The Effects of International Institutions:
An Annotated Bibliography
Prepared by Liliana Botcheva, David Andrew Singer, and Lisa L. Martin
Harvard University
Revised September 1999
Please send comments and suggestions to:
Lisa Martin
WCFIA
1737 Cambridge Street
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617-495-1294
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Contents:
Political Economy...... 3
Environmental Regimes...... 8
Security Institutions ...... 17
Human Rights...... 28
Other Relevant Literature...... 30
Political Economy
Bates, Robert H. 1997. Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World
Coffee Trade. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
The book explores the creation, impact and demise of the International Coffee
Organization (ICO). The ICO affected the world price of coffee by limiting coffee
exports, restricting arbitrage between member and non-member markets, and restricting
the competition among producers. It enabled cooperation by providing mechanisms for
monitoring and enforcement of compliance with quotas. It ensured against political
predation of big producers by small producers, and against exploitation of consumers.
Quotas allocated by the ICO had an impact on the welfare of exporters, and influenced
the development of domestic institutions that manage coffee exports.
Bird, Graham. 1996. "The IMF and Developing Countries: A Review of the
Evidence and Policy Options," International Organization, v. 50: 3, 477-513.
Review of studies on the role of the IMF in developing countries - its impact as a balanceof
payments-financing institution, and its influence over the design of economic policies.
There are also citations of the two main studies reviewed.
Burley, Anne-Marie and Walter Mattli. 1993. "Europe Before the Court: A
Political Theory of Legal Integration," International Organization. v. 47: 1, pp. 41-
76.
Offers a neofunctionalist account of legal integration, defined as penetration of EU
legislation into domestic law of member states.
Cohen, Benjamin. 1983. "Balance of Payments Financing: Evolution of a Regime."
Krasner, Stephen, ed. International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Examines the creation and evolution of international regimes dealing with balance-ofpayments
financing. In two short sections, the article discusses the functions of these
regimes, and how they affect the behavior of borrowers.
Eichengreen, Barry. 1993. “European Monetary Unification.” Journal of Economic
Literature, 31.
Policy convergence and price stability are important conditions for the realization of the
European Monetary Union. The crisis in the EMS that erupted in September 1992
resulted in the disturbance of exchange rate stability achieved in the 1989-1992 period,
and in the reimposition of capital controls. This episode indicates that the illusion
developed between 1989 and mid-1992, that exchange rate stability, capital mobility and
political autonomy were easily reconciled was just that: an illusion.
Fratianni, Michele and Jurgen von Hagen. 1991. The European Monetary System
and European Monetary Union. Boulder: Westview Press
The book evaluates empirically two interpretations of the role of the EMS. The
cooperative interpretation views the fixed exchange-rate mechanism as a substitute for
welfare-improving policy coordination. The disciplinary view contends that the high
inflation countries have used the fixed exchange-rate mechanism to delegate the conduct
of their monetary policies to the Bundesbank, thereby signaling commitment to price
stability. The Bundesbank's greater credibility allows these central banks to reduce
inflation rates and to do it at a lower output and employment cost. The evidence presented
shows that the EMS’s greatest achievement has been to reduce exchange rate and
inflation uncertainty. In contrast, its success in promoting disinflation is much less
convincing. In fact, the reduction of inflation rates in the EMS turns out to be no
different from the inflation rate reduction achieved by countries outside the EMS, but the
loss of output and growth in employment have been larger in the EMS. Furthermore, the
evidence does not confirm the alleged hegemonic role of the Bundesbank.
Garrett, Geoffrey and Barry Weingast. 1993. "Ideas, Interests, and Institutions:
Constructing the European Community's Internal Market." In Judith Goldstein
and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
By embodying, selecting and publicizing ideas or particular paths on which actors are
able to coordinate, institutions provide "constructed focal points." This helps actors
overcome the lack of unique path of cooperation which can be a barrier to realization of
collective gains. Case: the ECJ decision in "Cassis de Dijon" and the adoption of the
"mutual recognition principle.
Garrett, Geoffrey and George Tsebelis. 1996. "An Institutional Critique of
Intergovernmentalism." International Organization. v.50: 2, 269-299.
Different decision-making procedures in the context of the EU (consultation, cooperation
or codecision); as well as the preferences of the main actors determine the pace of
integration in different policy areas.
Giavazzi, Francesco and Alberto Giovannini. 1989. Limiting Exchange Rate
Flexibility: The European Monetary System. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Ch.5 evaluates the role of the EMS in the disinflation experience of European countries in
the 1980s. Most observers conclude that the exchange rate regime helped the highinflation
countries by allowing them to purchase a commitment to low inflation through
accepting German monetary policies. It is expected that the low inflation propensity of
the Bundesbank shifts the inflation expectation downward in other EMS countries. The
empirical results agree broadly with the theoretical presumption of the "disciplinary"
interpretation, but provide weak evidence of a shift in expectations associated with the
institution of the EMS. Inflationary expectations seem to have adjusted with a long lag:
4-5 years. One explanation might be that learning takes time. Another and more
appealing explanation is that some European governments might have used the EMS to
justify unpopular domestic policies. These policies, in turn, shifted expectations.
Giavazzi, Francesco and Marco Pagano. 1989. “The Advantage of Tying One's
Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility.” European Economic
Review. v. 32, No. 5.
Offers a formal statement of the argument that the EMS helps secure inflation discipline
in member countries, by enhancing the credibility of central banks' commitment to price
stability and low inflation. It also investigates the conditions under which the gains in
credibility delivered by membership in the EMS outweigh the implied losses.
Goldstein, Judith. 1996. "International Law and Domestic Institutions:
Reconciling North American ‘Unfair’ Trade Laws." International Organization. v.
50: 4, 541-64.
International rules can present solutions to domestic problems, and serve the purposes of
policy makers at home. Even a weak institution (such as the dispute settlement
procedures in NAFTA) can lead to significant change in the behavior of US bureaucracy
without change in legislation.
Gowa, Joanne. 1994. Allies, Adversaries, International Trade. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
The book examines the impact of alliances on free trade. Free trade enhances the
resources and the potential military power of any country that engages in it. Trade with an
adversary produces security diseconomy, while trade with an ally produces a positive
externality. Thus, countries are more likely to trade within than across politico-military
alliances. Furthermore, intra-alliance trade is more likely in a bipolar system, since the
risk of exit is lower, and the security externalities are more likely to remain internalized.
The statistical analysis confirms these two hypotheses, and is complemented by a case
study of the impact of the Anglo-French Entente on British trade policy.
Lipson, Charles. 1983. "The transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of
Regime Change." In Krasner, Stephen, ed. International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Specifies the salient features of the liberal trade regime and the sources of its change and
continuity. The article then considers the regime's impact on commercial policy and trade
flows.
Lipson, Charles. 1986. "Banker's Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling
Sovereign Debts." In Oye, Kenneth, ed. Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press
The article examines factors that facilitate and inhibit cooperation among creditors. It
shows the ways in which the IMF has been instrumental in helping overcome gaps in
cooperation among creditors.
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World
Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ch. 10. "The Consumers' Oil Regime, 1974-81"
This chapter explores how the international energy regime centered around the IEA
affects cooperation. Considers the 1973-74, 1979, and 1980 oil crises. The regime was
set up under US leadership after the crisis in 1973-74. The history of the 1979 oil crisis
shows that regime-oriented efforts of cooperation don't always succeed. In 1980,
however, the IEA regime helped to prevent another disaster of uncoordinated responses to
a problem of collective action. It reduced the costs of coordination by providing
information and by mobilizing workable coalitions behind politically feasible policies.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1991. "Negotiating the Single European Act: National
Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community." International
Organization. v. 45: 1, 19-56.
Explicitly argues that the EU institutions and supranational actors did not affect the
negotiation of the SEA in ways that the supranational institutionalism would predict.
Short discussion of the possible influence of the EU on bureaucratic interests, which in
turn might feed into increasing support of European integration.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1994. "Why the European Community Strengthens the State:
Domestic Politics and International Cooperation." presented at APSA, Sept. 1994.
The EU empowers the executive branch and bureaucrats by redistributing domestic
political resources (agenda setting power, ideological legitimacy, asymmetric
information) toward the executive.
Nweke, Aforka G. 1987. "The Organization of African Unity and Intra-African
Functionalism." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science. v. 489 (January), p. 133.
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) attempted to advance intra-African
cooperation by shifting the focus of African diplomacy from divisive ideological and
political issues to relatively uncontroversial economic, social, cultural, and technological
matters. However, the inherent contradictions of the ideas, behavior, and interests of
member states in conjunction with the dynamics of international politics, limited
significantly the effectiveness of this effort.
Strang, David and Patricia Mei Yin Chang. 1993. "The ILO and the Welfare State:
Institutional Effects on National Welfare Spending, 1960-80." International
Organization. v. 47: 2, pp. 235-263.
Discussion of the impact of the ILO on the expansion of the ideologies of the modern
welfare state. Explores the interaction between international and domestic institutions.
Sandholtz, Wayne. 1993. "Institutions and Collective Action: The New
Telecommunications in Western Europe." World Politics. v. 45: 2, 242.
Analysis of the conditions under which international organizations can exercise
leadership and organize collective action. The case study shows how the Commission of
the European Communities led the collective action in liberalizing telecommunications.
Weber, Axel. 1991. "Reputation and Credibility in the European Monetary
System." Economic Policy. v. 12, pp. 57-102.
Argues that the empirical analysis does not provide support for the "credibility
hypothesis", which views the EMS as an institutional arrangement that enables EMS
members to borrow the reputation of the Bundesbank by credibly pegging their exchange
rates to the DM. The evidence provided in the paper points to an alternative view. It
appears that after a short early phase, the EMS has functioned as a bipolar system with a
hard currency option offered by the Bundesbank and a soft currency option supplied by
the Banque de France. By adopting the soft currency option of a crawling peg vis-a-vis
the DM, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland have actually shared the inflation "reputation" of
France. At a later stage, however, the soft currency block has disintegrated and some
countries have shifted toward the hard currency standards. At least for the smaller EMS
members, interest rate targeting is just an operational procedure to control the exchange
rate.
Environmental Regimes
Bernauer, Thomas. 1995. "The Effect of International Environmental Institutions:
How Do We Learn More." International Organization. v. 49: 2, p. 351.
This is not an empirical article, but reviews studies on the impact and effectiveness of
international environmental institutions. Analyzes the relationship between institutional
effectiveness and specific dimensions of institutional design.
Haas, Peter. 1989. "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and
Mediterranean Pollution Control." International Organization. 43: 3, 377-405.
Although the negotiation of the Med Plan (1975) was difficult and had to overcome
resistance on the part of less developed Mediterranean countries, it was effective in
contributing to the improvement of the Mediterranean water quality. The key to this
success was that the regime empowered a group of experts (ecologists and marine
scientists, many of them associated with the UNEP secretariat), who then contributed to
the development of convergent state policies in compliance with the regime.
Haas, Peter. 1990. Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International
Environmental Cooperation. New York: Columbia University Press.
The book describes the evolving forms of cooperation for treating pollution in the
Mediterranean Sea (the Mediterranean Action Plan). The Med Plan, developed under the
auspices of UNEP, is widely regarded as a success: without it the Mediterranean would
be much more polluted than it is now. It served as a model for arrangements for nine
other regional seas. The regime influenced government policy mainly through
empowering a network of "epistemic communities" which contributed to the
reformulation of state interests and policies.
Haas, Peter, Marc A. Levy, and Robert O. Keohane. 1994. Institutions for the Earth:
Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection. Cambridge: MIT Press.
The book explores the impact of international environmental institutions on three
conditions that are deemed essential for effective action on environmental problems:
governmental concern; hospitable contractual environment; and political and
administrative capacity. Each chapter is a case study of an environmental regime, and
institutional effectiveness is judged by the extent to which institutions perform functions
that boost the three Cs. Summaries of the empirical chapters follow:
Ch. 2. Parson, E. "Protecting the Ozone Layer."
The chapter concludes that international ozone institutions have had increasing effects on
national actions over time. The treaty control measures adopted in 1987 and 1990
brought about national controls in countries where weaker controls or none would have
occurred otherwise. In the negotiations for the 1990 amendments, the institutional
combination of assessment panels, periodic treaty review by meetings of the parties, and a
strong secretariat were necessary conditions for achieving a prompt agreement. The
multilateral fund made CFC phaseouts possible in countries where they were not
previously so. The risk remains open, however, that even the seemingly rapid
international progress will be insufficient to revert serious ozone loss.
Ch. 3. Levy, Marc A. "European Acid Rain: the Power of Tote-Board Diplomacy."
The effect of the European acid regime on the policies of member countries varied across
cases. The poorest West European countries and the East European Countries failed to
reduce emissions. The hard-core environmentalists (Norway, Sweden, Germany) reduced
significantly, but well in advance of international rules; they would have undertake
reductions in the absence of the regime. In a group of countries (Austria, Finland,
Netherlands; Switzerland; Denmark, the UK, and the USSR) the regime affected
domestic policies by creating knowledge of domestic damage and by facilitating issue
linkage b/w acid rain and other foreign policy issues. Domestic proponents of action used
the rules of the regime to magnify pressure on recalcitrant governments.
Ch. 4. Haas, Peter. 1994. "Protecting the Baltic and North Seas.”
The regime created to control marine pollution in the North and the Baltic Seas helped to
amplify environmental concern in lateral countries. High-profile Ministerial Conferences
made it difficult for environmental ministries from laggard countries to oppose measures
proposed by leader countries. Institutional change became self reinforcing as national
bodies became better equipped to protect the environment and as public expectations of
their accountability mounted.
Ch. 5. Mitchell, R. "International Oil Pollution of the Oceans."
Efforts to achieve international regulation of oil pollution from ships had no impact on
improving the marine environment until the 1973 and 1978 agreements came into force.
The institution's success after the 1970s derived from its ability to take advantage of
exogenous increases in concern to enhance the contractual environment and remove
constraints on capacity that had previously impeded effective enforcement of the
agreements. In this issue, the institution's success resulted from rather than created
concern over oil pollution. Stringent measures were agreed only after strong public
concern in a powerful country like the US met with willing support from states concerned
over the problem or little affected by the proposed solutions.
Ch. 6. M.J. Peterson. "International Fisheries Management."
The article examines the performance of the institutional arrangements for international
fisheries management. Overall, the record of the pre-1977 international fisheries
Commissions was dismal. The bargaining dynamics of open access common pool
resources were too strong for these institutions; they were unable to provide mechanisms
for reconciling the strong divergence of interests. Yet, the pre-1977 record would have
been even worse if the international fisheries commissions had not existed. The
commissions contributed to spreading awareness of the issue and of new perspective on
dealing with them, keeping pressure on laggard countries. Fisheries regulators have been
somewhat more successful at avoiding overfishing and stock depletion since 1977. Most
of the credit for this change must go to the change in the broader law of the sea that
transformed most fishing from open-access common pool to enclosed resource. The
extent to which fisheries management improved has depended heavily on the preferences