the ontological argument[1]

‘When considered generally and impartially, this famous ontological proof is a delightful farce’ (Schopenhauer, died 1860).[2]

‘The fool has said in his heart “there is no God” (St. Anselm, quoting the Psalms)’

The Ontological Argument for God’s Existence argues from deductive principles (the idea that the premises of an argument logically entails its conclusion, as in the statement all people are mortal; Sonya is a woman, and she, therefore, is mortal) to the contention that His existence can be established on a-priori grounds, that is, without regard to any appeal to sense experience.

Appeals to empirical data for the existence of God, known as a-posteriori arguments, emphasise the importance of sense experience in providing evidence for a Creator, the most famous examples of which – the Design Argument, for instance – are to be found in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas.

In other words, the (a-priori) Ontological Argument for God’s Existence looks only to the minds of human beings for its validation. Its proponents – of whom the most famous are St. Anselm (died 1109) and Descartes (died 1650) – maintain that the existence of God is an intellectually self-evident fact, one that it is foolish to deny.

The essence of the Argument can be summarised in the claim that because human beings possess a concept of God, this must mean that He possesses necessary existence (the use of the adjective ‘necessary’ is important, since it conveys the idea that not only does God exist, but He logically cannot fail to exist, and that His existence is different from ours).

Proslogion – A Discourse on the Existence of God - Proslogion

Anselm’s account of the ontological argument, presented in (the) Proslogion (many scholars are of the view that this is not so much a formal proof for God’s existence; but, rather, a prayerful meditation on Anselm’s understanding of the nature of God, understood against the background of His putative attributes of omniscience, omni-benevolence and omnipotence; indeed, Anselm never employed the term ‘ontological argument’) has two forms to it.

anselm’s two versions of the argument

Anselm maintains that God is that being than which none greater can be conceived (he never defines ‘greatness’, but it is obvious that it is a reference to the attributes referred to in the preceding paragraph). In other words, Anselm, and later Descartes, says that it is not possible to make a distinction, on the one hand, between the concept of God and His existence in reality, on the other one.[3]

It is this claim that is simultaneously its greatest strength (the implication being that God’s existence is as self-evident as the equation 2+2=4) and its greatest weakness (logically, Anselm would have to accept the existence of unicorns, which is plainly daft, an observation to which we shall return, the significance of which is that he is wrong when he thinks that one kind of existence is superior to others).

For Anselm, then, God is the greatest being that can be thought of, that is, a being whose necessary existence cannot be improved upon. In summary, God, he argues, is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, and to be thought not to exist would be inferior to thinking of something that must always exist; God, therefore, must necessarily exist.[4]

Elsewhere in the Proslogion, Anselm famously refers to the fool of Psalm 14:1 – ‘The fool has said in his heart, there is no God’, arguing that this position is absurd, since he – the fool – understands that God is that being than which nothing greater can be conceived, yet he denies God’s existence: And, indeed, we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool has said in his heart, there is no God? But, at any rate, when this fool hears of this being of which I speak, a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, he understands this concept, but insists upon denying the existence of God (slightly adapted).

The central point of this quotation is to show that the fool is wrong to say that there is no God, since anyone who knows what is meant by the term ‘God’ must also realise that they thereby possess knowledge of God’s existence. In other words, Anselm maintains that to be in possession of the idea of God means that God really exists; for, if we try to imagine a situation in which the idea exists but not God Himself, it would mean that whatever we were thinking about was not the idea of God: ‘Given, then, that both the atheistical fool and the theist are contemplating the same idea (as they must be, if the fool is to deny what the theist asserts), it follows willy-nilly that the fool is committed to the existence of God’[5]. This (technically, the first) part of the Argument is an instance of what philosophers term the reductio ad absurdum approach to reasoning about metaphysical issues. When it is applied to the Ontological Argument, this instance of deductive reasoning maintains that the fool’s proposition – that there is no God – is reduced to absurdity because, at least from Anselm’s perspective, the fool has committed himself to a logical contradiction. In other words, the concept ‘God’ is one that is innate to human beings (also Descartes’ position) – even atheists have an idea of God in their minds, otherwise they would not be able to deny it.

the lost island objection to anselm

In his work, On Behalf of the Fool, Gaunilo, a contemporary of Anselm’s, argues that just because we have an intellectual understanding of many things (in intellectu being its Latin tag), this does not mean that they exist in reality (in re being its Latin tag).

The key feature of Gaunilo’s thinking is the obvious one: if the fool dismisses the existence of God, then it is clear that there are different understandings of what we mean by the term ‘God’.In other words, Gaunilo maintains that it is Anselm, not the fool, who has committed a logical contradiction, and he illustrates this point byemploying the imaginary analogy of the perfect island, which he says is lost somewhere and untouched by human beings.

If one is told that such an island exists, because of its perfection, then it is foolish in the extreme to accept the suggestion:

‘It is said that somewhere in the ocean is an island, which because of the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of discovering what does not exist, is called the lost island. … It is more excellent than all other countries …. . Now, if someone should tell me there is such an island, there is no difficulty in understanding his words. … And since it is more excellent not to exist alone in one’s understanding, but to exist both in the mind and in reality;for this very reason, the island must exist. But if it does not exist, then any existing island will be more real than it and, by definition, therefore, the existing island will be more excellent than any imagined one’ (abridged and slightly adapted).[6]

The key point of Gaunilo’s criticism is that it follows precisely Anselm’s way of structuring the ontological argument (incidentally, Anselm does not so much think of this as a proof for God’s existence, which he takes for granted), but with the opposite conclusion: what worked for Anselm failed for Gaunilo, thus demonstrating that it is possible to use this a-priori way of reasoning in two very different ways, a consideration which was not accepted by Anselm. He countered Gaunilo’s criticism in this (not particularly convincing) way:

  • It is possible to conceive of this perfect island in such manner that it does not have an actual existence, because – unlike God – there is nothing necessary about the existence of any island, or of any other contingent entity (human beings, for example). In other words, Gaunilo is not comparing like with like – islands have a beginning and an end, but God is an eternally necessary being.

descartes and the ontological argument

plato’s ghost - cogito ergo sum – plato’s ghost

Descartes, regarded as the founder of modern philosophy as well as being a brilliant mathematician, shares with Anselm the a-priori conviction that because people hold in their minds a concept of God, He must exist. Descartes’ version(s) of the argument can be summarised in this pithy (virtually ludicrous) statement:

Existence belongs to the nature of God (premise).

So: God exists (conclusion).[7]

His argument needs to be understood against the wider background of the school of thought known as Cartesian Doubt, Descartes’ famous claim that whilst he could doubt everything –his memory, the evidence of the senses, and even his own body’s existence – Descartes could not doubt the fact thathe was thinking, even if his thoughts were false. Thus, Descartes’ very doubts constitute a form of thinking (in this context – cogitans, the Latin for ‘thinking’ – refers to all conscious mental activities).

In other words, merely by considering the proposition,I think, Descartes cannot doubt his existence as a thinking being – epitomised in the famous saying, cogito ergo sum – I think, therefore I am. He then proceeded to consider what else, on a-priori grounds, could possess certain existence, and arrived at the conclusion that such entities included abstract mathematical concepts such as 2+2 = 4 and that triangles, even if they never existed (they do!), would still possess the unique properties of three sides and three angles. The key point is that Descartes rejects vehemently the suggestion that his awareness of a triangle’s properties derives from empirical data (sense experience), on the grounds that his senses could indeed be deceived, but not the mind’s deductive faculties.

For Descartes, therefore, because triangles, as concepts in the mind, possess all the (perfect) properties that he ascribes to them, he proceeds to argue, by way of analogy, that just as certainly as mathematical concepts, the mind possesses the idea of a supremely perfect being – God, and that this being, like triangles, must necessarily exist. In other words, Descartes argues that existence is one of God’s manyperfections, and that human beings – who, by definition, are imperfect, contingent creatures – can possess awareness of this truth only because God, perfection itself, has made it possible for them to perceive it. He therefore concludes that God must exist, and that He possesses all of the attributes ascribed to God by classical theism.[8]

Descartes second part of the argument is already summarised in the above premise-conclusion statement, but this requires further teasing-out. From the argument that God’s attributes of perfection – omnibenevolence, omnipotence and omniscience, for example – Descartes moves on to saying that existence is a predicate of God, meaning that, to claim otherwise, would mean that God is not perfect, and the notion of imperfection clearly cannot apply to a Supreme Being. In other words, it is a contradiction in terms to claim – as does Anselm’s fool – that God does not exist.

Once again, employing the triangle analogy, but this time in a slightly different way, Descartes says that trying to imagine God without the predicate of existence is illogical, rather like thinking of mountains without valleys and of triangles without three sides. In summary, for Descartes, the mind cannot conceive of perfection without its also conceiving of existence.[9]

objections to descartes’ argument

  • One obvious objection, anticipated by Descartes, is similar to Gaunilo’s island criticism of Anselm. Because we possess the concept(s) of mountains and valleys, does not mean that they have a real existence. ‘Descartes agrees that all that can be said is, if there are mountains, then there are valleys.’[10] But this criticism does not apply to God, on the grounds that God alone is the only supremely perfect being, about whom we are entitled to infer existence, argues Descartes, in the Fifth Meditation (1641):

Because I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, it does not follow that there is any mountain or valley in existence, but simply that the mountain or valley, whether they do or do not exist, are inseparable from each other; whereas, on the other hand, because I cannot conceive of God unless as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from Him, and therefore that he really exists: not that this is brought about by my thought, or that it imposes any necessity on things, but, on the contrary, the necessity which lies in the thing itself, that is, the necessity of the existence of God.[11]

  • Aquinas objected to the Argument (Anselm’s version of it, for obvious reasons!) on the grounds that the human mind can possess no certain knowledge of God – that He is beyond the scope of human beings’ understanding. In other words, the existence of God is not (intellectually) self-evident. In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas expresses the matter this way (abridged and slightly adapted):

God knows the meaning of the term ‘God’ by direct self-awareness. He knows that eternal existence belongs to Himself. But this truth is not available to people, who cannot intuit God’s essence. It is possible to make up a definition of God, and if that definition is correct, then God possesses necessary existence. But the real point is this one: How do we know the definition is correct? And even if – which he doubts – we have an inborn idea of the concept of God, it is a confused one, since we may know, for example, that someone is approaching us in the street, but we cannot know the identity of that particular individual.[12]

In summary, Aquinas argues that a-priori arguments for God’s existence are by definition mistaken. Our only way of knowing about God’s existence is by means of recognising His effects in the world, typified by evidence of design in nature. In other words, by defining the word ‘God’ it does not follow that such an entity exists – a-posteriori arguments alone can point us towards such a (deductive) conclusion.

This criticism, however, loses its force if we accept that Anselm’s Proslogion, far from being an argument for God’s existence, is ‘a prayer to God to aid faith’.[13]

But Aquinas’ championing of a-posteriori arguments as superior to a-priori ones is not without its own difficulties. David Hume summarised these difficulties by observing that because we live inside the world, having no awareness of any other worlds with which to compare it, it is not possible for human beings to make valid judgements about claims that point beyond the limitations of our experiences. He famously said that, for all we know, this world may be imperfect when compared with a putatively superior one; it may be no more than the work of some infant Deity who is embarrassed by His inferior efforts![14]

In similar manner, Hume made two objections to the ontological argument, regardless of its form:

  • He maintained, as did Kant later, that existence cannot be regarded as a predicate, meaning that

1

[1]The term ‘ontological’ derives from two Greek words – ontos, meaning ‘being’ and logos, loosely meaning ‘study of’. Anselm and Descartes, incidentally, are developing their versions of the argument from Plato’s doctrine of the Forms.

[2]N. Eviritt, The Non-Existence of God, 2004 edition, page 31. Eviritt observes, probably with justification, that it is difficult to conceive of anyone having converted to theism on the basis of the Ontological Argument.

[3]This distinction, of course, is fundamental both to Atheism and anti-Realist interpretations of religion.

[4]Technically, the argument from necessity is Anselm’s second part of the argument, but both parts are treated slightly differently in this set of notes, since – in the examination – the question will almost certainly be phrased with reference either to Anselm or Descartes, or a combination of both, and you are therefore advised to follow the format as set out above when preparing final revision notes for the examination. This summary is adapted from the A2 AQA textbook, page 3 (2009 edition).

[5]Eviritt, page 33. And the first part of this paragraph is adapted from the AQA textbook, page 2.

[6]AQA textbook, page 5.

[7]Everitt, page 37.

[8]Can you identify Plato’s Ghost here? And what are these ‘attributes’?

[9]This paragraph is adapted from the AQA textbook, page 6.

[10]AQA textbook, page 6.

[11]Ibid, page 7

[12]AQA textbook, page 7.

[13]AQA textbook, page 8

[14]It is interesting that William Paley, in his famous Analogy of the Watch, supporting the Design Argument for God’s Existence, maintained that there is no difference between a cabbage and a machine. In his view, each provides evidence of design. But Hume, about eighty years before Darwin published Species (1859), argued that the reason why animals and plants appear to be so well ‘designed’ is that those animals and plants that did not function properly died out, over a period of time. It is a remarkable deduction [Darwin, incidentally, had read Hume’s philosophical writings.] This f/note is mostly derived from the Heinemann OCRAS textbook, Philosophy and Ethics (page 55, 2008 edition).