Futenma Updates UM CCLP '10

Futenma Updates UM CCLP '10

1/3 Colella

Futenma Updates

***AFF*** 1

**Futenma** 1

Futenma Unpopular/Relocation Bad – Laundry List 1

Relocation Inevitable 1

Relocation Bad - Relations 3

**Guam** 4

Guam Good - Deterrence 5

Guam Bad - Relations 6

**Internal Link** 7

Economy I/L 8

Citizen Violence I/L 9

North Korea Conflict I/L 10

Japan-US Relations: Stability I/L 11

Relations I/L 12

**Impacts** 13

China Prolif 14

Korean War 16

Indo-Pak War 17

North Korea X Attack 19

Prolif Impacts 20

**AT** 21

AT: Deterrence 22

AT: Japan Economy Good 23

AT: Relocation CP 24

AT: American Reliance Good 25

AT: Okinawa Key 26

AT: Infrastructure Good 27

AT: Substantially 28

AT: Relocation Cancelled 29

***NEG*** 31

**Inherency** 32

No Relocation 33

**Advantage Frontlines** 34

Ecology F/L 35

**Kan Bad** 36

Kan Can’t Relocate – No Pol Cap 37

Kan Fails on Relocation 38

Kan Supports Current Plan 40

**Alliance Good** 41

Alliance KT Deterrence of NK, China 42

Alliance KT Regional Stability 44

**Disadvantages** 45

F-22’s 46

Taiwan DA 48

Stability DA 49

**Counterplans** 50

Relations CP Solvency 51

AFF

Futenma

Squo Fails – Can’t Re-Base

No chance to re-base correctly in the squo – elections mean the DPJ is too weak – cites a senate panel

NewsyStocks.com 7/22 (7/22/10, " DPJ election defeat, Okinawa poll may stall Futenma plan: Senate panel ", http://newsystocks.com/news/3606226)

A Senate panel has speculated that the relocation of a U.S. Marine base in Okinawa could be delayed beyond its planned 2014 deadline due partly to the crushing defeat of the governing Democratic Party of Japan in the national election earlier this month. According to the report drawn up by the Senate Appropriations Committee, which became available Wednesday to Kyodo News, a gubernatorial election in the prefecture scheduled for November could also stall the base relocation. The report said the DPJ's setback in the July 11 House of Councillors election ''could weaken its ability to govern, and the Okinawa gubernatorial election scheduled for November could further cloud the future of the realignment process.'' The transfer of some 8,000 U.S. Marine troops from Okinawa to Guam is part of a package deal between Japan and the United States which also includes the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station. The report noted that the Okinawa governor must sign a landfill agreement to proceed with the construction of a replacement facility on reclaimed land on the coast of the U.S. Marines' Camp Schwab in the Henoko district in Nago. The Pentagon views the signing of the landfill agreement, which it considers tangible progress toward the completion of the Futenma replacement facility, '' as the linchpin for entire plan,'' the report said. However, the Senate panel report said that while the landfill permit was originally expected to be issued in August, the permit ''will likely be delayed until after the gubernatorial election in November, and could be delayed into 2011.'' On the 2014 deadline, the report said, ''Given the delay in initiating the realignment, that deadline will be difficult, if not impossible, to meet.'' The report also touched on the severe political situation that Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan faces over the base issue. ''The newly appointed prime minister has faced political protest from the residents and elected officials in Okinawa for acknowledging that the current agreement must go forward,'' it said.

Futenma Unpopular/Relocation Bad – Laundry List

Futenma Unpopular/Relocation to Nago permanently damages relations, hurts regime credibility, and kills coral reefs and dugongs

Johnson, 5/10 - an American author and professor emeritus of the University of California, San Diego. He served in the Korean war, was a consultant for the CIA from 1967–1973, and led the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California, Berkeley for years. He is also president and co-founder of the Japan Policy Research Institute (Chalmers, May 10th 2010, Los Angeles Times, “Another battle of Okinawa,” http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/051010/opi_637078807.shtml)

The United States is on the verge of permanently damaging its alliance with Japan in a dispute over a military base in Okinawa. This island prefecture hosts three-quarters of all U.S. military facilities in Japan. Washington wants to build one more base there, in an ecologically sensitive area. The Okinawans vehemently oppose it, and tens of thousands gathered last month to protest the base. Tokyo is caught in the middle, and it looks as if Japan's prime minister has just caved in to the U.S. demands. In the globe-girdling array of overseas military bases that the United States has acquired since World War II - more than 700 in 130 countries - few have a sadder history than those we planted in Okinawa. In 1945, Japan was of course a defeated enemy and therefore given no say in where and how these bases would be distributed. On the main islands of Japan, we simply took over their military bases. But Okinawa was an independent kingdom until Japan annexed it in 1879, and the Japanese continue to regard it somewhat as the U.S. does Puerto Rico. The island was devastated in the last major battle in the Pacific, and the U.S. simply bulldozed the land it wanted, expropriated villagers or forcibly relocated them to Bolivia. From 1950 to 1953, the American bases in Okinawa were used to fight the Korean War, and from the 1960s until 1973, they were used during the Vietnam War. Not only did they serve as supply depots and airfields, but the bases were where soldiers went for rest and recreation, creating a subculture of bars, prostitutes and racism. Around several bases fights between black and white American soldiers were so frequent and deadly that separate areas were developed to cater to the two groups. The U.S. occupation of Japan ended with the peace treaty of 1952, but Okinawa remained a U.S. military colony until 1972. For 20 years, Okinawans were essentially stateless people, not entitled to either Japanese or U.S. passports or civil rights. Even after Japan regained sovereignty over Okinawa, the American military retained control over what occurs on its numerous bases and over Okinawan airspace. Since 1972, the Japanese government and the American military have colluded in denying Okinawans much say over their future, but this has been slowly changing. In 1995, for example, there were huge demonstrations against the bases after two Marines and a sailor were charged with abducting and raping a 12-year-old girl. In 1996, the U.S. agreed that it would be willing to give back Futenma, which is entirely surrounded by the town of Ginowan, but only if the Japanese would build another base to replace it elsewhere on the island. So was born the Nago option in 1996 (not formalized until 2006, in a U.S.-Japan agreement). Nago is a small fishing village in the northeastern part of Okinawa's main island and the site of a coral reef that is home to the dugong, an endangered marine mammal similar to Florida's manatee. In order to build a large U.S. Marine base there, a runway would have to be constructed on either pilings or landfill, killing the coral reef. Environmentalists have been protesting ever since, and in early 2010, Nago elected a mayor who ran on a platform of resisting any American base in his town.

Relocation Inevitable

Relocation to Henoko in Nago inevitable – that spills over to all other forces in Okinawa, uniquely worse for deterrence, etc. than simple removal

Shimoji, ’10 - born in Miyako Island, Okinawa, M.S. (Georgetown University), taught English and English linguistics at the University of the Ryukyus from April 1966 until his retirement in March 2003 (Yoshio Shimoji, "The Futenma Base and the U.S.-Japan Controversy: an Okinawan perspective," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 18-5-10, May 3, 2010)

Washington has remained adamant in insisting that Futenma's operations be moved to Henoko. On meeting Foreign Affairs Minister Okada Katsuya in Tokyo last October, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates urged Tokyo to implement the agenda specified in the 2006 Road Map as soon as possible. In return, Washington would relocate to Guam 8,000 (later modified to 8,600) Marine personnel, consisting mostly of command elements: 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force Command Element, 3rd Marine Logistics Group Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters. The remaining Marines in Okinawa would then be task force elements such as ground, aviation, logistics and other service support members. Japan agreed under pressure to fund $6.09 billion of the estimated $10.27 billion for the facilities and infrastructure development costs — another example of extortion. Upon completion of the relocation of Futenma's function to Henoko and the transfer of the Marine command units to Guam, the U.S. would return six land areas south of Kadena Air Base, including the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. In trying to sell this package, Washington claims that this reduces Okinawa's burdens tremendously.

Relocation Bad - Relations

Relocation bad – seen as mistrust for Japan, hurts relations

How should we interpret this situation: Futenma's relocation to Henoko so urgently demanded by the U.S. government, on the one hand, and the U.S. military's Guam military development plan in which most of Futenma's operations are to be moved to Guam, on the other? What is the current obfuscation all about? One answer may be that the U.S. government is manipulating the situation in order to retain every right to a permanent military presence in Japan. This suggests that U.S. policymakers mistrust Japan and the Japanese people despite repeated statements that Japan is the U.S.'s most important ally. In other words, their "deterrence" is not only directed against North Korea, China or Russia, but also against Japan. When the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, many expected a substantial reduction of the U.S. footprint on Okinawa. The drawdown of U.S. troops in Europe augured well for Okinawa, or so it seemed to me. Then came the 1995 Nye Report and the new US policy based upon it, shattering Okinawan hopes and expectations. On the pretext that the U.S. military presence was a driving force for keeping peace and prosperity in this allegedly volatile region, it announced that the U.S. would continue to maintain bases and troops in East Asia at approximately the same level as before. William Cohen, Secretary of Defense under the Clinton administration, thwarted our hopes around 2000, when the two Koreas seemed to be reducing tensions on the peninsula and even, perhaps inching to reunification, by saying that there would be no U.S. military withdrawal from Okinawa even if peace was established in a unified Korean Peninsula. That the U.S. intends to perpetuate its military presence in Japan is evident from its insistence that not only Futenma's operations be transferred to a new high tech base at Henoko, but also that other facilities such as Naha military port, whose return was promised years before Futenma, must be relocated within Okinawa. The 2006 Road Map betrays Washington's real intention by accidentally stating, "A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent field-carrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter." (Italics mine)

Relations – Futenma Key

Futenma is the lynchpin to current poor US Japanese relations – The election ensured no improvement in the short term

istockAnalyst.com (press release) 7/12 (7/12/10, " FOCUS: DPJ loss could complicate Japan-US cooperation on Futenma ", http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/4301265)

The setback of Japan's ruling party in Sunday's upper house election may complicate attempts by Japan and the United States to ''reset'' their political relationship strained over the relocation of a key Marine base in Okinawa, according to U.S. experts on the politics of the two countries. ''The Japanese are going to be embroiled in their own domestic politics for quite a while to come, and there's not going to be a lot of bandwidth'' for dealing with the United States, said Dan Sneider, a Japan expert at Stanford University's Freeman Spigoli Institute. The replacement of Yukio Hatoyama by Naoto Kan as Japan's prime minister seemed to provide the opportunity for the Democratic Party of Japan-led government to reset relations with the United States, which had gotten off to a rough start following the DPJ's landslide victory over the long-reigning Liberal Democratic Party in a general election last August. Whereas conventional wisdom in Washington said that the U.S. administration of President Barack Obama disliked Hatoyama and viewed him as a political lightweight, Obama's political and personal relationships with Kan seemed to have gotten off on the right foot on issues ranging from the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa to their mutual fondness for green tea ice cream. The DPJ's lackluster performance in the Sunday election, however, raises serious questions about whether Kan will be able to resolve troublesome issues in the bilateral relationship such as the implementation of a bilateral accord in late May on the base relocation. Japan has already witnessed five prime ministers in the last four years, an unusual frequency of change in leadership for a developed country. ''I think we're going to see a lot of political turbulence out of this election. I would not be surprised to see a new prime minister,'' said Sneider. ''It's a hard one to call.'' The months-long standoff between Tokyo and Washington over the Futenma issue seemed to have been resolved to some extent following a series of grueling and often quixotic negotiations that sapped the DPJ's popularity and ended in Hatoyama's resignation after only eight months in office. Unfortunately, Kan's ability to address such a touchy issue has likely been weakened by the DPJ's loss, Sneider said. ''Kan and the DPJ's ability to overcome opposition in Okinawa is going to be impacted by their weakening on the national level,'' he said, adding that ''the weaker the government is in Tokyo, the less able it is to strong-arm Okinawans'' into accepting the deal.