Topic: Saudi Navy

Analysts: Nate

Intern: Rami

Date: November 16-17, 2009

Summary:

  • The Saudi Navy has slowly improved its readiness and effectiveness, but still has major problems.
  • Only its fleet on the Gulf coast is regarded as making significant progress as a war fighting force. Its force on the Red Sea is seen more as a symbol than a war fighting force.
  • Joint warfare capabilities are limited, and the Navy is not integrated into either a GGC or Saudi-US-UK concept of operations.
  • It must also restructure is plans and capabilities to focus on Iran, now that Iraq has ceased to be a threat, and on defense of the Red Sea.
  • The Saudi navy, coastguard, and National Guard are able to provide adequate security screening for key ports, desalination facilities, and petroleum export facilities with roughly two weeks of warning. Coverage is generally very limited in peacetime.

Roles, Missions, and Capability

  • The Saudi Navy has a great deal of modern, expensive equipment, but lacks a clearly defined set of roles and missions and essential capabilities for joint warfare.This is to some extent the result of the fact it has been overshadowed by the role the US and British navies have played in the Gulf since the “tanker war” against Iran in 1987-1988.
  • Gulf navies have never had to develop the level of effectiveness and coordination that would be vital if they could not depend on the navies of other powers.
  • The Red Sea has also been a “quiet zone,” except for limited clashes between Yemen and Eritrea over several islands.
  • There are several obvious areas where changes could take place that would enhance the value of the Saudi Navy and justify its present strength and cost:
  1. Protection of critical facilities: The Saudi Navy may never need to directly engage the Iranian Navy, but sabotage or sudden strikes on offshore oil facilities, ports, and critical shoreline facilities like desalination plants are both possible and a form of asymmetric warfare that could do serious damage to the Kingdom.
  1. Mine warfare: Both the “tanker war” and Gulf War showed the danger mines pose, even if laid in covert operations or as free floating mines. This is an important mission in conventional war and asymmetric conflicts.
  1. Ship protection and escort: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard is well equipped to launch strikes against tankers and commercial shipping, and terrorists in Yemen have already shown that terrorists can attack in ports and other facilities.
  1. Joint land/air operations: Saudi Arabia has never fully exploited the maritime reconnaissance capabilities of its E-3A, and there is little jointness in Saudi Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense Force operations. The Saudi Navy would be far more effective as part of a joint team, able to use direct intervention with seapower when needed, relying on air strikes when more desirable, and carrying out maritime surveillance against both combat ships and potential covert and unconventional infiltration and operations.
  1. A maritime role in air and missile defense: Saudi E-3As have limits to their low altitude coverage and endurance. The ability to provide a forward screen of pickets and radar coverage, could help provide warning of air and cruise missile attacks, particularly if netted into the Saudi Air Force and Saudi Air Defense Force warning and control system.
  1. Anti-amphibious raid and operations capability: Iran has limited amphibious lift, but extensive ferry and Revolutionary Guard raid capabilities. These can attack offshore facilities, raid shoreline areas, and potentially transfer forces to a port in the event of a coup or upheaval in a Southern Gulf Country.

It should be noted that in all these missions, the Saudi Navy would benefit from a force multiplier effect if there was far closer and more realistic cooperation among all of the Southern Gulf navies, and if the Saudi Navy participated in more demanding and realistic exercises with the US and British navies. It is equally clear that “jointness” with the Saudi Air Force and possibly the Saudi Air Defense Force is equally critical.

Naval modernization program

  • Navy is making real progress, but remains small and has only limited funding priority.
  • Saudi Arabia plans only a limited naval modernization program once it takes delivery on the three French Lafayette-class frigates in 2001-2005 that it ordered during the 1990s.
  • Some officers still want to buy submarines, although it is far from clear that the navy can afford to buy and sustain them. Others would like to shift the navy’s modernization priorities to areas like mine warfare and to concentrate on filling in the gaps in US Navy mission capabilities in the Gulf.
  • Past Saudi naval imports often reflected more interest in prestige and in the “glitter factor” of having the best-armed large ships than in Saudi Arabia’s mission priorities or real- world military effectiveness.

Reliance on Western Forces and Reinforcements:

  • Saudi Arabia relies heavily on the US, and to some extent Britain and France, to supplement its own military capabilities.
  • The US Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy conduct continuing exercises and training with Saudi forces, as well as provide advisors serving with Saudi units.
  • It has never fully integrated the operational command of its own military forces and developed the kind of joint command and C4I/SR structure to allow its army, National Guard, air force, air defense force, and navy to conduct modern, high tempo operations against a large opponent like Iran or Iraq.
  • It places de facto reliance on US C4I/SR capabilities to integrate and coordinate Saudi joint operations in such contingencies.

Sources:

CSIS, Saudi Military Forces Enter the 21st Century: VI. Saudi Force Plans, Military Personnel,

Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, April 4, 2002

CSIS, THE SAUDI SECURITY APPARATUS: MILITARY AND SECURITY SERVICES - CHALLENGES AND DEVELOPMENTS, August 2004

CSIS, Saudi National Security: Military and Security Services-Challenges & Developments Full Report, Working Draft: Revised September 30, 2004

Open Source: (News Reports)

  • The kingdom has imposed a naval blockade on northern Yemen's Red Sea coast to try to prevent weapons and fighters flowing to Shiite rebels in the area.
  • Saudi warships were ordered to search suspicious ships suspected of carrying weapons or fighters sailing near northern Yemen.
  • Saudi Arabian naval blockade on the Yemeni coast is aiming to halt Eritrean weapon smuggling from reaching rebels.
  • Naval forces were stationed November 12 near the northern Yemeni coast in support of the Yemeni government’s attempts to put down the insurrection.
  • November 17, 2009 the Saudi navy extended its blockade to prevent a second smuggling route across the Red Sea from Yemen’s western neighbor Eritrea.

Sources:

Adviser: Saudi navy blockades north Yemen coast

Saudi Arabia enforces blockade near Yemen

Saudis 'to keep up Houthi campaign'

Saudi Trying To Stop Eritrean Weapon Smuggling to Yemen

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