Chapter Xx: The Commonwealth’s role in governance of the South Australian abalone fishery.
Jon Nevill 0422 926 515. 30 June 2008
Introduction:
The Australian Government (Commonwealth Government) has undertaken commitments to ensure that fisheries within its jurisdiction are managed in a sustainable and precautionary fashion (Commonwealth of Australia 1992, 1996:19, 1998:19). More generally, the Commonwealth is committed to the encouragement of good management practices within all such fisheries (Commonwealth of Australia 2003). Sustainable approaches are particularly important with regard to abalone, as the history of global abalone fisheries has shown vulnerabilities to overfishing and catastrophic decline (Shepherd & Rodda 2001, Hobday et al. 2001, Shepherd & Baker 1998).
Although most constitutional powers relating to natural resource management lie with State governments, the Commonwealth retains certain powers related to the control of exports and the management of issues of national environmental significance. In practice, Commonwealth accreditation of State fisheries management regimes under these powers relies almost solely on the Commonwealth assessing State fisheries against agreed guidelines (Commonwealth of Australia 2004). These guidelines (Commonwealth of Australia 2000) are referred to below as “the guidelines”. While it has been argued that the guidelines themselves are seriously flawed (Nevill 2004), that issue will not be discussed here.
According to the guidelines:
To satisfy the Australian Government requirements for a demonstrably ecologically sustainable fishery, the fishery, or fisheries if a species is caught in more than one fishery, must operate under a management regime that meets Principles 1 and 2:
Principle 1:
A fishery must be conducted in a manner that does not lead to over-fishing, or for those stocks that are over-fished, the fishery must be conducted such that there is a high degree of probability the stock(s) will recover.
Principle 2:
Fishing operations should be managed to minimise their impact on the structure, productivity, function and biological diversity of the ecosystem.
Five ‘objectives’ lie under these two principles, and in turn 28 ‘guideline components’ are used as assessment benchmarks in regard to the objectives (see Table X1 below).
This paper sets out to examine the degree to which the commitments referred to above are fulfilled under existing Commonwealth and State programs relating to the management of the South Australian abalone fishery. The establishment of benchmarks is critical to this examination.
Prior to commercial fishing, abalone were probably the most abundant herbivorous gastropod on rocky reefs in lower Gulf St Vincent and Investigator Strait (Shepherd 2008). Although their removal is often considered of little ecological significance, this view is the result of surmise rather than careful study. Given their former abundance, it is entirely possible they had significant effects, either directly or indirectly, on shallow reef ecosystems. As Power et al. (1996:617) note, in a discussion on the role of keystone species: “the preservation of a species of concern may depend on the distribution and abundance of other species with which the target has no recognized interaction.”
Most South Australian abalone species live on subtidal and near-subtidal rocky reefs where food in the form of drift algae is available, although one species grazes largely on seagrass epiphytic algae. The species of most commercial importance are not primarily grazers of fixed algae. Abalone are broadcast spawners; reproductive efficiency is thus partially dependent on population density as well as population size. Abalone form local metapopulations in areas of suitable habitat; these areas are often characterised by current eddies which are thought to retain eggs and larvae within suitable habitat. Abalone are absent from some offshore reefs of apparently suitable habitat; one possible explanation is that exposure to strong directional currents transports larvae away from the site. Juveniles are cryptic. Abalone are preyed upon by a variety of molluscs, crustaceans and fish, at various stages in their life cycle.
Commercial abalone harvesting in SA began in the 1960s. Baseline data on abundance (of abalone and abalone predators) was not systematically collected, and no large areas exist today which could provide data on the state of the unfished ecosystem. Anecdotal information on abundance indicates local densities in good habitat were over 100 /m2; commercial fishers were apparently able to fill their boat’s capacity without the need to shift anchor (Shepherd, pers. comm. 12/7/05). Substantial areas had pristine abundances around 5 / m2 (Shepherd 2008).
Method:
This paper uses benchmarks relating to three areas: sustainability, precautionary management, and good governance. These benchmarks take the form of four core questions. Each core question has two variants relating to either full or partial compliance, making eight questions in total.
Taking the issue of sustainability first, the most obvious benchmarks relate to the way in which the Commonwealth administers the guidelines. Two questions are examined:
· does the Commonwealth’s administration of the fishery require compliance with the guideline components? and
· does the Commonwealth’s administration of the fishery encourage compliance with the guideline components?
Taking the issue of precautionary fishery management, two similar questions are asked:
· does the Commonwealth’s administration of the fishery require use of the precautionary approach? and
· does the Commonwealth’s administration of the fishery encourage use of the precautionary approach?
Australia (along with many other nations) has adopted voluntary compliance with the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO 1995), referred to below as “the Code”. The FAO’s recommendations relating to the precautionary approach within the aegis of the Code (FAO 1996a) are used to assist in answering the two questions posed above.
Taking the issue of good fishery management practices, four additional questions are asked. The first two relate to the Code, while the second two relate to ‘generally accepted principles of good fishery governance’. Nevill (2004) has reviewed principles of good governance, and the 20 second-tier principles listed in his paper are used as criteria. The four benchmark questions are:
· is the management of the fishery in full compliance with the Code?
· is the management of the fishery in partial compliance with the Code?
· does the management of the fishery meet all generally accepted good governance principles? and
· does the management of the fishery meet most generally accepted good governance principles?
In attempting to establish answers to these questions, the paper restricts itself to documentary evidence in the form of published papers and reports available at the time the Commonwealth assessment was carried out (2004), and to a much lesser extent personal communications from those holding relevant information.
Compliance with industry sustainability benchmarks:
Sustainable management of the fishery:
The following questions are examined in Table X1 below:
· does the Commonwealth’s administration of the fishery require compliance with the guideline components? and
· does the Commonwealth’s administration of the fishery encourage compliance with the guideline components?
REFER TO TABLE X1 BELOW.
Under the accreditation arrangements between the Commonwealth and the State of South Australia mentioned above, the obligations of the Commonwealth are to assess compliance of the management regime with the Guideline’s two central principles. The objectives and guideline components are used as indicators of compliance with the two central principles.
The analysis described in Table X1 shows that the Commonwealth has not required full compliance with all the guideline components. This situation is summarised in Table X2 below:
Table X2: Guideline component compliance summary:
Compliance level / Guideline components / No.Full compliance / 1.1.8, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, 2.1.6, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.5, 2.2.6 / 11
Partial compliance / 1.1.3, 1.1.7, 1.1.9, 1.2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.4 / 6
No compliance / 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.4, 1.1.5, 1.1.6, 1.2.1, 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.3.5 / 11
According to this analysis, the South Australian fishery management authority (PIRSA) has demonstrated compliance or partial compliance with 17 of the 28 guideline components. In accrediting the fishery, the Commonwealth has acknowledged that this situation is acceptable, at least in the interim.
Table X1 also indicates that, where non-compliance exists, the Commonwealth has generally developed recommendations which, if not fully addressing non-compliance issues, will at least move the management regime towards compliance over a period of time.
The two compliance questions can be answered: Although the Commonwealth did not require full compliance with the guideline components, the recommendations contained in the approval decision do encourage an increased degree of compliance (on the part of the South Australian government fishery management agency) in the future.
The Commonwealth’s guidelines allow this flexibility. According to the guidelines, the fishery must meet the two core principles on which the objectives and the more detailed guideline components are based – see discussion above. Ultimately, the issue of whether or not the fishery complies with the two principles is based on the Commonwealth’s view of adherence to the more detailed objectives and guideline components. Under the Commonwealth’s administration of the guidelines, compliance with the two principles does not necessitate full compliance with the objectives or the guideline components.
In the case of the SA abalone fishery, the Commonwealth has argued that the fishery meets the two core principles.
While there are many flaws in the management of the fishery as described in the PIRSA assessment (see Table X1) these are not sufficient to provide a clear refutation of the Commonwealth’s view.
It should, however, be noted that there are arguments suggesting that Principle 1 is in fact not met in regard to many of the metapopulations which make up the SA abalone stock. The arguments for area closures to allow metapopulation recovery set out in Shepherd & Rodda (2001) and Shepherd et al. (2001) appear coherent and powerful, yet these recommendations have not been acted on, or even discussed within the PIRSA assessment.
With regard to Principle 2, the superficial presentation of information and discussion about possible ecosystem effects, and the absence of discussion of the role of no-take areas as a tool to examine such effects (see Table X1) could certainly be used to mount a powerful case arguing non-compliance with this principle.
The bottom line, however, is that the issue of compliance with the principles is ultimately a question which the Commonwealth must answer, and it is a question which, through its complex nature, must involve a degree of judgement.
Precautionary management of the fishery:
As discussed above, advocacy of the precautionary approach is part of the Commonwealth’s guidelines, and forms themes in both the Commonwealth’s Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, and the Commonwealth Fisheries Management Act 1991. The Commonwealth, through international and national statements and agreements, is committed to promoting this approach in a wide variety of areas relating to natural resource management. With regard to fishery management, the commitment is particularly strong (see discussion above).
The South Australian Fisheries Management Act 2007 does not specifically incorporate the precautionary principle (unlike, for example, the NSW Fisheries Management Act 1994, although s.7 (Objects of the Act) emphasizes “proper conservation” and the need to for actions to be “consistent with ecologically sustainable development”. As South Australian endorsed the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (Commonwealth of Australia 1992) which incorporates the precautionary principle, it appears implicit that precaution must be applied within activities sanctioned under the Fisheries Management Act.
Taking this issue of precautionary fishery management, two similar questions may be asked in relation to the SA abalone industry:
· does the Commonwealth’s administration of the fishery require use of the precautionary approach? and
· does the Commonwealth’s administration of the fishery encourage use of the precautionary approach?
An examination of the PIRSA and DEH accreditation reports, and a perusal of the analysis in Table X1 indicates that the discussion of precautionary management is superficial in both the South Australian and Commonwealth reports, in spite of the statutory obligations of the Commonwealth to ensure that fisheries under its control adopt a precautionary approach. The issue of defining management benchmarks in both qualitative and quantitative aspects is entirely ignored in both the PIRSA and DEH assessment reports. As far as the PIRSA report goes, this is surprising given that Shepherd et al. (2001) had addressed the issue of precautionary management of the SA abalone fishery, making a number of detailed and carefully-argued recommendations. At the very least these recommendations should have been discussed.
This apparently cavalier attitude to the precautionary approach is underlined by a comparison of the existing SA abalone management framework with FAO fishery guidelines. The voluntary FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995, echoing the Rio Declaration 1992, requires all compliant States to apply the precautionary approach. The FAO precautionary guideline (FAO 1996a, the Lysekil Statement) states (paragraph 7) that:
(a) all fishing activities have environmental impacts, and it is not appropriate to assume that these are negligible until proved otherwise,
and that:
(c) the precautionary approach to fisheries requires that all fishing activities be subject to prior review and authorization; that a management plan be in place that clearly specifies management objectives and how impacts of fishing are to be assessed, monitored and addressed; and that specified interim management measures should apply to all fishing activities until such time as a management plan is in place.
While such procedures are in place for the commercial fishery, the failure of the South Australian fishery agency to develop a management plan for the recreational harvesting of abalone, or to monitor effects and publish findings, places the agency in contravention of the precautionary elements of the Rio Declaration and the Code of Conduct in this respect.
The Lysekil Statement 2001 contains a number of other recommendations, which are relevant to the management of the SA abalone fishery:
Para. / Recommendation / State fishing agency response6b / Prior identification of undesirable outcomes and of measures that will avoid them or correct them promptly. / Recommendation ignored with respect to local serial overfishing (see Shepherd and Rodda 2001).
6c / Any necessary corrective measures are initiated without delay. / Ignored – see comment above.
6d / Where the likely impact of resource use is uncertain, priority should be given to conserving the productive capacity of the resource. / Ignored – see comment above.
25 / For all fisheries, plans should be developed or revised to incorporate precautionary elements. / Ignored with respect to recreational abalone harvesting.
28 / To be precautionary, priority should be accorded to restoration of overfished stocks, avoidance of overfishing, and avoidance of excessive harvesting capacity. / Ignored – see comment above (6b).
29 / Targets identify the desired outcomes for the fishery. For example these may take the form of a target fishing mortality or a specified level of average abundance relative to the unfished state. / Mortality targets have not been implemented. Relative fished/unfished abundance data is not discussed or even presented.
33 / Plans should include explicit effort-reduction measures that apply in response to unpredicted declines in recruitment. / No explicit effort-reduction measures are proposed.
41 / Precautionary monitoring of fishing should seek to detect and observe a variety of ancillary impacts, eg: environmental changes, fish habitat degradation… / Ignored with respect to determining environmental and ecological impacts through the establishment of no-take areas (see Lysekil para 37).
In summary, the PIRSA abalone management regime, as described in the PIRSA assessment, fails to meet several important precautionary benchmarks.