Theaetetus Reveals More Character: Metaphors: Meta-Commentary

157c2-157d5

Theaetetus reveals more character: Metaphors: Meta-commentary

Socrates concludes what he characterized as “completion” (ἀποτελεσθῇ) of a μῦθος (156c4-6) by asking whether Theaetetus wants a taste of it. Finally, after pages of being a cipher, Theaetetus says something showing a bit of spark: Οὐκ οἶδα. Too right. He said Οὐκ οἶδα once before, at 148e8, when Socrates first told him he was pregnant and in labor. Now, it appears that Socrates has almost fully birthed the baby by doing most of the labor himself, but Socrates does not see it that way.

With Socrates’ question about whether Theaetetus likes the taste of what Socrates is offering, at 157c2, a new metaphor comes to light, according to which Socrates is serving up food to Theaetetus and asking whether he would eat it, that is whether its taste pleases him. Soon after, at 157c9-10, (παρατίθημι ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι), the metaphor recurs, but this time in the middle of a recurrence of the midwife metaphor. In ways, it is an unfortunate combination of metaphors, midwifery and food tasting: either the metaphor of food is etiolated, or we are not intended to extend it at will. For if we extend the metaphors, Theaetetus is being served up bits of some illustrious people’s babies (which Socrates thinks are stillbirths) and then being asked whether he likes their taste and which he would eat more of. Liking their taste would constitute approval of the baby and also make it his own baby (perhaps it would impregnate him?) which he would then have tasted and given birth to. But eating people’s babies has something distasteful about it and thereby shows the limits of the metaphor. The food metaphor reminds us of the Protagoras, where Socrates says XXXX (ideas as food).

From the logic of the fictional world of the dialogue, Socrates surely thinks these ideas are stillbirths, because Socrates has been investigating these matters for years at this point and has known of Protagoras and Heraclitus and their ilk (also for years) and yet in all those years and investigations, he has not swallowed their teachings. Evidence for that is that he said back at 150c that he is barren and has no offspring of his own. If he approved of these purported answers to his questions, he would long ago have swallowed them and thereby made them his own offspring.

As for Theaetetus, his mind may be a good one, but he is made to keep it to himself. Socrates is doing not just all the heavy lifting here, but all the work that is done at all. Thus, given that Socrates has been a midwife for a long time now, and given that Theaetetus is providing next to nothing in the discussion, the idea that “Theaetetus’” ideas are in any way likely prove to be viable births is gainsaid handily by Socrates’ midwifery practice itself, for Socrates elicits nothing from Theaetetus that he himself has not formulated. On the other hand, Socrates does seem to take it as an article of faith that answers to questions dealt with in this dialogue are in fact able to be both discovered and understood by humans: in spite of years of searching, he still thinks that he may gain from encounters with others. Even if “Theaetetus’” ideas are not at all likely to prove fully viable, perhaps Socrates gains from rehearsing his own arguments in front of others who just might add a wrinkle here or there. At least they provide an audience: an excuse to rehearse the arguments, a spur to produce as good arguments as possible. Perhaps insisting that they take ownership of the arguments provokes them to participate, although Theaetetus is so far not actively participating.

Theaetetus says he does not understand and is not sure whether Socrates really believes any of the things he has offered to Theaetetus for approval. This implies that Theatetus has been and still is trying to figure out what Socrates himself believes, in spite of having heard Socrates’ explicit disavowal (back at 150c in the midwife metaphor) of both knowledge and also of the ability to satisfy his own questions regarding these matters. Socrates claimed to have no answers and thus to be as puzzled as Theaetetus. But Theaetetus persists in trying to figure out what Socrates believes.

Modern scholars often say things similar to what Theaetetus says here, both about Plato and about Socrates. We try to figure out what Socrates (or Plato) believes and persist in our belief that we can do so. That is, if we are willing to investigate things like “intentions” or think that words have meanings. Scholars try to figure out what the author or characters believe about various things, including the subject matter of the Theaetetus. Many scholars claim that because Plato never speaks in his own voice, we cannot confidently claim to know what Plato believed. And the character Socrates disavows knowledge of such things in the “aporetic” dialogues, and many scholars claim that we cannot take what is said here as what he believed. Thus the character Theaetetus, who is pretty much a cipher with little or nothing of his own to contribute so far, quite easily assimilates to us ourselves, who can essay to interact with Socratic and Platonic positions, but can never successfully interact with Socrates or Plato and are explicitly told that Socrates has no position. And yet, we continuously try to find coherent arguments and positions in these texts.

Via Theaetetus, Plato could be signaling to us quite clearly that he knows our situation as readers and is not going to make it easy for us. But then again, the less sceptical find it utterly incredible and unfathomable that Socrates does not believe a great number of things about what he is investigating. And the obstinate (like Theaetetus?) note the following: that Socrates says everything important in the dialogue; that there is obviously a persistent will and intellect(s) behind what he says, a will to make it as consistent, rigorous, and critical as possible; and that the position he limns out does indeed have a great deal of coherence, interest, and rigor, even if it is not systematic or completed. Given those observations, it seems hardly a bad idea to think that Socrates himself has at the very least some strong opinions and great understanding of the issues he discusses.

But Socrates says he is simply trying to figure out whether Theaetetus' idea is false or true. What is more, in presenting ideas to Theaetetus, Socrates claims that he does not say what he Socrates believes. From a strict viewpoint, however, since the midwife digression, Theaetetus himself has been the direct source of only one idea, namely that knowledge is perception (151e). That is the only idea that we can extract directly from his own words rather than via his agreement to what Socrates says. Before the digression, Theaetetus presented two sets of ideas, namely the mathematical discussion of 147c-148b and the brief discussion following 146d, where he suggested that knowledge is various disciplines. That is the limit of Theaetetus’ direct contribution to the ideas so far. Everything else is Theaetetus’ only by virtue of agreeing with what Socrates has said.

When Socrates claims that his contribution is limited to determining Theaetetus’ ideas, he turns the impression that Theaetetus is a cipher with nothing to contribute on its head. For he apparently claims that all the ideas and arguments presented so far are Theaetetus’. But maybe there is room for more nuance.

In the course of this section, Socrates says that he chants an incantation (ἐπᾴδω 157c9) and sets each of these wise things out to be tasted (παρατίθημι ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι 157c9-d1). Both of these actions, while figurative, nonetheless describe Socrates as the one who delivers the material, a conduit of ideas, even if other people’s ideas. As a conduit, Socrates could not avoid “tasting” and testing what he delivers, for he presents the ideas in his own words, which would be impossible without a high degree of understanding.

The connotations of ἐπᾴδω and παρατίθημι ... ἀπογεύσασθαι, 157c9, the two descriptions of what Socrates does, are different. ἐπᾴδω: παρατίθημι:

Socrates implies that his questioning constitutes the incantation and tasting while the answering constitutes giving birth by telling Theaetetus to continue bravely and persistently answering Socrates’ questions. There could, of course, be more to it, but incantation and tasting appear to fully characterize the birthing process.

Socrates says he incants and sets out ideas for tasting until he brings Theaetetus’ idea to light. The implication is that in Socrates’ mind, these incantation and tastings are the process which brings Theaetetus’ idea to light. Theaetetus apparently was not aware of that, for he has, in spite of that as well as Socrates’ disavowal of having offspring of his own, nonetheless been searching for Socrates’ own opinion in all that Socrates presents. And in spite of Socrates’ explicit disavowal of intellectual offspring, Theaetetus has justification for doing so in what Socrates says, for Socrates often presented what he has been doing up to now as a joint search, one in which “we” claim things, not just Socrates: see, for example, the first person plurals at 157a8 and b2. He does not exclusively use the second person singular, as he would logically have to if he were carefully and precisely using language to reflect his claim that none of what he presents is his own.

We have spoken of Theaetetus as a cipher, but that is just what he actually is up to this point. He is much more potentially: As a fictional character, there is always the possibility that he will be made to do something other than go along with Socrates. And because he is a character, we are encouraged to imagine a personality complete with intellect and will behind his simple affirmatives, an intellect and will pregnant with possibility: it might do something more than simply affirm. Consider the mathematical problem early in the dialogue, which showed Theaetetus actually capable of independent abstract logical thought, unlike, say, Euthyphro in the Euthyphro or the slave boy in the Meno, who never show themselves so capable. That mathematical problem demonstrates Theaetetus’ mental characteristics of curiosity, ability to follow and further reasoning, and to explain it. The mere possibility that Theaetetus might reject, modify, or refute something that Socrates says is always there and made stronger by the mathematical demonstration. Thus potentially, Theaetetus is always a real partner in conversation. That changes everything dramatically at least, for it creates many possible paths and unexplored tensions: every moment is a moment when Theaetetus could do something other than simply agree.

...ταῦτα δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἆρ’ ἡδέα δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ157c2

γεύοιο ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρεσκόντων;

{ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ

σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι πότερα δοκοῦντά σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἢ (5)

ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρᾷ.

{ΣΩ.} Οὐ μνημονεύεις, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ’ οἶδα οὔτε

ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλ’ εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἄγονος,

σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα ἐπᾴδω τε καὶ παρατίθημι

(d.)ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι, ἕως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν

δόγμα συνεξαγάγω· ἐξαχθέντος δὲ τότ’ ἤδη σκέψομαι εἴτ’

ἀνεμιαῖον εἴτε γόνιμον ἀναφανήσεται. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν καὶ

καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου ἃ ἂν φαίνηταί σοι περὶ

ὧν ἂν ἐρωτῶ. (5)

157c2 γεύοιο: this word was used metaphorically since Homer with meanings from making trial of or testing to partaking of to experiencing. Here, it must mean “partake of” and so “adopt as one’s own” rather than merely testing (and possibly not adopting as one’s own), for in order for Theaetetus to γεύεσθαι them ὡς ἀρεσκόντων, he must already know they are pleasing and so already have tested them. DOES it RETAIN SENSE MEANING PRIMARILY, OR IS IT A DYING/DEAD METAPHOR?

157c7 Οὐ μνημονεύεις: investigate: used elsewhere to remind/cross-reference.

157c7-8 οὔτ’ οἶδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν: the negative οὐδὲν confirms the negatives οὔτ’ ... οὔτε (Sm. §2761) and is the object of both οἶδα and ποιοῦμαι, while ἐμόν is a second predicate accusative with ποιοῦμαι alone (with which εἶναι has been omitted, perhaps because ποιοῦμαι verges on being a verb of naming or calling here: cf. Sm. §1041 and §1615). Worth looking into platonic use of it?

157c7 μνημονεύεις: cf. 144b8 n.

157c9 ἐπᾴδω: Investigate use/meaning.

157c9 παρατίθημι: often used of setting food out to be eaten. Investigate use/meaning.

157d2 ἐξαχθέντος: a genitive absolute whose noun is easily supplied from context (Sm. §2072) and is identical to the subject of the indirect question εἴτ’ ... ἀναφανήσεται (cf. Sm. §2073).

157d3 ἀνεμιαῖον εἴτε γόνιμον: cf. 150c3n.

157d3-4 θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως: Other talk of courage, manliness, patience/perseverance in argument?