Organized Crime Disadvantage Answerssludl/NAUDL 2015-16

Organized Crime Disadvantage AnswersSLUDL/NAUDL 2015-16

(Novice, JV, & Varsity Only)

Organized Crime DA – Affirmative Answers

Organized Crime DA – Affirmative Answers

Glossary

Uniqueness Answers

Uniqueness—Drug Violence Is Increasing Because of Current Strategies

Uniqueness—Drug Violence Is Increasing In an Unprecedented Fashion

Link/Internal Link Answers

Surveillance Fails To Solve Organized Crime

NSA Surveillance Fails – Because It Is Sloppy and Costly

Illegal Immigration Surveillance Fails – There is No Relationship Between Illegal Immigrants and Drug Trafficking

War on Drugs—Surveillance has Not Stopped the Drug Trade

War on Drugs Fails—International Studies Prove

Impact Answers

Answers to: Drug Cartels Cause Violence

Answers to: Drug Cartels Cause Poverty

Answers to: Drug Cartels Cause Economic Slowdown

Answers to: Drug Cartels Cause Gender Violence

Answers to: Drug Cartels Cause Sex and Human Trafficking

Answers to: Drug Cartels Cause Violence in Black Communities

Glossary

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Organized Crime Disadvantage AnswersSLUDL/NAUDL 2015-16

(Novice, JV, & Varsity Only)

Cartel—an organization created to regulate the supply of a good

Drug Cartel—a criminal organization that primarily participates in illegal drug markets but may also engage in human smuggling, kidnapping, oil theft and other crimes. Examples include Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Cartel

Trafficking—the illegal trade of something

Drug trafficking—The illegal trade of drugs

Hegemony—political, economic, and or military dominance

Oil Shock –a fast and significant change in the oil market

Homicide – killing of one person by another

Drug War/War on Drugs – the term referring to a set of strategies Mexico and the United States currently use to fight drug cartels. These strategies tend to be militaristic, including military aid and the capture of cartel members

Enrique Peña Nieto—the current President of Mexico

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) – the US agency tasked with solving drug trafficking

Counter-Narcotics—measures used to combat drug trafficking

Border Patrol – the Department of Homeland Security agency that attempts to prevent the entry of undocumented immigrants and other persons on the border

Force Multiplier – something that significantly increases the potential of an action or policy

RGV – the Rio Grande Valley, an area monitored by the Border Patrol

Insurgency—violent rebellion against government authority

Transnational – in more than one country

ISIS surveillance – in this file, ISIS surveillance refers to a surveillance system, not the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ICE – U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement , a federal agency tasked with immigration policy

SOD – Special Operations Division , a part of the Drug Enforcement Agency that does covert information gathering primarily surrounding drug trafficking

Kingpin – the leader of a crime organization

Database—a collection of information for a particular purpose

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Organized Crime Disadvantage (N, JV, & V Only)SLUDL/NAUDL 2015-16

AFFIRMATIVE

Uniqueness—Drug Violence Is Increasing Because of Current Strategies

( ) Cartel violence is only increasing—departure from current strategies is needed

Bender, Reporter, 2015

Jeremy, Reporter, May 14th, Mexico's drug war is getting even worse, Business Insider,

Despite eight years of violence spanning two Mexican presidential administrations, the country's drug war has continued with few signs that Mexico's drug cartels are waning in power.¶ Formally launched in December 2006 by former President Felipe Calderon and then continued under his successor, Enrique Pena Nieto, the drug war struck a series of high profile blows against Mexican cartels. At the same time, it triggered nationwide violence without coming anywhere close to defeating the country's drug traffickers.¶ Now, it's getting even worse.¶ High-profile captures — but a worrying shifting cartel tactics¶ Most recently, Omar Treviño Morales, the head of the notorious Zetas cartel, was arrested in March. Morales' arrest came within a week of the capture of Servando "La Tuta" Gomez, the head of the Knights Templar cartel and Mexico's most-wanted drug lord. ¶ But this "kingpin strategy" of targeting the heads of cartels has done little to quell the violence and bring security to Mexico. At least 60,000 people are believed to have died between 2006 and 2012 as a result of the drug war as cartels, vigilante groups, and the Mexican army and police have battled each other. ¶ The ongoing takedown of top-level drug lords has also contributed to the fragmentation of the cartels, leading to the emergence and growth of new, even more militaristic groups — some of which have started to directly target the Mexican military. ¶ The latest threat to emerge in Mexico is the Jalisco New Generation Drug Cartel (CJNG).¶ Most drug traffickers do not have an explicitly anti-government stance — they're criminal paramilitaries, not insurgent groups. But CJNG has proven willing to directly engage the Mexican military and police in brazen pitched battles, sometimes in broad daylight.¶ On May 1, the CJNG carried out attacks in Guadalajara after federal authorities staged an operation against the cartel's leader, NemesioOseguera. During the assault, the CJNG carried out arson attacks in two dozen other cities around Mexico, set up roadblocks, and downed a military helicopter with a rocket-propelled grenade, according to the AP. ¶ That incident was just the latest in a string of attacks against Mexican security forces. On April 7, the cartel ambushed a convoy of elite state police security officers en route to Guadalajara. Fifteen police officers were killed in the assault and a further five were wounded.

Uniqueness—Drug Violence Is Increasing In an Unprecedented Fashion

( ) Increases in drug violence are unprecedented—the disadvantage impacts are inevitable

Wilkinson, Reporter, 2015

Tracy, May 6th, Mexico drug violence intensifies as elections approach, LA Times,

The government of President Enrique Peña Nieto has killed or captured major drug lords in its 2 1/2 years in office, including the most-wanted fugitive Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, detained last year, and Servando "La Tuta" Gomez, head of Michoacan state's notorious gang operations, caught this year.¶ But those victories have given way to other organizations that have grown in the void.¶ With the fracturing of the Sinaloa and Zeta cartels, the country's most prominent, the New Generation of Jalisco quietly moved into preeminence, taking advantage of Jalisco state's geographical advantage on the west coast and its position as a business and industrial hub. The group is believed to be behind the downing of the military helicopter.¶ The New Generation of Jalisco "is a criminal group with very significant firepower," said Monte Alejandro Rubido, national security commissioner. "This undoubtedly has a very special connotation."¶ It is rare for drug cartels to confront the military head-on, and army commanders were furious about the attack. It is also virtually unheard of that cartels would use arms the level of rocket-propelled grenades.¶ "The magnitude of the attacks was spectacular," security expert Eduardo Guerrero said in El Financiero newspaper, noting they came as the government launched Operation Jalisco, designed to rein in the traffickers.¶ It is now likely that the military will launch a full-scale offensive against the Jalisco gangsters.¶ "A very difficult time approaches in Jalisco," Alejandro Hope, a former intelligence analyst, wrote in El Universal newspaper.

Surveillance Fails To Solve Organized Crime

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( ) Surveillance fails to solve crime – studies prove

Sheinin, Professor of International Law and Human Rights, 2014

(Martin, Professor of International Law and Human Rights at the European University Institute, October 14th, EU-Funded Study: Electronic Mass Surveillance Fails – Drastically, Just Security, A Security Analysis Website that is Supported by Open Society Foundations, Atlantic Philanthropies, and New York University School of Law,

Electronic mass surveillance – including the mass trawling of both metadata and content by the US National Security Agency – fails drastically in striking the correct balance between security and privacy that American officials and other proponents of surveillance insist they are maintaining.¶ We arrived at this conclusion by subjecting a wide-range of surveillance technologies to three separate assessments by three parallel expert teams representing engineers, ethicists, and lawyers. Each team conducted assessments of surveillance technologies, looking at ethical issues they raise; the legal constraints on their use – or those that should exist – on the basis of privacy and other fundamental rights; and, finally, their technical usability and cost-efficiency. This work was fed into and commented upon by two end-user panels, one consisting of law enforcement officials and the other of representatives of cities and municipalities. Various surveillance techniques and technologies were assessed during a scenario that simulated real-life experiences where surveillance has been used. The results of this research were published in the SURVEILLE paper, Assessing Surveillance in the Context of Preventing a Terrorist Act, available here.¶ Our research found that electronic mass surveillance performed poorly in terms of practical usability, ethical grounds, and the protection of privacy rights, whereas traditional (non-technological) surveillance or strictly targeted electronic surveillance might have a chance to strike a “balance.” The novelty in our work is demonstrating this through semi-quantification and numerical scores.¶ Electronic mass surveillance technologies were assessed in a terrorism prevention scenario in which six different surveillance methods were used to try to detect a terrorist act that was possibly in preparation.¶

Surveillance Fails To Solve Organized Crime—It is Politically and Economically Motivated

Mass surveillance is not helpful – it is politically and economically motivated rather than designed to solve organized crime and officials lie and exaggerate its effectiveness

Xynou, Masters in Security Studies from the University College London, 2015

Maria, researcher for Tactical Technology Collective, formerly worked for the Center for Internet and Society, Jan 8th, Lies and Revelations: Why mass surveillance is not about catching the “bad guys”,

In response to the Snowden revelations, many governments have argued that we need surveillance to safeguard national security – and this is not a new rhetoric. Ever since 9/11, governments across the globe which have, directly or indirectly, aligned with U.S foreign policy have argued that there is a trade-off between civil liberties and security. This implies that it is acceptable for intelligence agencies to spy on our communications so that they can detect criminals and terrorists – otherwise known as the "bad guys".¶ However, if we look a bit closer at the classified documents leaked by Snowden, it is evident that targeted surveillance is largely used to enhance the political and economic advantage of those in power, while mass surveillance is directed at spying on almost everyone – regardless of whether they have engaged in criminal activity or not.¶ Following the first Snowden revelations in 2013, General Keith B. Alexander – the (now former) Director of the NSA – testified to Congress:¶ In recent years, these programs, together with other intelligence, have protected the U.S and our allies from terrorist threats across the globe to include helping prevent the potential terrorist events over 50 times since 9/11.¶ This is just one quote through which a representative of law enforcement justifies mass surveillance in the name of national security. In June 2013, the NSA stated that it had successfully thwarted at least 50 potential terrorist attacks – which may or may not have occurred – through its bulk surveillance programmes. General Keith Alexander subsequently defended his agency's mass surveillance systems by arguing that he saw no effective alternative to the bulk collection of telephone and other electronic metadata to prevent terrorist attacks.¶ However, General Keith Alexander later admitted in October 2013 that he had lied about at least 50 terrorist plots having being thwarted through mass surveillance and that actually only one or two potential terrorist plots had been prevented as a result of his agency's operations.¶ Surveillance in the name of national security¶

NSA Surveillance Fails– Because It Is Sloppy and Costly

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( ) NSA Surveillance fails to solve organized crime – its sloppy and costly data collection has resulted in failure in the past

Schneier, Reporter, 2014

(Bruce, Reporter, January 6th, How the NSA Threatens National Security, The Atlantic, magazine,

We have no evidence that any of this surveillance makes us safer. NSA Director General Keith Alexander responded to these stories in June by claiming that he disrupted 54 terrorist plots. In October, he revised that number downward to 13, and then to "one or two." At this point, the only "plot" prevented was that of a San Diego man sending $8,500 to support a Somali militant group. We have been repeatedly told that these surveillance programs would have been able to stop 9/11, yet the NSA didn't detect the Boston bombings—even though one of the two terrorists was on the watch list and the other had a sloppy social media trail. Bulk collection of data and metadata is an ineffective counterterrorism tool.¶ Not only is ubiquitous surveillance ineffective, it is extraordinarily costly. I don't mean just the budgets, which will continue to skyrocket. Or the diplomatic costs, as country after country learns of our surveillance programs against their citizens. I'm also talking about the cost to our society. It breaks so much of what our society has built. It breaks our political systems, as Congress is unable to provide any meaningful oversight and citizens are kept in the dark about what government does. It breaks our legal systems, as laws are ignored or reinterpreted, and people are unable to challenge government actions in court. It breaks our commercial systems, as U.S. computer products and services are no longer trusted worldwide. It breaks our technical systems, as the very protocols of the Internet become untrusted. And it breaks our social systems; the loss of privacy, freedom, and liberty is much more damaging to our society than the occasional act of random violence.¶ And finally, these systems are susceptible to abuse. This is not just a hypothetical problem. Recent history illustrates many episodes where this information was, or would have been, abused: Hoover and his FBI spying, McCarthy, Martin Luther King Jr. and the civil rights movement, anti-war Vietnam protesters, and—more recently—the Occupy movement. Outside the U.S., there are even more extreme examples. Building the surveillance state makes it too easy for people and organizations to slip over the line into abuse.

NSA Surveillance Fails – Because It Results in Too Much Data

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( ) NSA Surveillance cannot weaken the Drug Trade –the agency’s obsession with surveillance just creates a mountain of data that’s impossible to analyze

Moody, Technology Author, 2015

(Glyn, technology journalist and author, February 27th, We Now Know The NSA And GCHQ Have Subverted Most (All?) Of The Digital World: So Why Can't We See Any Benefits?, Tech Dirt,

That being the case, there is another important question. If the NSA and other parties do have ways of turning practically every digital electronic device into a system for spying on its users, that essentially means there is no criminal organization in the world -- ranging from the so-called "terrorist" ones that are used to justify so much bad policy currently, to the "traditional" ones that represent the bulk of the real threat to society -- that is not vulnerable to being infiltrated and subverted by government agencies. ¶ And yet we don't see this happen. Drug cartels thrive; people trafficking is surging; the smuggling of ivory and endangered animals is profitable as never before. Similarly, despite the constant and sophisticated monitoring of events across the Middle East, the rise of Islamic State evidently took the US and its allies completely by surprise. How is it that global criminality has not been brought to its knees, or that such massive geopolitical developments were not picked up well in advance -- and nipped in the bud? ¶ One obvious explanation for this pattern is that just as the attackers of London, Boston, Paris and Copenhagen were all known to the authorities, so early tell-tale signs of the rise of Islamic State were detected, but remained drowned out by the sheer volume of similar and confounding information that was being gathered. Similarly, it is presumably easy to create huge stores of information on drug bosses or people smugglers -- but hard to find enough personnel to analyze and act on that data mountain. ¶ Now that we have a better idea of the extraordinary reach of the global surveillance being carried out at all times, the failure of that activity to make us safer by countering criminal activity, at whatever scale, becomes all the more striking. It's time the intelligence agencies accepted that the "collect it all" approach is not just failing, but actually exactly wrong: what we need is not more surveillance, but much less of it and much better targeted.

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Illegal Immigration Surveillance Fails – There is No Relationship Between Illegal Immigrants andDrug Trafficking

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( ) Immigration surveillance does not help weaken the Drug Trade because there is no strong connection between illegal immigration and drug traffickers. Data is at best uncertain and exaggerated

Hensley, Journalist, 2010