LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
1. Banogan v. Zerna
2. Ledesma v. Climaco
3. Cui v. Cui
4. Alawi v. Alauya
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process.
5. Re: Financial Audit of Atty. Raquel G. Kho
6. Chua v. Mesina
7. Soriano v. Dizon
8. Stemmerik v. Mas
9. De Ysasi III v. NLRC
10. Cordon v. Balicanta
CANON 2 – A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
CANON 3 – A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
11. In re Tagorda
12. Atty. Ismael Khan v. Atty Rizalino Simbillo
13. Canoy v. Ortiz
14. Linsangan v. Tolentino
CANON 4 – A lawyer shall participate in development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice.
CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve highest standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
CANON 6 – These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties.
15. Suarez v. Platon
16. Ramos v. Imbang
17. Catu v. Rellosa
18. PCGG v. Sandiganbayan
CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support t he activities of the integrated bar.
19. In re Galang
20. In re Arthur M. Cuevas
21. Samaniego v. Ferrer
22. Arnobit v. Arnobit
23. St. Louis University etc v. Dela Cruz
24. Advincula v. Macabata
CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
25. Reyes v. Chiong
26. Dallong-Galiciano v. Castro
27. Alcantara v. Pefianco
28. Camacho v. Pagulayan
29. Torres v. Javier
30. Linsangan v. Tolentino
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
31. Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.
32. Cayetano v. Monsod
33. Cambaliza v. Cristobal-Tenorio
34. Amalgamated Laborers’ Association v. CIR
35. Aguirre v. Rama
36. Judge Laquindanum v. Quintana
CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
37. Fernandez v. De Ramos-Villalon
38. Rivera v. Corral
39. Johnny Ng v. Alar
40. Fudot v. Cattleya Land
41. Bondoc v. Judge Simbulan
CANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
42. Berbano v. Barcelona
43. Sebastian v. Bajar
44. Hegna v. Paderanga
45. Plus Builders v. Revilla
46. Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez
CANON 13 – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
CANON 14 – A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.
47. Foodsphere v. Mauricio
48. Suspension of Atty. Bagubayao
CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
49. Hilado v. David
50. Nakpil v. Valdes
51. Hornilla v. Salunat
52. Northwestern University v. Arquillo
53. Quiambao v. Bamba
54. Heirs of Falame v. Baguio
55. Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
56. Licuanan v. Melo
57. Posidio v. Vitan
58. Lemoine v. Balon
59. Re: Atty. Maquera
60. Reddi v. Sersbio
61. De Chavez-Blanco v. Lumasag
62. Wilson Charm v. Patta-Moya
63. Jerry T. Wong v. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II
CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
64. Hernandez v. Go
65. PANELCO v. Montemayor
66. Sps. Adecer v. Akut
67. Belleza v. Macasa
68. Overgaard v. Valdez
69. Angalan v. Delante
70. Santon-Tan v. Robino
71. Somosot v. Lara
CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of law.
72. Briones v. Jimenez
73. Pena v. Aparicio
AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER
74. Manalang v. Angeles
75. Garcia v. CA
76. Santiago v. De los Santos
CANON 20 – A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
77. Sesbreno v. CA
78. Bautista v. Gonzales
79. Gamilla v. Marino
80. Pineda v. De Jesus
81. Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui
82. Law Firm of Tungol and Tibayan v. CA
CANON 21 – A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relationship is terminated.
83. Regala v. Sandiganbayan
84. Pfleider v. Palanca
85. Mercado v. Vitriolo
86. Genato v. Silapan
87. Hadjula v. Madianda
88. Rebecca J. Palm v. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr.
Canon 22 – A lawyer may withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
89. Wack Wack Gold and Country Club v. CA
90. Venterez v. Cosme
91. Santero v. Vance
92. Francisco v. Portugal
93. Metrobank v. CA
94. Doronila-Tioseco v. CA
95. Sesbreno v. CA
SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT
96. Gatchalian Promotions v. Naldoza
97. Santos v. Llamas
98. Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo
99. Vda. de Barrera v. Laput
100. Barrientos v. Daarol
101. Berbano v. Beltran
102. Tabas v. Malicden
103. Sesbreno v. CA
NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
CANON 1 – Independence
104. Libarios v. Dablos
105. Go v. CA
106. Sabitsana v. Villamor
107. Tan v. Rosete
108. Dimatulac v. Villon
CANON 2 – Integrity
109. Fernandez v. Hamoy
110. Dawa v. De Asa
111. In re judge Marcos
112. Lachica v. Flordeliza
113. Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana
114. Olga v. Judge Virgilio G. Caballero
CANON 3 – Impartiality
115. Dimo Realty & Development v. Dimaculangan
116. Pimentel v. Salanga
117. Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr.
118. Oktubre v. Velasco
119. Sandoval v. CA
120. The Law Firm of Chavez v. Justice Dicdican, etc.
CANON 4 – Propriety
121. J. King & Sons v. Hontanosas
122. Centrum Agri Business Realty Corp v. Katalbas-Moscardon
123. Rizalina v. Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante
124. Atty. Florencio Alay Binalay v. Judge Elias Lelina, Jr.
125. Concerned lawyers of Bulacan v. Presiding Judge Pornillos, RTC Br. 10 Malolos City
126. Venancio Ino, Anna Jane D. Lihaylihay, etc. Judge Alejandro Canda
127. In Re: Undated Letter of Louis Biraogo
CANON 5 – Equality
CANON 6 – Competence and diligence
128. Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, etc.
129. Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc v. Judge William Simon P. Peralta
130. Prosecutor Jorge D. Baculi v. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
131. Danilo David S. Mariano v. Judge Jose P. Nacional
132. Atty. Antonio G. Caneda v. Judge Eric F. Menchavez
133. Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v. Judge Renato J. Dilag
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
BANOGAN V. ZERNA
Facts:
The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. The petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge. The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners.
The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment would become so only “after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration.” If anyone was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their the pursuant thereto.
For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court.
It is shown that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.
Issue:
W/N petitioners are already barred by laches.
Held:
YES. This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
LEDESMA V. CLIMACO
Facts:
Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte for one of the cases pending before the sala of Judge Climaco. He filed a motion to withdraw from the case but the judge denied the motion and instead appointed him counsel de oficio for two more cases. Atty. Ledesma filed another motion to withdraw because he was appointed as election registrar, which was still denied.
Issue:
Should his motion to withdraw as counsel prosper?
Held:
No. The respondent judge’s denial was proper. It was observed that there is no real conflict between his duties as election registrar and counsel de oficio. The appointment of a lawyer as counsel de oficio is a privilege which veteran lawyers in fact, readily welcome as an opportunity to render their services for free. In the same way, all lawyers should treat it that way as an opportunity to prove to the community that the proper performance of his profession is not contingent upon the payment of his fees.
CUI V. CUI
Facts:
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons.” It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to “such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)”
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into between them that was embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the “convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of the position.
Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.
ISSUE
Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?