BMD Negative DDI 2010
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BMD Negative Table of Contents
BMD Negative Table of Contents 1
Independent BMD Turn 3
Independent BMD Turn 4
Extension 1: Japan will build independently 5
Extension 2: Independent worse than cooperative 6
Article 9 Advantage Frontline 7
Article 9 Advantage Frontline 8
Extension 1: No deployment yet 9
US-Japan Alliance Frontline 10
Extension 2: Plan tanks alliance 11
Chinese Modernization Frontline 12
Chinese Modernization Frontline 13
China NFU Frontline 15
Extension 1: China NFU Resilient 16
Extension 1: China NFU Resilient 17
Extension 1: China NFU Resilient 18
Extension 1: China NFU Resilient 20
ASAT Frontline 21
ASAT Frontline 22
ASAT Frontline 23
Extension 1: Chinese Space Dominance Inevitable 24
Extension 1: Chinese Space Dominance Inevitable 25
Extension 3: No risk of space attack 26
Japan Spending Frontline 27
Japan Spending Frontline 28
Extension 3: Saves money 29
Europe NMD Advantage 30
North Korea War DA 31
Extension 1: Cooperation key to prevent North Korea war 32
Extension 1: Cooperation key to prevent North Korea war 33
~~China Conditions CP~~ 34
China MTCR Condition CP 1NC Shell 35
China MTCR Condition CP 1NC Shell 36
China MTCR Condition CP 1NC Shell 39
China MTCR Condition CP 1NC Shell 40
A2: Perm do the Counterplan 41
Conditioning CP Good 42
AT: Perm do Both 43
AT: China Says No 45
Impact Extensions 48
~~Topicality~~ 50
1NC Shell – Presence is not BMDs 51
2NC—AT: W/M/ Other BMD = Military Presence 52
2NC—AT: BMD = Military Presence b/c On bases 53
2NC—AT: CI interoperability 54
2NC—AT: CI weapons not troops 55
2NC—AT: Functional limits check 56
2NC—AT: Core of presence/ Lit checks 57
2NC—AT: Excluding weapons bad 58
2NC—AT: “Substantial” checks 59
2NC—AT: Prove we’re unreasonable 60
Case list 61
Independent BMD Turn
1. The US would field BMD’s independently in Japan.
Michael D. Swaine, PhD in IR @ Harvard - @ Carnegie Rachel M. Swanger, Dean @ RAND Graduate School, Takashi Kawakami, Professor, Hokuriku University Ph.D., Osaka University, ‘1 [Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1374/index.html]
Critics of Japanese participation in a U.S.-led BMD system argue that any missile defense system beyond a limited, lower-tier system will overwhelm Japan’s limited national security resources and absorption capabilities and pose unmanageable strategic dilemmas for Washington and Tokyo (both factors are discussed in some detail in Chapter Three). In contrast, in addition to the burden-sharing and enhanced defense cooperation arguments mentioned above, U.S. proponents of Japanese participation insist that Tokyo’s acquisition of a BMD system would enhance both countries’ strategic position in Asia by strengthening extended deterrence and reducing the overall vulnerability of Japan and U.S. forces in Japan to limited ballistic missile threats during a regional crisis. Moreover, proponents argue that the United States will in any event eventually deploy a TMD system to defend its forces in Japan and under such circumstances could not conceivably deny such a system to the Japanese government, since a U.S.-only TMD force would allegedly impede interoperability and defense cooperation, and perhaps provoke resentment among the Japanese public.13 The U.S. Navy and several U.S. Navy defense contractors are particularly strong supporters of Japanese acquisition of the naval-based TMD systems.
2. That’s worse than cooperative BMD – freaks out Japan’s neighbors.
Richard P. Cronin, @ Congressional Research Service – Specialist in Asian Affairs, ‘2 [Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Theater Missile , fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9186.pdf]
3) Impact of Japan’s active involvement in regional deployment of a BMD system on U.S. operational flexibility. Given the historical mistrust of Japan’s intentions and programs among its Asian neighbors, a highly visible involvement by Japan in missile defense, were it otherwise possible, could have negative implications for U.S. security interests in Asia. China, for instance, might see an integrated U.S.-Japan BMD capability as more threatening to its interests than a U.S. system alone, because of the implication that Japan is joining a de facto collective security arrangement that is aimed at China, especially in a confrontation involving Taiwan. China and other neighboring countries may be less than convinced that Article 9 will continue to inhibit Japan’s participation in collective security with the United States, especially because the restriction has become the target of nationalist opposition in Japan. Thus for China, North and South Korea, and some Southeast Asian countries, an integrated U.S.-Japan BMD system could be viewed as symbolizing the remilitarization of Japan under the cloak of alliance cooperation with the United States. To the extent that joint BMD deployment generated fears of a rearmed Japan, it could detract from the acceptability of a U.S. BMD capability. On the other side of the equation, Japan’s neighbors are likely to regard an independent Japanese BMD with even greater concern. For some of Japan’s neighbors, such as South Korea, a Japanese capability firmly linked to that of the United States would seem more desirable. China, on the other hand, opposes both deployment options.
Independent BMD Turn
3. Ending cooperative has zero effect on the overall Asian BMD system.
Richard P. Cronin, @ Congressional Research Service – Specialist in Asian Affairs, ‘2 [Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Theater Missile , fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9186.pdf]
Japan’s involvement in joint development of the SMD element of the U.S. missile defense program represents considerable progress by Japan towards greater alliance burden sharing, but its full implications remain to be seen. Neither Japan’s participation in joint research and development, nor a decision by Japan for or against acquisition or deployment of a BMD capability, are likely to have critical impact on the development of a U.S. missile defense capability or on the deployment of an American sea-based capability in Asia. Nonetheless, Japan’s participation in the research and development hase is viewed by U.S. officials as possibly contributing important technology, and a decision by Tokyo to acquire a BMD capability could have considerable foreign policy significance for the United States and important military implications. Given the prevailing uncertainties about Japanese policy and the implications of its future decisions, Congress may decide to consider carefully the assumptions of the Administration and the terms of any further steps in BMD cooperation with Japan. Part of such consideration could be obtaining additional information on the threat perceptions of the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) and Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the possible implications of a change in the perceived threat from North Korea’s missiles, the attitude of Japanese political leaders and Ministry of Foreign Affairs policymakers towards China, Japan’s fiscal situation and defense budget trends, public and political attitudes towards U.S.-Japan security cooperation and U.S. bases in Japan, and the prospects for constitutional revision and the acquisition of emergency powers by the Japanese national command authorities.
Extension 1: Japan will build independently
The plan ensures indigenous Japanese BMD’s
Gregg A. Rubinstein, @ Center for Pacific Asia Studies @ Stockholm University, ‘7 [September 5, US-Japan Missile defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects, www.japanconsidered.com/.../Rubinstein%20USJA%20BMD%20article%20090507.pdf]
While US officials still debate the appropriate extent of their engagement with Japan, their Japanese counterparts are intent on not only acquiring BMD capability, but having a voice in the direction of future program development and ensuring that missile defense contributes to the development of Japan’s defense industrial/technology base. Japanese Ministry of Defense (JMoD) and industry officials expect a broader role in BMD systems development, and assume that current joint development projects will lead to joint production of missiles and related hardware as well – not a safe assumption given an all but certain collision between the Japanese government’s rigid approach to arms exports restrictions and likely US insistence on making any jointly developed/produced BMD products available to third country allies.12
They would easily go independent.
Gregg A. Rubinstein, @ Center for Pacific Asia Studies @ Stockholm University, ‘7 [September 5, US-Japan Missile defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects, www.japanconsidered.com/.../Rubinstein%20USJA%20BMD%20article%20090507.pdf]
By the end of this year Japan will have achieved an initial operational capability in both ground and maritime BMD programs; deployments of PAC-3 batteries and BMD refits to four Japanese Aegis-equipped warships will be largely complete by the end of this decade. US deployment plans now project a continuous presence of three Aegis BMD-capable warships in the Western Pacific in addition to the US PAC-3 batteries in Okinawa. Recent BMD consultations have raised the possibility of Japan adding the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system to its missile defense forces.28 Meanwhile the SCD project on development of an upgraded SM-3 missile will be the centerpiece of joint program efforts for some years to come.
They would build independent TMD or purchase from the US.
Akira Kurosaki, Prof. of Law @ Rikkyo Univ., ‘5 [ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs 1.1, “Proposal for a regional missile limitation regime: An alternative to missile defence in Northeast Asia,” http://www.google.com/search?num=50&hl=en&safe=off&q=%22Japan+Defence+Agency+%22Japan+TMD&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs_rfai=]
The Japanese government, which has conducted technological research on missile defence with the US government but has taken a rather prudent attitude to its development and deployment, now seems increasingly interested in developing and acquiring its own systems. As the concern about a nuclear weapons programme in North Korea has mounted, the fear of its ballistic missile capability has been intensified recently in Japan. Under such circumstances, the Japanese government is considering the purchase of SM-3 and PAC-3 from the United States [6]. In the meantime, Tokyo is determined to continue the joint technological research with the US government on a sea-based missile defence system (formally known as Navy Theater Wide Missile Defence, but now renamed as Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence), which started in 1999 in the aftermath of the launching of a Taepo Dong-1 missile [7]. It is reported that the Japanese government is planning to conduct flight tests of interceptors with the US government in 2005 and 2006 for the first time after the beginning of the bilateral technological co-operation [8].
Extension 2: Independent worse than cooperative
Independent is worse – Asian countries think cooperative BMD’s constrain Japan.
Richard P. Cronin, @ Congressional Research Service – Specialist in Asian Affairs, ‘2 [Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Theater Missile , fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9186.pdf]
Japan is also aware of negative ramifications that deployment of a BMD system could have on its diplomatic profile in Asia, especially among its Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) neighbors. As past victims of Japanese World War II aggression, many of the countries of Southeast Asia still harbor fears of Japanese remilitarization. Hence, many if not most countries in Southeast Asia view the U.S.-Japan alliance in a favorable light, for it signifies a continuing U.S. engagement in regional security and deters Japan from re-emerging as an independent military power. In this respect, joint deployment of a BMD system would tend to be less worrisome to most Southeast Asian countries than would Japan’s acquisition of an independent capability, but some Japanese policymakers are concerned that even this would be unduly provocative, and would partly negate Tokyo’s effort to improve its relations in the context of a de facto rivalry with China for influence in an area Japan once viewed as its “backyard.”
Article 9 Advantage Frontline
1. No block 2A until 2015
Henry S. Kenyon, @ Armed Forces Communication and Electronics Association, ‘8 [Japan Acquires Missile Defense Shield, http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/Signal_Article_Template.asp?articleid=1520&zoneid=228]
Under the Japanese Cooperative Development (JCP) program, the SM-3 Block 2A will be fielded in 2015. The current version of the SM-3 has a 21-inch first stage and 13-inch second and third stages. Each of the Block 2A missile’s stages will be 21-inches across. Known as the “full caliber round,” the larger stages will provide increased operational range, speed and room for more sensitive sensors and computers. The admiral notes that both the United States and Japan are developing the SM-3 Block 2A, with an even distribution of development funds.
2. Cooperative BMD won’t violate Article 9
Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D. Vice President of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, ‘1 [August 28, U.S.-Japan Cooperation and Ballistic Missile defense, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2001/08/US-Japan-Cooperation-and-Ballistic-Missile-Defense]
What then, are we waiting for? One matter that needs to be resolved in Japan to achieve greater cooperation and continued development of an effective, shared ballistic missile defense system is the current interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which prohibits Japan from participating in collective defense. The actual language of the article, which states that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes" and that "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential" to accomplish such aims "will never be maintained," leaves room for a much broader understanding of the article's intent. Achieving a more balanced alliance partnership will require some re-examination, reinterpretation, or even revision, of Article 9. Japan's voters need to be polled by political leaders on this matter. This was pointed out in the so-called "Armitage-Nye Report" published by the United States National Defense University in October 2000. Americans conscious of the threats to their own nation by ballistic missiles will welcome a change that allows Japan to be a stronger, more active and equal alliance partner.
3. They won’t explicitly change Article 9.
Richard P. Cronin, @ Congressional Research Service – Specialist in Asian Affairs, ‘2 [Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Theater Missile , fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9186.pdf]
The decision of the Bush Administration in the Summer of 2001 to eliminate the distinction between national missile defense and other BMD programs, and to redesignate the NTW project as the sea-based “mid-course” defense element of a seamless BMD capability, has created additional uncertainty in Japan about the benefits and constitutionality of participating in joint missile defense technology research. In particular, the Japanese government has serious qualms about the constitutionality of cooperating on the development of technology that effectively could become part of a system to defend U.S. territory from third countries. Japan’s constitution established the right of collective self defense under international law, but disallows the exercise of that right. (See a fuller discussion of this issue below.)