Does time pass?

An apparently simple question, a vastly debated answer. Time is a concept that has fascinated human beings since the beginning of it, intriguing philosophers and physicists alike. While not a generally accepted idea, I am going to argue that time does not, in fact, pass.

Firstly, the definition of ‘time’ is not universally agreed upon, therefore it is difficult to know what we mean by the passage of it. Language is no stranger to ambiguity, so it is hardly surprising we use the word ‘time’ to describe slightly varying concepts. Physical time is the objective, social measure of time; the kind that tells us when to catch a train or attend an appointment. Psychological time is our individual awareness of physical time, a subjective and alterable phenomenon. As psychological time can be moulded by environmental factors, (an engaging activity will inevitably speed this up) one is inclined to use the definition of physical time when debating metaphysics, however there are several versions of this as well. It is quite clear that “an overall structure of events that has an arrow or directionality due to later states of the universe being produced from the earlier states” and“what we intend to measure with aclock” could be describing very different concepts. An “overall structure of events” with “directionality” implies time is general term used to refer to the passage of one event to another, and this is not necessarily what we intend to measure with a clock. Clocks measure units of time – seconds, minutes or hours. An hour is 60 minutes long, however if humans had decided that it was 100 minutes, we would still say an hour has passed, regardless of what an ‘hour’ actually is. This suggests that measures of time are biased as they are fabricated, whereas the former definition of time relies on the objectivity of ‘later’ and ‘earlier’.Therefore, definitions of time have differing views of what it actually is, and so the definition of ‘passage of time’ must follow the same rule.If we cannot agree on the definition of time, it does not make sense to argue for the passage of it, as we do not actually know what we are declaring when we say “time passes”.

There are multiple theories about the nature of the universe and its relation to time, the two most notable being ‘A’ theory and ‘B’ theory. In the ‘A’ series (the universe that exists if ‘A’ theory is correct), time can be divided into components: past, present and future. Time passes as it flows through the stages, and each stage has unique, mutually exclusive temporal properties – pastness, presentness and futurity respectively. Several variations of ‘A’ theory have emerged over the years, for example, the moving spotlight theory states that all times are real, but only one has the property of being present, and this changes. Philosopher McTaggart famously took objection to ‘A’ theory with what is known as McTaggart’s paradox. The argument is as follows: if ‘A’ temporal properties such as futurity are mutually exclusive, event X is currently in the future and will be in the past. These are examples of second order temporal properties; an event that is currently in the future has the property of past-futurity. However, temporal properties are mutually exclusive so the concept of past-futurity is contradictory in itself. It is possible to invoke third order temporal properties to explain second order ones, and then to turn to fourth order properties to explain the third order. Very quickly, it becomes apparent that there is an infinite regress. Whilst McTaggart’s paradox is not regarded in high esteem by many modern philosophers, I feel that it highlights one of the fundamental problems with ‘A’ theory – an object or event cannot exist in the past, present and future at the same time if those times do not exist equally. The base of ‘A’ theory is clearly undermined by this argument, so it cannot be used to argue for the passage of time. The paradox shows that time cannot pass through stages individually and therefore the ‘A’ theory fails to convince many of the passage of time.

McTaggart also took issue with the counterpart to ‘A’ theory, the imaginatively named ‘B’ theory. This explanation of the universe states that all times are equal, much like all spaces. ‘Now’ is just where we are in relation to time, much like ‘here’ is where we are in relation to space. In the ‘B’ series, time does not pass, it is static and we move within it. Events are fixed in relation to each other, but they do not move themselves. McTaggart believed this was also an unsatisfactory explanation of time and as it does not allow for change, however I disagree. I find this argument deeply convincing as it explains time as having similar properties to space, an idea which we are all familiar with. Even though objects in dimensions act differently, it is generally accepted that the standard three dimensions of space obey the same laws of the universe and are similar to each other. A square and a cube resemble each other, and have many of the same qualities (for example all corners are at right angles, and none of the lines are curved) so it makes sense for us to follow the same principles with the fourth dimension, time. Therefore I believe the ‘B’ series is a likely possibility, and so time cannot be said to pass, as this simply cannot happen in a universe where all times are equal.

Philosopher Simon Prosser supports the view that time does not pass, and he makes two compelling arguments for it. Firstly, if time passes, we cannot know how quickly it does so. A rate is a ratio between two variables, and the only conceivable way we could measure time passing is with the unit seconds per second. To somehow make sense of this illogical unit, we would have to have a different time series with a different type of second. Since ‘A’ theory (which states that time does pass) rejects the idea of two times existing simultaneously, it cannot be used to explain this idea. Consequently, we have no way of measuring the passage of time, and no way of proving its existence. Prosser also argues that we are incapable of measuring the passage of time as we are incapable of experiencing it – we could not build a machine that detects the ‘passage of time’ as existing (as a substance would) in an ‘A’ universe, and does not detect it in a ‘B’ universe. A brain is a physical system, much like a machine, so this can also not measure the passage of time. Attempting to measure the passage of time is a category error; it is simply not a thing that can be measured. In my opinion, both of Prosser’s arguments are very convincing, as they show how we cannot experience and therefore cannot measure time, so it seems illogical to theorise that it passes.

To conclude, I feel my position that time does not pass is completely justifiable. Human beings cannot agree on what exactly time is and what its properties and definitions are, therefore it is unreasonable to make conclusions about something we do not understand or are able to define. ‘A’ theory is disproven by McTaggart’s paradox among other things, whereas I feel ‘B’ theory still has a sound basis. Prosser’s arguments about how we cannot measure time passes demonstrates that without this ability, it is impossible to draw a conclusion that it does indeed do so. Overall, I have come to my conclusion that time does not pass because I feel the arguments against it passing are stronger than the ones arguing for it.

Bibliography:

Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: Time

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Is Time Real? (YouTube)

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Does Time Pass (YouTube)

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Simon Prosser Durham University Lecture

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