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Possessing the Unfathomable. Approaching Jan van Ruusbroec's Mystical Anthropology as Responsive to the Primacy and Praxis of Minne.
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Patrick Ryan Cooper[1]
A.M.D.G.
"'Let him who has ears to hear, hear what the Spirit of God says to the churches,' (Rev 2, 11).... Whoever is more inwardly inclined to God's speaking in him, than outwardly inclined to the words of man, and rather listens to the word of God to live by than to know, and for whom the word of God is an inleading food in which God tastes better to him than all things, and who stays onefold with the inner word of faith and trust, that is the one who has ears to hear, for he is able to understand all the truth God is willing to reveal to him." (Ruusbroec, Vanden Vier Becoringhen ll. 1-2; 5-12.)
Introduction.
In the following analysis, I contend that the contemporary reception and possible critical retrieval of figures from the late-medieval contemplative tradition—and in particular, the works of Jan van Ruusbroec—within larger theological, philosophy of religion discourses as well as the academic study of spirituality are seen as hinging more upon the plausibility of a mystical anthropology of mutual indwelling and the various consequences stemming therefrommore so than the question of 'mystical experience' as a determining criteria of legitimacy and hermeneutical engagement. By way of these shifting approaches, the particularities and nuances of this uniquely relational imago Dei anthropology of which in Ruusbroec's case, is both thoroughly Christological and Trinitarian, while deeply rooted in his dynamic thinking of the primacy of love as minne, are themselves themes not only called upon for closer examination, yet furtherpresent themselves as key entry points in addressing contemporary demands for a distinct, reassessed theological anthropology, all the while functioning as a potential corrective to certain readings and the appropriation of such mystical texts.
In terms of the contemporary interest and reception of mystical texts, questions surrounding the 'possibility' of mystical experience and the academic reception of such authors, in the tradition of William James' influential Varieties of Religious Experience, of which had earlier on wellestablished the parameters of a renewed engagementof mystical authors within diverse academic fields such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, psychology of religion as well as branches of theology are appearing increasingly to be no longer at stake. This is evidenced in large part by the wide range of diverse engagements such contemplative authors have both provoked and served as resources within contemporary analyses. For example, recent philosophical and theological attempts to overcome ontotheological thinking structures in order to think transcendence in the works of Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion have often relied upon the tradition of apophatic or negative theology, and in so doing, their arguments have sought support from the mystical tradition (Dionysius Areopagita, Meister Eckhart, Angelus Silesius et al.).Conversely, the growing influence of approaches such as those of Amy Hollywood within Feminist and Gender Studieshave attempted within their own fields of discourseto rehabilitate the performative aspects of more "affective" and embodied forms of mysticism in figures such as Bl. Angela of Foligno, St. Teresa of Avila or Beatrice of Nazareth, gauged in terms of their contemporary reception as sufficiently resistant to more modern reductive psychological views of the 'hysteria' of female mysticism, as well as to categories that have previously sidelined such figures from serious reflection and consideration. Thus, "by taking seriously the words of those women", without however addressing the question of mystical experiences as such, Hollywood's approach advocates that such female mystical texts often challengethe "very antithesis between affective and speculative forms of mysticism, as well as the resistance to the gendering of that distinction, [of which] has its roots in texts written by and addressed to medieval women." (6)
In these contemporary, yet diverse examples, both manners of generous scholarly approach towards such medieval mystical texts are seldom concerned with defending and/or repudiating the possibility of "mystical experience" itself, especially when understood in terms of an "immediate" and "passive" experience. Rather, attention has noticeably shifted and centers now more upon the participatory and performative character of such mystical texts, both within their historical contextual reception as well as,in specific reference to Marion's reading et. al., of mystical theology's move beyond predicative speech of naming and affirming the truth and/or falsity of that which it speaks of, thereby beyond both kataphasis and apophasis, and in turn resolutely moves toward a third mode of speaking, characterized not in terms of a hyper-affirmative, yet as a mode of speaking that passes through such negation and cannot be separated from the praxis of such saying or "unsaying" itself. Hence, like the language of lovers, as Marion himself explicitly states, the pragmatic, nonconstative language of mystical theology is seen as speaking towards the other not so much to name or describe (and thereby to predicate), yet to call out towards and in a "prelocutionary" mode of address prompts and elicits enjoyment of the alterity of the other.[2]
However, while I am somewhatcautious in my overall assessment of thisapproach, Inonetheless see that it is a mistake to assume that such a 'pragmatic' or 'performative' approach to mystical texts thus relieves the text of its content, its claims and kataphatic affirmation, no matter the radicality of such an apophatic approach, as is the case for Marion. Instead, by such a performative approach to mystical texts, the weight of affirmation noticeably shifts away from that which is said and/or negated—as understood as an impartial or exclusive body of thought, a science, or a discourse that is sufficiently disembodied from concreteness and particularity—and is more dynamically relocated to the speaker himself, to the performer or the performed of the performance and the very praxis that such texts initiate and have as their demand. Hence, while we are by no means being presented with an anthropological turn as it were, construing the subject as having eclipsed the text, its claims and particularity, such a pragmatic approach can neither disentangle the content of that which it speaks from the very (un)saying or performing that the text itself demands.
In this current scholarly climate, Mark McIntosh's Mystical Theology[3] helps clarify how contemporary readers have become once again alerted to issues of praxis within mystical texts. Speaking from a distinct theological perspective that aims at re-examining and reasserting the mutual interdependencies between theology and spirituality as academic pursuits, McIntosh notes the limited, yet positive contributions that both feminist and liberation theological perspectiveshave made in helping overcome such divides that have bifurcated theory and practice within theology itself. Thus, McIntosh notes the privileging of praxis within various feminist and liberation theological perspectives and its positions of solidarity and "preferential option for the poor" and marginalized as broadly encompassing a "participatory model of truth rather than a purely propositional adequacy model."[4]McIntosh states: "Feminist and liberationist religious perspectives have recovered a fundamental assumption of earlier eras; namely, that living, practical involvement in reality is not a recipe for subjective beclouding of our understanding but is rather the prerequisite for true insight in conceptualization."[5] McIntosh then adds:"[T]ransforming practices of life give rise to a theoretical account of reality as it is understood by those practitioners. This account, in turn, is intended not as a higher ascent towards reality by means of theorization, but as a preliminary guide for those seeking to follow the transforming way of life themselves."[6]
Following such a re-examination, Louis Dupré has also highlighted mystical theology's praxis approach as a central characteristic of Christian love mysticism. When briefly describing Ruusbroec's distinct views of dynamic participation in the Son, within the Persons of the Trinity, as "form[ing] the basis of the mystic's view of the finite within the infinite",[7] Dupré then anticipates certain critical responses to such thinking that would inquire, "Is all this more than speculative theology? If through its ontological dependence upon an eternal source, the soul does indeed reside in God throughout all eternity, then a union realized from the beginning, in even the least devout person, appears to require no mystical ascent at all—only intellectual speculation."[8] In response to this critique that such texts are nothing more than purely speculative and demanding not of discernment, yet only of consent, Dupré then asserts:
The [mystical] union...takes place not in the order of pure speculation but in that of praxis. It is in the practical order, then, that the answer to this objection lies. A persistent use of the language of love should alert us that far more than intellectual speculation is at stake. Even those speculative mystics who speak of a substantial union grounded in man's ontological nature (such as Ibn' Arabi or Eckhart and some of the kabbalists) have recourse to the language of love and praxis.[9]
Thereby recognizing such a praxis character to these texts, Dupré rightly observes the "integrative" aspect of Ruusbroec and other exemplary figures within mystical theology, which aims at uniting contemplation with action without either collapsing nor confusing the distinctiveness of them both. And yet what precisely keeps these aspects from collapsing into each other is itself an open question and one that I shall return to later on. In turn, Dupréis right to stress that the distinct understanding that mystical theology holds towards love, of which, in Ruusbroec's understanding of minne, is continuously active and dynamic significantly problematizes an otherwise overly hasty reading of his works as indelibly constrained by a Neoplatonic privileging of stability, presence and permanence over against multiplicity, change and becoming. Or conversely, the charge of Neo-Platonism's inability to think happiness outside of presence, stability and the rest of contemplation. To these critiques, understanding the continuing, erotic praxis of minne sets itself apart from such an immediate, direct, Neo-platonic reading. Therefore, the praxis of such a loving union goes strongly against a more "reified" and static anthropology as seen more directly within a neoplatonic lineage, though is this "reified" anthropology what Ruusbroec has in mind in his understanding of mutual indwelling? This issue of forming an alternative mystical anthropological understanding of the created human person indwelling in God, other than such a static "reified representation", will appear again in the following analysis. But for now, as our brief examination has pointed out, current hermeneutical approaches to mystical textsmark a shifting attention towardsmore praxis oriented and performative modes of language pragmatics, all of whichattests to the overall fact that the question of "mystical experience", while in of itself remains an important inquiry, nonetheless is no longer primarily at stake and in its place, such approaches to mystical texts thereby explicitly raises the question of the mystical anthropology operative within such texts.
Repositioning mystical anthropological inquiry away from a 'what' or 'who', to that of a 'where'.
To address now more clearly the specific issues at hand,Bernard McGinn provocatively characterizes the distinct progression of late-medieval mystical anthropology seen in terms of union with God: "The union between God and the human person...challenges traditional views of anthropology as well as of theology."[10] And in referring to the lineage of mystics that uphold the possibility of union without distinction, McGinn characterizes the challenge that arises:
Such strong expressions of mystical union (or rather mystical identity, or, better, indistinction) between God and the human seem to lead to the following dilemma—either they are guilty of a form of autotheism by which the human subject divinizes itself in an unwarranted way, or else they imply the complete obliteration, absorption, or annihilation of the human personality. In either case, is there room for anything that can still be called an anthropology, a doctrine of the human as human or a psychology that studies human consciousness?[11]
The question that McGinn asks then—fully defending the works of figures such as Ruusbroec and Meister Eckhart against charges of autotheism, both of whom speak of union with God without distinction and especially in the case of Ruusbroec, who quite clearly defended union with God sonder differentie ochte onderscheet[12]—is precisely "who" then is this human person? For McGinn, who speaks of mysticism specifically in terms of "consciousness", while maintaining that this is what the "mystics are really about... to transform both consciousness and the self, the subject of consciousnes, the who of the human as person, as identity, appears as the decisive criteria to evaluate such a transformed consciousness. Following from this position, McGinn situates certain mystics, especially those who hold out the possibility for a union without distinction, as admitting of the "perdurance" of consciousness, one that "challenges...all forms of both ancient and modern anthropology and psychology that reject in an a priori fashion the possibility of the transition of the limited, discursive ego to levels of transcendent awareness.... the mystics hold out the possibility of the transconscious and the suprapersonal." (192) McGinn's emphasis is clearly upon the more radical position and discontinuity of the mystical tradition from its historically situated character, characterizing such figures in a more prophetic light of praxis and of heeding the call not to abandon the world, in all of its "quotidian multiplicity", but rather to "transform it", as attested by their committed activity within their respective communities and "their subsequent influence on their traditions"(193).
However, turning now specifically to Ruusbroec, while the question of who/what of the "creature" remains in the union sonder onderscheet ochte differencie Ruusbroec continuously maintains throughout all of his works that the creature shall eternally remain, "een ander van gode". Nonetheless, the guiding presuppositions of this question of who/what remains in the union without distinction appears to reveal less about Ruusbroec's own mystical anthropological understanding than it shows a more modern perspective in two distinct instances. First, the question of 'who' or 'what' of the human as human remains in such "obliteration, absorption or annihilation" in the union without distinction appears at least to presuppose a stable identity of the finite, human person understood as autonomous, from which the discontinuity of the "transformation" (overforminghe), is thus gauged as either diminishing or increasing not its transformed "consciousness", yet the very autonomy of the human as such, from which such an anthropology assumes as its ground. Secondly, seen from a distinct, Ruusbroecian perspective, the difficulty with such an anthropological perspective is namely, the presumption that the human as human, in its autonomy and removed from relation, is regarded as intelligible in of itself. Such a perspective, a foundational assumption within modern psychology, is the contention that the identity of the human "psychology that studies human consciousness", at its foundational core, can render me myself intelligible, enough so as to ground it as a scientific pursuit, is a position that not only contradicts Ruusbroec's anthropological conception, but furthermore is itself a limited position that nullifies the very richness and depth of our very interiority as indelibly marked by the alterity of the other.
In this regard, a possible opening for retrieving Ruusbroec are the critical demands placed upon a renewed, adequate theological anthropology, seen within specific reference to the primary modality of love—to competing modalities of truth and ontology—in both affirming the alterity of the Other, oneself and in turn, a view of the human person capable of receiving such a love as beloved and its return, as lover. This opening is in part motivated by various attempts at moving love beyond the divided impasse between self-possessive and self-denying love and with it, the "problem of love"[13] and metaphysics' difficulty in thinking the possibility of "disinterested love" that falls beyond egoism and self-benefit. Jean-Luc Marion critiques the basis of this metaphysical dilemma and its presumption of an "erotic neutrality", of which we can never in fact affirm, "without lying to ourselves....[For] Man is revealed to himself by the originary and radical modality of the erotic. Man loves—which is what distinguishes him from all other finite beings, if not the angels. Man is defined neither by the logos, nor by the being within him, but by the fact that he loves (or hates), whether he wants to or not."[14]
Thus, affirming love's "radical modality" as primary occasions a critical review of this very "self" that is suspected of having thus contributed to the divided view of love. More specifically, retrieving the dynamic view of Ruusbroec's understanding of the primacy of minnesubsequently demands for an adequate theological anthropology—a place, a relational inquiry of the self, not primarily as a reified substance or a 'what', nor a principle of identity and its self-enclosure as a 'who', but rather, a 'where', in terms of both its created origins and its progressive, desirous, salvific fulfillment for the place of meeting and union of the Other and the human, who shall "eternally remain a creature and other from God"[15]. Such a relational view of the self and its interiority inquires specifically over a locus capax Dei[16] and its horizon of deification that can both receive such love as indeed primary and immediate in its unitive character—as well as reflective of the necessary mediated character of such a love, glimpsed both in terms of its cultural and theological milieu, as well as its necessary activity as sacramental, virtuous and always "going out" and affirming the otherness of God as Other in and through its works.
Ruusbroec can critically aid in such a renewed anthropology, as he situates the otherness and uncreatedness of minne as emerging within the very distinction and particularity of individuals.[17] Affirming the ecstatic otherness of minne, "drunk and replete in God"[18] Ruusbroec does so, not by sequestering and distancing that which is beyond and "above" myself and my understanding, but places such affirmation of its otherness firmly within the "groundless abyss" of our erotic, created selves, "hungry and thirsty", wherein "he must feel that the foundation of his being is unfathomable, and as such he must possess it."[19] From this groundless foundation, Ruusbroec articulates such "possession" as a continuing relational dynamics within contemplative life, such that "we live completely in God, where we possess our bliss, and completely in ourselves where we practice our love towards God." ( E 485-487) Ruusbroec's mystical anthropology as inherently relational insists upon our dwelling in both myself and my continual desires, as well as in the Other and its bliss again attests to the general, dynamic approach of Ruusbroec's thought, a dynamism that is never "idle" and seen very much at the core of his thinking of minne.