Sergei Serebriany (Moscow)

Sergei Serebriany (Moscow)

(Anti-/Non-)European Dimensions in Post-Soviet Russian Self-identifications

Abstract of a paper which I first though I would have to present at the conference

HOMO EUROPAEUS – East and West

(the session “Models for the Future”)

In the “Author’s Preface” to his recent book “Negative Identity” (Moscow, 2004, in Russian) Lev Gudkov, a distinguished Russian sociologist, emphatically states the fact of “the growing dissatisfaction with the conceptual and theoretical arsenal of sociology and political sciences at our disposal” (p.5). According to Gudkov, “the arsenal of Western social sciences has revealed its limited applicability and descriptive inadequacy” for today’s social reality in Russia (ibidem). Russian social and political scientists ought to work out more adequate theoretical (conceptual) tools for describing and analysing their country and their people, but they (the scientists) fail to do so, the main reason being the general “atrophy of the intellectual community” in post-Soviet Russia. Thus speaks Gudkov.

On the one hand, these lamentations-cum-diatribes may be taken as but new variations on the old theme (thesis) of Russia’s uniqueness and difference from the “West” (and the rest of the world). One of the classical formulations of this thesis are the often quoted lines of Fiodor Tiutchev (1803- 1873):

Umom Rossiju ne poniat’,

Arshinom obshchim ne izmerit’… -

which may be translated as:

By [Western] intellect Russia is not to be understood,

By a common [Western] measure she is not to be measured…

But, on the other hand, it may be argued that any theoretical (conceptual) “arsenal” (to retain the paramilitary term of Gudkov) always has but a “limited applicability” to any reality it tries to describe and analyse (to “attack” or to “besiege”) – and so is never quite adequate to any reality. The Russian case may certainly involve some peculiar problems and complexities, but, referring to them as dramatically as he does, Lev Gudkov seems to fall into an old trap of the “Russian discourse” with its traditional dramatisation of the differences between Russia and the “West” (originally, Western Europe).

Now, in spite of his general disillusionment with the “Western” conceptual “arsenal”, Gudkov puts at the centre of his own book one of the most “faddish” Western terms: “identity”. One of the main peculiarities of the present Russian situation, according to Gudkov, is that people are inclined to define their “identity” (whatever it means) not positively, but negatively, that is through opposing themselves to others, to “aliens”, “enemies” and various “evil-doers”. This is the meaning of the term “negative identity”. Whether or not this is indeed the prevailing type of self-identification in today’s Russia, seems to be in itself a statement in need of verification. But, again, I doubt if this type of self-identification is peculiarly Russian. The Russian case (if such is indeed the case) may be just a variety of a more general (if not universal) phenomenon.

The term “identity” in the West has shared the fate of many other fashionable words: it has been used so widely that has become almost meaningless (cf. e.g.: Brubaker R. and Cooper F. Beyond Identity // Theory and Society. 2000. № 1, pp. 1-47). But in Russia and in the Russian language the corresponding word (actually the translation of the Western original) “identichnost’ ” is right now probably at the peak of its popularity. Recently, at an “inter-faith” meeting of Catholics and Orthodox Christians in Moscow, I heard a Russian Orthodox priest discussing the perspectives of mutual understanding between the two confessions. In his speech, one of the most often used words was “identichnost’ ” (that is “identity”): he insisted on the necessity for Orthodox Christians to “keep their identity”. After the session I asked him how he would define the term “identichnost’ ” and if he could find a more “native” word for the idea. He replied that “identichnost’ ” means simply “what we are”, but there is no native Russian word for the idea.

This case is indeed very telling. Even those Russians who want to stress their non-Western (non-Western-European) identity cannot help using the language of Western Europe for formulating and expressing their ideas. The modern Russian language was formed during the 18-20th centuries under a strong influence of Western European languages (German, Dutch, French, even Latin; later and to a lesser extent English), especially as far as intellectual discourses are concerned.

At this point I must remark that my paper deals only with ethnic Russians in today’s Russian Federation. Other peoples and other languages of our country, and their attitudes towards Europe, may present quite different stories.

For the purposes of my paper I may define “identity” as the feeling of (being conscious of) belonging to a certain entity (territorial, ethnic, linguistic, confessional, political etc.). One of the main problems (if not the main problem) with identities in today’s Russia is that very few (if any) entities (including Russia herself) can be clearly and unambiguously defined. Again, in today’s (post-modern) world Russia is hardly unique in this respect. For instance, and in a much similar way, speaking about (the) European identity we first of all stumble over the question “What is Europe?”.

Nevertheless even sociologists in Russia now use the words “Europe” and “European” in their questionnaires and in their analytical comments. Thus, Boris Dubin wrote recently that “according to the surveys of the last decade the majority of Russians either still, as before, do not feel and do not consider themselves as belonging to Europe, not considering the European culture their own, or – and this is a more recent development – have increasing difficulties with answering this question”. And here is a table:

Do you feel being a European?

(the figures show the % of the number N of respondents)

1995, 1996, 2003, 2004,

N=2000 N=1600 N=1600 N=1600

Often 10 12 12 17

Sometimes 13 16 14 16

Rarely 18 18 18 15

Never 56 52 55 40

Difficult to say 3 2 1 12

If we may rely on these figures, they might as well be interpreted in a different way: the number of those who never feel European has decreased, and the number of those who do feel European (even if rarely) has increased. But the figures at this table are, in any case, somewhat like the figures of the average temperature of patients at a hospital. It is a priori clear that answers to the question “Do you feel being a European?” would differ greatly in different social groups and in different regions of Russia. Next, we should also ask questions about what people consider “European”. It is also a priori clear that answers would be very different. In my paper I will try and discuss these matters on the basis of available data.