OFFICIAL DUTY VERSUS PRIVATE PRACTICE:

TEACHERS AND MARKETS FOR TUTORING IN POOR COUNTRIES

In developing countries, a lack of basic infrastructure and teacher absenteeism are prevalent features of government schools. Parents have responded to these problems by shifting their children to private schools and/or hiring the service of private tutors (a phenomenon that is widespread in South and East Asia).

According to research by Bibhas Saha and colleagues, parents’ willingness to rely on private tutoring has two critical side effects: first, local governments in these countries do not feel enough pressure to improve their acts, and second, many school teachers tutor their own students in a private capacity, and as a consequence, reduce the quality of class room teaching.

Banning private tutoring by public school teachers will have only limited effects, unless matching investments are made in school infrastructure. Both will require mature political institutions and public funds, which developing countries sadly lack.

Providing free public schooling in developing countries is riddled with challenges, including low teacher salaries, high teacher absenteeism, old textbooks and dilapidated school infrastructure. In India, the rate of absenteeism has been reported to be as high as 25%. In response, parents who can afford it seek private tuition. Evidence from India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Ecuador, and Peru confirms this pattern. Nearly 45% of Indian school children attend tutorial classes; the corresponding figure is 50% in Bangladesh, 30% in Cambodia, 65% in Kenya and 78% in Sri Lanka.

A school teacher, who is providing a public good inside the class room, can convert a part of it into a private good, by simply under-performing. Standard monitoring mechanisms will be less effective, because parents themselves are willing clients, and also because at the root of it lies government’s own failure to provide appropriate infrastructure. However, despite the obvious negative effects on low income groups, there is no denying that the system can benefit many through more personalized learning and participation of more enterprising tutors.

This paper studies such contradictions between efficiency and distributional effects in a world where teachers take on double roles. At the heart of the problem we identify two key factors: inadequate school infrastructure and government’s inability to fully control teacher’s shirking.

We find that in urban areas where there are many independent tutors, the teacher’s incentive to shirk is limited, and therefore, the benefits of low-cost personalised learning will outweigh the cost. The net effect is beneficial. In contrast, rural areas may witness an overall negative effect. Because here the schoolteacher can monopolise the tutorial market, his shirking will be excessive and the overall education level will be lower. In both areas poor households will loose out, and their children may drop out of school.

From the policy point of view, there are no obvious solutions; banning public teachers from private tutoring may indeed help, when such a ban is enforceable. But it will have limited effects, and in some cases (such as in urban areas) can even be counterproductive, unless matching investments are made to improve school infrastructure. Both are necessary for effective provision of public education. But this requires a mature political process and sufficient funds.

ENDS

Note for editors: ‘Official duty vs. private practice: teachers and markets for tutoring in poor countries’ was presented at the Royal Economic Society’s 2007 annual conference at the University of Warwick, 11-13 April.

Vegard Iversen is at the International Food Policy Research Institute, India. Bibhas Saha is at the University of East Anglia. Subhra Baran Saha is at Ohio State University.

For further information: contact Romesh Vaitilingam on 07768-661095 (email: ).