Recent Cross-Strait Relations Development and Its Prospect

Recent Cross-Strait Relations Development and Its Prospect

Dr. Ming Lee

Professor

Department of Diplomacy

National Chengchi University

Taipei

November 28, 2007

I.  Introduction

This year earmarks the 20th anniversary of Taiwan’s political democratization. Some policies were adopted in the year 1987, which covered policies like the lifting of bans for Taiwan’s veteran mainlanders visiting their mainland relatives, bans of organizing opposition parties, establishment of extra newspapers, and so on and so forth. Ever since late 1987, Taiwan’s political democratization could keep pace with what Professor Samuel Huntington’s articulation of “The Third Wave,” which mentions the political democratization emerged in some East Asian countries like Philippines, South Korea. On one hand, Taiwan’s political change added to a brand new element to its own domestic politics, making the political participation on the island more vigorous if seen from the active undercurrent of anti-Nationalist Party (or Koumintang, KMT) rule for more than four decades. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was established in September 1986 was allowed to exist and this party became the nationwide ruling party in the political transition in 2000. The DPP and other political forces against the KMT also helped to press the timely reform of the Parliament, in which many mainlander legislators were asked to leave the stage. New sense of Taiwanese localization, with the ideas like “Taiwan First” and refusal to be “reunified” by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), became an obvious trend and got more support from the Taiwanese people. More people went even further from separation to search for “independence” based on “Taiwan identity.” This political change brought about some one decade of power struggle between the KMT and the DPP, with the latter became the main force in upholding the independence movement. On the other hand, Taiwan’s vigorous opposition movement and final victory of the DPP also cast significant impacts onto the East Asian political atmosphere, in particular the bilateral ties between China and Taiwan, and the China-U.S.-Taiwan triangular relations. The separation movement, or what China prefers to label as “secession from the Chinese motherland,” would not be tolerated and will be intervened if use of force is in need. The ruling DPP’s China policy under Chen Shui-bian has been regarded as inconsistent as well as insincere if judging from Chen’s inaugural speech that he was not going to overthrow the status quo. Lacking of mutual trust, hatred that caused by mutual provocation in diplomatic campaigns, fear of China’s surprise attack and further insulation of Taiwan in global political community, all make the two sides experience sour relations if there had been improved relations like Koo-Wang Talks in 1993 and 1998 in which both sides decided to put some disputes aside and search for win-win possibility. The current situation happen in both sides of the Straits has been more complicated so as to make consensus even dim or impossible. This paper tries to analyze the recent bilateral relations and its impacts to the Taiwan Straits and the adjacent areas.

II.  Change in International Arena

1.  The United States is plagued by the Iraqi Stalemate

2.  China’s economic rise proposes opportunity and threat

3.  China’s military expansion further alarms its neighboring states

4.  The United States has to cooperate with China in manifold issues

5.  The oil and energy shortages make the tranquility of Taiwan Strait more appealing

6.  With the thorny North Korea, Taiwan’s security is another flash point

III.  Change in Taiwan

1.  The downgrading economic performance

2.  High possibility of triggering military clash with China

3.  Even bigger social cleavages due to election-oriented struggles

4.  Further insulated position in international community

5.  United States joins with other countries in opposing Chen’s adventure policy

6.  Chen’s policy shift—from “Four No’s” to “Four Want’s”

IV.  Change in Mainland China

1.  Consistently high-speed economic development, makes China careful about inflation and social unrests due to the worsened rich-poor diversity

2.  China’s gradual exposure in Asia, Africa, Latin America for energy

3.  China’s intensive alliance with the Shanghai Organization members as a counterweight vis-à-vis United States

4.  China’s growing economy offers magnetic effect to world investment

5.  China’s vigorous economic woos more Taiwanese trade dependence

6.  China’s better relations with ASEAN countries further deprives Taipei of rooms of diplomatic support

V.  The Current Cross-Strait Relations

1.  Hot economy, but cold politics

2.  Hot people-to-people relations, but cold official ties

3.  China refuses to recognize Chen as negotiating counterpart

4.  DPP’s unfavorable position to admit the existence of 1992 “one-China consensus”

5.  Throat-cutting competition in international organizations and diplomatic campaign in which Taiwan severely suppressed

6.  Beijing threat that China will never tolerate Taiwan independence warns Taiwan never challenge the red-line of a de jure independence

7.  Taiwan thinks Beijing is using Washington to “co-manage” Taiwan Strait

VI.  Some Controversial Issues Ahead

1.  Taiwan’s frustration and endeavor entering the WHO, and the United Nations

2.  A possible DPP version of the Taiwan New Constitution

3.  Referendums for enter-or-reenter the United Nations concurrently with ballots of presidential election

4.  The possible passage of the referendums would likely encourage DPP to formally announce “Taiwan independence” if it wins in the 2008 election

5.  Chen urges China to withdrew its some 1,000 missiles targeting on Taiwan, abandon China’s Anti-Secession Law erected in 2005, and cease China’s diplomatic blockade

6.  China insists Taiwan to accept the “One-China” principle as basis for improvement of relations, but the DPP insists there should be no precondition for dialogues

VII.  Prospect—Conclusion

1.  The bilateral relation of Taiwan-Strait has witnessed the combination of international relations, East Asian international interaction, and domestic politics of both Taiwan and China

2.  We can perceive the conciliatory relations at other corners of Asia, such as reconciliation in Korean Penisula, but there will be no dramatic change to soothe China-Taiwan animosity

3.  Taiwan’s DPP government has been criticized and urged to be a responsible country in not challenging the red line to provoke status quo in the Strait, but there is no sign that the DPP will shift its China policy

4.  Any of the above-mentioned DPP adventure policies, such as adoption of a “New Constitution” and “a de jure Taiwan Independence,” will be highly possible if the DPP’s presidential candidate Frank Hsieh wins the election

5.  Taiwan’s legislative election on January 12, plus presidential election on March 22, will be critical time judging whether if the cross-strait relations better-off or worse-off. The DPP has been seen as a dangerous factor in the future cross-Strait relation. The KMT has been long labeled as pro-PRC and anti-Taiwan identity, but even Ma Yingjiou should win the presidency, the cross-Strait relations will hardly be improved overnight. Ma claims his policy as “Taiwan First,” and “No unification, no independence, no war with China”

6.  Hu Jintao and other Chinese leaders carefully watch the Taiwanese domestic political development, but use less provocative communication so to arouse Taiwan’s resentment. Hu Jintao seems to be more calm and conciliatory than his predecessors regarding the Taiwan issue, although he stays firm in warning Chen’s policy

7.  The United States still plays as a key role in mediating the possible cross-Strait conflict. On the one hand, Washington persuades China to be patient, and decline the feasibility of Chinese use of force. The United States also tries hard to push Taiwan back to the previous “Four No’s” policy on the other hand, or warns Taiwan not to present further provocations in the future

8.  China still emphasize its territorial integrity and keep on asking the assistance of Washington in suppressing Taiwan’s “secessionist” tendency. China seems to be well-determined in intervening if the United States should “fail” in help. Whether if there is conflict in Taiwan Strait and the adjacent area is in fact in Taiwan’s decision

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