Destabilizing websites
By Lokman Tsui. AnnenbergSchool for Communication, University of Pennsylvania
Last updated March 16, 2005
Websites have been a prominent locale for mobilization. Mobilization efforts are, at times, considered destabilizing by a particular government. Here we are concerned primarily with two categories of such websites: a) “destabilizing websites” (i.e. sites considered to be such) the servers of which are located within the geographical of the government that perceives itself as threatened and b) such websites that are within the jurisdiction of another government. The latter category is particularly interesting because they lead to requests by the “threatened government” for the host government. Internet sites of the Falun Gong movements, for example, fall within both categories (located within and outside China). This paper will provide a comparative analysis of the different methods employed by governments to counter in specific these destabilizing websites.
Case Studies
We have identified a sample of websites that arguably fit the template. Some may not be appropriately viewed as imminently destabilizing. Obviously, there are a great many non-visible examples where Internet sites are closed down within authoritarian regimes. It is harder to enumerate sites where one state requests another state to take action. Summed up, they concern:
Date: May 13, 1999
Government seeking stability:UK
Party causing instability:American-based internet website
Location of website:US
Content of website:top-secret details of British intelligence agents
Countermeasure by government:requests to remove information, appeal to media not to publish the address of website, or its contents
Date:August 30, 2000
Government seeking stability:Germany
Party causing instability:US internet service providers
Location of website:US
Content of website:Nazi propaganda
Countermeasure by government:request by Dusseldorf District Government President to prevent access to websites. Migration to US servers is mentioned as cause of fining German servers DM500,000 for hosting Nazi propaganda.
Date:March 7, 2001
Government seeking stability:Japan
Party causing instability:Chinese hackers
Location of website:Saitama, Japan
Content of website:critical towards Japanese government, hacked website showing Chinese tank, Chinese messages about DiaoyuIslands
Countermeasure by government:website closed down
Date:September 1, 2001
Government seeking stability:Singapore
Party causing instability:Foreign Political Websites
Location of website:Outside Singapore
Content of website:Political websites
Countermeasure by government:Requirement to register, failure leads to blockade.
Date:October 12, 2001
Government seeking stability:US
Party causing instability:IRAradio.com
Location of website:US
Content of website:terrorist website
Countermeasure by government:FBI closed it down
Date:November 1, 2001
Government seeking stability:South Korea
Party causing instability:North Korean website
Location of website:China
Content of website:offers e-mail exchange and e-commerce
Countermeasure by government:approval of government required to subscribe to site
Date:March 28, 2002
Government seeking stability:Bahrain
Party causing instability:opposition groups, Freedom Movement
Location of website:London, UK
Content of website:inciting sectarianism, offensive content
Countermeasure by government:blockades of London-based servers
Date:April 24, 2002
Government seeking stability:China
Party causing instability:ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corp)
Location of website:Australia
Content of website:political sensitive to Chinese viewers
Countermeasure by government:Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman denied government involvement
Date:February 4, 2003
Government seeking stability:Kyrgyzstan
Party causing instability:Opposition website (Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement Party?)
Location of website:Kyrgyzstan
Content of website:critical of government, including shortcomings in the official draft version of the constitution
Countermeasure by government:website shutdown without explanation by ISP
Date:September 17, 2003
Government seeking stability:Uzbekistan
Party causing instability:Ozod Ovoz website
Location of website:Uzbekistan
Content of website:critical of Uzbek president, serves as public outlet for online protests about lack of freedom of expression
Countermeasure by government:blockade
Date:September 23, 2003
Government seeking stability:India
Party causing instability:Meghalaya’s Khasi tribe, militant group
Location of website:India
Content of website:espousing the cause of the tribe
Countermeasure by government:blockade, to ensure “balanced flow of information”, not censorship
Date:December 21, 2003
Government seeking stability:Malaysia
Party causing instability:opposition parties
Location of website:UK
Content of website:inflammatory material, support for former DP Minister Anwar Ibrahim
Countermeasure by government:complaints lodged, unknown by who
Update:December 24, 2003 reopened?
Date:May 14, 2004
Government seeking stability:Malaysia
Party causing instability:website of Acme Commerce
Location of website:Malaysia
Content of website:links to terrorist groups, showing beheading of US citizen in Iraq
Countermeasure by government:ordered ISP to close down website
Date:July 11, 2004
Government seeking stability:South Korea
Party causing instability:(alleged) Supreme Headquarters of Armed Islamic Warriors
Location of website:Iraq
Content of website:threat by militants to bomb South-Korean ships delivering US military supplies to Middle East
Countermeasure by government:security officials implemented “preventive measures”
Date:September 14, 2004
Government seeking stability:Russia
Party causing instability:kavkazcenter.com
Location of website:Lithuania
Content of website:support for radical field commander Shamil Basaev (his personal website is already blocked)
Countermeasure by government:Lithuanian ambassador summoned to Russian Foreign Ministry to explain failure of closing down website
Update:
Date:November 16, 2004
Reaction to countermeasure:Relocation of server to Sweden
Countermeasure by government:Swedish ambassador called to discuss website
Extra:Website previous on Finnish server (October 2004)
Date:October 16, 2004
Government seeking stability:US (FBI)
Party causing instability:Indymedia
Location of website:London, UK
Content of website:independent media
Countermeasure by government:FBI seizure of servers
Date:February 2, 2005
Government seeking stability:US
Party causing instability:Iran blogs
Location of website:Dallas, US
Content of website:Iran’s dissenting and liberal voices
Countermeasure by government:shutdown
Discussion
When located inside the legal jurisdiction, it is generally easier to shutdown the website, as opposed to blocking or filtering. In contrast, when outside the legal jurisdiction, the government of the country hosting the server is sometimes requested to shutdown the website but more often the government seeking stability will block or filter the website.
If “target” governments do not get the active participation of “server host”, then they resort to more covert means to disable a foreign website.For example, the Chinese government has been known to have launched Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks against servers hosting Falun Gong websites located in the United States and Canada. These attacks were only by accident found to be initiated by the Chinese government. Because of the illegality of the technique, covertness is a likely characteristic.
Some resources are available for further research. Some general websites on regulation, censorship and liability are at: : especially the sections concerning “content regulation”, “liability, jurisdiction and applicable law”, “racism and xenophobia”. There is an empty section on the website labelled “terrorism”. Terrorism, an ultimate description of a destabilizing activity, is a keyword to look out for when thinking about destabilizing websites. Since 9-11, government measures to act against opposite forces have gained more currency when posed under the label of ‘terrorism’. Other websites include:
Caslon Analytics
This guide explores censorship, regulation of offensive material and free speech in the digital environment. It includes discussion of freedom of information, archives and whistleblowing legislation.Also see
ICE: Internet Censorship Explorer
The Internet Censorship Explorer (ICE) is a blog maintained by the Citizen Lab's technical research director, Nart Villeneuve. ICE is an incubator where Nart explores the politics of technology (hacktivism, infowar/cyberterrorism and Internet filtering), develops ideas for future Citizen Lab projects, posts proof of concept code and any other snippets of raw data that don't really have a place anywhere else. ICE also contains bleeding edge Internet filtering and censorship research related to the work of the Citizen Lab and the OpenNet Initiative including the development of censorship circumvention technology.
Also see the OpenNet Initiative: Documenting Internet Content Filtering Worldwide
The ONI mission is to investigate and challenge state filtration and surveillance practices. “Our approach applies methodological rigor to the study of filtration and surveillance blending empirical case studies with sophisticated means for technical verification. Our aim is to generate a credible picture of these practices at a national, regional and corporate level, and to excavate their impact on state sovereignty, security, human rights, international law, and global governance.”
The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto, Canada focusing on advanced research and development at the intersection of digital media and world civic politics.
Also The Information Warfare Monitor is a joint project of the Advanced Network Research Group, part of the Cambridge Programme for Security in International Society, University of Cambridge, and the Citizen Lab, an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. “The Information Warfare Monitor is an advanced research project examining how states and non-state actors seek to exploit information and information systems to pursue political objectives through non-political means. The project seeks to examine this emerging dimension of global security on two levels:
- Operational Case Studies -- by building a repertoire of grounded, multi-dimensional "case studies" of information warfare operations, and to do so by employing a cross-disciplinary fusion of advanced network monitoring/visualization tools and qualitative social science research methodologies.
- Consequences for Global Security -- by using the case study data to assess emerging threats and consequences of information operations on global security in its military, political, economic, legal and human rights dimensions.”