Critical Theory, Democratic Justice and Globalization
Shane O’Neill
Queen’s University, Belfast
Critical theory is concerned with human emancipation. But what can emancipation mean in this increasingly complex world of late modernity? As always, it means liberating people from whatever causes them to suffer unnecessarily. The main causes of unnecessary suffering are the ways in which social, political and economic structures create, reproduce or exacerbate inequalities between groups of people, whereby some enjoy greater and more effective liberties than others in seeking to realize their full human potential. One way of providing a focus for critical theory, therefore, is to ask what might be involved in creating and maintaining a set of structures that could deliver equal and effective liberties for all. Given the continuing significance of the constitutional state in late modernity, this project is best understood in republican terms, as the realization of a democratic form of life in which free and equal citizens engage one another in the collective task of autonomous self-governance.
I want to begin by drawing attention to four basic features of democratic self-rule that have been explored recently by critical theorists, particularly in the model of democracy that has elaborated by Jurgen Habermas.[1] 1) Inclusive public discourse releases communicative power as citizens engage one another in the open and unrestrained practice of discursive will-formation. 2) Constitutionally grounded decision-making procedures should be sensitive and responsive to the public sphere by ensuring that this communicative power can be effectively transformed into legitimate law. 3) The legitimacy of any formally generated outcomes will depend on the quality of the process of democratic will-formation. 4) The relevant standard of evaluation should be that the process is driven by reasons that free and equal citizens can come to share through public deliberation, and not by structural conditions that deny some social groups equal and effective opportunities to exert political influence.
The effectiveness of our democratic procedures depends on the realization of conditions of maximal social inclusion by securing equal and effective political liberties for all citizens in our constitutional arrangements. I will argue that this republican account of democratic legitimacy presupposes a substantive and robust conception of egalitarian justice. We can refer to the key principle of justice involved to require the
equalization of effective communicative freedom for all structurally constituted social groups in any constitutional state.
I will refer here to a structurally constituted social group as an SCSG. If an inclusive and vibrant form of democratic self-rule is to be achieved in modern societies then it will depend on the creation of a social structure that allows all SCSGs to exercise their equal rights and liberties to good effect. This means that all SCSGs should have equal access, relative to the size of the group, to the informal flow of communication that filters through to the formal legislative process. An egalitarian social structure is, therefore, a precondition for the inclusion of all citizens as effective participants in the democratic process. Justice, as the equalization of effective communicative freedom, requires the deconstruction of all hierarchical relations between SCSGs, a project that has radical implications for all modern states in terms of political empowerment, fair distribution and due recognition of particular group identities. No structural inequalities can be tolerated in such a democratic order since all SCSGs should be free to articulate their own perspectives on matters that affect them. Furthermore, they should be capable of articulating their distinctive perspectives with equal effectiveness. All SCSGs should, in other words, have ‘equal voice’, relative to their size, in public discussions about matters of shared concern.
In this essay I will first ask why it is appropriate to focus on SCSGs rather than individuals in assessing the demands of democratic justice. Then I will outline briefly some key aspects of the demands of justice that are presupposed by the idea of inclusive self-government, and I will comment on some recent debates on such matters within contemporary critical theory. I will then turn to one of the main challenges facing any form of emancipatory politics today. This is the complex and multifaceted process of globalization.[2] The assumption that sovereignty resides in nation-states has been a distinguishing feature of the modern era but it has been clear for some time that the golden age of the nation-state as the lynchpin of political life has now passed. Stories of the demise of the nation-state remain, however, for now at least, fanciful exaggerations. Yet it is clear that the opposition between domestic and international politics is constantly being deconstructed in practice. The structures of the global order impinge ever more forcefully on local structures as all boundaries between the state and the global order in economic, cultural and political senses have become increasingly porous. If we are to take the republican project of radical democratization as a normative guide to an emancipated form of life, then we need to conceive of it in a way that acknowledges the global transformations that have been experienced throughout the world in the later modern era.
A Non-Essentialist Conception of the Structurally Constituted Social Group
John Rawls took the basic structure of society to be the primary subject of justice since the effects of this on the life-chances of any individual are so ‘profound and present from the start.’[3] Rawls did not deliver an adequate account of social structures.[4] Nor did he free himself sufficiently from liberal individualistic commitments that prevented him from getting to grips with the vital role that SCSGs play in democratic life.[5] While social groups seem to appear in his version of political liberalism as those who share reasonable comprehensive doctrines, there is little appreciation of the non-discursive origins of many groups, or of their identity-forming power and the dynamics involved in democratic interaction between them.[6] Nonetheless Rawls had, from the early stages of his career, correctly identified social structures, rather than say individual entitlements,[7] or cultural traditions,[8] to be the appropriate focus for theorists of justice. Individuals clearly stand in relations of relative advantage or disadvantage to other individuals as a result of their social location within the basic structure. This consists of the main political, economic, social and ethno-cultural institutions and arrangements in society, even if Rawls never considered directly issues or cultural or ethno-national justice. These various aspects of the basic structure intersect one another and impact on one another in complex ways that require, as we will see, sophisticated and analytically differentiated forms of critical exploration.
The main point here is that each of us occupies a specific location within this basic structure from the start of our lives and while we grow and develop a clear view of our strengths and weaknesses, goals and aspirations, our social location can change quite considerably during the course of our lifetime. So too can the structures themselves change over time. While it is clear that many social structures are, within one generation at least, relatively stable (examples might be relations constituted by class, gender or racial differences), all can potentially be disrupted and modified though changing patterns of individual activity. Social groups are ‘structurally constituted’ if members are differentiated from one another by a social relation that impacts profoundly, and from the start of their lives, on the chances they have of realizing their full potential. From the perspective of an account of justice, then, the key focus must be on the fact that the basic structure of all modern societies creates and produces inequalities that result in the historical formation of relatively stable hierarchical group relations. SCSGs emerge historically, therefore, as a result of the inegalitarian consequences of particular aspects of the basic structure.[9]
So while golfers and tennis players could be referred to loosely as social groups, they are not SCSGs since they are not structurally differentiated from one another. It is hardly questionable to suggest that the impact of the basic structure on the lives of golfers and tennis players, as collectivities, has in most contexts been broadly similar. The same could not be said of relations between children born into families at opposite ends of the income spectrum, or between men and women, or gay and straight citizens. All members of any one SCSG (X) have had their life-chances affected in a similar way as a result of the operation of some aspect of the basic structure. Other citizens, who have been affected in very different or opposing ways by that same aspect of the basic structure, will also form an SCSG (Y), one that stands in a hierarchical relation to X. For this reason citizens who are members of X will share a common interest, one that will be opposed to the interest shared by members of Y, at least with respect to whatever particular aspect of the basic structure is the source of the differentiation of X and Y. Each member of X, and the same will go for Y, is also likely to see the commonality they share as a significant identity-forming bond, an affiliation that feeds into each one’s sense of self. Apart from class, gender, race and sexual orientation X could be differentiated from Y on the basis of religion, membership or immigration status, age, or ability/disability, amongst other things.
It should be clear by now why we should seek to equalize effective communicative freedom among SCSGs rather than individuals. In democratic politics SCSGs play a vital role in mediating between the individual and the political community as a whole. We are focusing here on structural relations between groups rather than individuals, because it is these hierarchical relations that are the primary obstacles to the achievement of justice. Since individuals are always situated in a network of group affiliations, group memberships are unavoidable features of each individual’s identity-forming context. Furthermore, the structure of these affiliations is often the source of social antagonism and of conflicting political demands. These affiliations motivate citizens to engage in political activity and they help to shape the political agenda by engendering particular struggles for justice. The sparks that keep the motor of democratic politics running are generated by SCSG relations and not by individuals as such. Individuals suffer social injustice (as opposed to say criminal injustice) not as individual people per se but rather as members of particular SCSGs.
This is not to deny, however, that there are serious dangers attached to any normative analysis that relies on groups rather than individuals.[10] Each of us has multiple SCSG affiliations and it is up to us individually to work out what kind of priority the various affiliations that are constitutive of our individual identities should be given at any particular time. No self-styled ‘group-leader’ can dictate to other group members that the source of that particular affiliation must take priority in their lives whether that is asserted as a necessity for a certain historical period, or indeed forever. Marxists, feminists, gay activists, leaders of black liberation movements, and of religious, national or ethnic groups—each have provided examples of how this kind of group essentialism can become oppressive of group members. It is dogmatic and oppressive to insist that national liberation must take priority over the demand for gender justice, or that resistance to religious or racial discrimination must be subsumed into class struggle, or that gays and lesbians who do not put first the struggle to end all forms of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation are somehow disloyal to their group. Not only should it be left to each individual group member to work out how high a political priority to give to that particular affiliation, there must also be scope to distance oneself completely from the group. This potential is always present since individuals may find themselves drawn to a place where their priorities change and their identities shift. This might be due to new influences in personal relations with non-group members, of with a new awareness of a different group affiliation that cuts across that which had hitherto seemed most significant, or through a sense of no longer ‘belonging’ in the same way as before due to some perspective altering encounter with others that allows one to see things differently. All of these experiences lead us to relativize the importance of any specific SCSG affiliation. In certain circumstances such identity development could lead to an individual exiting a particular SCSG although this is more likely for groups structured by class, membership status or religious differences than gender, race, sexual orientation, age or ability.
The upshot of this is that we can only make adequate space for individual autonomy in this normative analysis of the requirements of justice if we operate with an anti-essentialist conception of the SCSG. It must be acknowledged that SCSG memberships are constituted by basic social structures, that they motivate political activity and shape the environment in which politics operates. In this way SCSGs, as noted earlier, play a crucial mediating role in the project of realizing democratic justice. Yet SCSG memberships, if conceived of rigidly, dogmatically or in an essentialist manner, are potentially oppressive. For this reason, justice requires that ways be found to ensure that those who seek to represent group interests politically are accountable to all SCSG members. The equalization of communicative freedom among SCSGs must be accompanied, therefore, by strong provisions for individual rights and by measures that ensure substantive equality of opportunity for all individuals. These civil rights should secure for each citizen adequate protections from discrimination and from all forms of identity-based oppression, whether they come from members of ‘other’ groups or from internal elites within their own group. We should not make the mistake of allowing the pursuit of equality to lead to a bolstering of internal group relations that are oppressive of some SCSG members.[11]
Having guarded against the dangers of essentialism by reiterating the central role that individual rights and equality of opportunity play in this account of democratic self-rule, it does, nonetheless, make sense to keep the focus of justice on SCSGs. We should seek to ensure that those groups, and not each individual citizen, enjoy equal and effective communicative freedom in democratic discourse. SCSGs will be made up of a range of diverse individuals with a wide range of talents, abilities and interests. Only some of these people will want to spend much of their time engaging in political activity and only some will have the leadership qualities and talents required to be effective in pursuit of the group’s political objectives. And while it is vital that individual group members are empowered to call their leaders and representatives to account, it is the group perspectives that will contribute to those forms of public discourse that feed into the legislative process. The important point is that if we are to achieve an effectively vibrant democracy then the perspective of each SCSG must be articulated clearly and effectively by some of that group’s own representatives on any issue that matters importantly to them. We should eliminate any structural or systematic advantage that makes it more likely that members of one group will have the reasons and arguments put forward by their representative accepted or taken up by others. The reasons and arguments must speak for themselves if the outcome is to be democratically just.
Recognition, Redistribution and Basic Democratic Capabilities
Effective communicative freedom can be understood in terms of the basic capabilities that are required if SCSGs are to engage constructively in public discourse. The idea of basic capabilities is central to the perspective on equality and justice that has been developed by both Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, but here we need to focus directly on democratic capabilities.[12] If we are to equalize effective communicative freedom then we need to identify what basic capabilities are required that will empower SCSGs to articulate their perspectives on matters of mutual concern. Citizens who seek to articulate and represent their SCSG perspective, while engaging constructively in democratic debate, require at least three basic capabilities associated with political agency. We can refer to these as agenda-setting, assumption-questioning, and claim-evaluating capabilities. First, it is important that citizens from each SCSG in society should be able to contribute to the democratic agenda by introducing new themes into political discourse and by raising public awareness about issues that affect them, particularly those that impact on them in a disproportional way. Secondly, they should be able to question effectively any unwarranted assumptions or prejudices that dominate current discourse and that result in them, or other SCSGs, suffering a deficit of due respect. Thirdly, they should have the necessary cognitive skills that allow them to evaluate critically a variety of competing claims, including the ability to adopt a self-critical perspective toward their own claims.[13]