United Nations Security Council


  1. Welcome Letter from the Chair
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  1. Introduction to the Committee
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  1. Topic A [Addressing the crevices of the SecurityCouncil in the wake of attacksby Non State Actors]:
  2. Introduction to the Topic
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  1. Timeline of events
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  1. Discussion
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  1. Bloc Positions
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  1. Conclusion – Key issues
  1. Bibliography
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Delegates,

It is my absolute honour to welcome you all to this edition of the Warwick MUN. Looking at how the organizing team is pulling things together, I am sure this will have a deep impact in your MUN experience and also on you as a person. That said, the core strength of the conference lies with youIf you want to do justice to the time, effort, energy and money that you’d be spending for the conference, strong research is a must. And this background guide helps you do just that. This guide has been wonderfully arranged to guide you through your research for the conference, which is just over a week away. This Background Guide is a collection of relevant material from various sources on the agenda – Addressing the crevices of the Security Council in the wake of attacks by Non State Actors. A very interesting issue to discuss and we hope with necessary preparation, you can come up with some great debate. Every issue, statement, policy, response and all the science behind every decision or lack thereof mentioned in this guide is supremely important. We have intentionally not mentioned a few related points from the guide to judge you on the depth of research. I’m sure this generation of MUN-ers are insanely talented and would do total justice to the agenda and the conference’s purpose. For any clarification on the agenda, the committee and anything at all, feel free to contact the executive board. MUNs are all about the experience. How we spend those two or three days, push us to earn about ourselves. Every MUN we do, every country we represent as a delegate, every committee we chair, the experience stays on. And that is the biggest take away from the conference. So be prepared to have a fun time, whilst intriguing debate, because the combination is just too romantic to miss. We urge you to use this background guide only as a starting point for your research. At no point are you supposed to rely completely on it. Only when you research beyond the guide can we ensure healthy debate. What this Executive Board expects is that you to express an analysis of the information you have, not to just read out that information. This will be a fast paced committee, and despite the tremendous pressure, it will be a refreshing experience from the usual pace of debate in MUNs. Never be afraid to suggest something out of the box, because the UN SECURITY COUNCIL is going to be discussed by your peers if you can lobby. We expect the delegates to perform well by striking the right balance between Substantive and Procedural knowledge.

Best of Luck,

Adrij Chakraborty

(Chairperson of UNSC, Warwick MUN 2016)

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1

The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House, Westminster, London. Since its first meeting, the Security Council has taken permanent residence at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City. It also travelled to many cities, holding sessions in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1972, in Panama City, Panama, and in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1990.

A representative of each of its members must be present at all times at UN Headquarters so that the Security Council can meet at any time as the need arises. Article 29 of the United Nations Charter sets out that the Security Council may establish subsidiary bodies as needed for the performance of its functions. This is also reflected in Rule 28 of the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure.

All existing committees and working groups are comprised of the fifteen members of the Council. While standing committees are chaired by the President of the Council, rotating on a monthly basis, other committees and working groups are chaired or co-chaired by designated members of the Council who are announced on an annual basis by a Note of the President of the Security Council.

The mandate of subsidiary organs, whether they are committees or working groups, can range from procedural matters (e.g. documentation and procedures, meetings away from headquarters) to substantive issues (e.g. sanctions regimes, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations).

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are subsidiary organs of the Security Council within the terms of article 29 of the Charter. As such they are dependent on the UN in administrative and financial matters, although as judicial institutions, they are independent of any one State or group of States, including their parent body, the Security Council.

Subsidiary Committees:

  1. Counter-Terrorism and Non-Proliferation Committees

Counter-Terrorism Committee

1540 Committee

  1. Military Staff Committee: The Military Staff Committee helps plan UN military measures and regulate armaments.
  1. Sanctions Committees: The use of mandatory sanctions is intended to apply pressure on a State or entity to comply with the objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to the use of force. Sanctions thus offer the Security Council an important instrument to enforce its decisions. The universal character of the United Nations makes it an especially appropriate body to establish and monitor such measures. The Council has resorted to mandatory sanctions as an enforcement tool when peace has been threatened and diplomatic efforts have failed. The range of sanctions has included comprehensive economic and trade sanctions and/or more targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, financial or diplomatic restrictions.
  2. Standing Committees and Ad Hoc Bodies: Standing Committees are open-ended and generally were established to address certain procedural questions, such as the admission of new members. Ad hoc committees are established for a limited time and to address a specific issue.

The Council vis-à-vis the United Nations Charter:

The Charter of the United Nations is the foundation document for all the UN work. The UN was established to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security. Peacekeeping, although not explicitly provided for in the Charter, has evolved into one of the main tools used by the United Nations to achieve this purpose. The Charter gives the UN Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Council may adopt a range of measures, including the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation.

The Security Council is the executive body of the United Nations whose main responsibility as laid out by Chapter V of the UN Charter is to maintain international peace and security.

The Security Council comprises of 15 member states, as per Article 23 of the UN Charter: 5 Permanent Members and 10 non- permanent states, which are elected for terms lasting two years. The five permanent states (collectively known as the P5) are the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the French Republic, the People’s Republic of China, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the Northern Ireland. As up to December 2016, the 10 non-permanent members are Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine and Uruguay.

For all voting procedures regarding amendments and resolutions, nine affirmative votes are required, including the collective consent of the P5 nations. Observer states may not vote on substantial matters. The Security Council enjoys a number of special powers under its jurisdiction that enable it to successfully accomplish its objectives as per the UN Charter:

Article 25: All member states must accept and carry out the decisions taken by the Council.

Articles 33-38: The Security Council can assess any conflict so as to ascertain whether it poses a threat to international peace. It may call upon the parties to the conflict to adopt specific means to bring the dispute to a pacific settlement. These recommendations are non-binding in nature.

Articles 39-51: The Security Council may determine any threat to international peace and can suggest a set of provisional measures to ease the tension. Furthermore, it enjoys the power to impose enforcement measures, such as economic sanctions or collective military action.

These decisions are binding in nature. However, it should also be noted that the Charter does not preclude the inherent right of self-defence of a nation or a group of nations (Article 51), nor does it prohibit the existence of regional arrangements among member states (Chapter VIII), provided that the activities of such agencies are consistent with the Principles of the UN.

Mandate:

The mandate of the SC is to maintain international peace and security and to take actions whenever peace and security are threatened. The Council’s authority is particularly relevant when looking at the United Nations’ four primary purposes, as specified in the Charter of the United Nations (1945): maintaining international peace and security; developing friendly relations among nations; cooperating in solving international problems; promoting respect for human rights as well as being a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. According to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Council shall determine the existence of any threat to international security and formulate recommendations accordingly. In order to prevent the escalation of a given conflict, the Council may call upon the parties to comply with provisional measures. In addition to these responsibilities, the body may also recommend new Member States to the United Nations General Assembly (GA) as well as suggest the expulsion of a Member State if considered that if has persistently violated the UN principles, as laid out in the Charter.

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A. Introduction to the Topic

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The debate concerning Security Council reform has historically been a very complex one. It goes hand in hand with the overall effort to reform the United Nations, in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness, legitimacy and implementation of its decisions. While there is consensus that the current structure and mode of working of the Council is problematic, there is wide disagreement as to how this can be addressed.

In the wake of an alarming wave of terrorist attacks by Non State Actors, an efficient and quick Security Council now seems to be needed more than ever. However, several crevices of the Security Council that indeed emanate from the Charter, have stopped it from taking rapid and effective action in situations and crises that are urgent and life-threatening.

The most important crevices of the Security Council include the veto power of the permanent members (P5), its size and representation, and its working methods. The most criticism has been directed at the infamous “veto power” of the P5 members since it has time and time again stopped the Council from adopting binding resolutions which would effectively deal with a life threatening crisis. An apt An apt example of that would be China’s and Russia’s constant veto on sanctions against Syria, Sudan or Iran or the US’ common veto on resolutions that are critical to Israel. The rationale for initially giving this great amount of power to the P5 nations was that the UN should not be taking direct action against any of its principal founding members[1]. Yet we see that this has been sacrificed in the name of national interests, and therefore results in inefficiency and non-security.

Delegates should always keep in mind the mandate of the Security Council as laid out by Chapter V of the UN Charter; namely to maintain international peace and security and to take actions whenever the aforementioned are threatened. The structure and mechanism of the Council play a crucial role in allowing those objectives to be achieved, and should therefore be revisited in the wake of alarming international threats by Non State Actors.

B. Timeline of events

The deliberations regarding the issue of Security Council reform have been numerous and spread over a long period of time. This timeline is not exhaustive, but rather tries to pinpoint to some of the most noteworthy events and decisions that made an impact in the overall process of reforming the Council.

-1992, A/RES/47/62

The United Nations General Assembly began discussions on the reform of the Security Council, as there was consensus that the Council was unrepresentative and undemocratic. Security Councilreform was added to the agenda of the General Assembly’s 48th Session.

-1993, A/RES/48/26

The A/RES/48/26 resolution resulted in the establishment of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), whose aim was to consider all aspects of the Security Council reform issue and submit a report on the progress of its work to the General Assembly before the end of its forty-eighth session.

-1997, Paper by the PGA/Chairman of the OEWG, Ismail Razali.

The paper was distributed in March 1997 in the form of a draft resolution, calling for the addition of five permanent and four non-permanent seats. New permanent seats included: two from industrialised countries, 1 from African developing countries, 1 from Asian developing countries, 1 from GRULAC developing countries. It did not include extension of veto power to new seats. After 10 years the situation could be reviewed. Also contained language on improved working methods. However, the GA decided not to adopt this resolution in 1998, by resolution A/RES/53/30.

-2 December 2004, A/RES/59/565

The then Secretary General Kofi Annan distributes the report from the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, in preparation for the 2005 World Summit. On Security Council reform it proposes two models, A & B.

252. Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

253. Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four- year renewable-term seats and one new two-year nonpermanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

Clause 256 of this report is also highly important in regards to the veto powers, and it reads: “... We also ask the permanent members, in their individual capacities, to pledge themselves to refrain from the use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses. We recommend that under any reform proposal, there should be no expansion of the veto”.

-September 2008, Decision 62/557

The passing of this decision formalised the intergovernmental negotiations (IGN) as a way to address the problem, and decided that those deliberations should focus on 5 key issues:

  1. Categories of membership
  2. The question of the veto
  3. Regional representation
  4. Size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council
  5. The relationship between the Council and the General Assembly

-2013-2014

PGA John Ashe created an Advisory Group which produced a concise text. On expansion the following options were listed:

a. enlargement in both existing categories, permanent and non-permanent

b. new category of seats of (x) years to be converted into permanent seats as well as enlargement in the non-permanent category.

c. new category of (8-12) years that are immediately renewable without prejudice to the possibility of enlargement with non-permanent seats.

d. new category of seats of (3-5) years and enlargement with non-permanent seats.

e. enlargement in the non-permanent category only, with or without the possibility of immediate re-election

With regards to the veto power, options included extension of the veto to new permanent members, extension of the veto but subject to a moratorium on its use for 15 years, and no extension of the veto. Additional options concerned limiting the use of the veto for Council action to prevent or end genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes; limiting the use of the veto to Chapter VII matters; or requiring two vetoes to block action.

-2014-2015

PGA Courtenay Rattray produced a one-page framework document in March 2015 and asked Member States to “populate” the text within three weeks.

Between 115-120 countries made contributions. The Arab Group, Uniting for Consensus, China, Russian Federation, US, and Lao made objections to the process and did not want their positions to be included in the 20-pages populated framework document. Rattray added their responses in an annex.

-July 2016

The General Assembly adoptedan oral decision enabling Security Council Reform negotiations to continue during Seventy-first Session[2].

Source:TIMELINE UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM 1992 - November 2015. Prepared by Lydia Swart for the Center for UN Reform Education. For a more detailed and analytical account, see the Center’s 2013 publication on Links to documents and meeting reports can be found on

B. Discussion

Context of the reform:

From its first meeting in 1946 to the present, the SC has been strongly criticized. Most of the criticisms relate to the veto power of the P-5 countries. If just one P-5 member objects to a SC draft resolution, the resolution will fail. This gives P-5 countries the ability to evade criticism of their own policies and to target countries with whom they disagree. The results are seen in three ways. First, the P-5 members often hold closed-door meetings to decide which issues should be put on the agenda and to draft resolutions for the approval of the full Council, which they allegedly treat as a “rubber-stamp.” Second, when rotating members are able to put items on the agenda during the month-long presidency of the Council that each member enjoys, the P-5 are able to veto draft resolutions that are not to their liking. For example, the US vetoes resolutions critical of Israel, 10 while Russia and China veto sanctions against governments such as Iran, Sudan, and Syria. As a result, the Council has failed to take action on many severe and persistent security problems. Third, the P-5 is quick to act on issues that threaten their interests (such as the 1990 invasion of oil-rich Kuwait by Iraq) but slow to act on issues that do not affect them (such as the 1994 genocide in resource-poor Rwanda). According to critics, the SC has double standards and is unwilling to act in the interest of global peace and security. For example, the SC has only recently passed its first significant resolution related to the situation in Syria; a resolution focuses on chemical weapons disarmament, not ending the civil war that has killed more than 100,000 people. Can a draft be made and resolution be passed that would make the Security Council more effective? How should such a resolution be crafted to gain the approval of the P-5?