URES Report: American Allied Withdrawal Decision
This semester I assisted Professor Davidson on his research project, titled “Heading for the Exits: America’s Allies and Withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan,” which seeks to determine which factors contributed to allies’ decisions to withdraw or to stay in Iraq and Afghanistan. Using Australia, Italy, and the Netherlands as case studies (all three allies made substantial military contributions), the project identified the following causal factors as possible reasons behind allies’ decision making: alliance value, prestige, threat to national interest, probability of success, and electoral politics.
For my assignment I used the online search engine “Cablesearch” to sift through thousands of diplomatic cables that supported these factors in Professor Davidson’s hypothesis. Using timelines provided for the project along with additional research, including readings from Professor Davidson’s book, America’s Allies and War: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (published in 2011), news sources, and interviews, I read hundreds of diplomatic cables pertaining to key events in both occupations regarding the U.S.’ alliance with Italy, the Netherlands, and Australia. While the project focused on allies’ reasons for withdrawal, I began my search with cables dating as far back as 2001, as allies’ decisions for deploying troops could shed light on why they chose to withdraw when they did (Italy and the Netherlands announced withdrawal from Iraq in early 2005, whereas Australia did not announce withdrawal until 2007; the Netherlands was the only ally to announce withdrawal from Afghanistan in the given timeframe, in December 2007). While I was limited by the availability of cables on the search engine, I extracted cables over a nine-year time period and ultimately provided over 1,700 pages of research for my half of the assignment (Australia-Iraq, Australia-Afghanistan, and Italy-Iraq).
I enjoyed the project because I gained valuable insights on the U.S.’ alliances and felt like I had a unique vantage point in seeing “the other side.” I learned about pivotal events in both countries that affected domestic public opinion on their engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan (e.g. the hostage crises with Australian citizen Douglas Wood or Italian Frabrizio Quatrrochi), their alliances with the U.S. amid growing anti-Americanism, and other domestic political factors regarding the Howard and Rudd governments in Australia and the Berlusconi and Prodi governments in Italy. I found compelling material regarding each country’s response to American requests for more troops (e.g. Obama’s December 2009 announcement regarding the War in Afghanistan). While my role focused specifically on extracting material (not determining final conclusions), I conceived that Australia’s decisions were in greater support of factors involving alliance value and threat to national interest while the Italian government appeared to be more concerned about electoral politics and prestige (although I also found interesting material on threat to national interest, particularly after other major terrorist attacks such as the 2004 Madrid train bombings).
Ultimately, I gained a more all-encompassing understanding of the U.S.’ engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, which sparked my initial interests in international relations in middle and high school. I also acquired extensive background on the complex nature of the U.S.’ relationship with its alliances, particularly during wartime, and learned from the prescriptions that Professor Davidson developed (e.g. “if ally did not perceive the target of intervention as a threat to national interest, ally is likely to announce withdrawal prior to the U.S”). Using empirical data in addition to original interviews and diplomatic cables, Professor Davidson’s conclusions on why American allies chose to stay or withdraw will be applicable to future U.S. engagements. I look forward to seeing the final project come to fruition.