Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of / ))
Joint Application by SBC Communications Inc., / )
Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Indiana Bell / )
Telephone Company Incorporated, The Ohio Bell / ) / WC Docket No. 03 -167
Telephone Company, Wisconsin Bell, Inc., and / )
Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc. / )
for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services / )
in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin / )
REPLY AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT J. ALEXANDER
REGARDING WHOLESALE POLICY ISSUES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUBJECT / PARAGRAPH /INTRODUCTION
/ 1PURPOSE OF REPLY AFFIDAVIT / 2
CHECKLIST ITEM 1 – INTERCONNECTION / 3
A. Central Office Power Plants / 7
B. Dual Power Leads / 14
C. Power Consumption / 20
D. Power Metering / 24
E. Non-Fused Leads / 34
CHECKLIST ITEM 2 – ACCESS TO NETWORK ELEMENTS / 38
A. Non-Discriminatory Rates / 41
1. The Illinois Agreement / 46
2. The Indiana Agreement / 47
3. Amendments Required / 48
B. Amendment Negotiations / 49
CHECKLIST ITEM 5 – LOCAL TRANSPORT / 52
CHECKLIST ITEM 10 – ACCESS TO CALL RELATED DATABASES AND SIGNALING / 53
CHECKLIST ITEM 13 – RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION / 56
CONCLUSION / 60
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment A Sept. 27, 2000 Transcript, TPUC Docket No. 21333 (excerpts).
Attachment B Birch Telecom of Texas Ltd., et al. Response to SBC’s Motion for Summary Decision, TPUC Docket No. 27782, at 11 (filed July 21, 2003) (excerpts).
Attachment C Verizon North Inc. Tariff P.U.C.O. No. 8 (excerpts).
Attachment D SBC Ohio’s Answer to AT&T’s Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and SBC Ohio’s Amended Counter-Claims-CrossClaims, Case No. C2-03-472 (S.D. Ohio filed Aug. 8, 2003).
Attachment E Arbitration Award, In the Matter of Petition of MCI Telecommunications Corporation for Arbitration Pursuant to Section 252(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to Establish an Interconnection Agreement with Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company, Case No. 97-152-TP-ARB (Aug. 14, 1997) (excerpts).
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I, Scott J. Alexander, being of lawful age and duly sworn upon my oath, do hereby depose and state as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. My name is Scott J. Alexander. I am the same Scott J. Alexander that previously filed Affidavits regarding Wholesale Policy Issues in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin on July 17, 2003.[1]
PURPOSE OF REPLY AFFIDAVIT
2. The purpose of this Reply Affidavit is to respond to certain comments filed in this proceeding by AT&T Corp. (“AT&T”), the Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counsel (“IOUCC”), NuVox Communications, Inc. (“NuVox”), TDS Metrocom, LLC (“TDS”), TSI Telecommunication Services, Inc. (“TSI”), Z-Tel Communications, Inc. (“Z-Tel”), and jointly by ACN Communications Services, Inc., Bullseye Telcom, Inc., Choice One Communications Inc., CIMCO Communications, Inc., Indiana Fiber Works, LLC., Mpower Communications Corp., and PowerNet Global Communications, Inc. (“ACN et al.”) regarding the BOC Applicants’ compliance with the section 271 competitive checklist.[2]
CHECKLIST ITEM 1 – INTERCONNECTION
3. AT&T alleges, through its witness’ declaration, that Ohio Bell’s monthly recurring charges for collocation power exceed TELRIC levels. See Declaration of Danial M. Noorani ¶ 4 (“Noorani Declaration”).[3] Similarly, NuVox alleges in its unverified Opposition that the monthly recurring DC power charges of both Ohio Bell and Indiana Bell are excessive. See Opposition of NuVox Communications, Inc. at 2 (“NuVox Opposition”). As NuVox admits, however, this issue is ultimately an interconnection agreement dispute,[4] and NuVox has filed pending complaints on this issue with the IURC and the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”). See NuVox Opposition at 6. AT&T, along with several other CLECs, has been granted intervention in the PUCO docket.[5]
4. Under these circumstances, the fact-intensive and complex policy, cost and pricing issues raised by AT&T and NuVox clearly should not be addressed in this proceeding. The Commission has consistently held that a section 271 proceeding is not the appropriate forum for the adjudication of such carrier-to-carrier disputes.[6] Indeed, the Commission declined to address almost identical collocation power issues in prior 271 applications, holding that such issues are appropriately resolved at the state level.[7]
5. The Commission’s reluctance to address such issues in the context of a 271 proceeding is further justified where the complaining party has failed to raise the issue before the state commission during the state 271 proceeding.[8] NuVox failed to raise this issue in either Ohio or Indiana. AT&T, as part of a coalition, did raise collocation power issues during the state 271 proceeding in Ohio. However, as AT&T’s witness admits, AT&T’s position was emphatically rejected by the PUCO. See Noorani Declaration ¶ 14 and Exhibit 1. Indeed, the PUCO’s rejection of AT&T’s position is abundantly clear in the Ohio Order.[9] Although AT&T alleges that the PUCO “dodged the issue,” id. ¶ 14, the PUCO’s findings on the issue were clear and unambiguous. AT&T appears simply to disagree with the PUCO’s decision.
6. Nevertheless, I address herein the specific arguments made by both AT&T and NuVox. Reduced to their essence, both parties complain that they should be billed for only a portion of the DC power capacity they have ordered – or only the DC power they actually consume. However, both parties ignore the realities of central office DC power plants, the obligations and costs that CLECs impose upon the ILEC when they order collocation power, and the way such costs are recovered.
A. Central Office Power Plants
7. Central office telecommunications equipment generally operates on direct current “DC” (as opposed to alternating current “AC”) power. The central office DC power plant is composed of numerous components, including rectifiers (which essentially convert commercial AC power to DC power), batteries, battery distribution fuse bays (“BDFB”) and back-up generators. The BOC Applicants must plan for, build and maintain these facilities to ensure a continuous supply of DC power for their own equipment and for collocators’ equipment within the central office. In doing so, the BOC Applicants are necessarily dependent upon the collocating CLECs to accurately estimate their own power needs because the BOC Applicants must be prepared to provide the full capacity of DC power ordered by the CLECs.
8. A typical collocation arrangement is served by multiple power leads (although the BOC Applicants do not require that CLECs utilize multiple leads). For example, when a CLEC requests that a BOC Applicant provision two DC power leads, consisting of an “A” lead and a “B” lead, each lead is “hot” and capable of simultaneously delivering its full capacity in AMPs as ordered by the CLEC. Thus, if the CLEC orders two 20 AMP leads, the BOC Applicant must be capable of delivering up to 40 AMPs of DC power. Similarly, if the CLEC orders two 50 AMP leads, the BOC Applicant must be prepared to deliver up to 100 AMPs of DC power.[10] Because the BOC Applicants are responsible for providing the power for CLECs’ equipment, as well as the power the BOC Applicants require for their own equipment, the failure to appropriately manage total power demand could result in a deterioration of service to all users of central office power.
9. As a result, it is unreasonable at best for CLECs to claim – as AT&T and NuVox do – that they should be free to essentially order any amount of DC power capacity (and put the BOC Applicants to the expense of ensuring that such power is available) and then pay for only the power they actually consume. Similarly, AT&T’s claim that it is disadvantaged because the BOC Applicants pay only the cost of “the power SBC consumes,” see Noorani Declaration ¶ 11, completely ignores reality. The BOC Applicants pay for the entire cost of the DC Power plant as well as the AC Power costs they incur. The BOC Applicants must take full responsibility for properly sizing and operating the DC power plant to satisfy their needs and those of their CLEC customers.
10. Sizing the DC power plant at a level that would provide less than the total power CLECs have ordered would place the BOC Applicants in the wholly untenable position of potentially being unable to supply the power the CLECs ordered – and subject the BOC Applicants to potential claims of breach of the parties’ interconnection agreements and/or tariffs. Conversely, allowing the CLECs to order as much power as they wish but to pay for only the power they consume (even if such consumption could be reasonably measured) would place the BOC Applicants in the equally untenable position of incurring power plant expenses that they could never reasonably expect to recover, unless the rates (and underlying cost studies) were revised to take into account such a revised structure.
11. Although the CLECs attempt to compare the BOC Applicants’ central office DC power plant and delivery systems to a commercial AC power utility – and thus conclude their power charges should be based solely on consumption in a manner similar to a residential consumer (the issue of power metering is discussed in more detail below) – the BOC Applicants believe that analogy is imperfect at best. See Noorani Declaration ¶ 8, n.6. First, a commercial power utility may have thousands (and potentially millions) of end-users. In addition, although I am not an expert in electric utility matters, it is my general understanding that the traditional electric utility possesses historical and industry load/capacity information that allows it to accurately project its generation, transmission and distribution requirements based on multiple variables (such as temperature, time of day, etc.). Under basic utility cost recovery principles, these assumptions would be built into the utility’s rate structure to ensure that the rates, based on the projected demand, allow full cost recovery.[11]
12. By contrast, a BOC Applicant’s central office DC power plant is designed to serve the BOC Applicant and the CLECs that have chosen to collocate in that office. The BOC Applicant does not possess historical information about the power needs of a particular CLEC in a particular central office. That load requirement is totally dependent on the type and amount of equipment the CLEC places within its collocation arrangement, which will depend on the CLEC’s specific business model and needs. Thus, only the CLEC can provide an accurate estimate of its power requirements – which it does through its collocation order. At that point, the BOC Applicant must ensure that it can deliver power in accordance with the CLEC’s orders.[12]
13. Second, unlike a commercial power utility, which I understand to be generally inter-connected to the broader power grid and can almost always import additional power (limited only by transmission capabilities),[13] the central office DC power plant is effectively an island. It is not connected to a DC power grid apart from the central office power plant. The amount of DC power available in the central office is effectively fixed based upon the size of the power plants built and maintained in that office. Again, the BOC Applicant must size the power plants to accommodate the maximum amount of power that might be drawn in that office – which is necessarily dependent in part on the amount of power the CLECs order.
B. Dual Power Leads
14. Both NuVox and AT&T attack the BOC Applicants’ right to bill CLECs for the power capacity associated with each of two leads – even where the CLEC has specifically ordered both leads. See Nuvox Opposition at 7; AT&T Comments at 50. This claim is apparently based on the erroneous assumption that both leads will not be used to provide power to the CLEC’s collocation arrangement and therefore represent no additional burden upon the BOC Applicant’s central office DC Power plant. Indeed, Mr. Noorani repeatedly claims that CLECs do not draw power from both leads and that the second lead is exclusively used as a redundant (or “backup”) lead.[14] Mr. Noorani’s sworn declaration, however, flatly contradicts sworn testimony previously provided by AT&T’s long-time collocation expert witness, Mr. Steven Turner, in proceedings where he has testified in support of the CLEC-sponsored Collocation Cost Model (“CCM”) – which has been adopted in a number of states.
15. For instance, during the permanent collocation rate proceeding in Public Utility Commission of Texas (TPUC) Docket No. 21333, Mr. Turner unambiguously testified that CLECs do in fact draw power from both leads:
The way the collocation cost model is set up is that when you order 40 amps of power, you get it in two 20 amp feeds. 20 amp feed on the A side and 20 amp feeds on the B side over 35 feet . . .
But typically what would happen is if you had a 40-amp load on a piece of equipment, you would feed that off of two fuses so that you would have redundant power, and you would feed part of the load to that equipment [sic] of A side and part off of B. So if you needed 40 amps of power, you would only require to put 20 amps on each side, and so that’s the way we cost it out in the model.
Sept. 27, 2000 Transcript, TPUC Docket No. 21333, p. 345, ll. 19-23; p. 347, ll. 12-21 (emphasis added) (Attachment A hereto).