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March 23, 1999
Innovative Energy Systems and CO2 Stabilization
(Aspen Global Climate Change Institute Workshop, July 14-24, 1998)
Chapter 8
What Nuclear Power Can Accomplish
To reduce CO2 emissions
Robert Krakowski and Richard Wilson
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
8.1. OVERVIEW 1
8.1.1. General Considerations 1
8.1.2. Nuclear Electricity Has Been Cheap. 1
8.1.3. Reasons for the Cost Increases. 2
8.1.4. Are Uranium-Fuel Supplies Sufficient? 3
8.1.5. Are Public Concerns Real? 4
8.2. BACKGROUND 5
8.2.1. How Did We Get Here? A Brief History of Nuclear Energy. 5
8.2.2. Basic Physics of Fission 5
8.2.3. Taxonomy of Nuclear Reactors 6
8.2.4. Decay Heat and Fission-Product Radioactivity. 8
8.2.5. Present Status of Nuclear Power 10
8.2.6. Fuel Supply 10
8.3. PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE 12
8.3.1 Public Perceptions 12
8.3.1.2. Social Concerns About Nuclear Power 13
8.3.1.3. Public Opinion Metrics (Polls). 15
8.3.2. Nuclear Energy Four Cardinal Issues 16
8.3.2.1. Safety 17
8.3.2.2. Waste Disposal 18
8.3.2.3. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 19
8.3.2.4. The Cost of Nuclear Electricity [NEEDS WORK]. 21
8.3.3. Gaining (or Restoring) Public Confidence 21
8.4. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 23
8.4.1. Technological Responses to a Nuclear-Energy Future 23
8.4.1.1. Management Responses [TBD] 23
8.4.1.2. Regulatory Issues 23
8.4.1.3. Government (National, World) [TBD] 26
8.4.2. Technological Responses 26
8.4.2.1. General Approach to a Nuclear Future. 26
8.4.2.2. A Three-Phased Approach 27
8.4.2.3. Fuel Chains and Cycles 28
8.4.3. General Prospects and Directions 32
8.4.3.1. Five Possible Approaches 32
8.4.3.2. Possible World Futures 33
8.4.4. Maintaining Equilibrium and Reversing the Trend [TBD] 35
8.5. INCORPORATING NUCLEAR ENERGY INTO ENERGY-ECONOMIC-ENVIRONMENTAL (E3) MODELS 36
8.5.1. General Setup and Limitations of a Model 36
8.5.3. Sample Results: Capital Cost Variations 38
8.5.4. Sample Results: CarbonTax Variations 39
8.5.5. Comparative Summary of E3 Modeling Results 39
8.6. CONCLUSION: A POSSIBLE FUTURE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY 41
REFERENCES 44
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 53
ENDNOTES 57
APPENDICES
A. Abbreviated Chronology of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons Development (Willrich 1974; Goldschmidt 1982; Gardner 1994) 59
B. Design Characteristics for New Nuclear Reactors (Nuclear News 1992). 62
TABLES 63
FIGURES 69
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8.1. OVERVIEW
8.1.1. General Considerations
In the USA we now emit 11% more CO2 than in 1990; and at Kyoto we promised to reduce CO2 emissions to 8% below 1990 levels in 10 years for a decrease of 19% below today's levels. If all the electricity now generated by nuclear power were to be generated by coal, CO2 emissions would increase by another 8%, making it more difficult to meet our commitment if we abandon nuclear power. About 30 years ago Dr. Glenn Seaborg, then Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), testified to the Joint Committee of Atomic Energy of the US Congress (JCAE) that nuclear power would be comparatively benign environmentally (in particular, not producing appreciable CO2) and also produce electricity at a modest cost (REF). This optimism was nationwide and worldwide. Since that time opposition to nuclear power has arisen, and nuclear power at the present moment is not being considered by most governments in the world as an option to meet energy and environmental aims and desires. Our purpose is to show ways in which nuclear power could help the world and in particular the USA to meet their commitments made at Kyoto. Our purpose is also to examine the causes of the changes in the fortunes of nuclear energy and discuss the extent to which nuclear power can provide electricity safely and economically worldwide. We end by showing examples of quantitative model results showing how nuclear energy can impact global climate change.
8.1.2. Nuclear Electricity Has Been Cheap.
We will firstly explain that nuclear energy was in the past very competitive and presumably could be again. This position is not a matter of optimism brought on by believing results from a model, but is one of accepting historical fact. Twenty-five years ago, Maine Yankee nuclear power plant had just been completed for a total cost of $180 million, or $200 per kWeh of installed capacity. Connecticut Yankee nuclear power plant was producing electricity at 0.55 cents per kWeh busbar cost, some part of which was needed to pay for the $55 million mortgage. The operating cost was perhaps only 0.4 cents per kWeh. Twentyseven years ago, Benedict (1971) (Table I) estimated average operating costs that were a little lower than this value and capital costs that were about 25% higher than for Maine Yankee. Taking no credit for learning, we could do as well if we could return to the optimism and procedures of 25 years ago. Allowing for inflation, the operating cost could be less than 1 cent per kWeh, and, by keeping construction times down, the capital cost could be less than 2 cents per kWeh.
Yet the average operating cost of nuclear plants in the USA today is 1.9 cents/kWeh (McCoy, 1998) and for a well-operated plant is still 1.4 (South Texas) to 1.5 (Seabrook) and 1.7 (Palo Verde) cents per kWeh. The construction cost of a new GE reactor is $1,690 per kWe being built in Taiwan in about four years (leading to a charge for the capital of about fourcents per kWeh. These costs are still very high and could be more if construction takes longer than four years.
8.1.3. Reasons for the Cost Increases.
As noted in the overview, nuclear electricity has been competitive with electricity from other technologies. What has changed? Can it be changed back? Can it be partially changed back? Can it be put on a new economic track?
Nuclear advocates expected in 1973 that as more nuclear power plants were built and operated both the construction cost and the operating cost would follow the decreases predicted by a learning curve (REFs). But the reverse has been the case - the costs have followed a "forgetting curve." (Wilson 1991)
Some people argue that the increased cost has been caused by the need for increased safety (REFs). But the safety of nuclear power in 1973 was probably better than for other comparable industrial facilities, has been steadily improved since then, and new designs promise further improvements. It is important to realize that the safety improvements have mostly come from improved analysis - which is (in principle) cheap. [Needs some ELABORATION]
We have seen no careful study of this. Indeed, in 1984 when the Energy Engineering Board of the US National Academy of Sciences proposed a study of the subject it was opposed by the utility industry, perhaps for fear of adversely influencing prudency hearings that were in progress before public utility commissions. [Explain “prudency” hearings…ELABORATE]
Various ideas include the following:
· In 1970 manufacturers built turnkey plants or otherwise sold cheap reactors as loss leaders, but turnkey operations can only account for a small proportion of the capital cost.
· Construction costs generally have risen since 1970 even when corrected for inflation.
· It may be that in 1972 we had good management and good technical people; but why has management got worse when that has not been true for other technologies?
· Operating costs rose rapidly in the 1970s because the rate of expansion of nuclear energy exceeded the rate of training of good personnel.
· A sudden rise in costs came in the late 1970s after the accident at Three Mile Island Unit II.
· Although mandated retrofits have been blamed for cost increases, this applies to existing plants and not to new construction.
Most people seem to agree that the principal present limitation in nuclear power development is related to diminished public acceptance of the technology. Decreased confidence and increased risk aversion drives excessive regulation, and this in turn increases the cost. As noted above, this increased cost often reaches a factor of three even after correction for inflation. It is highly likely that nuclear power plants are safer today than they were in 1972. It would be hard to argue, however, that the actual safety improvements that have occurred have been the cause of the threefold increase in cost. Most improvements have resulted from more careful thought, using such approaches as event-tree analysis, but without excessive hardware expense.
Many people have suggested that the problem is that the regulation is more than needed for adequate safety, and this over-regulation increases the cost (Towers and Perrin 1995). In particular, many claim that regulation is too prescriptive and not based upon performance. A few of the arguments related to over-prescriptive regulations are as follows:
· The response to many regulations is to increase staff. The staff numbers at the Dresden-II power plant went from 250 in 1975 to over 1,300 today (Benhke 1997). This increased staffing costs money - 0.8 cents per kWeh, and it is far from clear that adding personnel improves safety.
· Shut downs (always costly) for failure to meet technical specifications occur when the tecnical specifications have little effect upon safety.
· Any delay in licensing can seriously increase the capital cost, as interest payments incurred during construction accrue.
· A demand for safety-grade equipment in parts of the plant that have little impact on safety are expensive.
The problem is not unique to the USA. In the UK the Atomic Energy Authority had to spend a lot of money making the Thorpe reprocessing plant as earthquake proof as an operating reactor; yet the inventory of dangerous material is far less than in a reactor, and the danger of recriticality is remote (Hill 1997).
In another paper (Wilson 1999) and in Congressional testimony (Wilson 1998) one of us addressed the problem of excessive regulation; reasons why it inevitably appears and what can be done to avoid the problem. The Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently addressed this question (Jackson 1998) and emphasized this area as a vital area of research and subsequent implementation. This issue is discussed further in section 8.4.1.2.
8.1.4. Are Uranium-Fuel Supplies Sufficient?
Various opponents of nuclear power have argued that the uranium fuel supply is insufficient to make it worthwhile to face the problems (whatever they may be) with nuclear energy. We show here that this is false. Twenty-nine years ago Benedict (1971) reported that we had 20 million tonne of uranium at prices up to $100 per pound (Table II); the higher prices only raised the operating cost in an LWR by 0.5 cents per kWeh, which would now be considered an acceptable increase. The total quantity of uranium resources (column 2 of TableII) does not seem to have changed; subsequent columns of Table II are merely physical calculations from the first two columns. Thus, Table II is as accurate today as it was 28 years ago. The Uranium Institute reported in 1998 that we have about 18 million tonne of uranium in ore, proven reserves, reasonably assured supplies and possible supplies at prices up to $200 per kgU, as is depicted for the variously defined categories categories in Fig. 1. We can afford without appreciably increasing the initial fuel cost. This would produce in a light-water-reactor (LWR) system about 4 x 1015 kWeh (4.6 ´ 105 GWeyr) of electricity, or enough for over a century at the postulated year 2030 demand of 2,500 GWeyr/yr. [Check out]
A general rule about prices of any fuels seems to have evolved. The time for depletion of reserves has stayed between 15 to 30 years for nearly a century! (Coal reserves are an exception). If enough fuel exists for 30 years there is little incentive for exploration, but if the amount falls below 15years the profit motive ensures that exploration restarts. The present and anticipated use of nuclear power provides little incentive to explore uranium. Allowing for a price increase of 0.5 cents per kWeh, it appears we could have a future for nuclear power for 50 years without a breeder reactor (uranium or a thorium cycle), and possibly for many, many more. After perhaps half a century it would be wise to be ready to use alternate fuel cycles. The use of a thorium cycle in Light Water Reactors might postpone the need for a plutonium breeder reactor using fast neutrons. These alternate reactors and nuclear fuel cycles are discussed in 8.4.2.3. All in all, a factor of 1000 increase in effective fuel supply seems not unreasonable. It would be impudent to project the existence of the human race beyond the 100,000 years implied by these factors.
8.1.5. Are Public Concerns Real?
The public has expressed a number of concerns related to nuclear energy. These concerns will be addressed in Section 8.3. We note here several general features of the public concerns that seem relevant to us. Often a concern is expressed that can be shown to be technically unwarranted or exaggerated. Yet the concern persists even after the truth is accepted; perceptions persist. This indicates to us that the statements of the anti-nuclear opposition, while based on these perceptions, may not be a real indicator of the concern. Nevertheless, right or wrong, perceptions have consequences.
8.2. BACKGROUND
8.2.1. How Did We Get Here? A Brief History of Nuclear Energy.
Several descriptions of the history of nuclear energy clearly overlaps the history of nuclear weapons. (Goldschmidt 1992, XXX) In Appendix A we show a chronology of important events replated to the development of nuclear fission starting with nuclear weaponry and proceeding to civilian nuclear energy. In addition, general books about nuclear energy discuss the history and the basic issues very clearly (Bodansky 1997, XXXX).