FILE NAME Jeff Zhang

FILE NAME Jeff Zhang

DDI 09, SS Lab 1

Index

Index 1

Thoughts 2

Explanation: How Food Stamps Work 3

1AC – Inherency 4

1AC – Inherency 5

1AC – Inherency 6

1AC – Economy Advantage 7

1AC – Economy Advantage 8

1AC – Economy Advantage 9

1AC – Obesity Advantage 10

1AC – Obesity Advantage 11

1AC – Hegemony Advantage 12

1AC – Hegemony Advantage 13

1AC – Plan Text 14

1AC – Solvency 15

Restrictions Now 16

A2: Fraud/Cheats 17

A2: Block Grants CP 18

A2: Combine Food Stamps w/ TANF CP 20

A2: Eliminate Quality Controls 21

Eligibility/Participation 22

A2: Abuse 23

Solves Econ 24

Food Stamps Now 25

Other Cards 28

Thoughts

Farm lobbies love food stamps

http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=kH4H6lbemrQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA335&dq=%22food+stamps%22&ots=dTm5PByevl&sig=ItJ-0kSAHYZhflhuOWeEiIBfRO0 – p346

http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2009/02/hunger.html

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1554/is_n1_v21/ai_16791409/pg_6/?tag=content;col1

“But for all the problems with the program, study after study shows that simply handing it over to the states could actually make things worse.” – 1995

food stamps W/20 error rate W/20 penalty ----- last 10 years

A juggling act

SECTION: EDITORIAL; Pg. 6A Vol. 121 No. 307

LENGTH: 568 words

State fined for food-stamp errors

BYLINE: Catherine Candisky and Jeffrey Sheban, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 01A

LENGTH: 693 words

http://76.12.61.196/publications/foodstamp_programreauthorization.htm

Solvency advocate? http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/Farm_Bill/pdfs/nutrition/DepartmentofSocialServices.pdf

STATES HAVE MADE PROGRESS REDUCING PAYMENT ERRORS, AND FURTHER CHALLENGES REMAIN

SECTION: GAO REPORT

LENGTH: 11839 words

http://www.cbpp.org/research/index.cfm?fa=viewAll&id=31

Neg stuff: http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411752_food_stamps.pdf

http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:xuQ05QFEaLYJ:www.ppionline.org/documents/Food_Stamps_902.pdf+%22Supplemental+Nutrition+Assistance+Program%22+%22quality+control%22+reform&cd=27&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a

http://larouchepac.com/node/10965 – states budgets on the brink

Explanation: How Food Stamps Work

How the food stamp program works.

Wiseman, Research Professor of Public Policy and Economics, George Washington Institute of Public Policy, 02

(Michael Wiseman, Research Professor of Public Policy and Economics, George Washington Institute of Public Policy, March 2002, “Food Stamps and Welfare Reform,” http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2002/03welfare_wiseman.aspx)

Food stamps help people buy food. Over 80 percent of recipients receive food stamp assistance by using special ATM-like debit cards in grocery stores. The basic benefit is adjusted annually for changes in food costs. To be eligible for food stamps, households must have gross (before tax) monthly incomes of less than 130 percent of federal poverty guidelines (in 2001 the guideline was $1,219 for a family of three) and few assets. Certain adults are required to register for work, and some adults without dependents are required to work or to participate in training as a condition of assistance. Families receiving TANF benefits and persons receiving Supplemental Security Income are in most circumstances automatically eligible for food stamps if they live alone. In fiscal year 2001, the maximum monthly food stamp benefit for a household of three was $341. Beyond a standard deduction and certain other allowances, benefits are reduced by $0.30 for each dollar of income from sources other than earnings and by $0.24 for each dollar of earnings. In fiscal year 2000, households with children received an average monthly food stamp benefit of $234. While the federal government pays most FSP costs and sets most of the regulations, the program is operated by states, generally through local welfare offices. Management is evaluated annually by a joint federal/state review of a sample of cases drawn from each state's recipients list. This quality control sample is sufficiently large to provide reliable information on the people receiving food stamps, the rate at which administrators make errors in benefit determination, and the amounts of payments involved. States can be charged for the benefit cost of error rates in excess of national averages. In practice such penalties are often waived; when enforced, states pay by investing the fine in programs to improve performance.

How the quality control system works.

Gigliotti, Policy Associate, National Conference of State Legislatures, 05

(Katherine Gigliotti, Policy Associate, National Conference of State Legislatures, June 2005, “Food Stamp Program,” http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/statefed/humserv/FSP.pdf)

State food stamp agencies are required to conduct quality control reviews of randomly selected food stamp cases. Reviews are conducted on active cases to determine if the household is eligible and is receiving the correct benefit allotment and on negative cases to verify that the decision to deny, suspend or terminate the household from the Food Stamp Program was correct. An error is counted against the state when an incorrect benefit allotment is made (payment error) or when a household is found to have been incorrectly denied, suspended or terminated from the program (negative error).

1AC – Inherency

Despite improvements, current federal quality control standards decrease eligibility and participation in food stamp programs.

Greenstein, executive director, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, former Administrator of the Food and Nutrition Service, 07

(Robert Greenstein, executive director, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities; former Administrator of the Food and Nutrition Service, January 30, 2007, Statement of Bob Greenstein Executive Director Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “Federal Food Assistance Programs,” Lexis)

Food stamp participation by eligible households, especially households with children, declined significantly in the 1990s. According to USDA, participation rates among eligible individuals fell from about 75 percent in 1994 to about 60 percent in 2000; among children, participation fell from some 90 percent of those eligible to 72 percent during that period. A primary reason for the participation decline, according to policymakers, was the burdensome procedural requirements imposed by states, partly because of various federal requirements and partly as a result of the food stamp quality control (QC) penalty system. Many of these requirements fell disproportionately on working families, which states viewed as more likely to add to the state's error rate because their incomes were more likely to fluctuate than the incomes of non-working families. This posed a particular problem because working-poor families' schedules can make it especially difficult for them to make frequent visits to the welfare office to respond to repeated requests for additional paperwork. The 2002 Farm Bill gave states numerous options to streamline paperwork requirements and deliver benefits more effectively to eligible households, especially working families and those who have recently worked their way off welfare. States have overwhelmingly embraced the new options as ways to reduce administrative burdens on both food stamp participants and state agencies. For example: -- some 40 states have coordinated their food stamp definitions of income and resources with the definition they use for TANF cash assistance or family Medicaid coverage; -- almost 20 states have opted to provide five months of transitional food stamps to families that leave welfare, making it easier for such families to move from welfare to work successfully; -- more than 45 states have adopted the option to provide food stamp benefits for six-month intervals with reduced paperwork requirements; and -- more than 40 states have simplified their food stamp "standard utility allowance" to reduce the amount of paperwork required from participants. In addition, Congress included a major reform of the food stamp performance measurement or quality control system. The QC rules were reconfigured to penalize states with persistently high errors rather than every state with an above-average error rate. In addition, performance awards were expanded to reward states with high or improved participation rates and customer service, in addition to high payment accuracy. The combination of new state flexibility and a reformed QC system has contributed to improved participation. Between 2003 and 2004 (the most recent years for which data are available), USDA estimates that food stamp participation rose from 56 percent to 61 percent. Participation rose both among eligible working families (from 47 percent to 51 percent) and among eligible children (from 74 percent to 82 percent). It is likely that participation rates have continued to increase since 2004. Even more impressive, payment accuracy has improved dramatically even as participation rates have increased. In 2000, the most recent year for which error rates were available when Congress was considering the 2002 farm bill, the combined food stamp error rate -- i.e., the sum of the percentage of benefits issued to ineligible households, the percentage of benefits overissued to eligible households, and the percentage underissued to eligible households -- was almost 9 percent. It has fallen every year since then, to 5.84 percent in 2005. In 2000, 15 states (including some of the largest states) had combined error rates over 10 percent; in 2005, none did. Conversely, in 2000, 13 states had error rates below 6 percent (a level that at the time entitled states to enhanced administrative funding); by 2005, fully 32 states did. Moreover, in 2005, fewer than 2 percent of benefits were issued to households that were not eligible for food stamps, which means that more than 98 percent of the benefits issued went to households that were fully qualified. In addition, the percentage of benefits that either were issued to ineligible households or overissued to eligible households that received too many benefits was 4.5 percent. (This figure is lower than the 5.84 percent total error rate cited above because that figure also includes underpayments -- that is, benefits that should have been issued but were not.) However, despite the impressive progress of the last few years in improving program participation among certain populations, the Food Stamp Program still is missing a large share of eligible households. In particular: -- Only about 50 percent of eligible low-income working families participate in the program. This means 9 million people in working families are missing out on food assistance that could help them make ends meet and provide a nutritionally adequate diet for their children. -- Fewer than 30 percent of eligible low-income seniors participates in the program. Some of these individuals and couples would qualify for relatively low benefits because they receive Social Security and/or SSI income. But most eligible food stamp elderly households either have sufficiently low income or qualify for food stamp deductions (based on their medical and shelter expenses), with the result that they would qualify for about $70 or more per person per month in food stamp benefits. That could help them obtain more nutritionally adequate diets.

1AC – Inherency

In addition, measuring state error rates in comparison to the national average puts increased pressure on states to reduce error rates.

Nilsen, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues at the General Accounting Office, 07

(Signurd Nilsen, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues at the General Accounting Office, January 30, 2007, Statement of Sigurd Nilsen Director Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues GAO, “Federal Food Assistance Programs,” Lexis)

Improper food stamp payments and trafficking of benefits have declined in a time of rising participation, and although progress has been made, ensuring program integrity will continue to be a fundamental challenge facing the program. We found that payment error rates have declined substantially as FNS and states have taken steps to improve payment accuracy and that future reductions may prove challenging. Attention from top USDA management as well as continued support and assistance from FNS will likely continue to be important factors in further reductions. In addition, if error rates continue to decrease, this trend will continue to put pressure on states to improve because penalties are assessed using the state's error rate as compared with the national average. We also found that FNS, using EBT data, has made significant progress in taking advantage of new opportunities to monitor and disqualify traffickers. However, a more focused effort to target and disqualify these stores could help FNS meet its continuing challenge of ensuring that stores are available and operating in areas of high need while still maintaining program integrity. Given the size of the Food Stamp Program, the costs to administer it, and the current federal budget deficit, achieving program goals more cost-effectively may become more important. FNS and the states will continue to face a challenge in balancing the goals of payment accuracy, increasing program participation rates, and the need to contain program costs. To reduce program vulnerabilities and better target its limited compliance-monitoring resources, we recommended in our October 2006 report on trafficking that FNS develop additional criteria to identify stores most likely to traffic; conduct risk assessments, using compliance and other data, to systematically identify stores and areas that meet these criteria, and allocate resources accordingly; and provide more targeted and early oversight of stores determined most likely to engage in trafficking. To provide further deterrence for trafficking, we recommended that FNS work to develop a strategy to increase the penalties for trafficking, working with the Inspector General as needed, and consider developing legislative proposals if the penalties entail additional authority. To promote state efforts to pursue recipients suspected of trafficking and thereby reduce the pool of recipient traffickers, we recommended that FNS ensure that FNS field offices report to states those recipients who are suspected of trafficking, and revisit the incentive structure to encourage states to investigate and take action against recipients who traffic. Department of Agriculture officials generally agreed with our findings, conclusions, and recommendations but raised a concern regarding our recommendations on more efficient use of their compliance- monitoring resources. They stated that they believe they do have a strategy for targeting resources through their use of EBT transaction data to identify suspicious transaction patterns. We believe that FNS has made good progress in its use of EBT transaction data. However, it is now at a point where it can begin to formulate more sophisticated analyses. For example, these analyses could combine EBT transaction data with other available data, such as information on stores with minimal inventory, to develop criteria to better and more quickly identify stores at risk of trafficking. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have.

This results in bureaucratic measures that deter individuals from applying for and receiving benefits.

Gundersen et. al., Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois, 09

(Craig Gundersen, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois, Dean Jolliffe and Laura Tiehen, Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture, August 2009, “The challenge of program evaluation: When increasing program participation decreases the relative well-being of participants,” Volume 34, Issue 4, Pages 367-376, ScienceDirect)