Academic Versus Practical Pursuits

ACADEMIC VERSUS PRACTICAL PURSUITS:

CONTRADICTORY INTERESTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Introduction

A fundamental problem facing students in large public American research universities is the forced choice between the practical interests of business and government, as represented by the administration, and the purely academic interests of the faculty. This is not a moral crisis, as Durkheim might suggest. It is not a legitimacy crisis, as Weber might suggest. It is not an economic crisis, as Marx might suggest. It is not, in fact, a crisis at all. It is the nature of the beast. The conflicting interests of business and government, on the one hand, and academic faculty, on the other, are institutionalized in this university system.

The university is supported by government and business because research might produce useful ideas or inventions and because education adds to the productive power of student labor and prepares students for managerial, technical, and professional employment. The professors, however, are not motivated by these practical concerns. As academics, they are committed to scholarship as an end in itself.

This value-rational orientation to their work (see Weber) makes professors easy to exploit but difficult to control. Because they are "disinterested" scholars, it is relatively easy to appropriate the fruits of their labor (in the form of research and educated students). Because they are committed to "pure" research they are dependent on government or corporate sponsorship and can therefore be retained for relatively low wages. Simply stated, because professors would (and often do) work for free they are an exceptionally cheap source of labor.

Nevertheless, the academic faculty's interest in "pure scholarship" conflicts with the practical interests of those who finance and administer the university. The conflict between "pure scholarship" and "applied and technical training and research" is endemic (institutionalized in the university structure) and epidemic (expressed periodically in rancorous faculty-administrative conflict).

Students are invariably caught in the middle and feel pressured to choose between the conflicting interests of administrators, business, and government, on the one hand, and professors, artists, writers, and other academics, on the other. Nevertheless, so long as students do not become cynical and blase, the experience of these contradictory pressures can help them to develop creative strategies for finessing institutional constraints. Thus they might develop a better appreciation of who they are, what their interests are, how their interests might be served within this institutional structure, or how this structure might or should be changed.

Body

Students at large public research universities are confronted with institutionalized conflict. The university, although nominally governed by the faculty, is financed and administered by representatives of business and government. University presidents and senior administration officers are generally recruited from faculty, but their job within the institution is to represent not the faculty but the government and business interests who finance university administration. To a large extent, university presidents are "boosters." They attempt to attract and retain public and private support with the promise of valuable returns on investments. The private and public investors consume the benefits of education and research by using the technology and information produced through faculty research, by using academic experts as consultants, and by employing the productive labor of the educated students. These investors want to get their money's worth in useful technology, ideas, and information and in experts, managers, technical, or professional workers.

Nevertheless, the essential business of the university (research and education) is effectively controlled by faculty, who are not interested in the practical utility of the products they produce. They are committed to scholarship as an end in itself. They evaluate their work according to professional standards that are academic rather than utilitarian. They are not particularly interested in or capable of instrumental rational calculus. Generally, academics are poorly equipped to judge the future market value (or practical use) of research and education. In fact, we are not even particularly good at predicting student and faculty success, even as measured by purely academic criteria.

Whether we choose to view the distinctive interests and capacities of professors and administrators as functional differentiation (Durkheim/Merton) or alienation (Marx/Habermas), there is general agreement that political and economic interests interfere with the pursuit of knowledge. Both Merton's analysis of the scientific community and Habermas' reflections on the ideal speech situation, despite other important differences, point to the same conclusion. Although academics cannot support themselves and must depend upon public or private sponsors, they cannot or will not produce knowledge when operating under market or political constraint.

The extent to which modern or postmodern academics are selling education and research like a fast-food restaurant (Ritzer) or are engaged in useless research that is not serving the public or private interest (Bloom) is worth considering and should be debated. For present purposes, however, it is more important that we recognized the nature of the conflict and the contradictory interests that are institutionalized in higher education.

This is not a moral crisis. All interested parties value education and research. All interested parties value honest, disciplined, dedicated scholarship. The conflict is not rooted in values but in interests. Whose goals (utilitarian or academic) should guide the administration of the enterprise? Who (business and government or faculty) are entitled to the products?

This is not a legitimation crisis either. Business, government, universities, and academic disciplines are all legal-rational bureaucracies. Universities, in varying degrees, retain traditional authority, as do academic professionals. Charismatic authority is, of course, also important in sustaining the authority of individual actors. The struggle, however, is not a social movement challenging the legitimacy of the institution (see Weber). It is a struggle between contradictory interests within the institution. It is not a response to a charismatic leader. It is an inherent conflict that is expressed in various forms on a regular basis.

This is not class conflict in the narrowly defined sense that some Marxists might suggest, but the conflict is, in some sense, focused on the surplus labor value of the academic faculty. Public and private sponsors do appropriate the value added to raw materials (equipment, supplies, etc.) through faculty labor in the production of research findings, inventions, and educated students, which are consumed by government and industry. The conflict is clearly focused on the control of the production process and the means of production (the university). One might even argue that the conflict is between productive, paid labor (faculty) and unproductive or nonlaboring supervisors, managers, and administrators.

Nevertheless, administrators are not an exploiting nonlaboring class. They receive salaries instead of profits. They merely represent the interests of government and business. By the same token, faculty are not laboring proletarians. They consume the labor of others (notably, clericals). They are relatively autonomous in their control of research and teaching, and they claim at least some portion of the products that they produce, in the form of graduate students and book royalties.

Although this is not exactly class conflict, as some Marxists might define it, it is institutionalized in the relations between administrators and faculty in the production of research and education. Professors are employed by the university to serve the interests of those who finance the institution (government and business). They produce inventions and information that might be useful to their sponsors, and they train the next generation of professional, technical, and supervisorial workers, whom government and business will employ.

As servants of business and industry, professors are relatively inexpensive and easily exploited because they are committed to research and education as an end in itself--without concern for its practical value or for the extrinsic benefits that it might yield. Beyond this, the value of faculty labor is highly unreliable and difficult to evaluate in the short to medium run, which sharply diminishes demand and thus contributes to lower wages. Yet while this value-rational orientation makes faculty easier to exploit, it makes them harder to control and generates protracted conflicts between faculty and administrators. Faculty want to do their work subject only to their personal and professional interests and ethics. Administrators want tangible results to show to government and private sponsors.

Thus the conflict between the value-rational academic and the instrumental rational administrator (see Weber) is institutionalized in the university structure in the conflicts between pure and applied research and between classical education and modern training. It is expressed periodically in rancorous faculty-administrator conflict, including current arguments about retaining and recruiting students while cutting faculty lines in the interest of efficiency.

Conclusion

Students face an often-bitter conflict between academic and instrumental interests in their education. This is often expressed as a philosophical debate on the nature of scholarship and academic freedom. It is, however, rooted in the contradictory interests of those who physically struggle to educate and who generally control the education process versus those who finance and administer the bureaucratic structure within which education takes place.

This conflict can be a barrier to education. Students can develop a cynical, disinterested approach to education (as might faculty). Thus they might withdraw from the conflict, refusing to choose sides or to participate in the education process. Nevertheless, as Simmel suggests, the student's struggle toward a creative resolution might lead toward greater insights and understanding of self and society, both inside and outside of the university. This struggle is, in fact, the essence of education. Let's continue to fight the good fight.

References

References to classical theorists (e.g., “see Weber”) are to the assigned readings (the Ritzer text and the Farganis reader) or to lecture notes. The reference to Ritzer refers to his book, The McDonaldization ofSociety, which I have not read, but which he discussed with me in private correspondence. The reference to Bloom is, Harold Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind, which I have not read either, but which (former) Dean Caputo discussed at a Books and Coffee presentation a few years back. Although I tried to limit the references to classical theories, I did slip in two contemporary theorists (Merton and Habermas) who speak more directly to the problem of academic and practical interests.

There are no references to specific page numbers or chapters, because these are general (global) references to arguments that I recall from my readings. I didn't go back to the book to look up the difference between "value" and "instrumental" rationality, for example. Thus I feel confident that the words are mine (except for the names of the specific types of social action). The ideas are sufficiently general that a specific reference is not necessary. Had I gone back to my books or notes (instead of relying on my memory) I would have provided more specific references (page numbers). Had I borrowed some words from the text, I would have enclosed them in quotes and included the page number in the reference.