Review of „Studying preference attainment using spatial models”

This is a very interesting paper that has the potential to make a considerable contribution to the study of interest group influence and the surrounding methodological debates. However, the main aim and scope of the paper is unclear and the writing is very confusing. The paper tries to do too many things at once and ends up not doing any of these properly. It requires major revisions before it can be published.

To begin with, the author sets out to show that “the difference between preference attainment and influence has so far been overlooked as well as the theoretical premises which underpin preference attainment” The author then sets out to make a second contribution, which is to reconceptualize political space as used in spatial analyses of interest group politics. The first of these is dealt with briefly on p3 but the outcome and merit of the short discussion remain obscure. The second theme seems to be the main contribution of this paper and I would encourage the author to strengthen this while cutting down on the side arguments. Even more confusingly, the author then announces a

third argument, according to which “preference attainment is a theoretical approach to accounts for whether and to what extent policy outputs move towards interest groups’ preferences.” That is all very well but this strand of the argument is subsequently abandoned. Finally, the discussion of multi- dimensional scaling appears out of context and its contribution to the overall paper is not clear. Does it aid with the conceptual task set out earlier? If so, this needs to be explained.

For the empirical analysis, more detail on the MDS procedure needs to be reported. The analysis

itself is interesting and probably carried out well (though this is not be, as insufficient documentation is provided). However, there is one major flaw with the way preferences are ascribed to one of two main corporate actors (Philip Morris): Contrary to what the author claims, the PM quote on p11 does very clearly *not* support the view that PM favoured soft law intervention over no intervention. The words in the PM document state the exact opposite quite clearly. As this affects the coding and therefore possibly the entire subsequent analysis quite substantially, it is in fact possible that the findings presented in this paper are wrong.

The claim made on p9 that the method presented here is superior to those used in previous studies is entirely unsubstantiated. To support it, the author would need to compare the findings from studies applying these different methods to the same data.

The author introduces a number of concepts whose meaning is not clearly stated. Examples include the distinction between “initial and final policy outputs”, “alternative specifications” and “ex post methodology”.

Smaller points:

The paper uses a lot of flowery prose (e.g. p.1: “increase theoretical consciousness”) and an excessive amount of the word “indeed”.

What does the author mean when s/he writes that other authors “implicitly” or “explicitly” “chop dimensions into factors” (p7-8)?

Is preference attainment as dominant an approach to studying lobbying success as the author suggests on p1? If so, s/he should be able to list a few exemplary references. I also wonder if preference attainment is the proper English term for what is being described: conventionally, people (and, presumably, organizations) attain of fail to attain their goals but not their preferences. In rationalist social science, people have preferences, so they no longer need to attain them. And while in constructivist approaches preferences are formed rather than attained.

“Resolving Controversy in the EU” (p7). It would be better to cite the original volume by Thomson et al here.

The language is often poor and the paper should be carefully proofread before re-submission.