Normativism and Mental Causation
by
Justin Thomas Tiehen, B.A.
Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of The Graduate School
of the University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
The University of Texas at Austin
May 2007
49
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ………………………………………………………………….... 1
Chapter 1. Divergences from Davidson...…………………………………….. 8
1.1 Objections to Davidson’s Argument…………………………………...... 9
1.1.1 OBJECTIONS TO THE TRUTH OF THE ARGUMENT’S PREMISES………………………………………………………………. 9
1.1.2 OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT’S VALIDITY……………. 11
1.1.3 OBJECTIONS TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………………. 14
1.1.4 OBJECTIONS TO DAVIDSON’S VIEW OF MENTAL CAUSATION……...……………………………………….…………….. 15
1.2 Events……………………………………...……………………………… 16
1.3 The Causal Argument for Physicalism…………………………………… 17
1.3.1 WARRANT TRANSMISSION………………………………. 18
1.3.2 THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT’S GUIDING THOUGHT……. 22
1.3.3 THE METAPHYSICS BEHIND (P1) ………………………... 24
1.3.4 OVERDETERMINATION AND THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT FOR (P1) …………………………………………………………………. 26
1.3.5 EVIDENCE FROM THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES………….... 28
1.3.6 EVIDENCE FROM NEUROSCIENCE………………………... 34
1.3.7 CONCLUSION……………...…………….…………………… 38
1.4 Mental Causation……………………………….…………………… 38
Chapter 2. Constitutive Rationality: What It Means...…………………... 45
2.1 Some Varieties of Functionalism…..….……………………………… 45
2.2 Ramsification….…………………….……………………………..... 48
2.3 Normative Clauses…………………….….………………………………. 53
2.4 Points of Clarification………………………………………………. 57
2.4.1 THE (CRT) AND FUNCTIONALISM……………….……….. 57
2.4.2 MORE ON THE (CRT) AND FUNCTIONALISM………….… 58
2.4.3 CONSTITUTIVE RATIONALITY WITHOUT NORMATIVITY
….…………………………………………………………………… 62
2.4.4 THE PRIORITY OF NORMATIVITY TO THE MENTAL…... 64
Chapter 3. Constitutive Rationality: Arguments in its Favor ………...… 66
3.1 The Argument from Essential Causal Powers..……………………… 68
3.1.1 IRRATIONALITY…………....……………………………..… 69
3.1.2 ARATIONALITY…………....……………….……………..… 76
3.1.3 RATIONALITY……………………………....……………..… 79
3.2 The Argument from Counterpossibles….……..……………….…..... 84
3.2.1 PRELIMINARY REMARKS REGARDING COUNTERPOSSIBLES
….…………………………………………………………………… 84
3.2.2 THE (CRT) ENTAILS THAT (CP) IS TRUE….……….…..... 87
3.2.3 BELIEF ZOMBIES…………………………...……………..… 89
3.2.4 KNOWLEDGE…………………………..…...……………...… 91
3.2.5 THE SPACE OF REASONS……...……..…...……………...… 92
Chapter 4. Normativisim and Irreducibility ……..……………………… 96
4.1 Normativism……………………………………..………….…………… 96
4.1.1 WHY THE TEST IS USEFUL……….……………………..… 96
4.1.2 POTENTIAL COUNTEREXAMPLES…..…..……………..… 97
4.1.3 COUNTERPOSSIBLES AND METAPHYSICS…………..… 101
4.1.4 (CP) AND DIFFERENT ACCOUNTS OF NORMATIVITY... 104
4.1.5 CONCLUSION….…………………………………………..… 106
4.2 Irreducibility……………………………….……..……………….….... 106
4.2.1 CORNELL REALISM AND STANDARD NONREDUCTIVE PHYSICALISM….………………….……………………………… 107
4.2.2 FINE-GRAINED PROPERTIES…..…..………………..…..… 113
4.2.3 THE PROBLEM WITH ANALYTICAL REDUCTIONISM… 116
4.2.4 METAPHYSICAL REDUCTIONISM…..……………..…..… 120
4.2.5 CONCLUSION…..…………………....………………..…..… 124
Chapter 5. Physicalism …………………………..………………………… 125
5.1 Normative Supervenience………………….……..….……..………… 125
5.1.1 CONCEIVABILITY, POSSIBILITY, AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE NORMATIVE AND THE PHENOMENAL….… 127
5.1.2 SUPERVENIENCE AND REDUCTION..….……..………… 134
5.1.3 SUPERDUPERVENIENCE..……………….……...………… 137
5.1.4 PHYISCALISM AND MENTAL CAUSATION.………….… 139
5.2 Causal Exclusion………………………………...……………….….... 141
5.2.1 SIX THESES……….………...……………………………… 143
5.2.2 THE DEMONSTRATION OF INCONSISTENCY .…..……… 145
5.2.3 LOOKING AHEAD……………………....……………..…..… 148
Chapter 6. Reductionism….………………………………………………… 150
6.1 Realizer-State Functionalism………...…….……..….……..………… 150
6.1.1 ROLE-STATE FUNCTIONALISM……………………..….… 151
6.1.2 REALIZER-STATE FUNCTIONALISM AND MENTAL CAUSATION
….………………………………………………………………...… 152
6.1.3 MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY……….…….……...………… 153
6.2 The Nature of Realization……….……………....……………….….... 157
6.2.1 BEING IN PAIN AND ROLE-STATE FUNCTIONALISM... 157
6.2.2 NATURAL AND MULTIPLY REALIZABLE PROPERTIES
….………………………………………………………………...… 158
6.2.3 WHAT KIND OF RELATION IS REALIZATION? ..….….... 161
6.2.4 CONCLUSION………………………………………..….….... 165
6.3 Kim’s Disjunction Identity Theory………...……...….……..………… 165
6.3.1 INTRODUCING THE DISJUNCTION IDENTITY THEORY.. 168
6.3.2 A MODIFIED CAUSAL EXCLUSION ARGUMENT…...… 169
6.3.3 INSTANTIATION IDENTITIES WITHOUT PROPERTY IDENTITIES
….………………………………………………………………...… 171
6.3.4 A NEW CAUSAL PROBLEM………...…..….……..………… 174
6.3.5 THE DISJUNCTION IDENTITY THEORY AND MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY………...……...….……..………………………… 175
6.4 Eliminativist Functionalism………...……...….……………………… 176
6.4.1 A SCOPE DISTINCTION………………..………………...… 177
6.4.2 HOW ELIMINATIVIST FUNCTIONALISM DIFFERS FROM OTHER VIEWS……………………………………………………....….….... 178
6.4.3 CONCLUSION………………………………………..….….... 179
Chapter 7 The IBE Argument against Reductionism...…………………… 180
7.1 Three Types of Causal Generalizations……...…..….……..………… 180
7.1.1 EXPLAINING (1)………………….……………………..….… 180
7.1.2 EXPLAINING (2).……….………………………………....… 182
7.1.3 EXPLAINING (3)……………..……….…….……...………… 183
7.2 The Trouble with Coincidences……….………………………….….... 186
7.2.1 THE IBE ARGUMENT……………………………………..... 186
7.2.2 FODOR’S ARGUMENT FROM SPECIAL SCIENCE LAWS
….………………………………………………………………...… 190
7.2.3 EXTENDING THE ARGUMENT…………………...….….... 191
7.3 Qualifications and Complications…………...…..….……..………… 192
7.3.1 ALTERNATIVE REDUCTIVE EXPLANATIONS…....….… 193
7.3.2 KIM’S PUZZLE..……….………………………………....… 194
7.3.3 HAVE ANY COINCIDENCES BEEN ELIMINATED?.…… 196
7.4 Generalizing the Exclusion Problem………..………………….….... 199
7.4.1 A REDUCTIO?...... ……………………………………...... 199
7.4.2 INCREASING THE POOL OF EVIDENCE..…………....… 200
7.4.3 THE EVIDENCE FOR MULTIPLE REALIZATION….….... 201
7.4.4 CONCLUSION..………………………………….……...... … 203
Chapter 8. Overdeterminationism ………..….…...…………………...…. 205
8.1 Proportionality………………………..……...…..….……..…………... 206
8.1.1 GILMORE’S PAIN….…………….……………………..….… 206
8.1.2 YABLO’S ACCOUNT….…………….……………...……..… 207
8.1.3 YABLO AS AN OVERDETERMINATIONIST….………..… 210
8.2 Mental Causation without Proportionality.…..….……..…………... 212
8.2.1 THE EXPANDED GILMORE CASE….……………….…..… 212
8.2.2 FIRST RESPONSE…………………….……………….…..… 213
8.2.3 COUNTERPART GILMORE……...….……………….…..… 214
8.2.4 THE ABSENCE OF STRICT LAWS………………….…..… 218
8.2.5 CONCLUSION….…………………….……………….…..… 219
8.3 The Broader Picture.…..….…………………………..…………... 220
8.3.1 A SIMPLEMINDED APPROACH.…..….……..…………... 221
8.3.2 GILMORE’S ANXIETY.…..….………………..…………... 222
8.4 The No Competition Approach to Mental Causation..….……….... 223
8.4.1 COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSAL REASONING...... 224
8.4.2 CAUSES AND BACKGROUND CONDITIONS...... 225
8.4.3 REALIZATION-SENSITIVE CAUSAL POWERS...... 227
8.4.4 PUTNAM’S PEG..….…………………………………….... 231
Chapter 9. The Solution ………………..………………………………… 234
9.1 A Shoemakeresque View.……..……...……...….……..……………. 236
9.1.1 REDUCTIVE CAUSAL STRUCTURALISM…..……..….… 236
9.1.2 CAUSAL POWERS: TYPES AND TOKENS……...………… 239
9.1.3 CONJUNCTIVE PROPERTIES AND COMPOSITE EVENTS 240
9.1.4 THE SUBSET VIEW OF REALIZATION………....………… 241
9.1.5 TRADITIONAL CONJUNCTIVE PROPERTIES AND REALIZAITON
….………………………………………………………………...… 244
9.1.6 CONCLUSION: THE METAPHYSICAL PICTURE………… 246
9.2 Mental Causation…………………………….…..….……..…………... 249
9.2.1 THE EXERCISE OF CAUSAL POWERS..…………….…..… 249
9.2.2 MENTAL CAUSATION AND THE PART/WHOLE CAUSATION THESIS…………………….………………….……………….…..… 251
9.2.3 CATEGORIZING THIS ACCOUNT..….……………….…..… 254
9.2.4 WATERED DOWN PROPORTIONALITY…………….…..… 254
9.2.5 OBJECTIONS TO THE PART/WHOLE CAUSATION THESIS 256
9.3 Normative Mental Causation………………………….……….…..… 261
9.3.1 INCLUSION AND OVERLAP………………………….…..… 262
9.3.2 CAUSAL LIABILITIES…………………..…………….…..… 264
9.3.3 PURE NORMATIVE TYPES AND TOKENS……………..… 267
9.3.4 PURE NORMATIVE EPIPHENOMENALISM? ………….… 268
9.3.5 “BY VIRTUE OF” RUN AMOK…………………..……….… 270
9.3.6 EMBRACING PURE NORMATIVE EPIPHENOMENALISM? 271
9.3.7 A DOUBLE ASPECT THEORY? ………………………….… 273
49
Introduction
The mental is normative. Or so a number of philosophers say, at least. For various reasons, those who say it often make a point of avoiding putting the matter in overly metaphysical terms. So for instance Donald Davidson, in setting up a defense of the mental’s normative status, writes that “the mental is not an ontological but a conceptual category . . . To say of an event, for example an intentional action, that it is mental is simply to say that we can describe it in a certain vocabulary.”[1] The mental’s normative-based irreducibility to the physical, then, is a mere conceptual irreducibility, for Davidson. It is the irreducibility of normative mental concepts to non-normative physical concepts.[2]
In a similar vein Robert Brandom provides part of the historical context of his own normative view of mind when he writes that the
emphasis on the normative significance of attributions of intentionally contentful states marks a decisive difference between Kantian and Cartesian ways of conceiving cognition and action . . . Where Descartes puts forward a descriptive conception of intentionality, Kant puts forward a normative or prescriptive one – what matters is being the subject not of properties of a certain kind but of proprieties of a certain kind.[3]
It goes without saying, no doubt, that the Kantian conception is the deeper of the two by Brandom’s lights.
One of the central claims defended in this work is that the proprieties Brandom mentions just are properties, and properties distinct from any which are not proprieties. Thus, a new Cartesian/Kantian synthesis is offered. Or, at least, what is offered is a view according to which the mental’s normative status sets it apart metaphysically – and not merely conceptually – from the physical. This normative status renders mental properties irreducible to physical properties, though not in a way that is incompatible with physicalism. Inspired in no small part by Davidson’s classic paper “Mental Events,” my normativism about the mental aspires to be a novel form of nonreductive physicalism.
A consequence of my metaphysical focus is that the metaphysics of normativity, and of the relation between the normative and the non-normative, comes to play an absolutely central role in the discussion. If the mental’s normative status is supposed to be what guarantees its irreducibility to the physical, then presumably the normative itself must be irreducible to the physical, or more generally to the non-normative. In this work I argue that this is indeed the case. In doing so, I end up occupying a metaphysical view of the normative that is importantly like G. E. Moore’s antireductionism in metaethics. There are occasional references to Moore in Davidson’s own defense of antireductionism about the mental, and in the works of certain philosophers sympathetic to Davidson, like John McDowell.[4] The metaphysical focus of the present work leads to an expanded role for Moore, though, or at least for a broadly Moorean sort of view.
This appropriation of Moore would appear to create tension for my claim that the view being defended is physicalistic. After all, Moore himself is a non-naturalist about normativity. It is in the attempt to alleviate this apparent tension that I turn to the causal exclusion problem facing nonreductive physicalists. If my normativity-based antireductionism about the mental can be reconciled with a physicalistically acceptable account of mental causation, then that would seem to undermine the charge that my view is not sufficiently physicalistic. And this in turn would eliminate one of the most serious barriers to embracing an antireductionist view of normativity and (thus) the mental. Even aside from wanting to have an acceptable account of mental causation for its own sake, then, I turn to the causal exclusion problem partly for the purpose of earning a physicalist credential for my antireductionist view.
Given the themes set out, there are bound to be important similarities between the position defended in this work and Davidson’s. There are also important differences, however, some of which are explained in Chapter 1. One of the primary differences is that I am highly suspicious of the sort of causal argument for physicalism which is at the center of “Mental Events.” I contend that though the causal argument is sound, there are reasons to think that it is not cogent – that is, that the argument cannot help one come to learn (for the first time) the truth of physicalism. This is because the most plausible way of defending the causal argument ends up committing its defenders to an epistemically problematic form of non-causal overdetermination. We ought to be physicalists, but probably not on the basis of the reasoning offered by the causal argument.
In Chapter 2 I turn to the claim defended by Davidson and others that the mental realm is governed by constitutive principles of rationality. What does this constitutive rationality thesis mean exactly? I borrow the machinery of Ramsification to try to formulate the thesis in as clear terms as possible. Briefly stated, the idea is that this constitutive rationality thesis is true just in case the theory that specifies the essences of mental states (the theory being Ramsified) includes normative clauses. The thesis so understood does not outright contradict causal functionalism, but a kind of tension with causal functionalism is set up at this point.
I then turn in Chapter 3 to defending the constitutive rationality thesis just formulated. I develop two distinct arguments, one from essential causal powers and one from counterpossibles. The argument from essential causal powers says that while belief actually has many different sorts of causal powers, the only powers that are essential to it are its rational powers – that is, its powers whose exercise are to the rational credit of believers. If this is correct it is something that calls out for explanation, and only the constitutive rationality thesis is able to explain it adequately. The argument from counterpossibles involves assessing what would follow if (per impossibile) normative eliminativism were true. One thing that would follow, I claim, is that there would be no beliefs. Defending this claim requires establishing the conceivability of belief zombies – that is, physical duplicates of us who lack beliefs. In attempting to do this, I build on Jaegwon Kim’s critique of Quine’s naturalized epistemology.
With the close of Chapter 3 I take myself to have established the truth of the constitutive rationality thesis. I then begin chapter 4 by arguing that it follows from the thesis that belief properties themselves are normative. Now, this normative status does not by itself entail that belief properties are irreducible. What is needed for this conclusion is the further premise that normative properties in general are irreducible. The remainder of the chapter is spent building toward this further premise. In arguing that normative properties are irreducible, I draw on the parallels that philosophers including Frank Jackson and others have noted between certain views of normativity and certain views of phenomenal consciousness. While these parallels are interesting for their own sake, the primary reason for appealing to them is that they genuinely help clarify the views of normativity in question, since the metaphysical differences between the relevant views of phenomenal consciousness have been worked out to some extent. Given this framework, I observe that my antireductionism about normativity is like David Chalmers’ antireductionism about phenomenal consciousness in important respects.
There are also important differences between the two views, however. In particular, antireductionism about normativity and thus belief is compatible with at least a moderate form of physicalism, or so I suggest in Chapter 5. I begin by noting that normative antireductionism is compatible with the metaphysical (as opposed to mere nomological) supervenience of everything on the physical. The question then is whether such supervenience is sufficient for physicalism, as is often thought. Terence Horgan has argued that it is not. Horgan claims that physicalism requires not just supervenience, but superdupervenience. I concede that my antireductionist view is incompatible with superdupervenience. Still, a further physicalist credential for my view would be secured if I could show that my normativity-based antireductionism about belief properties is compatible with a physicalistically acceptable account of mental causation. This would distinguish my view from others that are incompatible with superdupervenience, like standard emergentist views, which seem to require physicalistically objectionable forms of downward causation. I thus turn to the causal exclusion problem.
I set out the exclusion problem as a demonstration that six theses, each of which is independently plausible, are jointly inconsistent. One of the theses must be rejected then. Out of the six, only three are real options for rejection, given physicalism. Chapter 6 is devoted to examining different reductionist accounts, which reject the thesis that mental properties are irreducible to physical properties. What the various reductionist views in question have in common is that they all deny the existence of properties that are both natural and multiply realizable.