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The Relationship between Accuracy of Self-Perception and Attachment Organization
in Adolescence
Lauren Berger
Distinguished Majors Project
University of Virginia, Spring 2001
First Reader: Joseph P. Allen, Ph.D.
Second Reader: Thomas F. Oltmanns, Ph.D.
Abstract
This study examined the relationship between attachment organization and accuracy of self-perception among 176 adolescents. Attachment organization was assessed with the Adult Attachment Interview. Accuracy of self-perception was measured in terms of mutuality of adolescent self- and parent/peer-report on measures of adolescent psychosocial functioning. Preoccupied adolescents overreported internalizing/externalizing symptoms in comparison to parent-reports. Dismissing adolescents were more likely to be discrepant from parent-reports of internalizing/externalizing symptoms, and from peer-reports of behavior conduct. These linkages remained after accounting for baseline levels of adolescent symptoms. The findings suggest that attachment theory may account for individual differences in self-perception of symptoms in adolescence.
The Relationship between Accuracy of Self-Perception and Attachment Organization
in Adolescence
Since the birth of psychology, researchers have been interested in ascertaining how well people know themselves and what psychological processes promote accuracy versus distortion in self-perception (Robins & John, 1997). Attachment theory, which has received considerable attention in the field of developmental psychology over the past thirty years (Masten & Coatsworth, 1998), offers a particularly interesting perspective on the development of self-views. However, despite promising theoretical inference and a substantial body of research on linkages between attachment and psychosocial functioning in childhood (e.g., Eliker, Englund, & Sroufe, 1990), adolescence (e.g., Allen, Moore, Kuperminc, & Bell, 1998), and early adulthood (e.g., Waters, Merrick, Reboux, Crowell, & Albersheim, 2000), there is limited empirical research on how attachment may account for stable and enduring individual differences in self-perception across the lifespan (Allen & Land, 1999). Allen and his colleagues (1998/1999) suggest that exploring adolescence, which marks the critical period in development in which an individual first acquires the capacity to logically and abstractly reflect on the self and attachment experiences, is crucial to expanding our understanding of how attachment operates over time. Taking a step in this direction, the purpose of the current study was to investigate the extent to which attachment may account for individual differences in self-perception accuracy in adolescence.
Self-Perception versus Other-Perception
The present study will consider three issues regarding self-perception: 1) what the construct of self-perception means, 2) what it signifies for an individual to be accurate versus distorted in their self-judgments, and 3) how individuals form self-perceptions.
Self-Perception
To begin with, what is self-perception? Classic theories in social psychology regard self-perception as an individual’s self-knowledge or views of the self (Bem, 1972). While there is a vast body of theoretical literature on self-perception, means of empirically assessing the accuracy of self-judgments are controversial since there is no absolute, objective standard for measuring a person’s traits, capabilities, emotions, and so forth. In the absence of an objective measurement of self-insight or self-perception, it is difficult to study the accuracy of a person’s self-views. Researchers have only recently begun to recognize the need for objective assessments of self-perception accuracy and to formulate methods for empirically measuring self-judgment.
Robins and John (1997) suggest that a growing number of researchers in the fields of personality and social psychology operationally define and measure accuracy of self-perception in terms of a social consensus criteria. According to a social consensus criteria, accurate self-insight is seeing oneself as others see one. Kruglanski (1989), for instance, posits that an accurate self-judgment is a judgment that is congruent with judgments by others. Similarly, Funder (1999) suggests that a realistic approach to objectively measuring accuracy of self-perception is to examine the mutuality of self- and other-judgments.
Conceptualizing self-perception accuracy in terms of the congruence between self- and other-judgment does provide a convenient means of assessing accuracy of self-perception. However, interpretations of this measurement must take into consideration 1) who is the other judge and 2) what is the domain of judgment.
First, it is important to consider whois making the other-judgment. How reliable is the other-judge? For instance, if a researcher is examining an adolescent’s accuracy of self-perception, is a parent or a close peer a more valid judge of the adolescent? Is a mother versus a father a more accurate judge of the adolescent? A number of studies, for instance, indicate that the validity of person perception increases with acquaintanceship (see Paulhus & Bruce, 1992). In addition, the researcher cannot be the other-judge provides a more valid standard of accuracy than the self-judge. Take, for example, a finding of disparity between adolescent- and mother-report of adolescent behavior problems. There are at least three possible explanations if the adolescent reports that s/he does not have behavior problems and the mother reports that her daughter/son does have behavior problems: 1) the adolescent has a distorted self-perception of her/his problem behavior, or 2) the adolescent has an accurate self-perception, and the problem is a distortion in communication between mother and adolescent; the mother may have a distorted perception of the adolescent’s behavior, or 3) the two preceding explanations are not mutually exclusive and the disparity in adolescent- and mother-report reflects adolescent distorted self-perception and distorted communication in the adolescent-mother relationship. In order to increase the probability that the other-report is in fact the more accurate judge, Kenny (1994) suggests that the most valid measurement of accuracy is obtained by averaging the judgments of all possible observers of all possible behaviors being targeted.
A second factor to consider in utilizing the congruence of self- and other-report to infer accuracy of self-perception is the domainof judgment. Is there a significant difference between investigating observable behaviors versus non-observable emotions? Some personality researchers have hypothesized that overall, self-other agreement is higher for judgements of traits that are more visible in an individual’s behavior (Funder & Dobroth, 1987; Marsh & Craven, 1991; Shavelson, Hubner, & Stanton, 1976). Is there a significant difference between investigating the mutuality of self- and other-report of personality traits versus internalizing or externalizing symptoms? As Funder (1999) and van Aken and his colleagues (1996) posit, there are multiple, complex components of a self-concept that should be considered. In particular, there may be important differences between examining the mutuality of self- and other-description of affective versus social attributes of an individual.
Self-Perception Accuracy versus Distortion
Another critical facet of self-perception accuracy is what it signifies for an individual to be accurate versus distorted in their self-judgments. Theories on self-perception suggest that self-insight or understanding one’s own self is important for healthy adjustment. In general, research has suggested that accuracy of self-perception is associated with positive psychological adjustment whereas distorted self-perception may be associated with unhealthy adjustment. For instance, van Aken, van Lieshout, and Haselager (1996) found that greater congruence between self- and other-description was positively correlated with adolescent competence.
In addition, previous research has indicated that accuracy of self-perception may be related to individual differences in personality (Osberg & Shrauger, 1986; van Aken, van Lieshout, & Haselager, 1996). Colvin (1993), for example, found that adolescents who scored high on the personality dimension of neuroticism were likely to have less mutuality of self- and other-report. Conversely, adolescents who scored high on the personality dimension of openness were significantly more likely to have interrater agreement.
These studies suggest that accuracy versus distortion in self-perception may be an important indicator of psychological adjustment, but more research is needed to determine what psychological processes promote the development of self-perception and the maintenance of accuracy versus distortion in self-judgment.
Development of Self-Perception
Given that accurate self-perception may be a significant factor for healthy adjustment, how individuals develop self-judgments is an important question for researchers. Kelly (1955) draws the analogy that just as the scientist uses facts and observations to develop empirically-based theories, the individual processes information or cues from the environment to acquire a self-construct or a theory about the self and the world. While developmental theories emphasize the effects of childhood experiences on individuals’ developing self-perceptions (see Masten & Coatsworth, 1998), research indicates that adolescence marks a critical period in development in which in an individual first acquires the cognitive capacities to reflect on the self.
Self-Perception in Adolescence
Some of the most interesting changes in the self-system take place in adolescence (Harter, Marold, Whitesell, & Cobbs, 1996; Steinberg, 1999). Most significantly, adolescence is characterized by the advent of increased cognitive capacities for logical and abstract thinking which allow an adolescent to perceive and reflect on the selfas existing separate and apart from others (Ricks, 1985; Allen & Land, 1999). Allen and his colleagues (1998) suggest that these developments result in substantial, increased differentiation between self in an individual’s self-representations.
A central developmental task of adolescence which builds on these gains in cognitive capacity is the establishment of a self-concept (van Aken, van Lieshout, Haselager, 1996).
Harter and her colleagues (1996) have suggested that a normative part of this process involves role experimentation. According to Harter, adolescents may engage in false-self behavior, acting in ways that do not reflect one’s true self, as a means of exploring their self-identity. However, research by Harter and Lee (1989) indicates substantial variability in adolescents’ usage of false-self behavior. Moreover, Harter (1996) found support for a linkage between motivations for engaging in false-self behavior and adolescents’ perceptions of parent and peer support. Normal role experimentation motivations for engaging in false-self behavior were associated with greater quality and level of perceived parent and peer support, whereas clinically debilitating motivations for engaging in false-self behavior were associated with perceptions of less parent and peer support. Along the same lines, research conducted by Benson, Harris, and Rogers (1992) suggests that securitymay be a prerequisite for the healthy establishment of a self-identity in adolescence. These findings suggest that adolescents’ perceived familial and social support may be related to individual differences in the development of a self-concept and in self-perception accuracy.
Clearly, more research is needed to enhance our understanding of how individual differences in perceived support may affect adolescents’ development of self-perception, and conversely, how accurate versus distorted self-perception may reflect individual differences in perceived support. Attachment theory, which emphasizes the importance of interpersonal, attachment relationships in shaping an individual’s views about the self and the world, provides a very interesting framework for pursuing these questions.
Attachment Theory
Attachment theorists stress the critical role of interpersonal relationships in the development of individuals’ perceptions of themselves and the world around them. Bowlby (1973) posited that an individual’s developing view of the self originates in infancy and is inextricably linked to early attachment experiences. Beginning in infancy, human attachment relationships are driven by a behavioral-motivational system that regulates the physical proximity and psychological availability of a primary caregiver (Bowlby, 1979). As a result of repeated interactions with a primary caregiver, an infant’s internal representation of self and others evolves from his or her expectations of the caregiver’s availability and sensitivity (Bowlby, 1969/1982). Research conducted by Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, and Wall (1978) with infants in the Strange Situation indicated that variability in a caregiver’s availability and sensitivity to an infant resulted in secure (healthy) or insecure (maladaptive) attachment relationships. Ainsworth et al. found that secure attachments are fostered when children experience consistent caregiver warmth and availability. On the other hand, avoidant/dismissing attachments are cultivated through caregiving that is characterized by unavailability or insensitivity, and ambivalent/preoccupied attachments develop through inconsistent or intrusive caregiving.
What is the importance of secure versus insecure infant attachment? A substantial and growing body of research has demonstrated that there are impressive linkages between infant attachment and later psychosocial functioning in childhood (e.g., Eliker, Englund, & Sroufe, 1990), adolescence (e.g., Allen, Moore, Kuperminc, & Bell, 1998), and young adulthood (e.g., Waters, Merrick, Reboux, Crowell, & Albersheim, 2000).
According to attachment theorists, the affective infant-caregiver attachment bond impacts psychosocial adjustment beyond infancy through an internal working model of self, others, and attachment relationships (Bowlby, 1969/1982; Bretherton & Munholland, 1999). Theoretically, internal working models are individual organizations of attitudes, expectations, and feelings about attachment experiences, which serve as a framework for future emotions, thoughts, and behaviors (Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985; Kobak & Cole, 1994; Weinfield, Ogawa, & Sroufe, 1997). Belsky & Cassidy (1994) have likened internal working models to social psychologists’ notions of expectancy confirmation. Similar to expectancy confirmation, internal working models describe a partly conscious and partly unconscious affective-cognitive template that influences what an individual attends to, encodes, and recalls.
While attachment in infancy and childhood can be assessed through observable behaviors (Strange Situation, Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978), examining attachment representations in adolescence and adulthood involves the evaluation of internal or mental working models of attachment. The Adult Attachment Interview, developed by George, Kaplan, and Main (1985), permits researchers to assess individuals’ reflection and communication about parent-child attachment experiences and their ability to integrate specific memories into a coherent understanding of attachment relationships. Theoretically, the Adult Attachment Interview assesses an individual’s state of mind with regard to attachment. Attachment research suggests that individuals with an insecure-dismissing state of mind with regard to attachment devalue the importance of close relationships and emphasize autonomy and separateness at the expense of intimacy and connectedness. An insecure-preoccupied attachment organization is associated with exaggeration of attachment issues and discomfort or fear of separateness and autonomy. Finally, individuals with secure-autonomous attachment models have a healthy balance of recognizing, appreciating, and desiring both intimacy and autonomy, and both separateness and connectedness (Cassidy & Berlin, 1994; Main, 1990, Main & Goldwyn, in press; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985).
Research has demonstrated strong concordance between classification of maternal attachment organization on the Adult Attachment Interview and infant attachment security, as assessed in the Strange Situation (Main et al., 1985; Posada, Waters, Crowell, & Lay, 1995; van Ijzendoorn, 1992; Waters, Hamilton, & Weinfield, 2000). In addition, studies have demonstrated significant predictive, concurrent, and retrospective agreement between parents’ state of mind with regard to attachment as assessed on the Adult Attachment Interview and their infants’ attachment security, as assessed in the Strange Situation (Fonagy, Steele, & Steele, 1991; Main et al., 1985, van Ijzendorn, 1992; Waters, Hamilton, & Weinfield, 2000). While these findings are impressive, critics have pointed out that little data exists on whether individual differences in attachment remain consistent over time. Several recent studies that have examined the stability of attachment in infancy to attachment representation in young adulthood indicate mixed results (Hamilton, 2000; Waters, Merrick, Reboux, Crowell, & Albersheim, 2000; Weinfield, Sroufe, & Egeland, 2000). Waters et al. found that among Caucasian, middle-class individuals, 72% of infants received the same secure versus insecure attachment classification in early adulthood. Weinfield et al. found no evidence for significant continuity between infant and adult attachment among individuals at high risk for poor developmental outcomes. However, continuous and discontinuous groups could be differentiated on the basis of significant, negative life events such as child maltreatment, maternal depression, and family functioning in early adolescence. As Waters, Hamilton, and Weinfield (2000) have pointed out, malleability of attachment classification is, in fact, consistent with Bowlby’s (1953) original hypotheses that significant, attachment-related life experiences do influence the stability or flexibility of individual attachment over time.
Do internal working models of attachment significantly account for individual differences in self-perception? Bowlby (1981) argued that attachment organization is critical to understanding an individual’s model of self. Findings from a few recent studies suggest that there may be a relationship between individual differences in self-perception accuracy and attachment.
Prior research has suggested that attachment organization may be related to the development of self-perception in terms of a self-concept. Cassidy (1988), for instance, looked at the relationship between self-concept and attachment in childhood and found a moderate association between attachment classification and views about the self. Along the same lines, Cooper, Collins, and Shaver (1998) examined individual differences in attachment style and self-concept among adolescents and found that secure adolescents were the most well-adjusted, whereas preoccupied and dismissing adolescents had poorer self-concepts.
Research conducted by Kobak and Sceery (1988) on the affective and representational correlates of attachment organization in late adolescence also suggests a relationship between self-perception accuracy and attachment. Kobak et al. found a lack of congruence between dismissing adolescents’ self-reports and peer-reports of adolescents’ social competence and distress. Although peers perceived dismissing adolescents as less socially competent and more distressed, dismissing adolescents’ self-reports did not differ from secure adolescents’ self-reports of perceived social competence and distress. Interestingly, dismissing adolescents also significantly reported more loneliness and lack of support in their relationships. Congruent with other research on features of dismissing attachment, these findings suggest that a dismissing attachment organization may be related to distorted self-perception, characterized by less acknowledgment or even denial of distress.