights.
3. All humans are members of the same moral community. Everyone is equally deserving of human rights.
Martha Nussbaum [Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,The Boston Review 1994 http://www.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan/nussbaum1.html]
The Stoics who followed his lead developed his image of the kosmou politês or world citizen more fully, arguing that each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities -- the local community of our birth, and the community of human argument and aspiration that "is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun" (Seneca, De Otio). It is this community that is, most fundamentally, the source of our moral obligations. With respect to the most basic moral values such as justice, "we should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors" (Plutarch, On the Fortunes of Alexander). We should regard our deliberations as, first and foremost, deliberations about human problems of people in particular concrete situations, not problems growing out of a national identity that is altogether unlike that of others. Diogenes knew that the invitation to think as a world citizen was, in a sense, an invitation to be an exile from the comfort of patriotism and its easy sentiments, to see our own ways of life from the point of view of justice and the good. The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident; any human being might have been born in any nation. Recognizing this, his Stoic successors held, we should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic membership or even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings. We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect. This clearly did not mean that the Stoics were proposing the abolition of local and national forms of political organization and the creation of a world state. The point was more radical still: that we should give our first allegiance to no mere form of government, no temporal power, but to the moral community made up by the humanity of all human beings. The idea of the world citizen is in this way the ancestor and source of Kant's idea of the "kingdom of ends," and has a similar function in inspiring and regulating moral and political conduct. One should always behave so as to treat with equal respect the dignity of reason and moral choice in every human being.
4. We should adopt the goal of equal access to rights because concern for the welfare of others allows us to make more rational policy choices.
Martha Nussbaum [Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,The Boston Review 1994 http://www.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan/nussbaum1.html]
Through cosmopolitan education, we learn more about ourselves. One of the greatest barriers to rational deliberation in politics is the unexamined feeling that one's own current preferences and ways are neutral and natural. An education that takes national boundaries as morally salient too often reinforces this kind of irrationality, by lending to what is an accident of history a false air of moral weight and glory. By looking at ourselves in the lens of the other, we come to see what in our practices is local and non-necessary, what more broadly or deeply shared. Our nation is appallingly ignorant of most of the rest of the world. I think that this means that it is also, in many crucial ways, ignorant of itself.
The affirmative thesis is that an international court is necessary to promote the recognition of human rights as something belonging inherently to individuals and not something to be granted by a state. The U.S. must join the ICC in order to do its part to promote equality. If we do not join we deny our own citizens access to the protections the court offers.
First, the ICC checks state abuses of citizens by regulating their conduct.
Atul Bharadawaj [International Criminal Court and the Question of Sovereignty, Strategic Analysis, January-March 2003 Vol. XXVII No. 1]
The charisma of state’s authority is under strain. The staggering rise in intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War world and the growing tentacles of transnational terrorism have raised questions about state legitimacy. States are no longer considered to be the most effective means of enforcing international norms and order among individuals. The detailed scrutiny of the human rights records of certain countries by the international community is leading towards a new international order, where the absolutes of state sovereignty are being challenged. In the new international setting stability and order take precedence over equality among states. The sovereign immunity enjoyed by states is being restricted and limited by the emergence of international constitutional structures, which exist beyond the boundaries of states. The ongoing trends in the discourse on sovereignty suggest that a perceptible shift is occurring away from the theories of national sovereignty, which had dominated the post-Second World War world, towards constitutional notions of sovereignty that intend to limit sovereignty. At the end of the Second World War, Charles E. Merriam had argued, “sovereignty must make friends with constitutional values, scientific values, idealistic values, which are the heart of our new civilization.” 47 The right to hold individuals responsible and accountable and the thrust towards international humanitarianism are a part of the same cosmopolitan ideology. The advanced technology available with the international community enables it to look into the happenings within state territories. The spatial reach of the international community is leading towards the construction of an international moral solidarity against infringement of individual rights. 48 The fresh wave of cosmopolitanism is something akin to the medieval cosmopolitanism, which came via the church. However, one fundamental difference between the medieval and current cosmopolitanism is that while the former was based on the authority derived from God, the latter relies on scientific means of monitoring human activity for its legitimacy. The growing interconnectivity and interdependence in the world is leading towards redefining sovereignty in terms of its obligation to international rules. According to the former UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, “Sovereignty and international responsibility are different sides of the same coin...The nexus between sovereignty and humanitarianism introduces us to the notions of international rule of law... Sovereignty and international responsibility leads back to the international rule of law.” 49 International responsibilities of states are normally associated with their external sovereignty. The right to be an equal member in the comity of nations is an important aspect of external sovereignty. Alan James finds splitting of sovereignty into external and internal components to be too dangerous for the unitary character of sovereignty. Sovereignty, according to James is ’constitutional independence’, which can neither be shared nor be divided. 50 However, George Sorensen, while acknowledging the impregnability inherent in ’constitutional independence’, pierces the concept of sovereignty by dividing it into ‘constitutive rules’ and ‘regulative rules’. 51 The core of ’constitutive rules’ is composed of constitutional independence, which remains stable. But according to Sorensen, the ‘regulative rules’ remain in a state of flux. The difference between James’ and Sorensen’s ‘constitutional independence’ can be located in the age-old question: what came first, the egg or the chicken? While James holds the opinion that international law is the child of sovereignty, Sorensen believes that sovereignty is a passport for entry into an already constituted international community. The unitary character of James’ ‘constitutional independence’ leaves no room for any external interference in the running of the state. However, Sorensen merely sees constitutional independence as a piece of paper to lure the states into an international society, where their sovereignty can be regulated through a different set of norms. Applying the George Sorensen logic to the recently constituted ICC, one can safely argue that it does lead to a divided or truncated sovereignty for states. While the ICC acknowledges the constitutional validity of the states, it also undermines it by asking states to share their absolute authority, which they enjoy over their subjects, thus circumscribing their supremacy or ‘constitutional independence’. It is claimed that the Court is not a supra-national body but a membership of international society. It only identifies certain core constitutional values, which are shared by all national societies. Therefore, there is no master-slave relationship between sovereign states and international institutions. However, one sees that states will always be subordinate to the ICC because, the latter possesses the treaty powers to force states to comply with its requirements. Transactions between states and ICC are one-sided. It is only states that are required to give something (person or documents). ICC is not obliged to give anything in return to states. The ICC promises not to states but to its subjects, the protection of their rights.
The ICC not only directly intervenes on the side of individuals against abuses by states but also isolates leaders who choose to deny rights to their citizens. As the source of rights shifts from the state to the individuals, states who deny rights will become increasingly isolated, which will force a shift in their policies.
Payam Akhavan [“BEYOND IMPUNITY: CAN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE PREVENT FUTURE ATROCITIES?” THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 95:7, 2001]
Even an isolated Somali or Afghan warlord cannot entirely disregard the relation between international acceptance and long-term survival. The stigmatization associated with indictment, as much as apprehension and prosecution, may significantly threaten the attainment of sustained political power…In concert with other policy measures, resort to international criminal tribunals can play a significant role in discrediting and containing destabilizing political forces. Stigmatizing delinquent leaders through indictment, as well as apprehension and prosecution, undermines their influence. Even if wartime leaders still enjoy popular support among an indoctrinated public at home, exclusion from the international sphere can significantly impede their long-term exercise of power. Failure to deliver on promises of economic growth and prosperity, together with the humiliation of pariah status in an interdependent world community, eventually exacts a cost on such leaders' influence and authority. Moreover, political climates and fortunes change, and the seemingly invincible leaders of today often become the fugitives of tomorrow. Whether their downfall comes through political overthrow or military defeat, the vigilance of international criminal justice will ensure that their crimes do not fall into oblivion, undermining the prospect of an easy escape or future political rehabilitation. A post conflict culture of justice also makes moral credibility a valuable political asset for victim groups, rendering vengeance less tempting and more costly. Of course, the preventive effects of international criminal justice can extend beyond post conflict peace building in directly affected countries. The prosecution and related political demise of such leaders sends a message that the cost of ethnic hatred and violence as an instrument of power outweighs its benefits. Precedents of accountability, however selective and limited, contribute to the transformation of a culture of impunity that has hitherto implied the political acceptability of massive human rights abuses. Together with the ICTY and ICTR precedents, the ICC blueprint for a future international criminal justice system, has raised accountability to unprecedented prominence in the politics of international legitimacy. Criminal accusations increasingly constitute a serious political impediment to the ambitions of existing or aspiring leaders. In the calls for the establishment of further ad hoc international criminal tribunals, mixed tribunals, and prosecutions before national or foreign courts, in places as diverse as East Timor and Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Chile, one finds an unmistakable contagion of accountability. This spread of accountability reflects the early glimmerings of an international criminal justice system and the gradual emergence of inhibitions against massive crimes hitherto tolerated or condoned by the international community.