The Opium Economy

Draft: Jun 2007

The Opium Economy:

A Possible Approach to Reform

Jeremy Berkoff: Draft, June 2007

1. Introduction 2

2. Economic Forces 3

2.1 General 3

2.2 Issues in supply 5

2.3 Issues in trafficking 15

2.4 Issues in demand 18

3. Policy Prescriptions 26

3.1 General 26

3.2 Some past policy prescriptions 26

3.3 A possible incremental approach 30

4. Concluding Note 36

References 37

1.  Introduction

Much has been written about illicit drugs and the harm that they do. Options for addressing this harm range from prohibition at one extreme, through differing forms of regulation in supplying, transit and consuming countries, to full market liberalisation at the other. The current consensus - as reflected in international treaties and national policies - is close to full prohibition. This consensus is however eroding: in supplying countries, a degree of tolerance is sometimes practiced based on appeals to cultural traditions (as in Bolivia) or to farmer livelihoods or to the political and other costs of prohibition; in transit countries, trade is facilitated directly and/or via money laundering by rogue states (e.g. North Korea), banking regulations (as in some tax havens) and corruption: and in consuming countries, personal ownership or use of ‘soft’ drugs has been liberalised (as in the Netherlands, even of hard drugs as in Russia), some addicts are provided with regulated supplies on prescription (as in Nordic countries) or the police turn a blind eye to some limited drug activities (as in the UK).

Prohibition is supported by the international control regime set up under the 1961 Convention on Narcotics Drugs and by the policies of individual States. The latest UN World Drug Report (UNODC 2006) points to “encouraging signs of mid-term containment” and gives evidence that prohibition has hampered production, trade and use. It advocates maintaining the present course, implying that any weakening of resolve would undermine the current regime just as it is showing signs of success. However, the damage done by illicit drugs remains large and, as indicated by the eroding consensus, there are many who take an opposing view, i.e. that prohibition as currently practiced has failed. This has led to numerous proposals for reform, ranging from the intensified criminalisation of drug use and ownership at one extreme to the full or partial liberalisation of (domestic) drug markets at the other.

This paper accepts the general case for reform but, rather than prejudging the final outcome, it proposes a framework for scheduling reforms gradually over time. It takes as its starting point the underlying economic forces that determine behaviour and, in common with most other observers, argues that producers and traffickers respond to incentives and competitive pressures much as in normal markets but that consumers respond in ways that are biased since - as in the cases of tobacco and alcohol - many are in some sense ‘addicted’[1]. But in contrast to most other observers, who tend to focus either on supplying or on consuming countries[2], the paper reviews options for reform within a holistic context. Taking opium as an example, reform proposals are tracked from Afghanistan to the UK[3] in the hope that this can throw light on how reforms at every level inter-act and can complement each other.

A holistic approach highlights in particular the margin between farmgate and retail prices. That this margin is so high is often attributed to excessive illicit profits, which provide the driving incentives behind the trade. But if trafficking is even moderately competitive, the explanation for such a high margin must lie primarily in the costs incurred by traffickers. ‘Normal’ costs and ‘normal’ profits can explain only a minor part so it must be the costs and risks associated with prohibition that keeps the margin so high. If so, rather than posing reform and prohibition as alternatives, the key would seem to be to maintain prohibition for the foreseeable future to keep the costs of trafficking high, while simultaneously squeezing trafficker profits so as to reduce incentives for illicit trading. Public supply is at present limited to medicinal and - in a few cases - prescription uses. But if public drug operations were to expand in the context of reforms, or if regulated markets were to become locally feasible, one approach might be for public agencies to adopt a form of ‘predatory pricing’[4] with the aim of containing - and ideally eliminating - illicit competitors. Given the nature of addiction, predatory pricing alone will not be enough to suppress demand, so it will need to be complemented by regulatory and educational measures designed to minimise harm.

The paper suggests how such an approach might be implemented. The paper is in two parts. The first broadly assesses the economic forces at work in the opium economy based on recent UN reports and reports specific to Afghanistan and the UK which are quoted from liberally; and the second briefly reviews policy prescriptions in the latter reports, before exploring the suggested approach further. The paper ends with a brief concluding summary.

2.  Economic Forces

2.1  General

Given its criminal nature, there are few reliable data on the world illicit drugs economy. However, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has done much to quantify estimates of the trade and there is a consensus as to its broad scale and characteristics. The recent RSA report provides a summary that sets out the overall context:

“… illegal drugs are a business, a business that, though illegal, operates in most other ways like any other large-scale business. It operates in a global market. That market is highly competitive … The intensity of competition ensures that prices remain low. Far from illegal drugs being expensive … they are in fact remarkably cheap (but see below) and their prices, instead of rising, tend to fall. There is no reason to think that the illegal-drugs business and its accompanying market can simply be closed down … all efforts so far (to do so) … have been dismal and often expensive failures … its operations are … secret or disguised with the help of expert lawyers and accountants … (and) the statistics (are) highly politicized … the only certainty is that the drugs business that remains hidden is very much larger than the part … that becomes visible … But no one would deny that illegal drugs are a multi-billion dollar global commodity. (UNODC’s) best estimate of the value of the market in 2003 was $13 billion at the production level, $94 billion at the wholesale level … and $322 billion at the retail level (… taking seizures and other losses into account). The largest market is for cannabis herb (with a retail market size in 2003 of $113 billion), followed by cocaine ($71 billion), the opiates ($65 billion) and cannabis resin ($29 billion). The ATS [amphetamine type stimulants] markets … amounted to $44 billion … While UNODC is reasonably confident with its estimations on opiates, cocaine and the ATS … the degree of certainty is far lower for cannabis … As for trends … UNODC concluded in 2006 that the overall market is growing, though to different degrees for different drugs. The market for opiates is up following a renewed supply-push from Afghanistan … The overall market for cocaine is up; production is increasing, and the market is diversifying with a particularly noticeable rise in demand in Europe. There is no sign of any slowing in the consistent increase of the market for cannabis; perhaps more significantly, the numbers … in treatment for cannabis is growing worldwide. The market for amphetamines and ecstasy, having declined slightly, would appear to be increasing again, largely as a result of increased use of methamphetamine in East and South East Asia. In terms of profitability, cocaine is perhaps the world’s number one drug, thanks to the combination of high demand and a relatively high price, as compared with heroin (high price but relatively low demand) and cannabis (high demand but relatively low price)” (RSA 2007).

By any measure, US$322 billion – the estimated value of illicit trade in drugs at retail prices – is a huge sum. It is equivalent to about 0.7% of Gross World Product (CIA Fact Book 2007). If the value of the drugs trade at wholesale prices approximates to its value in international trade, then US$94 billion is equivalent also to about 0.7% of the value of total world merchandise imports and to perhaps 12% of world trade in agricultural products (WTO 2005).

Whether it is true that drugs are ‘remarkably cheap’ (RSA op cit) is perhaps questionable. A comparison of UN ‘best estimates’ of value implies a wholesale mark-up relative to farmgate prices of seven-to-eight times and a retail mark-up relative to wholesale prices of three-to-four times. Mark-ups for hard drugs (cocaine and opiates) are undoubtedly much higher still (Section 2.3) given the long supply lines and great risks incurred. As suggested in Section 1, such mark-ups are far higher than can be explained by ‘normal’ processing & marketing costs or ‘normal’ profits. In other words, they mainly reflect the high additional costs incurred in trafficking illegal commodities. These include: the costs of drug seizures and other losses; the costs of secrecy, corruption, lack of vertical integration, security, money laundering etc.; and the high-risk premiums that are invariably demanded by traffickers at each level. Though prices may be contained by competitive forces, and may have declined in recent years for understandable reasons (see Section 2.2), they would collapse to levels far below their current levels if international trade was fully liberalised and if drugs were treated simply as another commodity. In this sense, it is misleading to say that drugs are ‘remarkably cheap’.

These factors set the illicit trade in opiates, cocaine and – to a lesser extent – other drugs apart from that in legal goods. Supply and trafficking may respond to incentives in ways that are comparable to those of other goods, and interception may have failed to prevent drug supplies getting through. Nevertheless, prohibition maintains prices well above the levels that would prevail under a fully liberalised trading regime. Irrespective of the peculiarities of addiction, this has been an important factor constraining growth in consumption (Section 2.4).

2.2  Issues in supply[5]

World trends. Figures 1 and 2 summarise UNODC estimates of trends in the cultivated area worldwide and potential production of opium/heroin and cocaine since 1990.

Figure 1. Cultivation of Illicit Opium Poppies and Coca Bushes

World and Afghan Estimates: 1990 - 2004

Source: UNODC 2006. See note to Figure 2.

Figure 2. Potential Production of Illicit Opium, Heroin and Cocaine

World and Afghan Estimates: 1990 - 2004

Note: The anomalous estimates for opium and heroin in 2001 reflect the ban imposed on poppy cultivation in Afghanistan by the Taliban Government.

Source: UNODC 2006

Several conclusions can be drawn from these figures. First the cultivated area for both opium and cocaine has apparently declined significantly since 1990, providing some evidence in support of UNODC’s conclusion (op cit) that there have been “encouraging signs of mid-term containment”[6]. But, second, according to UN figures there has been no comparable decline in potential production. Average yields have thus risen. Third there has been a very marked increase in the share of Afghanistan, both in cultivated area and potential opium output. And, fourth, irrespective of any trends, the figures illustrate how tiny the absolute numbers are. The area under poppies was just 151,000 ha in 2005, equivalent to no more than 0.01% of world arable area. Even in Afghanistan, poppies occupied only 1.3% of the arable land, equivalent to no more than 4.0-4.5% of the area under wheat and 3.5-4.0% of the land that is irrigated[7]. World potential output of illicit opium in 2005 is put at 4,620 tonnes equivalent to no more than 472 tonnes of heroin. This could be carried in four Boeing 747 freighter aircraft. Illicit cocaine output of 910 tonnes might require a further nine.

Trends in Afghanistan. Despite the tiny numbers “the impact of the drug industry on Afghanistan’s economy, polity, and society (has been) profound, producing some short-run economic benefits for the rural population and macro-economy but major adverse effects on security, political normalization, and state-building, as well as on sustainable longer-term economic development” (Byrd & Ward 2004). Ward & Byrd (2004) estimate that drug-related income in 2004 was US$2.8 billion, more than a third of total national drug-inclusive GDP (54% of official drug-exclusive GDP). They argue that instability has limited opium’s macro-economic benefits, also limited by Dutch disease and related exchange rate and capital flow effects. This instability was, however, much less marked during the 1990s. Cultivated area and the potential output shifted from year-to-year in response to climate and market conditions but the underlying trends have been unmistakable (Figures 1 & 2). Afghanistan’s share in world output doubled to 80% in 1999. Average farmgate prices were apparently also constant in the period 1990-95, though they rose sharply in 1995 in response to drought and the Taliban takeover, falling back in 1998 as output recovered (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Annual Change in Cultivated Area, Yields and Farmgate Prices

Opium, Afghanistan: 1990 - 1999

Source: UNODC 2000

Farmgate prices in 1999 ($55 per kg) were still about 50% higher than in 1990-95 ($37 per kg at 1999 prices) (UNODC 2000) and this may help explain why output rose steeply in that year. If other things had remained equal in 2000-01, and the Taliban had not enforced its ban, output would probably have continued to rise, and real prices to fall, until the limit of world demand had been reached. It is arguable that farmgate prices would then have settled at a broad equilibrium level that maintained output at levels that satisfied demand (varying from year-to-year in response to climate etc.). Whether the long-term average price would have fallen to the level of the early 1990s would have depended on such factors as the growth in world demand, the competitiveness of the world opium market, the effort put into suppression and the returns of alternative crops. Quite possibly prices would have settled at a somewhat higher level, which is arguably what is now happening (see below).