Embeddedness as a trade union strategy: The Spanish experience
Mike Rigby* Miguel Angel García Calavia**
Introduction
Literature on trade union renewal ‘does not tend, with a few exceptions, to extend its discussion of the strategies available to those countries where membership and enterprise level organization are not the only bases of union strength and where institutional and political embeddedness or stickiness play an important role in explaining union power (Streeck and Thelen,2005). The Spanish trade union movement is a movement which has a given consistent emphasis to institutional and political involvement from the period of Spain’s transition to democracy and, as such, is an example of a union movement that successfully reversed the signs of decline in the 1980s in the face of globalization and European integration (Hamann,2012). This paper considers the resilience of the Spanish trade union model in the face of the economic recession which began in 2009 and the crisis measures adopted by the Spanish government with the encouragement of the European Union and the International Monetary Fund.
The paper begins by reviewing the dominants strands of literature on trade union renewal. It then outlines and evaluates the most important features of the Spanish unions’ political and institutional approach during the last three decades and their achievements in respect of worker representation. Thirdly it summarizes the threats posed to the unions by the economic crisis and the associated government measures. Finally the paper considers the effectiveness of the embeddedness model in helping the unions to maintain their role in Spanish society.
Trade Union Renewal
During the last three decades trade unions have faced an increasingly challenging environment. This environment has been a product of several factors; structural change with the decline of those sectors of employment in which unions were strongest; globalization, the associated increase of competitive pressures and the quest for flexibility which have reduced the space for union impact at enterprise and sectoral level; and political/legislative changes which have not favoured collective employment relations.
As a result, a focus of debate in employment relations literature has been how trade unions can effectively cope with this new environment. This debate has centred on how unions can renew or revitalize themselves in a new or hostile environment (Turner, 2005).The actions available to unions would appear to include (Frege and Kelly 2003):
An enterprise level, partnership focus based on mutual gains
A qualitative rather than quantitative bargaining agenda
Intervention at a political level
The development of international links
- *London South Bank University ** University of Valencia
Organizational restructuring e.g. mergers
An emphasis on organizing and recruitment, responding more effectively to worker needs
Coalition building with other social movements
The length of this list is however deceptive. More attention has been focused on some actions than others. The difficulties identified with partnership and organizational restructuring have limited interest in them more recently. In the former case, partnership agreements have been relatively rare (Gumbrell McCormick and Hyman,2013) and have been criticised for detaching union representatives from rank and file members and restricting member participation and mobilization (Danford et al, 2002). In the case of restructuring, mergers between unions have tended to be seen as a defensive strategy (Waddington , 2005) while the variety of internal restructuring initiatives have not resulted in any consensus in the literature or in practice except perhaps the potential tension between measures adopted on grounds of enhanced efficiency and union democracy. Certainly there is a continuing interest in the engagement of unions with more qualitative issues such as training and work life balance (e.g. Rigby and O’Brien Smith,2010) but the crisis driven environment of the last five years, with the attendant priorities of preserving jobs and living standards, has limited the purchase of such issues. Similarly although the literature tends to emphasize the value of internationalism its potential is constrained by the lack of institutional power resources at that level (Gumbrell McCormick and Hyman (2013)
Given the perceived limitations of other options, a considerable element of the Anglo- American union renewal literature during the last decades has been a focus on two of the above strategies: organizing and coalition building with other social movements. Both strategies have strong advocates and a growing body of literature has sought to develop and refine them. The merits of an organizing approach have been emphasized (Carter,2006; Gall and Fiorito,2012) as have the problems in implementing it such as a lack of clarity about objectives, inadequate resources and an excessive focus on the workplace (Heery and Simms,2011). A similar and growing focus in the renewal literature can be found on the potential of coalition building, often in conjunction with an organizing approach. Examples of coalition building in operation are discussed in Wills and Simms’ (2004) evaluation of the TELCO campaign in East London, Martinez Lucio and Perrett’s (2009) study of campaigns among cleaners in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and Muir and Peertz’s (2010) report on the Australian unions’ ‘Your Rights at Work ‘ campaign. An increasing body of literature discusses the preconditions for successful coalition building. Examples of this are Gahan and Pekarek’s work on the importance of framing (2012) and Tattersall’s discussion of the role of bridge builders and of different scales of action (2010).
The problematic nature of this relatively narrow focus has been pointed out (Bryson et al, 2011). Union organizing relies on an Anglo-American model of trade unionism emphasizing workplace presence and union membership levels as the key indices of union strength. Coalition building or social movement unionism involves assumptions about the strength of civil society to provide a basis for genuine community coalitions and grassroots worker mobilization. Anglo-American literature records successful examples of union action in both organizing and coalition building without convincing that either offers a sustainable and comprehensive solution to the challenges faced by trade unions (Bryson et al., 2011). It is in the context, for example, of their lack of success in organizing that the US unions have intensified their political activity (Masters and Delaney,2008).
As suggested above political and institutional embeddedness has received relatively little consideration in the employment relations literature on renewal as a unionstrategy probably because of the inclement political climate of recent decades in western countries. It is certainly the case that writers have commented that unions cannot and should not avoid political involvement. It is difficult for unions to operate without the institutional security which political engagement can bring. Union disengagement with politics is a high risk strategy given the importance of governments for the generation of labour rights and standards (Masters and Delaney, 2008). Governments set the rules of the game and state policies affect worker security, incomes and the social wage and therefore trade unions have to be involved in politics (Gumbrell McCormick and Hyman,2013). However the literature has tended to stress the risks and problematic nature of political involvement: the unions can become complacent and come to depend on political involvement particularly if they become organizationally weak; political success may erode workers’ interest in trade unions; the movement towards the centre of social democratic parties weakens their ties with the unions which have become less attractive (and necessary) as allies as they have become weaker (Gumbrell McCormick and Hyman,2013; Masters and Delaney,2008). Writers have also been concerned about how unions can engage politically and achieve results when they are often faced by neoliberal governments. To engage politically in such an inhospitable climate requires unions to adopt a broader campaigning role: ‘Reasserting their identity as sword of justice….unions have to help construct a new type of politics….engaging with campaigning and protest movements’ (Gumbrell McCormick and Hyman, 2013, pp. 203-4).
Caveats such as the above do point to the kind of political engagement which might bear most fruit for trade unions. Three issues would seem to be most important in this context. Firstly the engagement should be aimed at institutional development which facilitates union growth and establishes/consolidates the role of trade unions in the world of work and society at large. Its focus should not be on the achievement of gains in pay and other conditions of employment through the parliamentary route, reducing the visibility of trade unions on an everyday basis. European examples of such engagement include the institutions associated with co-determination in Germany (works councils and supervisory boards) and the involvement of trade unions in the system of unemployment insurance in Belgium which continues to make union membership more attractive to workers and results in a union membership less biased towards older workers and those employed in the public sector than in other countries (Van Rie et al., 2011).Secondly the engagement should not be on too narrow a front. To inspire the kind of broad political support necessary to make engagement successful unions need to campaign consistently on a wider front than has sometimes been the case and move beyond seeking to protect existing rights at work- ‘political action will only be an effective tool for revival if it inspires the movement of the workforce and broader public into labour’s corner’(Masters and Delaney, 2008). Thirdly engagement should not be seen in isolation from other union renewal strategies. Political engagement alone is not sufficient to revive union fortunes. Institutional embeddedness can become subject to erosion. Thus, in the case of Germany, literature points to the weakening of institutions such as works councils and the exclusion of trade unionists from policy making processes (Greer, 2008). Organizing strategies can play an important role in consolidating embeddedness and coalition building in developing broad political support.
Implicit in the literature discussed so far is the need for trade unions to develop renewal strategies. It is relevant to recognize the problems of translatingpiecemeal to unions the concept of strategy as applied to the corporate world. The association of strategy with leadership is uncomfortable for those concerned about union democracy (Gumbrell McCormick and Hyman, 2013). Union strategies may have to be read from the pattern of union behaviour rather than be identifiable as a consciously developed, consistent, cohesive and integrated set of policies on a strategic management model (Undy et al, 1996). Leisink et al. ( 1996:2) points out that, in respect of union strategies, ‘rationality is often bounded and focused on the next step rather than on the long term , and internal disagreements may lead to attempts to dilute the implementation of decisions once they have been reached ‘.Nonetheless bearing in mind these qualifications, it is possible to identify the circumstances most likely to encourage effective union strategies. A supportive trade union structure and, specifically, a degree of trade union unity which favours the development of a coherent response would seem to be an important condition (Rigby et al, 1999). Secondly adequate leadership and resources, material and knowledge–based, are needed to implement the strategies adopted (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013). Thirdly there needs to be a legal and institutional framework which provides some level of security to trade union action. Boyer (1995) stresses the difficulties of trade unions developing effective policies without a favourable legal/institutional framework climate, giving France as an example. Last but not least is the importance of strategies being developed in response to the challenges of the external environment and the opportunity structures in that environment and not being dominated by introspection.
The Political/Institutional Approach of the Spanish Unions
In the decades since the transition to democracy the Spanish trade unions played an important role in representation of the Spanish workforce. Up to the recent and continuing economic crisis the Spanish trade union movement could point to a number of achievements. These included pay agreements above the rate of inflation. Thus in the six years from 2002-2007 the average pay increase of 3.8 compared with an average inflation rate of 3.2 (Economic and Social Coumcil,2014) and a bargaining coverage which officially has tended to oscillate between70% and 80% of the labour force (Pitxer I Campos and Sanchez,2008). This maintenance of purchasing power and high bargaining coverage was accompanied in the 1990s by a steady growth in employment from the mid 1990s.
These achievements took place in an environment which was not favourable for union organization. New organizations had to be established in the transition period atatime when the democracywasbyno means entirelysecure(1).Afocusoflabouropposition had been provided bytheworkers´ commissions underFrancobutnostable union structureshadbeendeveloped. The transition to democracy was marked by high levels of unemployment. A constant problem was the high proportion of workers employed on temporary contracts. Other features of the Spanish economy which did not favour union action were the significance of the informal economy and the high proportion of small firms. In this context union membership never rose to a level higher than 20% after the immediate transition years.
These featuresofthe unions´context played amajor role in shapingtheirstrategies.Theymade it important for the unions to become politically involved and for themto seekto useinstitutionalinvolvementand regulatoryunderpinningto supportthe unions´ roleinthenew democracy. Another feature ofpostFranco Spaininvitedandfacilitated thisstrategic response.Astrongregulatoryculture, particularly in areas such as job security,typicalofMediterraneanmodels ofcapitalism, was inherited by the new regime fromthe dictatorship. Itwas thereforequite consistentfortheunions toseeka high leveloflegal regulation ofemployment relationsin postFranco Spain.That the emergentinstitutions and regulation, embodied inthe Workers’Statute of1980, wouldfavourthe unionsshould be understood inthe contextofthe unions´part inthenew politicalsettlementandthe politicalandsocialcapital theyenjoyed.Thelabourmovementhad played animportantrole in the oppositionto the dictatorship.The developmentoffreetrade unionsandstronger workers´rightswere keypillars ofthenew democracy.The unionsalso helped toconsolidatethe newdemocracyby managingexpectationsinthe early1980sandsupportingnationalpaypacts.
Thusthepattern ofemployment relationsandtrade unionismwhich emerged depended on aregulatorycontextwhichestablished works councilswithbargainingpowers and theautomatic extensionofcollective agreementsto allrelevant employees. Labour courts were
available to the unionsto enforce these rights as a last resort. The allocation ofthe statusof‘representative’union atnationallevel withattendantadvantagesofstatefinancialsupportand bargaining rights onlyto thoseunion confederations whichachieve ten percentof the workscouncil delegateselected favouredthe emergence of twocentralizedconfederations. Works Council elections, participation in which was typically quite high (67% in 2007 (Jodar et al, 2010)) were dominated by the General Workers Union (UGT) and the Workers’ Commissions (CCOO) although in the Basque Country and Galicia nationalist unions were also important.The economic contextofSMEsmilitatedagainstthe developmentofanystrongrankand file organization which couldhave threatened centralunion authority. Such challengesto thecentralconfederationswhich did emerge on occasion wereexternal; often in the formofspecialinterestgroups whosebargainingpowergave thema degreeofautonomyof action(pilots, doctors,locomotive drivers).Thetwomajorconfederations thereforewerein a relativelystrongpositiontoestablisha consistentand coherentapproachto strategy- a positionstrengthenedfurther inthe1990sasthetwo central confederationsovercame theirrivalryto establish ahigh degreeofunity.
Inthelasttwodecadestheunionsdeveloped furtherthe institutionalizationoftheirrolein Spanishsocietyand,inparticular,intheeconomy.Thistookplaceineitherbipartiteinstitutions fundedbythestateorintripartiteinstitutionswhichhaddirectstateinvolvement.Examplesofthese developmentsaretheunion-employer federationrole inthemanagement,organizationanddelivery ofemployeetraining, the jointdelivery withemployers ofintermediary support inhealthandsafetyandthe resolutionofcollectiveconflictbygovernmentfundedmediationand arbitrationservices.In the case of training specifically the unions became directly responsible together with employer bodies for managing significant funds (Rigby,2002).
Regulatory support forcollectiveemploymentrelations andthe institutional embeddednessof thesocialpartnersinSpainhasnormallybeenviewed positivelybyemployers’ organizations.Theyhavefacedthesamedifficultiesasthetradeunionsin establishing ahighlevelof membershipdensityinaconstituencydominatedbySMEsandhavethereforebenefittedfromsome ofthesamemechanismsenjoyedbythetradeunions
It is certainly the case that in the decadeof the 1990s Spaintopped the Europeanstrike league tableinterms of workingdays lostthrough strike action. However much ofthis industrialconflictwas institutionalized (Rigby and Marco Aledo, 2001).The generalstrikescalledin postFranco Spainhave allbeencontrolledone-daydemonstrations, attemptingto displaythe politicalcapitalofthe unionsand applyingpressure on government to modifyunpopularpolicies.Thisinstitutionalization ofcollective conflicthasalsoappliedtotheother areaofstrike activityresponsibleforSpain’s high‘days lost’record, one daydemonstrationstrikes associated withthesectoralbargainingstructure-strikesseekingto applypressure to aparticularset ofnegotiations. Suchstrikesalsoin asense are displayingpoliticalcapital– thatof the elected works councilrepresentativesassociated withthestrike call.Thishelps toexplainhowunions withrelatively few members canmobilizemany more workers in industrialaction–becausetheworkers feel some commitmentto theserepresentativesforwhomtheyhave voted.
Pre crisis evaluations of the unions’ embeddedness strategy tended to be tempered by two areas of concern.First,theirweakorganization atenterpriselevel, conditioned bythehigh numberofsmes, has limitedtheunions´abilityto take advantage ofthe fruits of theirpoliticalandinstitutional strategy. The unionshave often notbeen ina positiontoalwayspolicetheapplicationoftheregulationstheirnational role hashelped toengineer.Thus‘real’figures forbargainingcoverage rateand companieswithworkplace representationare probablysignificantlybelowofficiallyquoted statistics. Secondlythe Spanish unionswere unable toresolvewhat,togetherwith unemployment, hasbeen one ofthetwomain labourmarketproblemsin Spainduringthe past three decades – the high degree of labour marketsegmentation natureand,specifically, the highpercentage ofSpanish workers employedon temporarycontractssincethe 1980s, easilythe highestin WesternEurope. Spain had more than 30% of the labour force employed on temporary contracts in the period before the economic crisis compared with a European average of less than half that,14.45% in 2007 (European Foundation,2009.)
The Economic Crisis and the Spanish Government Reaction
After fifteen consecutive years of growththe Spanish economy entered into an important recession at the end of 2008 which still continues. By the end of 2013 unemployment had climbed to 26.5% (Economic and Social Council, 2014). Internal factors which precipitated the recession were the collapse of the construction sector and domestic demand both of which had been based on high levels of private credit. Recessions in neighbouring European countries exacerbated the Spanish situation which eventually resulted in a 100 billion euro EU backed bailout.