Lack of Intelligence Hampers Operations

Lack of intelligence hampers operations

Introduction

Intelligence-driven operations ensure the economical and efficient use of resources, focused on the prompt and effective achievement of peace operation objectives at hand. Operations not directed or guided by intelligence, or crisis-management operations conducted reactively or on gut feeling, will fail to achieve objectives successfully.

The word “Intelligence” within the UN was considered unacceptable for many years. This point of view has started to change recently. The UN have realised that a basic, overt intelligence capability is required in order to guide operations and achieve objectives. In the interest of projecting a non-threatening posture, however, the term military information is used, and not intelligence.

Experiencies

Nyamamba

In March this year we ran a series of high profile operations in ITURI involving several contingents. One of these, Operation NYAMAMBA, aimed to disarm UPC militia deployed outside authorized camps by using three- four companies and all available helicopters. The NYAMAMBA area was believed to harbour about 300 militia members. The operation succeeded, but not without encountering a number of difficulties created by a lack of intelligence.

We were unable to carry out a needed ground reconnaissance as our troops had been ambushed during previous patrols. Unfortunately, available information volunteered by the local population in nearby villages was only partially accurate.

We had no usable maps. The operation plan was mainly built on air reconnaissance conducted at altitudes in excess of 500 m and on photographs taken with private digital cameras. Therefore we were unable to identify all militia locations with the result that when we executed the operation, we came under fire from unexpected directions.

Areas of elephant grass were not identified. One platoon was ambushed in such a place during the action.

A bridge detected on the photographs proved to be non-existent on the ground.

The airborne company faced big problems in fulfilling its mission since, during the reconnaissance, the elevation of hills in the rolling landscape was underestimated.

Bukavu crisis

During the BUKAVU crisis in May-June the dissident General NKUNDA marched towards BUKAVU with soldiers belonging to the Forces Armées République Démocratique du Congo, (FARDC). On his way from MINOVA to BUKAVU his forces were significantly reinforced to a strength of between 2-3,000 men.

NKUNDA’s intentions were unclear to MONUC and that created difficulties when we tried to determine his status.

NKUNDA’s troops were reinforced with troops brought across Lake Kivu, some of which probably came from RWANDA. He also moved troops on barges on the lake from GOMA. Some of his troops marched over the mountains. In eastern CONGO all movement of troops takes place during the dark hours while fighting occurs in daylight. When NKUNDA entered BUKAVU during the morning hours his troops emerged from different directions even though his logistic units were bound to the single road.

The two MILOB teams that had been deployed along the KivuLake were redeployed to safety at MONUC compounds. This lack of surveillance capability on the lake and a poor night fighting capability within MONUC made it impossible to determine NKUNDA’s troop movements.

Demonstrations

On 9 June a large demonstration of between 8-10,000 people, including about 500 hardliners armed with primitive weapons and sticks, suddenly erupted in BUKAVU. The Kivu Bde, heavily employed by the BUKAVU crisis for 2.5 weeks, was taken by surprise.

Pieces of information indicated a manifestation for peace but nothing more. Language limitations among the ranks hampered communication with the local population. Swahiliphones were most requested. We lacked a proper intelligence network inside BUKAVU. A small amount of money to pay for information and develop HUMINT contacts would have helped.

In the end we succeeded to contain the demonstration although at one stage we were close to losing control of the situation. This was mainly due to lack of pre-warning.

Future operations

The mandate given to MONUC in SC resolution 1565 of 1 October prescribes:

“To support the operations to disarm foreign combatants led by the armed forces of the DRC.”

The mandate also authorizes MONUC to use all necessary means, within its capacity.

At this moment we are making preparations for such operations and plans are developed in coordination with the FARDC. We are in need of a reinforced intelligence capability to be able to carry out missions successfully.

The dominating group, of Rwandan rebels, is well organized and rather well equipped. We need precise information about: the location of their camps and accommodation areas; landing sites for our helicopters; road network if present; terrain conditions as well as information about their units and their capability to engage our helicopters and APCs.

Preparations must mainly be done by air recce and if available, Special Forces. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) would be an invaluable asset. Money to pay for information should be available when we are interacting with the population in the nearby areas.

The information cycle

To be credible, effective and be able to guide operations, military information (mil info) has to be conducted in a structured manner. To ensure professional management, in order to achieve useful outputs and products, the information cycle is used as a tool.

The cycle however has to be complete, resourced, guided and continuously fed, or redirected to be of any value.

The cycle should further be managed as a dynamic and live process, with the content ever-changing, to adapt to the requirements of the situation and the commander’s intent.

The information cycle compromises of the following basic steps:

• The commander’s intent could also be referred to as “direction”.
• Information collection
• Analysis and processing
• Dissemination.

Commander’s intent

The first and most important step in the information cycle is the commander’s intent. This initiates all military activities, including the information process and provides direction to the entire information effort, thus ultimately, determining the result, or product.

Information collection

The second step in the information cycle is collection. The collection effort entails all those agencies and relevant activities involved with the obtaining of information, defined by the UN as “the exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of reports”. The first thoughts that come to mind when thinking collection are mandate, sources and resources; let us discuss these as my last points.

Analysis and processing

Raw information is of no value to a commander. It needs to be put through a process of collation to extract the value out of the information obtained, to create or turn raw information into intelligence. This process is called analysis, or processing.

Dissemination

To be of any value, intelligence has to be shared. Dissemination is the last, but not the least, step of the mil info cycle, which relevant info is distributed to the relevant / applicable appointments.

Collection

Quickly back to the sources and resources for collection.

Collection sources

Collection mandate. Peace operations differ from conventional operations in that the collection and processing of information, or the producing of intelligence, may be politically restricted.

Contingents. Addressing the military deployed in the area, although invaluable, the following immediate shortcomings with the Kivu Bde were identified:

Not all the battalions had established a routine to conduct information patrols including briefing and debriefing on their own initiative. All information patrols were conducted on instruction of the Kivu Bde HQ. Specifically with two subunits valuable information was lost due to failure to report or report properly.

MILOBs. Deployed to be the “eyes and ears of MONUC”, the MILOBs ensured a constant flow of information to the Kivu Bde. Although several problems were experienced with the reporting of the MILOBs, they were useable sources. With the evacuation of the MILOBs, the flow of information dried up and never recovered.

The Kivu Bde HQ was heavily affected by the evacuation of the MILOB teams, during the BUKAVU crisis. Suddenly the “eyes and ears” of the Bde were shut and there was no continuous flow of information to the Bde HQ. The secondary sources of the Bde HQ and subordinate units were the NGO’s and lesser-used UN agencies. Thus, they became the primary sources, along with the RSABATT and URUBATT, as deployed.

UN offices and agencies. No problems were experienced with co-operation, but there were frustrations about the reporting. As experienced, especially concerning our civilian counterparts and colleagues, alternative reporting channels were something we had to learn to live with, although very frustrating.

In the second place, but a close second, was the reporting by the UN offices and agencies on military matters. Worst than this was the trust and belief our superior HQ put in these reports.

Some UN offices and agencies had excellent access to very good sources. Understandably, they did not want to break the trust with their sources by sharing sensitive information.

NGOs. Ngo’s were very reluctant to share information. In the case of the ICRC, for example, it is totally understandable and it always takes some extended time to establish enough trust for them to share any information. After all, their neutrality is their security! More or less the same challenges experienced with the UN agencies were also experienced with the NGO’s, and more.

Government sources. The main government sources were the Congolese national army and provincial / local administrations. We experienced that 99% of all reporting was politically, or self-interest motivated, and dare it be said – “inspired”, and needs to be checked / followed up thoroughly.

They did not trust MONUC and used us as a tool only, reporting to us what they wanted us to know, or believe.

Population. It was understood, but opposed, or challenged at least, was the absolute restriction on payment for information. However, the matter of transparency, politics and neutrality taken into account, the effective collection of information requires the mandate and funding to pay, or reimburse in some way, for information received.

Collection resources

Resources available to the military information collection effort were too limited. With the vast mandate and resources available to the UN, surprisingly few of them were seen, or experienced during the time of reporting. Ranging from satellites to infantry, the UN had access to enormous resources for use by intelligence. The Kivu Bde had some resources to deploy, but unfortunately, due to a variety of reasons not all resources were used to the fullest.

MOU. The UN should revise the TCC MOU about military information resources. More military information orientated resources are required.

Special Forces. On numerous occasions Special Forces type of operations were required. If available such units could have given sufficient early warning and related information at NKUNDA march to BUKAVU.

Night fighting capability. I said earlier that the Congolese military formations, national army, or militia, fight in the day, but move during the night time. If sufficient equipment and trained troops had been available valuable information would have been collected.

Helicopters. Sufficient transport and attack helicopters were available in the area of operation. These helicopters however were too big for reconnaissance purposes. Smaller, more tactical helicopters than the MI-17 / MI-8 are required for information collection purpose.

Fixed wing reconnaissance aircraft. A requirement for a smaller type fixed wing aircraft was also identified, to fly longer and higher reconnaissance missions, equipped with adequate photographic equipment.

Unmanned aerial vehicles. UAV are invaluable in mil info operations. The endurance, silence and if correctly equipped, the direct feedback of information to the control centre are of crucial importance to the tactical information process.

Night flying capability. At least some of the available aircrafts should have an improved night flying capability and night surveillance equipment.

Units on the lakes. Lake Kivu was, and still is, un-patrolled. Numerous reports of boat traffic across Lake Kivu were reported, but MONUC did not have the resources to follow up the information, or conduct any patrols.

SIGINT. A definite need for signal intelligence (sigint) existed. Tracking of signals were required, in the establishing of certain individual’s whereabouts. In the location of the concentration of foreign armed groupings, sigint can play a vital role.

Functional resources. A huge shortage so-called functional resource was experienced. Items as cameras, video cameras and other specialist equipment are required in the mil info environment in the effective execution of the task.

IT resources. There were policies and prescriptions. But the number of staff sharing the same computer has to be revised urgently. The collection and processing of information is a full time specialist function, which is IT dependant.

Bde level G2 structure. The posts allocated to the Kivu Bde HQ G2 compartment were insufficient for the task at hand. Responsible to manage, gather, process and disseminate mil info for the entire Kivu Bde (sector 5) area of operations, were eight officers and three clerks.

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11:10 A3/P310/29/2018