Movement and Migration in the Middle East: People and Ideas in Flux

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BRISMES Conference 2017

Movement and Migration in the Middle East: People and Ideas in Flux

Movement and Migration in the Ottoman Empire

Ali Danis Neyzi, SOAS

The Kadızadeli Movement and Its Exiled Leaders:

A Window Into the Politics of 17th Century Ottoman Empire

In the 17th century the political rhythm of the Ottoman capital had become as turbulent as the Black Sea. The increasing political activism in this era can be observed in frequent rebellions and depositions of sultans, intensifying factionalism within Ottoman state structures and society alike, newly emerging socio-economic classes and the popularity of political treatises. The turbulence of this era is interpreted in scholarship as signs of transformations in state structures, dramatic changes in state-society relations and formations of alternativepolitical ideologies.[1]

One of the main strategies of the state in dealing with political challenges was exile. Movement in this case was enforced with state decrees (ferman). Ottoman exercise of banishment wasn’t codified in a clear-cut manner and occurred in a variety of forms, such as depriving one of titles (nefy), imprisonment (habs), dismissal of sedition (def’ifitne), rehabilitation of self (ıslah-ınefs) or confinement in a fortress (kal’ebendilik). Banishments fell under the category of discretionary punishments (ta’zir) and peculiarly did not stipulate a specific time period. Typically, exiles lasted for one year, afterwards were rescinded by new orders.[2] During this period of political transformations, the prerequisites for an exile aren’t very clear.What did it take for the state to banish someone?

Kadızadeli movement was one of the most controversial political strife of the century. The second and the third leaders of the movementÜstüvaniMehmed (d. 1661) and VaniMehmed (d. 1685) were exiled. By providing a brief overview of the Kadızadelis, this essay aims to depict the intricacies of the circumstances that led to banishment, in order to emphasize the importance of context and the popular political ideas of this politically tumultuous era.

a) The Historicity of the Early Modern Ottoman State

“In short, Ottoman history of [late 16th to early 18th century] is lacking a grand narrative with an explanatory power that might connect well-defined short periods, themes and topics in a coherent whole.”[3]

In recent years, researchers of Ottoman history have suggested alternative ways of thinking about the early modern Ottoman state structures. Increasing authoritarian rule of the state, centralization of bureaucracy,[4] formation of political factions, the rebellions and depositions they staged, and a new ruling class of family households (kapı) are among the historical factors that have been brought attention.[5]Primary sources, such as imperial historians, political commentary and court records, report political alliances between rebels, janissaries and the religious faction of the society.[6] Political contracts were made between the imperial court and influential households. TurhanaHatice Sultan, theValide Sultan in the early years of Mehmed IV’s reign, negotiated with KöprülüMehmedPaşa and granted him significant authority as the Grand Vizier. This paved the way for the Köprülü household to dominate the grand vizier position for the bulk of the latter half of the century.[7]

It is important to keep in mind that the state adopted new structures in response to the political challenges of its time. The authoritarianism of Murad IV is directly related to the deposition and murder of his brother Osman II, who had attempted to radically reform state and military structures.Murad IV is also notorious due to his banning of tobacco, the consumption of which had raised great controversy with its quick spread throughout the empire.[8] In short, a methodology that prioritizes the historicity[9] of the Ottoman state, in tandem with that of the early modern Ottoman society as well as the prominent religio-political ideas of the time would be, I suggest, of great contribution.

b) The KadızadeliMovement

One of the most striking and popular socio-political movements of the 17th century, the Kadızadeli ideology can be categorized as a version of Islamic puritanism. The Kadızadelis defended that the Ottoman society had to be cleansed from what they considered to be religious innovations (bid’at), especially Sufi practices such as dancing, singing, shrine and tomb visiting, saint worshipping, all of which were quite popular practices. The Kadızadeli mottos included active “commanding right and forbidding wrong,” (emr-ima‘rufvenehy-imünker) and “renewal of faith,” (tecdid-iiman).[10]

Kadızadeli puritanism had precedents in medieval Islam. The main proof for this is the fact that the pioneer of Kadızadeli doctrines, BirgiliMehmedEfendi (d. 1573), whose treatise that became popularly known as “Risale-iBirgiliMehmed,” draws heavily on the influential medieval scholar IbnTaymiyya’s (d.1328) works, especially in regards to its orthodox reformist ideology.[11]Öztürk confirms this by adding that the first of the three preacher-leaders of the Kadızadelis in the 17th century and the movement’s eponym KadızadeMehmedEfendi, translates most of IbnTaymiyya’s treatise “al-Siyasat al Shar‘iyya fi Islah al-Ra’iwa al-Ra’iyya” in his own popular risale, which he had called “Taj al-Resail.”[12]

Three key points in order to comprehend Kadızadeli movement’s relations to the state are highlighted by Madeline Zilfi’s studies. The first is the political nature of the Kadızadeli texts, such as Birgili’s and KadızadeMehmed’srisales, within a context in which religious educational writing was a “favoured genre of Sunni scholars.”Terzioğlu reminds us that ilm-ihal texts were not only popular as religious educational aids, but also as manifestos embedded with ideologies.[13] This is proven to be the case when juxtaposed with Zilfi’s and Öztürk’s reports of the controversy that arose on account of Birgili’srisale. The history of Naima, a court historian, relates that when two Halveti-Sufi scholars, the greatest enemies of the Kadızadelis, wrote refutations of Birgili’srisale, the Kadızadelis, who were enjoying a good influence on the court due to the popularity of the second Kadızadeli leader ÜstüvaniMehmed,appealed both to the sultan and the şeyhülislam in protest of the Halveti refutations. In the end, the grand vizier issued an imperial decree that forbids any criticism of Birgili’srisale.[14]

The second way in which the Kadızadeli movement became political was through its vocalization. All three Kadızadeli leaders were preachers in imperial mosques in Istanbul.Their roles as preachers were significant in that they were not part of the higher positions of the ulemahierarchy, and they had direct contact with congregations through the practice of Friday preaching (hutbe). The Kadızadeli movement was opposed to the Sufi practices, but also blamed the heads of the state’s religious faction, the ulema,for tolerating them.

The third political aspect of the movement had been its active pursuit of enforcing its ideology.Zilfi argues that Kadızadeli movement wasn’t only limited to the religious circles, but had an activist spirit. Öztürk describes the Kadızadeli preachers as not only embodying zeal, but also having adopted a sort of “mission.” Birgili and KadızadeMehmed’srisales indicate a stance against Sufi practices that goes further than disagreement. They declare that practices such as raqs (dancing), sema’ (whirling), ziyaret (tomb-shrine visiting), evlihaullah (saint worshipping), are contrary to şeriat and therefore should be outlawed and punishable. According to the Birgili, the main idea behind Sufism, tasavvuf, must adhere to laws ofşeriat, and otherwise would be considered an illegal innovation (bid’at).[15]KadızadeMehmed’srisale depicts correlation to that of Birgili’s, as it calls for the illegalization of religious practices prevalent in Turkey still today, such as complementary prayers (nawafil) on special occasions (kandil), e.g. the first Friday of Rajab (regaibkandili), fifteenth of Shaban (beraatkandili) and 27th of Ramadan (kadirgecesi).[16]

KatipÇelebi, one of the most interesting scholars of the time, critiquesthe Kadızadelis’ banning of popular religious practice. KatipÇelebi alternatively interprets that both Birgili and KadızadeMehmed oppose custom and usage (‘örfve ‘adet) and thus create strife (fitne) among the Prophet’s community (ümmet-iMuhammed). Even if it were proven within Islamic jurisprudence that they were illegal, KatipÇelebi seems to disagree precisely with the coercive activist methods of the Kadızadeli movement in banning custom and usage.[17]

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c) Exiled Kadızadeli Leaders

Kadızadelianimosity towards Sufism would go as far as mobilizing and arming the masses against Sufi lodges. Naima’schronicles report extensively the violence occurred in the late 1640s and early 1650s, in the era of ÜstüvaniMehmed’s leadership. Kadızadelis received a fetva from the şeyhülislam that legitimized the removal of Sufi lodges. Only when a prominent Halveti sheikh, ÖmerEfendi, became the new şeyhülislam in 1651, this fetva was revoked. The Kadızadeli violence continued before and after the revoke however, finally being confronted with the newly appointed grand vizier KöprülüMehmedPaşa’s forces outside of the Fatih Mosque in 1656. It is significant that the authoritative grand vizier’s first policy in his new position was suppressing the Kadızadeli movement, exiling Üstüvani and two other Kadızadeli preachers of Bayezid and Süleymaniye Mosques to Cyprus.[18]

The Kadızadeli violence resurfaced when its third leader,VaniMehmedEfendi, became influential in the court in the late 1660s until his exile in 1683. KöprülüMehmed’s son, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, succeeded his father as the new grand vizier in 1661. Shortly after, he appointed VaniMehmed as the preacher of the sultan’s court, whose Kadızadeli influence was felt in state and society alike. As it was during the time of Murad IV and KadızadeMehmed, smoking in coffee shops was banned. As it was in Üstüvani’s era, violent antagonism Sufi lodges was legalized with a fetva. The banning of alcohol had also occurred during Murad IV’s reign, yet VaniMehmed issued a prohibition that would apply to both Muslims and non-Muslims. No alcohol was to be sold or consumed around mosques, regardless of the religious disposition of the surrounding neighbourhood. VaniMehmed’s banishment was also politically induced. He was a staunch supporter of the Vienna campaign in 1683 with jihadist motives, and the catastrophic result cost Vani his position and career.[19]

Conclusion

A brief look at the Kadızadeli movement reveals that the exiles of its leaders, ÜstüvaniMehmed and VaniMehmed, were interrelated with the history of the movement, as well as with the socio-political impact to which its ideology gave rise. ÜstüvaniMehmed was exiled when his armed followers were confronted with the state’s forces, and Vani was exiled due to his support of the catastrophic Vienna campaign. Their cases depict that politics of exile in 17th century Ottoman Empire have intricate stories to tell. Without delving into the stories behind exiles in depth, it isn’t possible to comprehend the reasons behind the phenomenon of exile. Understanding how the Ottoman state chose to exile, who, when and why remains crucial, as exile continues to occur in many other forms today, but perhaps with similar motives.

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• Barkey, Karen. Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994.

---. “Rebellious Alliances: The State and Peasant Unrest in Early Seventeenth-Century France and the Ottoman Empire.” American Sociological Review, vol. 56, no. 6, 1991, pp. 699–715. JSTOR,

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---. “Ottoman Politics through British Eyes: Paul Rycaut's ‘The Present State of the Ottoman Empire.’”Journal of World History, vol. 5, no. 1, 1994, pp. 71–97.,

• Dudley, Will. Hegel and History. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009.
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• Hathaway, Jane. Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2002.
• KâtibÇelebi, Musṭạfā ibnʻAbdAllāh, translated with an introduction by Geoffrey Lewis. The Balance of Truth. London: Allen and Unwin, 1957.

• Öztürk, Necati. “Islamic Orthodoxy Among the Ottomans in the Seventeenth Century with Special Reference to the Qadi-Zade Movement.” Unpublished Thesis, PhD. University of Edinburgh, 1981.

• Piterberg, Gabriel. “Speech Acts and Written Texts: A Reading of a Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Historiographic Episode.” Poetics Today, vol. 14, no. 2, 1993, pp. 387–418. JSTOR,

---. An Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography At Play. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003.

• Sariyannis, Marinos. “The Kadızadeli Movement as a Social and Political Phenomenon: The Rise of a ‘Mercantile Ethic’?” in Political Initiatives “From the Bottom Up” in the Ottoman Empire: Halcyon Days in Crete vii, written by AntonisAnastasopoulos. pp. 263-89

• Terzioglu, Derin. Sufi and Dissident in the Ottoman Empire: Niyazi-iMisri, 1618-1694. Ann Arbor, MI: Proquest, 1999.

---.Where ʻİlm-iḤāl Meets Catechism: Islamic Manuals of Religious Instruction in the Ottoman Empire in the Age of Confessionalization. Past Present 2013; 220 (1): 79-114. doi: 10.1093/pastj/gtt001

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• Tezcan, Baki., Karl K. Barbir, and Norman Itzkowitz. Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World: A Volume of Essays in Honor of Norman Itzkowitz. Madison, Wis.: Center for Turkish Studies at the University of Wisconsin, 2007.

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---. 'The Kadızadelis: Discordant Revivalism in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul', Journal of Near Eastern Studies 45/2(1986) 251–69

[1]Fordiscussions of “DeclineParadigm” anditscritiquessee: Hathaway, Jane. MutinyandRebellion in theOttomanEmpire. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2002.

[2]Terzioğlu, SufiandDissident, pp. 144-147

[3]Tezcan, the Second Ottoman Empire, p 9-10

[4]Barkey, BanditsandBureaucrats, pp. 6-7

[5]Abou al-Hajj, Formation of the Modern State, pp. 2-3

[6]Barkey, Karen. “Rebellious Alliances,” 700-1.

[7]Darling, “OttomanPoliticsthrough British Eyes,” pp. 81

[8]Grehan, James. “Smoking and ‘Early Modern’ Sociability,” pp. 1354-5

[9] Dudley, Will. Hegel and History, pp. 1-2

[10]Zilfi, Politics of Piety, pp. 137, Sariyannis, pp. 272, Öztürk, pp. 256

[11]Zilfi, “TheKadızadelis,” pp. 260-1 The debate between the proponents of pure and orthodox version of Islam of the Prophet and His Companions’ time versus those of the traditional Islam a culture had come to adopt is considered to be an inherent aspect of Islam, mostly by early 20th century orientalists.Zilfi, pp. 253

[12]Öztürk, pp. 170

[13]Terzioğlu, “Whereİlm-i Hal MeetsCatechism,” pp. 84-8

[14]Zilfi, “The Kadızadelis,” pp. 261-2, Öztürk, pp. 245-6. Brief listings of the Kadızadeli literature is provided in Öztürks dissertation.

[15]Öztürk, pp. 140-2

[16]Öztürk, pp. 154

[17]Lewis, Balance of Truth, pp. 134

[18]Sariyannis, pp. 272, 277, Zilfi, “The Kadızadelis,” pp. 262

[19]Zilfi, “The Kadızadelis, pp. 263-5