Framework Core ADI

ADI 20101

Lab NameFile Title

Kritik Answers Core

ADI 20101

Lab NameFile Title

Kritik Answers Core

**A2: Agamben**

A2: Agamben – No Link: Liberalism Good

A2: Agamben – No Link: Rights Good

A2: Agamben-Perm-Do Both

A2: Agamben – Perm: Neg Totalizes

A2: Agamben – No Impact: Holocaust/Genocide/Nazis

A2: Agamben – No Impact – Turn: Trivialization

A2: Agamben – No Impact – Turn: Value to Life/Bare Life

A2: Agamben-No Impact-A2: Root Cause

A2: Agamben – No Alt – Turn: Oversimplification

A2: Agamben-No Alt-Turn-Biopolitics

A2: Agamben-No Alt-Turn-Juridical Utilization

A2: Agamben-No Alt-Turn-Oppression

A2: Agamben-No Alt-Turn-Sovereign Control

A2: Agamben-No Alt-Turn-Violence

A2: Agamben-No Alt Solvency-Generic

A2: Agamben-No Alt Solvency-Generic-EXTN

A2: Agamben-No Alt Solvency-No Spillover

A2: Agamben-No Alt Solvency-Political Exclusion

A2: Agamben – No Alt – A2: Musselman

A2: Agamben – No Alt – A2: Whatever Being

A2: Agamben – No Alt – A2: The Refugee

**A2: Borders**

A2: Borders-Turn-Conflict

A2: Borders-Turn-Conflict-EXTN

A2: Borders-Turn-Individual Needs

A2: Borders-Turn-International Security

A2: Borders-Turn-Laundry List

A2: Borders-Turn-New Borders

A2: Borders-No Alt Solvency-Difference

A2: Borders-No Alt Solvency-Timeframe

A2: Borders-Defense-Deterritorialization Inevitable

A2: Borders-Defense-No Violence

**A2: Borderlands**

A2: Borderlands-Perm-Reform Necessary

A2: Borderlands-Turn-Exclusion

A2: Borderlands-No Alt Solvency-Generic

A2: Borderlands-No Alt Solvency-Generic-EXTN

A2: Borderlands-No Alt Solvency-Flawed Methodology

A2: Borderlands-No Alt Solvency-SQ Policies Inevitable

**A2: Critical Race Theory**

A2: CRT-Perm-Political Reform Necessary

A2: CRT-Turn-Integration Good

A2: CRT-No Alt Solvency-Generic

A2: CRT-Defense-Biased Literature

A2: CRT-Defense-Not Real World

**A2: Cultural Assimilation**

A2: Cultural Assimilation-Perm Do Both

A2: Cultural Assimilation-Turn-Assimilation Good

A2: Cultural Assimilation-Link Turn-Immigration=Less Assimilation

A2: Cultural Assimilation-Defense-Literature Bias

A2: Cultural Assimilation-Defense-Multiple Populations

**A2: Empire**

A2: Empire-Perm-Do Both

A2: Empire-Turn-Focus Tradeoffs

A2: Empire-Turn-Globalization Good

A2: Empire-Turn-Interstate Conflict

A2: Empire-Turn-Local Destabilization

A2: Empire-Turn-Reterritorialization

A2: Empire-Turn-Violence

A2: Empire-Turn-Extinction

A2: Empire-No Alt Solvency-Generic

A2: Empire-No Alt Solvency-No Global Spillover

A2: Empire-No Alt Solvency-No Method

A2: Empire-Defense-Borders Decreasing

A2: Empire-Defense-Empire Theory is Wrong

A2: Empire-Defense-Empire Theory is Wrong-EXTN

A2: Empire-Defense-Multilateralism Checks Impact

A2: Empire-Defense-No Empire

A2: Empire-Defense-No Empire-EXTN

A2: Empire-Defense-No Link

A2: Empire-Defense-No State Collapse

A2: Empire-Defense-No Empire

A2: Empire-Defense-West Is Best

**A2: Foucault**

A2: Foucault – No Link

A2: Foucault – Perm Solves

A2: Foucault-Perm Solves

A2: Foucault-Perm-Solves

A2: Foucault – Perm Solves – Strategic Reversibility

A2: Foucault – No Impact – A2: Genocide/“Vital Massacres”

A2: Foucault – No Impact – Resistance Solves

A2: Foucault – No Alt – Cede the Political

A2: Foucault – No Alt – Solvency

A2: Foucault – No Alt – Turn: Fill-In

A2: Foucault-No Alt-Turn-Oppression

A2: Foucault-No Alt-Turn-Seduction

A2: Foucault – No Alt – Turn: Violence

**A2: Queer Theory**

A2: Queer Theory-Turn-Heterosexual Control-EXTN

A2: Queer Theory-Turn-Misogynism

A2: Queer Theory-Turn-Misogynism-EXTN

A2: Queer Theory-Turn-Oppression

A2: Queer Theory-No Alt Solvency-Generic

A2: Queer Theory-No Alt Solvency-Discrimination

A2: Queer Theory-No Alt Solvency-Narrow Focus

**A2: Schmitt**

A2: Schmitt-Perm-Do Both

A2: Schmitt-Turn-Domination

A2: Schmitt-Turn-Facism

A2: Schmitt-Turn-Mass Violence

A2: Schmitt-Turn-War

A2: Schmitt-No Alt Solvency-Incoherence

A2: Schmitt-Defense-Aff Doesn’t Deconstruct Dichotomies

A2: Schmitt-A/T-Schmitt Isn’t Our Author

**A2: Work K**

A2: Work-Turn-Complicity

A2: Work-Turn-Ethics

A2: Work-Turn-Establishment Control

A2: Work-Turn-No Political Movements

A2: Work-Turn: Violence

A2: Work-Turn-“Work”

A2: Work-Turn-“Work”-EXTN

A2: Work-No Alt Solvency-Generic

A2: Work-No Alt Solvency-Generic-EXTN

A2: Work-No Alt Solvency-Ethics

A2: Work-No Alt Solvency-Focus Tradeoff

A2: Work-No Alt Solvency-Focus Tradeoff-EXTN

A2: Work-No Alt Solvency-Methodology

A2: Work-No Alt Solvency-No Spillover

A2: Work-No Alt Solvency-No Spillover-EXTN

A2: Work-No Alt Solvency-Work is Necessary For Reform

A2: Work-No Alt Solvency-Work Inevitable

A2: Work-No Alt Solvency-Work Inevitable-EXTN

ADI 20101

Lab NameFile Title

**A2: Agamben**

A2: Agamben – No Link: Liberalism Good

All forms of control are not equal – Liberalism solves the worst excesses

Heins5 (Volker, polisci ConcordiaUniversity, 6 German Law Journal No. 5, May,

According to this basic Principle of Distinction, modern humnitarian action is directed towards those who are caught up in violent conflicts without possessing any strategic value for the respective warring parties. Does this imply that classic humanitarianism and its legal expressions reduce the lives of noncombatants to the "bare life" of nameless individuals beyond the protection of any legal order? I would rather argue that humanitarianism is itself an order-making activity. Its goal is not the preservation of life reduced to a bare natural fact, but conversely the protection of civilians and thereby the protection of elementary standards of civilization which prevent the exclusion of individuals from any legal and moral order. The same holds true for human rights, of course. Agamben fails to appreciate the fact that human rights laws are not about some cadaveric "bare life", but about the protection of moral agency.[33] His sweeping critique also lacks any sense for essential distinctions.It may be legitimate to see "bare life" as a juridical fiction nurtured by the modern state, which claims the right to derogate from otherwise binding norms in times of war and emergency, and to kill individuals, if necessary, outside the law in a mode of "effective factuality."[34] Agamben asserts that sovereignty understood in this manner continues to function in the same way since the seventeenth century and regardless of the democratic or dictatorial structure of the state in question. This claim remains unilluminated by the wealth of evidence that shows how the humanitarian motive not only shapes the mandate of a host state and nonstate agencies, but also serves to restrict the operational freedom of military commanders in democracies, who cannot act with impunity and who do not wage war in a lawless state of nature. Furthermore, Agamben ignores the crisis of humanitarianism that emerged as a result of the totalitarian degeneration of modern states in the twentieth century. States cannot always be assumed to follow a rational self-interest which informs them that there is no point in killing others indiscriminately. The Nazi episode in European history has shown that sometimes leaders do not spare the weak and the sick, but take extra care not to let them escape, even if they are handicapped, very old or very young. Classic humanitarianism depends on the existence of an international society whose members feel bound by a basic set of rules regarding the use of violence—rules which the ICRC itself helped to institutionalize. Conversely, classic humanitarianism becomes dysfunctional when states place no value at all on their international reputation and see harming the lives of defenseless individuals not as useless and cruel, but as part of their very mission.[36] The founders of the ICRC defined war as an anthropological constant that produced a continuous stream of new victims with the predictable regularity and unavoidability of floods or volcanic eruptions. Newer organizations, by contrast, have framed conditions of massive social suffering as a consequence of largely avoidable political mistakes. The humanitarian movement becomes political, to paraphrase Carl Schmitt,[37] in so far as it orients itself to humanitarian states of emergency, the causes of which are located no longer in nature, but in society and politics. Consequently, the founding generation of the new humanitarian organizations have freed themselves from the ideals of apolitical philanthropy and chosen as their new models historical figures like the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who saved thousands of Jews during the Second World War. In a different fashion than Agamben imagines, the primary concern in the field of humanitarian intervention and human rights politics today is not the protection of bare life, but rather the rehabilitation of the lived life of citizens who suffer, for instance, from conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder. At the same time, there is a field of activity emerging beneath the threshold of the bare life. In the United States, in particular, pathologists working in conjunction with human rights organizations have discovered the importance of corpses and corporal remains now that it is possible to identify reliable evidence for war crimes from exhumed bodies.[39]

A2: Agamben – No Link: Liberalism Good

Liberal democratic mindset prevents the use of structures for control – Even if the aff authorizes control, institutional power for autonomy massively overwhelms the link

Dickinson4(UC Berkeley – History, Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarianor totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering.

A2: Agamben – No Link: Rights Good

Carefully crafting reductions in restrictions is better than entirely rejecting rights

Daly 4( FrancesAustralianNationalUniversity)

Agamben's second argument is that the existence of rights stands in contradiction to the denial of these rights to refugees, and that this is the result of the State's most fundamental contradiction – the promotion of the idea of inalienable human rights - and the failure to protect this idea when it is no longer possible to conceive of human rights as rights of a citizen (Agamben, 2000: 20). This contradiction is not, for him, something inherent within the State itself, but is the outcome of the existence of rights in a world in which they are not granted equally (Agamben, 2000: 21). What we are not then given is an examination of what it is about this world that gives rise to these inequalities. Being told that contemporary existence is completely spectacularized does not provide us with sufficient insight to know why some refugees are denied rights, or why proclamations on rights do not always lead to their enactment. Agamben's analysis of rights is too cursory and dismissive for us to be able to draw any relation between his critique of alienation and his understanding of the place of the refugee. As a result, any basis for seeing within rights concerns for what it might mean to be human or for what community might entail, is discarded. For example, Agamben discerns an ambiguity within the 1789 Declaration on the Rights of Man and of the Citizen because it is not possible to know whether the different rights mentioned – those of 'man' and those of 'the citizen' - refer to two distinct realities or are somehow subsumed within each other (Agamben, 1995: 116). But with this he both discerns an ambiguity and then neutralizes the tension underpinning its significance, by inferring from it that humans are reduced to 'bare life' in the State through the very existence of principles of freedom and equal respect. We are then led by him to conclude that this ambiguity is in fact the occlusion of human potentiality from rights. A number of problems could be raised with this dismissal of ambiguity. Why, for example, should we not view this problem as the real asymmetry that ambiguity entails, an ambiguity which might, under different circumstances, animate rather than annihilate a sense of being human? It is surely up to us to claim a complex sense of humanity or being human within rights, and there would seem to be some basis for this via the unresolved tensions and incompletions that the affirmations of equality and liberty signify. Might we not consider, then, that rather than the problem being that rights continue to fail our expectations or attempted realizations, it is perhaps us who have not yet arrived at a place where we might answer the appeal set down by the 'liberty, equality, fraternity' impulse of natural rights?

A2: Agamben-Perm-Do Both

Perm solves- Agamben’s conception of the state doesn’t assume political transformations-The rising political power of individuals proves our link would be residual at best

Lemke,09( Thomas Studied Political Sciences, Sociology and Law @ Frankfurt/Main,SouthamptonParis.(

Firstly, Agamben does not take into account that the site of sovereignty has been displaced.While in the eugenic programs in the first half of the 20th century biopolitical interventions were mainly executed by the state that controlled the health of the population or the hygiene of the race, biopolitics today is becoming more and more a responsibility of sovereign subjects. As autonomous patients, active consumers or responsible parents they demand medical or biotechnological options.Today, it is less the state that regulates by direct interventions and restrictions, since the capacity and competence of decision-making is increasingly ascribed to the individual subject to make “informed choices” beyond political authoritarianism and medical paternalism.Decisions on life and death are less the explicit result of legal provisions and political regulations but the outcome of an “invisible hand” that represents the options and practices of sovereign individuals (Lemke 2002b; Koch 2002). Agamben’s analysis is too state-centred, or rather, it relies on a limited conception of the state which does not take into account important political transformations since the Nazi era. He does not take into account that in contemporary liberal societies political power is exercised through a multiplicity of agencies and techniques that are often only loosely associated with the formal organs of the state.

A2: Agamben – Perm: Neg Totalizes

Totalizing sovereign power makes resistance infeasible

Hussain 2k(Department of History at Berkeley Nasser, 34 Law & Soc'y Rev. 495, lexis).

Here once again we are forced to question Agamben's teleological mode of thought. Is this sovereign power represented in the concentration camps really a constitutive feature of sovereignty tout court? Even limiting ouselves to the remarks above, we can imagine a liberal critique of this position that asks from where come the limitations that Agamben concedes previous Weimar governments had observed.Surely, one does not have to accept in its entirety a normative liberal conception of sovereign power in order to appreciate that the demand for a factual accounting for the decision on the exception, and institutional checks upon the totalization of the space of exception, can nonetheless - at least in certain instances - be effective. Indeed, one could go further and suggest that a liberal theory of sovereign power understands full well the paradoxical relation between law and fact, norm and exception; and, precisely in light of such an understanding constructs an institutional system that cannot resolve the paradox but nonetheless attempts to prevent it from reaching an intensified and catastrophic conclusion. Given that Agamben is a nuanced and fair-minded thinker, one must wonder about why he largely ignores such a system. We think that one possible answer is that, just as for Agamben the source of the problem is not the institutional operation of sovereign power, but its object - bare life - so too the solution is not a proliferation of institutional safeguards but a rethinking of that mode of being. In this regard, we find his concluding musings on Heidigger to be suggestive.

Their absolute link claims are unverifiable

Lewis 99 (Stephen, Modernism/Modernity 6.3, p. 165, Project MUSE, Humanities Professor at Chicago,)