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The Korean Peace-Building Process:

Problems and Prospects

Tae-Hwan Kwak, Ph. D.

Former President, Korea Institute for National Unification,Seoul, Korea/

Professor Emeritus, Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, KY. U.S.A.

E-mail:

Phone: 82-2-3217-2105 (Seoul, Korea); 1-859-623-7444 (USA)

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Paper Prepared for Presentation ataSeminar at School of Law,

Hokkaido University on November 20, 2002

The Korean Peace-Building Process:An International Cooperation Approach

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. ROK's Engagement Policy of Reconciliation and Cooperation Toward North Korea
  3. The Four Party Peace Talks: An International Cooperation Approach to Peace Regime Building
  1. Trilateral Cooperative Interactions Among the U.S., South and North Korea in the Korean

Peace-Building Process

V. Conclusion: What is to Be Done?

I. Introduction

After the historic inter-Korean summit meeting in June 2000, inter-Korean relations are still characterized by mutual distrust, animosity, a lack of mutual cooperation and conflicting ideologies. The inter-Korean peace process has been moribund since the summit.

The Korean peace-building process in this article may be defined as the process by which the two Korean states at an inter-Korean level, and the two Koreas, China and the United States at an international level attempt to cooperate to establish a peace regime on the Korean peninsula by reducing tensions through a policy of national reconciliation and cooperation, and replacing the 1953 Korean armistice agreement with a Korean peninsula peace agreement. The process is one of essential conditions for achieving an eventual unification of the Korean peninsula by peaceful means.

The inter-Korean first-ever summit meeting between President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong-il held in Pyongyang on June 13-15, 2000 produced an inter-Korean joint declaration of June 15, 2000. This landmark declaration provided a framework for institutionalizing a peaceful coexistence between the two Korean states. Chairman Kim Jong-il’s decision to accept the June summit meeting symbolized his strategic policy change toward the South. The new inter-Korean peace process continues to build mutual trust and understanding on which a durable peace on the Korean peninsula will be firmly established.

The objectives of this article are: (1) to examine the significance of the June 15 joint declaration which laid a foundation for a new inter-Korean peace process after the summit; (2) to examine the inter-Korean and international cooperation approaches to the peace regime building; and (3) to analyze key issues between the two Koreas and the U.S. in the peace process. Three major arguments are presented in this article. First, the Korean peace-building process is the first and necessary step for achieving Korean reunification. The inter-Korean track and an international track-- to peace regime building are required to establish a durable peace in Korea. Second, the two Koreas and the U.S.should continue to remove key obstacles to inter-Korean reconciliation, cooperation and peace process. Third, the two Koreas need to work together to find an alternative to the South’s principle of an inter-Korean peace agreement and and the North’s principle of a North Korea-U.S. peace treaty to establish an agreed framework for a durable peace. Let us now take a brief look at inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation approach to peace regime building under President Kim Dae-jung.

  1. ROK's EngagementPolicy of Reconciliation and CooperationToward North Korea

TheKim Dae-jung government adopted a new policy toward North Korea in 1998 to establish a durable peace on the Korean peninsula. With the inauguration of President Kim Dae-jung in February 1998, the ROK government adopted a new policy toward North Korea known as the “Sunshine Policy.”[1] The basic objective of this new policy is to improve inter-Korean relations by promoting reconciliation, cooperation and peace. The policy also assumes that, at the present stage, it is more important to establish a peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas than to push for immediate unification. Two specific goals of the sunshine policy are: (1) peaceful management of the national division and (2) promotion of a favorable environment for North Korea to change and open itself without fear.[2]

President Kim’s sunshine policy is designed to engage the North through more exchanges and cooperation with the South, and encourage the North toward further opening and changes. This policy is based on three principles: First, South Korea will not tolerate any armed provocation by North Korea. The ROK will maintain a strong security posture against North Korea to deter war and will make it clear that it will respond to any provocation. At the same time, South Korea will continue to make efforts to reduce tensions and build mutual confidence in order to create a favorable environment for durable peace on the Korean peninsula.

Second, South Korea will not attempt to take over or absorb North Korea. The ROK government has neither the desire to harm North Korea nor the intention to absorb it unilaterally. Rather than promoting the collapse of North Korea, South Korea intends to work toward a peaceful coexistence with the North, thus creating a South-North national community that will gradually lead to peaceful unification of Korea by mutual agreement.

Third, inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation will be expanded in order to resolve hostility between the two Koreas. The South wants to implement the 1992 inter-Korean basic agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression and exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North.

The ROK government has consistently implemented its engagement policy towards North Korea since February 1998. This policy has produced some tangible results. First and foremost, the South’s engagement policy has prevented a war on the Korean peninsula, and has contributed to a peaceful and stable environment in which North Korea could resolve difficult problems relating to its nuclear freeze and long-range missile testing.[3]

Second, the engagement policy has contributed to tension-reduction on the Korean peninsula and a favorable environment for improving inter-Korean relations. Thus, inter-Korean economic cooperation and exchanges on a non-governmental level have been substantially expanded. The Mt.Gumgang sightseeing project constitutes a milestone in the history of inter-Korean cooperation. More than 430,000 tourists visited Mt. Gumgang between November 18, 1998, when the first cruise ship bound for Mt. Gumgang left, and the end of March 2002. Inter-Korean trade began in 1989 with a meager turnover of approximately $18 million, and its volume reached $330 million in 1999 and more than $400 million in 2000.[4]

Third, the ROK’s policy of engagement encouraged inter-Korean sports games, exchanges of separated family members, and cultural exchanges between Seoul and Pyongyang, thereby contributing to mutual understanding of South and North Koreans. It also contributed to Chairman Kim Jong-il’s decision to agree to the landmark inter-Korean summit meeting in June 2000.

The Significance of the Inter-Korean Summit Talks

President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong-il held historic summit meeting in Pyongyang on June 13-15, 2000.[5] The inter-Korean summit, the first-ever one in 55 years since the division of the country, was significant in promoting mutual understanding and trust. The summit produced a five-point declaration of June 15, 2000. President Kim cordially invited Chairman Kin to visit Seoul, and Chairman Kim agreed to visit South Korea.

Let us take a look at the significance of the summit and the June 15 Joint Declaration. First, it was the first agreement signed by the two leaders of South and North Korea in 55 years since the division of the Korean peninsula. Second, the Declaration confirmed the independence principle of solving the Korean issue by Koreans themselves. Third, South and North Korea agreed that they would first lay a foundation for unification through peaceful coexistence, reconciliation and cooperation, and work out the common ground of their unification formulae through talks. Fourth, both leaders agreed that reuniting separated family members is a humanitarian issue that must be resolved as a top priority. The South and North agreed that the issue should be worked out gradually. The process should be step-by-step, and not be a one-time deal. As the first step, the two sides agreed to allow separated family members to meet one another on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the National Liberation. Fifth, both agreed to economic cooperation projects, including the reconnection of the Seoul-Shinuiju railroad line and the anti-flood project on the Imjin River. Sixth, there was an agreement on the return visit to Seoul by Chairman Kim Jong-il.

The two leaders confirmed that they had no intention of invading the other side and they would refrain from any acts threatening the other side. President Kim urged Chairman Kim to settle pending international disputes with the parties concerned, including the North's missiles issue, at an early date so that Pyongyang's relations with neighboring countries would be improved. According to President Kim, Chairman Kim said, “it is desirable that the American troops continue to stay on the Korean peninsula and that he sent a high-level envoy to the United States to deliver this position to the American side.”[6] In short, this landmark declaration provided a framework for building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula.

Brief Evaluation of Inter-Korean Relations After the Summit

After the June summit, South and North Korea made efforts to implement inter-Korean agreements contained in the June 15 Joint Declaration.

Positive Aspects: Since the inter-Korean summit in June 2000, through various channels of inter-Korean dialogue, including eight rounds of inter-Korean ministerial talks, the two Koreas have worked together to resolve thirty-one inter-Korean pending issues. President Kim and Chairman Kim shared the view that war should never reoccur on the Korean Peninsula. Since the inter-Korean summit, North Korea has subsequently stopped broadcasting propaganda against the South and discontinued other activities that could raise tensions.

South and North Korea held their first defense ministers' talks in September 2000 and agreed to eliminate the threat of war, cooperate militarily to carry out the terms of the June 15th joint declaration and discuss tension reduction on the Korean Peninsula. In the course of five working-level military talks, agreement was reached on a set of ground rules for the peaceful use of the DMZ and the installation of "South-North Joint Control Areas." At the inter-Korean summit, the two Koreas agreed on a gradual and step-by-step unification approach based on the principle of peaceful coexistence. Both sides recognize that there are common elements in ROK’s confederation proposal for reunification and DPRK’s federation of lower-stage plan and that the two sides would pursue unification with this in mind. Therefore, at present, emphasis would be placed on de facto unification based on peaceful coexistence rather than legal, institutional unification by achieving a unified state.

Negative Aspects: The inter-Korean peace process, with the inauguration of the Bush administration has been moribundsince March 2001 when inter-Korean official talks were unproductive.The inter-Korean railway project halted and is now in progress. The humanitarian project on the reunions of separate families has ended with no more scheduled. The inter-Korean economic talks concerning the supply of electricity to the North have been put on hold. Hopes of fielding joint sports teams have vanished. All inter-Korean governmental talksare on and off. Thus, President Kim Dae-jung has made more than eight calls for Chairman Kim to visit Seoul as promised. But Chairman Kim has not given his itinerary yet. Furthermore, President Kim is now faced with domestic economic problems,political criticism, corruption charges and a growing erosion of public support for his sunshine policy. The institutionalization of the South-North summit meeting is desirable and essential to the Korean peace process, but the conditions for Chairman Kim’s return visit to the South do not exit.

III. The Four-Party Peace Talks: An International Cooperation Approach to Peace Regime Building

The Korean issue has two components—inter-Korean and international. An international cooperation is essential to the solution of the Korean issue. Thus, the 1953 Korean armistice agreement needs to be replaced by a peace treaty for guaranteeing stability and peace on the Korean peninsula. Who will be parties to a peace treaty? Why did the four-party talks fail to produce a peace treaty? What is the best option for replacing the Korean armistice agreement? These questions will be discussed below.

An international cooperation approach to peace at the four-party talks is the best option for establishing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula by replacing the 1953 Korean armistice agreement. However, the four-party peace talks have been deadlocked since August 1999, when the sixth round of the four party talks ended without setting agenda items, because North Korea refused to come to a negotiation table.As will be discussed below, the four party peace talks had six plenary sessions where North Korea repeatedly maintained that the four party peace talks should deal with the two issues of U.S. troop withdrawal and the conclusion of a peace treaty between the U.S. and North Korea. The four parties have yet to set agenda items to be discussed at the four-party talks. Let us now take a brief look at the origin, development, and evaluation of the four party peace talks in 1996-1999 as an international cooperation approach to the Korean peace-building process.

On April 16, 1996,the ROK and US governments jointly proposed a four-party peace conference among the four concerned parties-- the two Koreas, China and the United States-- to initiate a process aimed at achieving a permanent peace treaty to replace the 1953 Korean armistice agreement, thereby building a new peace regime on the Korean peninsula.[7] After sixteen months of protracted negotiations, the first round of preliminary peace talks was convened on August 5-7, 1997 in New York to decide on the date, venue, and agenda for substantive negotiations at the four-party peace talks. The U.S., China, and the two Koreas agreed to hold the four-party peace talks in Geneva and also agreed on the format for the peace talks, which envisaged a general conference and sub-committee meetings on separate agenda items.

The issue of determining the agenda items was the most difficult. North Korea put forward the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea as an agenda item, and also proposed to discuss the issue of concluding a peace treaty between DPRK and the United States. On the other hand, South Korea proposed to discuss peace regime building and confidence-building measures between the two Koreas. The US wanted a “general” agenda that focused on stability, security and confidence building measures. China proposed to discuss improvement of bilateral relations among the four parties along with confidence-building measures. Meanwhile, DPRK chief delegate Kim Gye-gwan noted that the withdrawal of 37,000 US forces stationed in the South was a “key issue” and that the establishment of a peace system on the Korean peninsula was possible only through the withdrawal of US forces and the signing of a peace treaty between the U.S. and North Korea.

A second round of the four-party preparatory meeting was held in New York City on September 18-19, 1997. This meeting failed to produce an agreement on agenda items to be discussed at the four-party plenary session. At the second round, North Korea insisted that the agenda for the four party peace talks include the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and a U.S.-North Korea peace treaty. At the informal meeting, North Korea repeatedly demanded a guarantee of massive food aid before the convening of the four-party Korean peace talks in Geneva. South Korea and the United States again rejected North Korea’s demand, maintaining that food aid to North Korea should not be a precondition for holding the four-party peace talks.

The second round in September again stalled over the issue of US troops and food aid to North Korea. The North’s demands for the agenda items of the four-party Korean peace talks—the issue of US troops withdrawal and a Washington-Pyongyang peace treaty—were neither acceptable to the United States nor South Korea. However, the food aid issue was negotiable. At the third round of the preliminary talks on November 21, North Korea agreed to participate in the plenary session of the four-party peace talks on December 9, 1997 in Geneva. The four parties agreed to an agenda- “the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula and issues concerning tension reduction there.” The agenda is deliberately broad and simple enough to assure that all parties are free to raise any issue at the plenary meeting.