FEATURES OF NATO REFORM PROCESS
GENERATED BY THE NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2010
Cosmin FlorianOLARIU,
Lecturer, National Defense University “CAROL I”,
JohnJOHNSON,
Researcher, National Defense University “CAROL I”,
Abstract:In military terms, NATO is, very probable, the world's strongest and most successful military defence organisation. By a closer glance, everyone must to admit that NATO is much more than just a military organisation. It is not just a purely defensive Alliance, as started to be more than 60 years ago, while now is a strong call around the world for its capabilities and its responsiveness. Beside its military capacity, there is a strong political consultation forum for the entire North-Atlantic Community, allowing its members and their neighbors to make the best decisions,in accordance with their principles and values, so their interests are well protected at home and all over the world, too. But, such an organisation, being an alive organism, a community of countries that share basic political principles and values, including respect for human rights, requires strong and intensive attention so it can work properly.
Keywords:reform, transformation, Command Structure, Forces Structure, capabilities, operational
The primary outcome of NATO Strategic Concept 2010
NATO Strategic Concept 2010 (from now on NSC 2010) is balanced and functional, structured into a short but a comprehensive content, considering its ambitious but realist approach, as well as the need to maintain North-Atlantic Alliance in the top of global community, and, the last but not the list respecting the request of its Secretary General for having the most inclusive and open elaboration process so every interested should be able to express their opinions in order to encounter the contestants like ones saying that “NATO is just a political and military organisationunder the direction of the President of United States of America”[1].
The fundamental principles of NATO Strategic Concept 2010
The fundamental principles stated in the Washington Treaty are opening the NSC 2010, pointing out the trans-Atlantic link and indivisibility of its security which shall be promoted by common objectives, solidarity, assumed price and underlining of the NATO as being a community of countries that shares common values and principles. The nine chapters of the document proves loud and clear the chosen title of the NSC 2010: “Active Engagement, Modern Defence”.
If NSC 1999 defined security, consultation, discouraging and defence as being the fundamental tasks, the first chapter of NSC 2010, “Core Tasks and Principles” redefines them as being collective defence (on the basis of art. 5), crisis management, and cooperative security.
The second chapter of NSC 2010 bolds the impact of the insecurity and current conflicts over the Euro-Atlantic security due to the new risks and threats as international terrorism, CBRN and their vectors proliferation, cyber attacks, the use of new technologies in support of extremism, terrorism, weapons, drugs and human traffic, environment degradation, low level of vital resources and free access to them, climacteric changes and rising of energetic consumption.
Within the third chapter, the supreme responsibility of the Alliance to protect and defend the member territories and population is reaffirmed. Even is not nominating any state as being its enemy, no one on the world should not underestimate the NATO’s capacity and determination to solve any kind of situation affecting its own security. The entire Alliance’s Defence Strategy is built around deterrence, considering the combined effort of its conventional and nuclear capabilities.
An innovating spirit is proved by the document in the fourth chapter “Security through Crisis Management”, stating that, by political or military involvement, in cooperation with civil organisation, NATO will engage to prevent or manage crisis situations and later on will support stability and reconstruction efforts.
The fifth chapter underlines the Alliance’s role in consolidation of Arms control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation, including specific and clear objectives like creating of those necessary conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons or transparency accords withg Russia.
The Open Doors Policy is reminded as a successful choice with significant impact to the NATO’s security, which shall be kept active. In the same time, are mentioned the dialog and cooperation opportunities offered by Partnerships as: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Partnership for Peace programs, NATO-Russia or NATO-Ukraine bilateral dialogs, Mediterranean Dialog and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, stronger and tidier relations with UN and OSCE, and strategic partnership NATO-EU.
The last two chapters of the NSC 2010 are dedicated two transformation and reforms, including explicitspecifications relating the parameters of the military forces that are to respond whenever and wherever they are requested, in accordance with a sufficient level of financial, military and human resources. With the express mention of keeping the same level of ambition, running eight simultaneous operations (two major and two small operations), these resources must be used in themost efficient and effective way possible in order to:maximize the deployability of NATO forces, and their capacity tosustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focusedefforts to meet NATO’s usability targets;ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduceunnecessary duplication, and to focus our capability developmenton modern requirements;develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of costeffectivenessand as a manifestation of solidarity;preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards,structures and funding that bind members together;engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures,improve working methods and maximize efficiency.[2]
The transformation and reform process shall lead to an Alliance ready to face the challenges and threats of the 21st Century, in accordance with the highest political level commitments which encloses the NSC 2010.
Immediately consequences of members NATO Strategic Concept 2010
As an immediate consequence, considering the core tasks of the Alliance, there are several measures to be taken by members states in order to maintain an optimal level of nuclear and conventional forces, counting the operational capacity in accordance with the assumed level of ambition[3]. In the same time, developing and maintenance of specific deployable forces at NATO disposal, including their associate training activity, developing of expeditionary doctrines and military capabilities, selective participation to consultations and carefully planning of nuclear deterrence are to be considered.
The reform process requires:maximization of forces deployment parameters, a better coherence among defence planning sectors, developing of joint capabilities ready to answer to present and foreseeable threats, including missile defence and anti CBRN, better and closer consultations in terms of arms control and disarmament, increased capacity to prevent, detect and respond to cyber attacks and international terrorism. Considering vital resources, NATO shall increase its efforts to protect the depot and transport infrastructure for energetic resources and to assess the impact of the new technology over its own security, simultaneous with the maintaining of necessary defence budgeting, in accordance with the principle of sufficiency of resources stated by the NSC 2010.
In order to keep the dynamic line and its relevance, considering the existent and foreseeable security environment and its hybrid threats and risks, it is essential to understand that the reform process shall be a very flexible one, based on permanent research and refurbish, due to the speed generated by globalization and limited resources posed by current economic crisis.
The entire international system changed dramatically, and the risk of having national interests competitions, including inside the Alliance, is very high. The evolution of human society proves a continuous struggle for gaining and maintaining of control without regard to social organisation form, imagination and innovation being strong engines that led to situations when answer was not well prepared or coordinate, due to the lack of time. Hence the need for common defence capabilities, ready to answer with short or without notice and to adapt to the future requirements.
Operational effects of NATO Strategic Concept 2010
The entire evolutive process shaped from words of the NSC 2010 into figures, in accordance with the results of technical analyses and consultations among Allies, under the coordination of the SecretaryGeneral and the North Atlantic Council in order to take the reformprocess forward without delay, consolidating NATOAgencies and shaping a more effective, learner, and moreaffordable NATO Command Structure[4].
More than two years ago, at NATO Defence Ministers Meeting, February, 2010, the Secretary General was mandated to develop transformation proposals, including for the Command Structure, as the economical crisis strongly affected all members and Lisbon Summit was to come. As a matter of facts, the mandate was to reduce NATO Command Structure significant below 10.000 positions, considering that in 1995 there were 27.000 positions in 26 headquarters and in 2010 there were more than 13.000 positions in 11 headquarters.
The next step was done at Lisbon Summit, November, 2010, once the new model of NATO Command Structure was approved. Last year, at NATO Defence Ministers Meeting, June, 2011, geographical locations filled the picture of the Command Structure. In accordance with these decisions, resulted a new structure including 8800 positions, which means a reduction of 4000 positions from the previous one.
Both of Strategic Headquarters, Allied Command Operations and Allied Command for Transformation were maintained in the same locations, ACO atMons, Belgium and ACT atNorfolk, USA. In the same time, the Striking Force NATO (STRIKFORNATO), the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control and Alliance Ground Surveillance (Germany and Italy) and Communication and Information Group (Belgium) will be directly subordinated to ACO, as NATO’s strategic capabilities.
Each of the existent Joint Forces Headquarters, Naples, Italy and Brunssum, Nederland will include a deployable structure and static Air, Maritime and Land Tactical Command and Control Components. One of the significant changes in the new Command Structurewill be the transfer of the STRIKFORNATO from Italy to Portugal[5]. It is very probable that the transfer to be done as compensation to Portugal for loosing the Joint Headquarters located at Lisbon.
At tactical level there will be a Deployable Land Command Headquarters located at Izmir, Turkey, a static Maritime Command Headquarters at Northwood, United Kingdom and a static Air Command Headquarters at Ramstein, Germany. The Air Command Headquarters has two Combined Air Operations Centres, in Uedem Germany and in Torrejon Spain, each one of them having a Deplyable Centre, and a Deployable Air Command and Control Centre at Poggio Renatico, Italy.
As a result of these transformations, the new structure will positively answer to one of the requirements of NSC 2010, more precisely will offer options for faster intervention in case of necessity. In the same time, due to the decision to maintain the level of ambition, it will be a high level of dependence on the NATO Force Structure in order to compensate the operational requirements.
According to some estimation, the new NATO Command Structure will bring an real economy of about 20 million Euro per every single year to the Organisation and this sum may increase once with the implementation of the new Host Nation Support Policy. In the same time, there are some risks posed by the very possible situation of not having all the positions filled, leading to supplementary expenditures for Host Nation.
In the way the Command Structure is reshaped it may ensure certain and credible advantages: it provides supplementary expertise and capabilities to Land Forces once with the Command and Control structure; it provides supplementary resources and capabilities to Air Forces, due to its deployable structures; and it offers an remarkable support to the deployable forces and structures once with the new functional structure of the Communication and Information System.
For a good and efficient exploitation of these advantages, it is strictly necessary to understand that the new NATO Command Structure is viable, at least from a military point of view, if respected the condition posed by NSC 2010, named sufficient quantitative and qualitative human and logistic resources. Any diminishing of the resources may lead to a fragile structure, as it can be assumed that members will not be able to permanently provide supplementary capabilities through NATO Forces Structure. Implementation of that new command structure will closely depend on the deployable CIS capabilities, more precisely on the degree of the military control over those capabilities in order to obtain expected operational success. For this, it is necessary that both International Staff and Military International Staff to prove accordingly priority for implementation of the new Command Structure. It will be the responsibility of Resource Planning and Policy Board to lead the efforts of the entire Alliance for identification and application of the best measures so the sketch on the map to became real and operational byobtaining “better insight and knowledge of initiatives within the three resource pillars of Manpower, Military Budget and Investments and their inter-relationships in the current climate of restraints”[6]. At the end of all, everything depends on common funding which “is a success story and we need to learn how to market it and how to sell it…. . We need to be blunt but hopeful; as it is common funding that remains the glue that keeps the Alliance together”[7].
A clear road map of such elaborated transformation process it will be offered by a Detailed Implementation Plan with explicit details regarding the main timeline for transition, a summary of the activities of main headquarters and their subordinate structures, and deadlines for Initial Operational Capabilities and Full operational Capabilities.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
- *** Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2010, published on
- ***NATO after Lisbon Review, published on
- Lacoste, Yves, Géopolitique: La longue histoire d’aujourd’hui, Larousse, 2009
- ACT Multimedia, “Clear Rules - Clear Game focus of Resource Conference”, on
[1]Yves Lacoste, Géopolitique: La longue histoire d’aujourd’hui, Larousse, 2009, p. 86
[2]“Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation 2010”,accessed March 15, 2012, on p.11
[3]“Background on NATO Command Review – June 2011”, accessed March 15, 2012, on p.1
[4]“NATO after Lisbon”, accessed March 17, 2012, on p.4
[5]“Background on NATO Command Review – June 2011”, accessed March 15, 2012, on
[6]Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, French Air Force General Stephane Abrial speech at Inaugural Resource Conference “Resourcing requirements for the future of the Alliance.”, Prague, November 4-5, 2010, on “Clear Rules - Clear Game” focus of Resource Conference” article, accessed March 17, 2012, on
[7]Chairman of NATO’s Resource Planning and Policy Board, Michel Lepage speech at Inaugural Resource Conference “Resourcing requirements for the future of the Alliance.”, Prague, November 4-5, 2010, on “Clear Rules - Clear Game” focus of Resource Conference” article, accessed March 17, 2012, on