8
Blushing as a discourse: Was Darwin wrong?
CRISTIANO CASTELFRANCHI andISABELLA POGGI
The aim of this chapter is to consider the social and biological functions of shame and the communicative value of its most typical expression, blushing, while arguing against Darwin's theory of blushing, which would deny it any specific function.
Embarrassment, shame, and guilt
Before elaborating on our topic we wish to define our sense of the word "shame" as opposed to "embarrassment". A common element in shame and embarrassment is that they are unpleasant social emotions. They may be called social in that they have the function of cognitive mediators of the individual's social behaviour (Castelfranchi, Conte, Miceli, & Poggi, 1989): Through the unpleasant feelings they inflict they lead one to avoid or remediate possible misfunctioning in one's relationships with other people.
Apart from this common element and the fact that they may occur at the same time in many situations, one may view shame and embarrassment as largely distinct emotions as to their antecedents, feelings, somatic expressions, and social and biological functions. Yet, as several chapters in this volume have indicated, there is no consensus in the literature that they are different. Some authors (e.g., Goffman, 1967; Zimbardo, 1977) group them in a single category; others distinguish them in terms of severity of inadequacies, with embarrassment experienced for minor flaws and shame for severe flaws (Buss, 1980; Harre, this volume); alternatively, embarrassment is linked to etiquette, and shame to moral worth (Schlenker & Leary, 1982).
In attempting to draw a clearer distinction between the two emotions we find it useful to start with linguistic issues. It is our impression that the semantic areas linked to the words for embarrassment and shame in English and Italian do not completely overlap (Figure 8.1).
The English word "embarrassment" seems to cover at least some part of the meaning that in Italian is borne by vergogna, the word for"shame".
Blushing as a discourse: Was Darwin wrong?
Figure 8.1. The semantic area of embarrassment, shame, and guilt, in English
and Italian.
In particular, the English "embarrassment" seems to include the idea of some shortcoming of the individual, some inadequate feature or behaviour, that in Italian is implied by the word vergogna, but not necessarily by the word imbarazzo. The minimum necessary core of meaning of imbarazzo does not even refer to an emotion; it may simply mean a conflict among different choices: One does not know what to choose or what to do because all choices are equally good (or bad). This element of a decision conflict is still present in imbarazzo as an emotion (Zammuner & D'Urso, 1986): In a social situation one may experience some conflict among different goals, often among one's own goal and those of others. Suppose a very boring and dull scholar often intrudes in a conference with lengthy silly and irrelevant questions. This may cause people to be embarrassed (or at least imbarazzati), but not, we think, because they feel inadequate. They merely feel uncomfortable because they do not know what to do in such a situation: They are experiencing a conflict between the goal of telling the bore to shut up and the goal of being polite, of not offending the bore. This conflict between two goals, one Ego-oriented and the other Alter-oriented, is, in our view, the crucial semantic element of the Italian word imbarazzo. This word, then, covers a more restricted area than the English "embarrassment" because it does not necessarily imply any shortcoming on the part of the embarrassed person. That semantic area is covered, instead, by vergogna. Thus, in comparison, "embarrassment" seems to trespass on the area of vergogna.
On the other hand, and unlike "shame", vergogna may refer not only to moral flaws but also to simple clumsiness. In this, "shame", with itsstress on moral matters, looks closer to "guilt", with which it seems to share a semantic element of responsibility (Silver, Sabini, & Parrott, 1987).
CRISTIANO CASTELFRANCHI and ISABELLA POGGI
This is one further divergence of "shame" from vergogna, which may refer to physical defects, or even to one's good luck, for which one is not responsible.
Finally, from a linguistic point of view, "guilt" and its Italian match senso di colpa seem to overlap much more than do the words for embarrassment and shame, the crucial element in both being responsibility for harm to others.
The mental state of shame
Darwin (1872/1965), consistent with his analysis of other expressions of emotions, proceeds from blushing (the expression) to shame (the emotion). We follow the opposite path of making predictions concerning the functional and phenomenological aspects of blushing on the basis of our theoretical analysis of shame (Castelfranchi, 1988). We start from a cognitive analysis of the mental state of shame, in terms of the goals and assumptions holding within the mind of the ashamed person,1 from which we derive functional hypotheses about the mental state of shame and about its expression, the blush.
In our view, the most famous functional explanations, the evolutionary explanations provided by ethology and sociobiology, though important and stimulating, are somewhat misleading or weakened because they cut out the cognitive mediator of social and biological facts: the individual's mind. A functional hypothesis about some behaviour, emotion, or verbal or non-verbal communication can, instead, be enhanced and rendered more sophisticated if entities and processes of the mind are taken into account and the mind itself is seen as a mediator, at the level of the individual organism, of social and biological functions. Because goals are what determine external behaviour (Parisi & Castelfranchi, 1984), goals inside the mind may be seen as corresponding to goals outside the mind, therefore acting as their cognitive mediators and, functionally, as their sub-goals (Castelfranchi, 1981). That is why an important parallel can be drawn between, say, an analysis of the mind of the ashamed and blushing person, on the one side, and an analysis of the functions of shame and the blush, on the other side.
In sum, the analysis of the mind is essential, in our opinion, in order to gain a deeper understanding of behaviours and emotions and to reduce their endless variability for theoretical ends. People may be ashamed about an infinite number of things in the various cultures andsituations, but the analysis of shame as a state of mind can be abstract and general.
Blushing as a discourse: Was Darwin wrong?
The ashamed person's mind
According to our analysis (Castelfranchi, 1988), shame is an emotion implying regret or fear of being thwarted in one's goal of esteem and/or self-esteem.
As is well known (Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980; Scherer, 1983a,b; Scherer & Ekman, 1984), an emotional state includes several aspects: physiological arousal, leading to visceral and somatic responses, a state of physiological and motivational readiness, a subjective feeling, an expressive display of this internal state, and so on. All of these responses are plausibly triggered by a perception of one's state of mind, that is, of the set of one's goals and assumptions. Our analysis focuses on this aspect of the emotion.2
Specifically, shame may be a kind of regret — the emotion felt when the individual has been thwarted in one of his or her goals - or it may be a kind of fear - the emotion felt as one assumes that one is risking being thwarted in some goal, namely, the goal of esteem and/or the goal of self-esteem. In other words, we are ashamed when we regret or fear a loss of face before others or ourselves.3 In this sense, shame is an alarm system for face-saving, and its function is to protect our goals of esteem and self-esteem, in that the pain it causes us informs us when we are thwarting those goals or are about to thwart them.
The goals of esteem and self-esteem are defined, respectively, as the goals of being evaluated positively by others and by ourselves with respect to our values (Castelfranchi, 1988); that is, the goals of showing others and ourselves that we are able to achieve some goals - some norms and expectations.
A goal approach provides us with a tool to simply and precisely define such notions as image, evaluation, value, esteem, and self-esteem. The definition of shame as an emotion aimed at protecting the goals of esteem and self-esteem may lead to predictions about
1. what one is ashamed of - we can be ashamed only about things that cause, or may cause, a negative evaluation of ourselves,
2. those who can feel shame and those who cannot - only people who have some goal of esteem and self-esteem (not infants, for example) can experience shame,
3. those before whom we are ashamed - we can be ashamed only before those whose esteem we seek (including ourselves).
CRISTIANO CASTELFRANCHI and ISABELLA POGGI
Figure 8.2. The ashamed mind.
Blushing as a discourse: Was Darwin wrong?
The goals and assumptions of shame
As is shown in Figure 8.2, at least three goals and three assumptions must be represented in a person's mind for him or her to be ashamed. Both goals and assumptions generally involve three arguments: E (Ego), the ashamed person; A (Alter), the person before whom E is ashamed; and F (Fact), the fact about which E is ashamed. Here, then, are Ego's goals (as summarised in Figure 8.2, left):
G1. E has the goal of being esteemed by A as an X, that is, as a member of the class X.
He may, for example, want to be considered a real man by A. Being considered a worthy member of the class of men is the "specific goal of esteem" of E before A. Coupling that with all other specific goals of esteem of E before A yields a "general goal of esteem of E before A", the whole of positive evaluations E wants to elicit by A.
From goal G1 stems goal G2 — a sub-goal of G1 — in E's mind:
G2: E has the goal of being evaluated positively (esteemed) by A with respect to the criterion of evaluation C.
In our example, E may wish to be judged positively with respect to the criterion of physical strength and courage. A goal that one must be able to fulfill in order to belong to some class can be taken as a criterion of evaluation (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 1989). Being considered a man entails being strong and brave, and anyone unable to do so cannot be considered a real man. So, being evaluated positively against the criterion of courage (i.e., being evaluated as a brave person) is a sub-goal of being considered a man, and for E it also becomes a goal G2, in that it is a necessary means to attaining E's goal G1. This holds, however, only if E also has goal G3, that is, if the evaluation criterion C is also one of E's values:
G3: E has the goal that people who want to belong to the class X are evaluated against criterion C.
In E's view of what it takes to be a man, courage is a value (i.e., a criterion of evaluation that rightly and necessarily applies to being a man). A value is defined, in fact, as a criterion of evaluation against which one has the goal of evaluating, and of being evaluated by others and oneself (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 1989).
We now come to the assumptions of the ashamed Ego.4
A1: Assumptions about facts. Generally, if E is ashamed before A, E assumes that he and A share the same assumptions about facts.
CRISTIANO CASTELFRANCHI and ISABELLA POGGI
SupposeE is a doctor and A is his patient, and A asks him about some new medicine; E is forced to admit that he does not know anything about it and feels ashamed. In this case, E assumes some fact F, that is, that he docs not know the medicine (see arrow a in Figure 8.2, right, box A1). E assumes that A also assumes F (arrow b); but, also, E assumes that A assumes it (c), and assumes that A assumes that E assumes it (d).
As far as assumptions about facts are concerned (but, as we shall see later, values and assumptions about values are the most crucial ones), assumption awould be sufficient for E to be ashamed before himself only. If the doctor tries to bluff his way out of it, pretending he knows the new medicine, he may nonetheless be ashamed in his own eyes; self-shame may be felt even in the absence of assumptions b, c, and d. (On the contrary, as we shall see later, assumption a is not a necessary condition to experience shame before others.).
A2: Assumptions about evaluations. Other assumptions by E that are relevant to shame are evaluations - the evaluating assumptions deriving from facts. For E to be ashamed before A, E not only must assume the fact F but also must assume that such a fact naturally leads to a negative evaluation about criterion C. In our example, E not only assumes that he does not know the new medicine but also assumes that such a shortcoming is enough to warrant judging him to be incompetent as a doctor; he assumes that such a fact F can lead to a negative evaluation of himself (Figure 8.2, right, box A2, arrow a).
As was the case for assumptions about facts, shame of E before A also requires, first (arrows b and c), that E assumes that A shares E's negative evaluation resulting from the fact F and, second (arrow d), that E assumes that A assumes that he also assumes that evaluation.
A3: Assumptions about values. We now come to the third and, in our model, most crucial assumption related to shame: the assumption about values (Figure 8.2, right, box A3). E cannot be ashamed, before A or himself, if E has not accepted the criterion of evaluation C as one of E's values, as a goal against which E thinks people should be evaluated; and E cannot be ashamed before A if he does not share the criterion of evaluation that E assumes to be a value for A.
In our example, let us assume that E knows that patient A's criterion for evaluating the competence of a doctor is some status symbol, say a luxurious office or a big car. If E does not agree that this is a good criterion for his goal of esteem of being judged a good doctor, this will not be included among his own values, and he will not feel proper shame, either before himself or before A, when going to visit patients in a ramshackle car.
Blushing as a discourse: Was Darwin wrong?
On the other hand, he may be ashamed only in his own eyes if he does not know about a new medicine - for him a relevant criterion -even if A does not use this as a criterion in forming A's opinion. Finally, he will be ashamed before both A and himself in the circumstances outlined in box A3 - if values are shared. Here, both E and A assume (arrows a and b) that they have G3 (i.e., the goal that every doctor be judged a good doctor according to the criterion C of medical competence). Furthermore, they each assume the other to have the goal G3 (arrows c and d), and, finally, E assumes that A assumes E's sharing of value (arrow e) and assumes (arrowf) that A also assumes E's assumption e.
The conditions of shame
According to this analysis of the ashamed mind, three conditions are relevant to being ashamed before others:
1. when assumptions about facts are shared,
2. when paths from facts through evaluations are shared, and
3. when values are shared.
E is ashamed before A if he assumes that he and A share assumptions about some trait or behaviour of E and also assumptions about this fact leading to a negative evaluation against some shared value.
The crucial point we make in this analysis is that the sharing of values (condition 3) is a necessary condition of shame before others, whereas the sharing of assumptions about facts (condition 1) and the sharing of their evaluations (condition 2) are not. If doctor E is only being absent-minded at the moment, but actually does know the new medicine, he may not be ashamed about not answering A readily; likewise, he may not be ashamed if he believes that an overall opinion of medical incompetence should not be based on ignorance of a single new drug.
Moreover, shared assumptions about facts and evaluations are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for shame to occur; one is not necessarily ashamed even if one has actually been evaluated negatively or criticized in fact. Doctor E may be perfectly aware of the negative evaluation attached to driving an old car. But because he does not agree that surface appearance is a good criterion for judging a doctor, he may not be ashamed of his car and may even drive about in it ostentatiously. In fact, because some criteria of evaluation are values to others, but not to oneself, one can show one's contempt for those criteria by nonchalantly and openly flouting them.
CRISTIANO CASTELFRANCHI and ISABELLA POGGI
Blushing and the sharing of values
From our analysis of the goals and assumptions in the ashamed person's mind we can draw the following predictions regarding the feeling of shame before others and oneself, and hence the occurrence of blushing.
As values are shared, one may be ashamed before both others and oneself, or only before others. The latter case occurs when values are shared but assumptions about facts or evaluations are not. Suppose a man E saves a girl from drowning and gives her mouth-to-mouth respiration; passer-by A might think that E is taking advantage of the situation. If E has a clear conscience - he knows that is not the case -he does not share the assumption about the fact, and so he will not be ashamed before himself, but he might be before A.5 Here, shame only before others is caused by failure to share assumptions about facts. The other case of shame only before others occurs when evaluations are not shared, as in the example of the absent-minded doctor, where a momentary lapse of memory docs not mean, for him, a serious gap in his medical competence.