Battle Study: Khe Sanh

Battle Study: Khe Sanh

Submitted by:

GySgt Bailey

GySgt Baughman

GySgt Deleonguerrero

GySgt Isaacson

GySgt Lopez

GySgt Medina

GySgt Quinata

Advanced Course Class 04-05

2nd Platoon

Staff Noncommissioned Officer Academy

Marine Corps Base

Camp Pendleton, California 92055-5104

Organization and Strength

The main enemy forces in the area were identified as the

325C North Vietnamese Army Division, which had moved back into

the region north of Hill 881 North, and a newcomer, the 304th

North Vietnamese Division, which had crossed over from Laos and

established positions southwest of the base. The 304th, an elite

home-guard division from Hanoi, had been a participant at Dien

Bien Phu. In addition, one regiment of the 324th North

Vietnamese Division was located in the central demilitarized

Area, some ten to fifteen miles from Khe Sanh, fulfilling a

supply role. In the early stages of the siege of Khe Sanh, the

presence of the 320th Division was confirmed north of the Rock

Pile within easy reinforcing distance of the enemy Khe Sanh

forces. The 304th and 325C Divisions were known to have armored

units with them and were supported by the North Vietnamese 68th

and 164th Artillery Regiments (The War in The Northern

Provinces page 30). Enemy numbers totaled over 40,000.

In January 1968, the forces defending the Khe Sanh area

included three battalions of the 26th Marine Regiment under the

command of Colonel David E. Lownds. The 1st Battalion, 9th

Marines; 1st Battalion, 13th Marines; and the 37th Vietnamese

Army Ranger Battalion were also present. A Civilian Irregular

Defense Group company with its U.S. Army Special Forces advisers

and the supporting aircraft control radar detachment

representing the U.S. Air Force rounded out the 6,000 or so men

in and around the base (The War in The Northern Provinces page

36).

SIGNIFICANT LEADERS

General (Gen) William C Westmoreland (USA)

General William Childs Westmoreland was born in 1914 at

Spartanburg, S.C. He graduated from West Point in 1936, and

fought with distinction in North Africa and Europe during World

War II, and later in Korea (1952–53). After serving as

superintendent of West Point (1960–64), Westmoreland attained

the rank of general (1964) and commanded U.S. military forces in Vietnam (1964–68). He was the senior commander of American troops in Vietnam (1964–1968). He was instrumental in raising the level of U.S. forces deployed in Vietnam and in developing the strategies implemented in the region. Gen Westmoreland continuously requested for an increase in manpower in Vietnam; and President Johnson, who had his own troubles at home, refused to send more troops, and finally recalled Gen Westmoreland after he successfully stopped the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. His colleagues noted that, "Westmoreland sought, as a cadet, to achieve his leadership objectives by example . . . far more than by propriety and power of position." The General's leadership in Vietnam between 1964 and 1968 drew considerable protest from antiwar activists who went so far as to burn him in effigy; however, his soldiers almost unanimously praised his convictions and his concern for their welfare. On the whole, Gen Westmoreland pursued a conservative course militarily during his four years of command in Vietnam. General Westmoreland's strategy was one of a "war of attrition," in which he sought to kill infiltrated and indigenous Vietnamese Communist soldiers more rapidly than they could be replaced. The general followed a plan of "search and destroy" missions in which well-trained and armed American units would try to find and bloody so-called main-force Communist forces. However, General Westmoreland was under constant pressure from Washington to avoid the kind of disaster that befell the French Army during the 55-day siege at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 that ended the French effort in Indochina. For this reason, he normally forbade any military operations by units smaller than a battalion of about 750 men. He also developed a somewhat unusual method of operation in which artillery guns were airlifted into fire bases and troops were, for the most part, forbidden to proceed past the 11,000 to 20,000-yard "fan" of the artillery. (http://www.vietnampix.com/ popww.htm)

Major General (MajGen) Tompkins

MajGen Tompkins served in the Pacific during World War II. He received the Navy Cross, the Corps' highest award for valor except for The Medal of Honor, for his heroism on Saipan, a Silver Star at Tarawa, and a Bronze Star at Guadalcanal. During the Korean War, he commanded the 5th Marine Regiment of the 1st Marine Division. In 1967, he went to South Vietnam as commander of the 3rd Marine Division, Reinforced. He commanded the division during the Tet Offensive and the siege of Khe Sanh.

General Robert E. Cushman

General Robert Everton Cushman, Jr., 25th Commandant of the

Marine Corps, was born 24 December 1914, in St. Paul, Minnesota.

He attended Central High School, and at sixteen, before

graduating, was appointed to the U.S. Naval Academy. He

eventually became Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion, 9th

Marines, and in May 1943 was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.

During the two years he held that post, he led his battalion

repeatedly into combat. He earned the Bronze Star Medal with

Combat “V” on Bougainville, the Navy Cross during the recapture

of Guam, and the Legion of Merit with Combat “V” during the Iwo

Jima campaign, where he led his battalion against "Cushman's

Pocket,” a complex of enemy caves.

He was later assigned as the Deputy Commander, III Marine

Amphibious Force. Upon assuming duty as Commanding General, III

Marine Amphibious Force, the largest combined combat unit ever

led by a Marine, he was promoted to Lieutenant General in June

1967. As Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force,

from June to December 1967, he was awarded the Distinguished

Service Medal. A Gold Star, in lieu of a second Distinguished

Service Medal, was awarded for his service as Senior Advisor, I

Corps Tactical Zone; and I Corps Coordinator for United

States/Free World Military Assistance Forces, from January 1968

to March 1969.

Colonel (Col) David E. Lownds

Col David E. Lownds was the Commanding Officer of Khe Sanh

in 1968. He was considered “A real "Marines-Marine,”

constantly looking out for his Marines.

Col Lownds was as concerned for the Air Support

groups as he was for his own Marines. Semper Fidelis, George T.

Curtis (HMM-363 LCpl67-68) MGySgt USMC Ret, “Came across your

photo of David Lownds thought it was just terrific. I had the

privilege of serving under Col Lownds at Khe Sanh from mid-'67

to April, '68 as a somewhat naive junior Officer (1st Lt./Capt.)

and thought the world of the man. From those days to now, I have

never met anyone that I had more respect for. During some pretty

dark times, he never, ever conveyed anything but a quiet, strong

confidence in believing that things would work out.”

General Vo Nguyen Giap

General Vo Nguyen Giap was a Vietnamese four-star general,

who was the military leader of the Viet Minh guerrilla group

under Ho Chi Minh's political leadership, and of the Peoples’

Army of Vietnam (PAVN) in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Gen Giap, was a nationalist who joined the Vietnamese

Communist Party in the 1930s, later joining Ho Chi Minh China.

Giap helped to organize the Viet Minh forces, fighting to oust

the Japanese in World War II, and the French after the war. He

became commander of the Viet Minh in 1946. A master of guerrilla

warfare, he was credited with the defeat of the French at

Dien bien phu (1954), and later directed the strategy of the

North in the Vietnam War, most notably in 1968 Tet offensive. In

addition to his position as Commander in Chief, Giap was also

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. Giap, who never

trained as a military leader other than reading some articles in

an old encyclopedia, nonetheless proved himself as a master at

accomplishing victory against tremendous odds. His tactics were

simple, and he allowed his subordinate commanders much latitude.

In the end, his willingness to fight as long as necessary and

sustain as many casualties as required gained him victory and

unification of his country. He is cited in Vietnam as a

"national treasure," and regarded internationally as a unique

expert on guerrilla warfare. Associates also have described him

as forceful, arrogant, impatient and dogmatic. (http://www.

vietnamwar.com/Hotspots.htm)

ARMAMENT

The weapons and armament available to and used by both American and North Vietnamese forces during the Siege of Khe Sanh were key to the battle plans for both sides. Each weapon system employed by the opposing forces, from small arms to tanks and air support, ended up having a significant impact on the course of the battle at some point.

The basic weapon for each U.S. Marine at Khe Sanh was the new M16, capable of automatic fire. At 8.4 pounds and 39 inches, the M16 was lighter and longer than the enemy counterpart weapon, the AK47. The AK47, along with most of the communist Vietnamese forces’ weapons, was a Soviet-designed weapon. It was an accurate, rugged, and reliable automatic weapon carried by almost all North Vietnamese (NVA) and Viet-Cong (VC) soldiers. The AK47 was much less likely to jam than the M16 when fired dirty or partially obstructed by debris. Both the M16 and the AK47 had effective ranges of 400 meters, although the AK47 had a slower rate of fire (600 rounds per minute versus 700 rpm) and muzzle velocity (2,350 feet per second versus 3,250 fps). The M16 fired 5.56mm rounds, and the AK47 fired 7.62mm cartridges. Despite the smaller size, the 5.56mm rounds were technically more deadly because of their wound ballistics. The enemy could not carry as much ammunition because of the size. Because of this, enemy riflemen spent their bullets frugally, however, the 7.62mm round was less likely than the M16 round to be deflected by grass or leaves when fired (Doleman Jr. 94).

Unfortunately, the M16 was considered by many U.S. troops to be less reliable than the Army counterpart, the M14. Even after the M16 was recalled for refitting in January of 1968, many Marines continued to distrust its merits. Battles in the hills surrounding Khe Sanh during late April and early May of 1967 had taught the Marines a bitter lesson. In the course of battle for Hill 881, “their new M16 rifles-received earlier that month-began to break down. As the Marine fire dropped off, signal whistles sounded on the hillside. North Vietnamese squad leaders maneuvered their soldiers out of the bunkers to flank and overrun isolated Marine positions. After the battle, dozens of American dead were found crouching over their rifles, killed as they tried to thread together the three separate pieces of their cleaning rods so they could ram a jammed shellcasing out of their rifles and return to the fight” (Pisor 19). An entire company of Marines assigned to the defense of Khe Sanh, India Company, traded their M16s for M14s. At 500 meters, the M14s had a longer effective range than the M16s, although they were a bit longer and heavier.

Each infantry Marine also carried several M26 fragmentation grenades, which could be lobbed some forty meters and had a kill radius of five meters. Typically, each fire-team of Marines also had one M79 grenadier. The M79 was a portable 40mm grenade launcher with pinpoint accuracy to 150 meters, and a maximum range of 350 meters. The M79 was valuable in covering the gap in range between a hand grenade and mortar fire or artillery support. Like the hand grenade, the 40mm grenade round had a kill radius of five meters. Enemy soldiers also carried fragmentation grenades. The grenade was an invaluable tool for the NVA and VC since one of their most successful tactics was deep infiltration and attack on Command and Control from close proximity with grenades and satchel charges (Dougan and Weiss 47).

The Marines assigned to Khe Sanh also carried M72 66mm light anti-tank weapons (LAW). The LAW was a one-shot disposable rocket launcher with armor piercing capabilities and an effective range of 300 meters. It weighed just over five pounds, but Marines did not mind carrying it since it packed a significant amount of firepower useful for engaging the enemy or destroying bunkers. Unfortunately, there was very little training given to the Marines on the LAW. The lack of training contributed to many LAWs being fired inaccurately or with ineffective results, especially against armored targets like tanks. The enemy counterpart to the LAW was the Soviet RPG7 rocket launcher. It had a maximum effective range of 500 meters and a maximum range of 900 meters. The RPG7 was the VC and NVA infantry’s favorite heavy weapon, and was used extensively during the siege of Khe Sanh. Although much heavier than the LAW at fifteen pounds, the RPG7 fired a five pound rocket that was much more lethal than the LAW rocket. During the siege on Khe Sanh, the RPG7 was extremely effective against the Marine defenses on the hill positions and main combat base. In the first main offensive against Khe Sanh’s main combat base, one of the rockets fired into the base hit the main ammunition dump and ignited 1,500 tons of American ordnance. The loss of ammunition and supplies due to that one rocket blast was near devastating. Another enemy rocket hit a cache of tear gas that quickly had the entire base filled with choking vapors so thick that even gas masks could not filter them (Dougan and Weiss 44).