Lesson Plan for Russian Revolution

Lesson Plan for Russian Revolution

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Lesson Plan for Russian Revolution

Aims:

1. To understand and describe the process of running a successful coup d’etat

2. Describe the historical basis for the Russian Revolution.

Warm-Up:

In 1917, a train travels from Switzerland, guarded heavily—armoured, shuttered, guraded by soldiers with orders to shoot to kill anyone who approached the train too closely. The train will make its way through Germany. Its eventual destination is Tsarist Russia. It carries a weapon that Germany hopes will knock the Russians out of World War One.

What is it? Write a paragraph on what you think it could be.

Background:

Russia during WWI. Issues of War increasing stress on Russian society, economy, and political structure.

Give out handout

History

World War One- Took its toll on all nations, especially Russia. Russia started industrialization late, and apart from some city centers is mostly agricultural.

People in city centers go on strike, desertions in the army, starvation, agitation for change.

Tsar loses confidence of Army, Bureaucracy, & the Church (as well as the general populace).

February 1917 the Tsar abdicates. Provisional Government under first Lvov and then Kerensky formed, in the Capital of Russia- St. Petersburg (Petrograd).

Petrograd is an industrial center and port as well. It has lots of workers.

Rather than get out of the War which most Russians wanted, Lvov and then Kerensky kept Russia in the War to maintain obligations to the Allies.

Government gets more and more unpopular

At the same time that the Provisional Government is formed, groups of workers in Petrograd form “Soviets” or worker committees that issue alternate instructions. This means that there are two centers of legitimacy after the fall of the Tsar, not just one. The Soviets and the Provisional Government cooperate.

Lenin comes into Russia. He has plenty of money from the Germans, and a cadre of dedicated Revolutionaries.

Marxist-Leninism builds on the ideas of Marx. Marx believed that

A revolution would have to occur in an advanced industrial capital country like England, Germany, or the USA.

Not Russia- too backward, economically- you need lots of workers.

The capitalist class needs to exploit workers in order to make profits, and must do so at an increasing rate. This increases the pain of the working class.

When this got bad enough, the Proletariat would rise up against the capitalist class and take over.

The state would wither away, and there would be a communist paradise.

In addition, Marxist-Leninism (M-L) held that

The revolution could be speeded up, and it could occur in a country that was not a well developed, such as Russia.

The agents of change would be a dedicated cadre of revolutionaries who would “jump-start” the revolution

Russia should not be in a war that was being fought for capitalists- a squabble over resources and an outcome of imperialist tendencies of capitalist countries

Make peace with Germany- Germany would fall to world-wide revolution anyway when the Revolution spread, so loss of territory and reparations would be made up.

The war drags on into the Summer and Fall, with more hardships, increased fracturing. Rioting and agitation (July) from all sides increases

A right-wing inspired military coup led by General Konilov fails in September

Soviets and Provisional Government more alienated from each other.

Given information, get into groups of 3-4 students. Now, answer the following question: You are a cadre of dedicated revolutionaries. You are heavily financed by external sources. What steps do you need to take in order to gain control over the country?

Compare and contrast the different takes.

Central ideas:

1. The role of the Soviets—infiltration and control.

2. Press—Pravda; role of propaganda.

3. Military arm—train workers, infiltrate armed forces; can you gain support of some officers?

4. Slogan—Peace, Land, Bread.

5. Assassination.

6. Coups against power centres—St. Petersburg and Moscow.

7. Use coups as evidence of weakness of government and the need for strong leadership to protect Russia..

Hand out April Theses.

What do the Bolsheviks demand?

How successful were they?

What role did the Soviets play in all of this?

Handout Call to Arms.

Do you think Lenin is serious when he says that it doesn’t matter who takes power, only that power be seized? Why?

Discuss.

Review:

Homework:

TBA

April Theses—The Bolshevik Opposition, visited 2 April 2006

1. In our attitude toward the war not the slightest concession must be made to "revolutionary defencism," for under the new government of Lvov & Co., owing to the capitalise nature of this government, the war on Russia's part remains a predatory imperialist war. In view of the undoubted honesty of the mass of rank and file representatives of revolutionary defencism who accept the war only as a necessity and not as a means of conquest, in view of their being deceived by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary most thoroughly, persistently, patiently to explain to them their error, to explain the inseparable connection between capital and the imperialist war, to prove that without the overthrow of capital it is impossible to conclude the war with a really democratic, non-oppressive peace. This view is to be widely propagated among the army units in the field. . . .

2. The peculiarity of the present situation in Russia is that it represents a transition from the first stage of the revolution - which, because of the inadequate organisation and insufficient class-consciousness of the proletariat, led to the assumption of power by the bourgeoisie - to its second stage which is to place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry. . . . This peculiar situation demands of us an ability to adapt ourselves to the specific conditions of party work amidst vast masses of the proletariat just wakened to political life.

3. No support to the Provisional Government; exposure of the utter falsity of all its promises, particularly those relating to the renunciation of annexations. Unmasking, instead of admitting, the illusion-breeding "demand" that this government, a government of capitalist, should cease to be imperialistic. . .

4. Recognition of the fact that in most of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies our party constitutes a minority, and a small one at that, in the face of the bloc of all the petty bourgeois opportunist elements..... who have yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie...... It must be explained to the masses that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies is the only possible form of revolutionary government and that, therefore, our task is, while this government is submitting to the influence of the bourgeoisie, to present a patient, systematic, and persistent analysis of its errors and tactics, an analysis especially adapted to the practical needs of the masses. . . .

5.

Not a parliamentary republic - a return to it from the Soviet of Workers' Deputies would be a step backward - but a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the land, from top to bottom.

Abolition of the police, the army, the bureaucracy. . . .

All officers to be elected and to be subject to recall at any time, their salaries not to exceed the average wage of a competent worker. . . .

6.

In the agrarian programme, the emphasis must be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies.

Confiscation of private lands.

Nationalisation of all lands in the country, and management of such lands by local Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies.

A separate organisation of Soviets of Deputies of the poorest peasants.

Creation of model agricultural establishments out of large estates . . .

7. Immediate merger of all the banks in the country into one general national bank, over which the Soviet of Workers' Deputies should have control . . .

8. Not the "introduction" of Socialism as an immediate task, but the immediate placing of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in control of social production and distribution of goods . . .

9. Party tasks:

A. Immediate calling of a party convention.

B. Changing the party program, mainly:

1. Concerning imperialism and the imperialist war.

2. Concerning our attitude toward the state, and our demand for a 'commune state."

3. Amending our antiquated minimum programme.

10. Rebuilding the International. Taking the initiative in the creation of a revolutionary International, an International against the social-chauvinists and against the "centre" . .

April Theses (SHORT)—The Bolshevik Opposition, visited 2 April 2006

1. In our attitude toward the war not the slightest concession must be made to "revolutionary defencism," for under the new government of Lvov & Co., owing to the capitalist nature of this government, the war on Russia's part remains a predatory imperialist war. In view of the undoubted honesty of the mass of rank and file representatives of revolutionary defencism who accept the war only as a necessity and not as a means of conquest, in view of their being deceived by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary most thoroughly, persistently, patiently to explain to them their error, to explain the inseparable connection between capital and the imperialist war, to prove that without the overthrow of capital it is impossible to conclude the war with a really democratic, non-oppressive peace. …

2. The peculiarity of the present situation in Russia is that it represents a transition from the first stage of the revolution - which, because of the inadequate organisation and insufficient class-consciousness of the proletariat, led to the assumption of power by the bourgeoisie - to its second stage which is to place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry. . . . This peculiar situation demands of us an ability to adapt ourselves to the specific conditions of party work amidst vast masses of the proletariat just wakened to political life.

3. No support to the Provisional Government; exposure of the utter falsity of all its promises, particularly those relating to the renunciation of annexations.. . .

4. Recognition of the fact that in most of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies our party constitutes a minority, and a small one at that, in the face of the bloc of all the petty bourgeois opportunist elements..... It must be explained to the masses that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies is the only possible form of revolutionary government … to present a patient, systematic, and persistent analysis of its errors and tactics, an analysis especially adapted to the practical needs of the masses. . . .

5. Not a parliamentary republic … but a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the land, from top to bottom.

Abolition of the police, the army, the bureaucracy. . . .

All officers to be elected and to be subject to recall at any time, their salaries not to exceed the average wage of a competent worker. . . .

6. [Agrarian Reforms].

Confiscation of private lands.

Nationalisation of all lands in the country, and management of such lands by local Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies.

Creation of model agricultural establishments out of large estates . . .

7. Immediate merger of all the banks in the country into one general national bank, over which the Soviet of Workers' Deputies should have control . . .

8. Not the "introduction" of Socialism as an immediate task, but the immediate placing of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in control of social production and distribution of goods . . .

Lenin: Call to Power, Oct 24, 1917

The situation is critical in the extreme. In fact it is now absolutely clear that to delay the uprising would be fatal.

With all my might I urge comrades to realize that everything now hangs by a thread; that we are confronted by problems which are not to be solved by conferences or congresses (even congresses of Soviets), but exclusively by peoples, by the masses, by the struggle of the armed people.

The bourgeois onslaught of the Kornilovites show that we must not wait. We must at all costs, this very evening, this very night, arrest the government, having first disarmed the officer cadets, and so on.

We must not wait! We may lose everything!

Who must take power?

That is not important at present. Let the Revolutionary Military Committee do it, or "some other institution" which will declare that it will relinquish power only to the true representatives of the interests of the people, the interests of the army, the interests of the peasants, the interests of the starving.

All districts, all regiments, all forces must be mobilized at once and must immediately send their delegations to the Revolutionary Military Committee and to the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks with the insistent demand that under no circumstances should power be left in the hands of Kerensky and Co.... not under any circumstances; the matter must be decided without fail this very evening, or this very night.

History will not forgive revolutionaries for procrastinating when they could be victorious today (and they certainly will be victorious today), while they risk losing much tomorrow, in fact, the risk losing everything.

If we seize power today, we seize it not in opposition to the Soviets but on their behalf.

The seizure of power is the business of the uprising; its political purpose will become clear after the seizure....

...It would be an infinite crime on the part of the revolutionaries were they to let the chance slip, knowing that the salvation of the revolution, the offer of peace, the salvation of Petrograd, salvation from famine, the transfer of the land to the peasants depend upon them.

The government is tottering. It must be given the death-blow at all costs.

This text is part of the Internet Modern History Sourcebook, visited 2 April 2006