Researching Multi-level Governance[1]
Ian Bache
Department of Politics
University of Sheffield
Paper presented to the CINEFOGO/University of Trento Conference on The Governance of the European Union: theories, practices and myths, Brussels, January 25-6, 2008.
Researching Multi-level Governance
Introduction[2]
Multi-level governance has grown from its early origins in the study of EU cohesion policy to become an established concept in a range of sub-fields of political science, although it remains most closely connected to the study of the European Union (EU).
There is a relatively established debate over the validity of the empirical claims made by multi-level governance scholars, which is summarised below However, there is a need to take this debate further and this paper is a contribution to this endeavour. In particular, it responds to the call by Piattoni (2008, 1) to address a number of theoretical and empirical challenges that are intimately connected:
‘From a theoretical point of view, it is unclear whether MLG refers to processes and trends or states and institutions. We clearly need to reflect on the concept’s ontology … and assess its theoretical relevance. From an empirical point of view, we must consider which phenomena can be uniquely subsumed under MLG which could not be detected by other concepts and decide whether it marks a significant distinction vis-à-vis other concepts, such as governance… we must decide where MLG stands on the “ladder of abstraction” (Sartori 1984)… [and have] a solid definition of what we mean by “level”.
In doing so, the paper tries to develop a clearer understanding of the value of the multi-level governance concept and suggests ways in which it might be strengthened, namely through:
- a clearer explanation of the assumptions in relation to the location and nature of power and, relating to this;
- adopting tools and benchmarks from other approaches to guide multi-level governance research;
- explicitly theorising the relationship between actors/governance arrangements and the social context;
What is multi-level governance?
Early development
The intellectual context in which multi-level governance emerged is described in a number of places (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2001; Pollack 2005; Rosamond 2000) but some restatement is useful here. Until the mid-1980s, the study of the EU was dominated by approaches developed from the study of international relations (IR) that were concerned with understanding the process of integration. From the IR tradition of pluralism, neofunctionalists (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963) argued that the national governments who had initiated the integration process were losing control in an increasingly complex web of interdependence, a web that involved supranational, subnational, and nonstate actors. The counterview came from intergovernmentalism (Hoffman 1964, 1966), informed by realist approaches in IR. More critical perspectives (e.g., structuralism, constructivism) came relatively late to prominence in debate on the EU (for an overview, see Bache and George 2006, 1–78).
The neofunctionalist argument fitted neatly with events until the mid-1960s, when the reassertion of national authority strengthened the counterclaims of intergovernmentalists that governments retained control over the important issues—not least through the persistence of the national veto in most areas. The period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s is generally seen as one in which intergovernmentalist explanations prevailed; although the period was not marked by rapid advances in integration through significant new treaties or other headline developments, a considerable amount of lower-level integration continued to take place.
The turning point in relation to theorizing on the EU came with a renewed push for integration in the form of the single market program, culminating in the Single European Act (SEA) signed in 1986. This initiative led to an expansion in EU competences and revised decision-making procedures, most notably to eliminate the national veto in a number of areas to facilitate faster integration. The effects of the single market program on the process of integration and, in turn, on the nature of the EU as a political system prompted a new wave of theory challenging the dominant intergovernmental-supranational debate. Increasingly, parallels were drawn between the EU and domestic political systems, and tools and approaches from the study of domestic and comparative politics were utilized (Hix 1994).
Multi-level governance emerged in this period and drew upon both the old and new debates. Gary Marks (1992) first used the phrase multi-level governance to capture developments in EC cohesion policy after the reform of the structural funds in 1988. Subsequently, Marks and others developed the multi-level governance approach to apply to EU decision making more broadly (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001). The approach drew insights from both the study of domestic/comparative politics and the study of international politics. In particular, it had connections to the work by Fritz Scharpf (1988) and others on German federalism, resembled aspects of neofunctionalism, and was replete with network metaphors.
EU Cohesion Policy and Multi-level governance
EU cohesion policy has both social and economic aspects and focuses particularly on developing disadvantaged regions in the context of market integration. The main financial instruments of cohesion policy are the structural funds, which are governed by “structural policy,” which differs in some respects from the policies for other instruments of cohesion policy (see Bache 2008, chapter 4).
In the context of the acceleration of market integration in the 1980s and an increase in the number of relatively disadvantaged regions through the accession of Greece, Portugal, and Spain, structural policy underwent a major reform in 1988. In addition to agreeing to double the funding allocated, national governments also agreed to a new set of governing principles for structural policy, not least to ensure that funds were spent effectively. These were the principles of partnership, additionality, programming, and concentration, the first two of which became central to the case study from which multi-level governance was developed.
The partnership principle required that the structural funds be administered through partnerships established in each assisted region. These partnerships were to consist of national, subnational (regional and/or local), and supranational (EU Commission) actors. This decision gave subnational actors a formal role in the EU policy-making process for the first time. In subsequent years the Commission pushed for and secured agreement to a greater role in the partnerships for nonstate actors (trade unions, environmental organizations, voluntary and community groups, and so on).
The additionality principle required that EU funds be spent in addition to any planned expenditure in the member states. The requirement had been in place since the introduction of EU regional policy in 1975 but was strengthened in 1988, having been regularly ignored to that point—in particular by the British government, which treated EU funds as a reimbursement to the Treasury for its payments to the EU budget. Following the 1988 reform, the Commission took the British government to task over additionality and—with the support of British local authorities—forced a change in the government’s approach. This case of joint supranational-subnational action was taken as further evidence of an emerging multilevel polity. Gary Marks (1993, 403) suggested that “Several aspects of the conflict—the way in which local actors were mobilized, their alliance with the Commission, and the effectiveness of their efforts in shifting the government’s position—confirm the claim that structural policy has provided subnational governments and the Commission with new political resources and opportunities in an emerging multilevel policy arena.”
In its early manifestation, multi-level governance referred to “continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers” (Marks 1993, 392) and described how “supranational, national, regional and local governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks” (Marks 1993, 402–3). “Multilevel” referred to the increased vertical interactions and interdependence between governments operating at different territorial levels, while “governance” signaled the growing horizontal interactions and interdependence between governments and nongovernmental actors. Although not a theory of integration, the approach had strong neofunctionalist antecedents in its argument that supranational actors and interest groups were significant players in EU politics, although multi-level governance placed more emphasis on the importance of subnational actors. Both approaches shared the view that states had lost some control in this changing context. In the context of European integration, Hooghe and Marks (2001, 3–4) made three main claims in relation to multi-level governance:
- decision-making competences are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by state executives;
- collective decision making among states involves a significant loss of control for individual state executives (notably, through qualified majority voting in the Council);
- political arenas are interconnected rather than nested. Subnational actors operate in both national and supranational arenas, creating transnational associations in the process
These claims have been examined in a number of contexts, but most prominently in the field of EU structural policy: the ‘home turf’ of multi-level governance.
Applications and Criticisms
Hooghe’s (1996) edited volume on the implementation of structural policy across the EU found considerable variations in the evidence for multi-level governance across states, with the preexisting balance of territorial relations a key part of the explanation. These findings were confirmed in a Commission-funded study (Kelleher, Batterbury, and Stern 1999). Studies of Britain demonstrated variations both across issues within structural policy and across different regions within the country (Bache, George, and Rhodes 1996). On the additionality issue, the change in the government’s approach to implementation failed to lead to the anticipated extra spending in Britain’s regions. Policy control that the state “gatekeeper” lost through pressure from joint supranational-subnational action (above) was clawed back at a later stage of the policy process (Bache 1999). Here it was argued that defining the role of gatekeeper in the traditional sense, of controlling the flow of connections between nested arenas of international and domestic politics, missed an essential point: that it is the influence over outcomes from the policy process that matter most—not control over the interconnections between actors. More specifically, in modeling a two-stage process of policy making, Moravcsik’s (1993) liberal intergovernmentalism overlooked the important third stage of the process—policy implementation—where the decisions taken at the EU level are put into effect. This stage involves further political activity, the outcomes from which provide a more complete picture of state power.
A number of other criticisms of multi-level governance emerged, in particular that it focused more on relations between state actors at different levels than on relations across sectors (i.e., multilevel government not governance), that it was more descriptive than explanatory, and that it overstated the autonomy of subnational actors (for an overview of criticisms and a response, see Jordan 2001 and George 2004). In a subsequent development of the approach, Hooghe and Marks (2003) and Marks and Hooghe (2004) developed a two-fold typology of multi-level governance, which clarified aspects of the approach that had been criticized. In particular, they clarified that the empirical concerns of multi-level governance were with both intergovernmental relations (type I) and the less orderly governing arrangements (type II) that did not always nest within these relations.
Two Types of Multi-level governance
Type I multi-level governance has echoes of federalism. It describes system-wide governing arrangements in which the dispersion of authority is restricted to a limited number of clearly defined, nonoverlapping jurisdictions at a limited number of territorial levels, each of which has responsibility for a “bundle” of functions. By contrast, type II multi-level governance describes governing arrangements in which the jurisdiction of authority is task-specific, where jurisdictions operate at numerous territorial levels and may be overlapping. In type I, authority is relatively stable, but in type II it is more flexible, to deal with the changing demands of governance (see Table 1).
Table 1. Types of multi-level governanceType I / Type II
General-purpose jurisdictions / Task-specific jurisdictions
Nonintersecting memberships / Intersecting memberships
Jurisdictions at a limited number of levels / No limit to the number of jurisdictional levels
System-wide architecture / Flexible design
These types of multi-level governance are not mutually exclusive, but can and do coexist. Britain is a case in point, where general-purpose jurisdictions exist alongside special-purpose jurisdictions: formal institutions of government operate alongside, and indeed create, special-purpose bodies designed to carry out particular tasks. Their coexistence may lead to tensions, but such tensions (and their resolution) are a characteristic feature of multi-level governance.
In applying the concept to Britain, Bache and Flinders (2004a; 2004b) identified characteristics of a multi-level polity as a counter-point to the characteristics of the Westminster Model, the traditional organising perspective of British politics:
Table 2: The contrasting features of the Westminster model and the emerging multilevel polity
Westminster model /Multilevel polity
General Principles
Hierarchy / HeterarchyControl / Steering
Clear lines of accountability / Opaque lines of accountability
External Dimensions
Absolute sovereignty / Relative sovereigntyBritish foreign policy
/ Multiple foreign policiesInternal Dimensions
Unitary state / Quasi-federal stateParliamentary sovereignty / Interinstitutional bargaining
Strong executive / Segmented executive
Direct governing / Delegated governance
Unified civil service / Fragmented civil service
Source: adapted from Bache and Flinders 2004a, 2004b.
They argued that, in contrast to the claims of the Westminster Model, Britain should be understood as a multi-level polity:
‘In the context of devolution, there is greater evidence of a bargaining executive, rather than a strong executive; of interdependence between territorially distinct state organizations, rather than hierarchy; of multiple and confused accountability, rather than clear lines of accountability; of a quasi-federal state, rather than a unitary state. We also suggest that further investigations would be likely to cast doubt on other pillars of the Westminster Model in the context of devolution: in particular, those of a unified civil service and the notion of a single foreign policy’ (Bache and Flinders 2004, 105).
At the same time, they cautioned against reading from this interpretation that state power was inevitably eroded in this context and suggested this should continue to be examined empirically, with the changing context ‘likely to reveal variations in central government power across different parts of the United Kingdom and in relation to different issues and policies. Our discussion of devolution reveals that while the centre faces new challenges in this new context, it has begun to develop new means through which to achieve coordination, steering, and gatekeeping.’ (2004, 105-6).