Danish media at war
The Danish media coverage of the invasion of Iraq in 2003
Nete Nørgaard Kristensen, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Mark Ørsten, Roskilde University, Denmark
Published in Journalism 2007, vol. 8(3): 323-343. © The Authors, 2007. Available at: http://jou.sagepub.com/content/8/3/323.extract.
DOI: 10.1177/1464884907076458
ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the relationship between the media and the state in Denmark before and during the invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003. The media–state relationship in time of crisis and war is central to the discussion of the media’s watchdog role in a democratic society. So far, studies of the war in Iraq have focused primarily on the media–state relationship in an American or British context; fewer have focused on the smaller countries that were also part of the coalition. This article explores an often neglected aspect of the media–state relationship: what are the different historical contexts for the media–state relationship in countries such as Denmark, the USA and Great Britain, and do historical differences in this relationship reflect the Danish media’s coverage of the war in Iraq when viewed through the lens of Robinson’s (2001) policy–media interaction model.
A content analysis of 2045 news items produced by the Danish news media before and during the first weeks of the Iraq war in 2003 shows that there are clear differences, but also clear similarities, between Danish, British and American news coverage of the invasion. Like most of the international media, the Danish media took as their clear thematic focus the reporting of military strategy and battles, and were too reliant on sources within the national government (politicians as well as civil servants), the coalition and the military. Nevertheless, they were critical of the invasion in two ways: 1) there was a supplementary strong thematic focus on the many negative social and psychological consequences of the war, and 2) significant use was made of sources that possibly represented alternative angles on the war, including Iraqi civilians and the media’s own representatives.
This analysis points to a paradox in the Danish coverage of the war: on the one hand, there appears to have been an intention to report on the war independently of official (political and military) versions of events; but on the other, the opportunity, willingness and ability to actually do this appear to have been lacking.
KEY WORDS
Danish news media, embedded journalism, Iraq war, journalism and war, media and politics, media and state, news sources, propaganda, spin, war correspondents
Introduction
If war is the continuation of politics by other means, to quote von Clausewitz, then media coverage of war should be a continuation of the critical, independent political reporting that most media in western societies hold up as an ideal. Indeed it could be argued – as, of course, it has been – that critical and independent media coverage becomes even more crucial to the functioning of democratic society when war threatens, or during wartime, than is the case normally (Aday et al., 2005: 3; Entman and Page, 1994: 83; Taylor, 2003: 63): only if the public is well informed by the media will it be able to decide whether to support or oppose government decisions that lead to, or prolong, war.
However, though most scholars and journalists agree with this thesis, there is very little evidence to suggest that the media actually perform this critical role during conflicts. Hallin (1986), Bennett and Paletz (1994), Carruthers (2000) and Knightley (2000) give short shrift to the idea that the media perform independently in time of war. It seems, as McLaughlin (2002: 257) pointed out in a recent article, that ‘every war from Crimea to Kosovo has been followed by a post-mortem on the failure of journalism to cover the conflict truthfully and courageously’. The reason for this more or less constant post-mortem might be, as Taylor (2003: 78) suggests, that ‘scholarly analysis of media performance is rooted . . . in frustration about what the media should be saying, or are not saying, as distinct from what it is possible to say’. McLaughlin argues along the same lines in his study of the bombing of Kosovo by NATO in 1999. He finds that the media have been subject to unfair criticism. For McLaughlin, stu- dies such as Knightley’s (2000), which offer ‘a deeply pessimistic verdict’ (McLaughlin, 2002: 264) on war correspondents and war coverage, are ‘rapidfire responses based on first impressions’ (2002: 264). His own study finds that the picture is not quite so bleak and that ‘there was real media counterweight to NATO spin’ (2002: 264). Robertson (2004) finds cause in a study of Scotland’s national broadsheet papers for both pessimism and optimism over the press coverage of the Iraq war, discovering an ‘unquestioning use of military sources’ and a lack of focus on civilian deaths and public health (2004: 479), but also, in one of the national mainstream papers, a ‘fairly powerful antiwar climate’ that suggested a ‘real critique of power can appear’ (2004: 480).
The research cited above points to possible subtle variations that should be further investigated in the media coverage of war among countries of different sizes, with different foreign policy traditions and different historical relationships between the media and the state. According to Hallin and Mancini (2004), western societies can be divided into three models in terms of media and politics:
- the Mediterranean or Polarized model, which includes France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain;
- the Northern European or Democratic Corporatist model, which includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland and;
- the North Atlantic or Liberal model, which includes Britain, the USA, Canada and Ireland.
The models are distinctive in four main ways, which can, for the purposes of this article, be reduced to just two: the first refers to differences in the media system – for instance whether this is commercially or publicly owned, or both; the second to those in the political system – for instance ‘the degree and nature of the links between the media and political parties or, more broadly, the extent to which the media system reflects the major political divisions in society’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 21).
Having presented the models, Hallin and Mancini conclude that despite the difference in media systems and political systems across Europe and North America, ‘an international media culture has become common to all the countries we studied’ (2004: 251). This common culture is described as the triumph of the liberal model: commercialism is on the rise, and politics has become ‘professionalised as parties and campaigns are increasingly run . . . by specialists in political marketing’, as well as ‘increasingly personalised or presidentialised’ (2004: 251). Still, fundamental differences between the models remain, and it is the potential influence of these differences on the media–state relationship that this study seeks to explore.
Theoretical context: the ‘policy–media interaction’ model with a geographical twist
It is important to remember that ambiguousness of empirical research into the media’s coverage of war exists in the context of more than 30 years’ fierce scholarly debate on the media–state relationship – a debate that, according to Robinson (2001: 523), ‘has been dogged by dichotomous and one-sided claims’.
One of these claims is the so-called ‘CNN effect’, which attributes to the media a degree of power sufficient to influence the direction of governments’ foreign policies; another is the opposite claim: that the media, in time of crises and wars, only function to ‘manufacture consent’ (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) between elite opinion and public opinion. In order to reconcile the different claims, Robinson (2001: 536) has presented the policy–media interaction model (see Table 1), which seeks to offer a more nuanced approach that allows for three scenarios of media influence:
1) a scenario of non-influence, where the media merely ‘manufacture consent’ for the official policy;
2) a scenario of limited influence, in which the media reflect the elite dissensus; and
3) a scenario of strong media influence, where the media, in a ‘CNN effect’ kind of way, drive the direction of government policy.
As the model shows, what characterizes the three scenarios of policy–media interaction is the level of elite consensus/dissensus and the level of policy certainty/uncertainty. Regarding the consensus/dissensus thesis, it is widely claimed that media coverage in time of war ‘conforms to the interest of political elites in general’ (Robinson, 2001: 526) and therefore ‘operate within the sphere of . . . national consensus’ (Lehmann, 2005: 64). This so called ‘elite version’ (Robinson, 2001) of the ‘manufacturing consent’ thesis stems from Hallin’s study of media coverage of the Vietnam war. Hallin (1986) finds that critical coverage only appeared after members of the Washington elite had spoken out against the war. Inspired by Hallin’s study, Bennett’s (1990) indexing hypothesis argues that if elites agree on a subject, news coverage of it will tend to mirror that consensus. However, in the case of elite dispute or disagreement, at least some of the critical viewpoints will also be apparent in the news coverage. The concept of policy certainty/uncertainty refers to whether or not an agreed policy is in place when an issue suddenly rises up the agenda (Balabanova, 2004; Lehmann, 2005; Robinson, 2001). If a policy is in place and has a strong following, it is less likely that the government will be susceptible to media pressure; if, however, no firm policy exists, or there is disagreement about what policy to follow (i.e. policy uncertainty), the media can have greater influence on, and perhaps sometimes even drive, the formulation of foreign policy.
The question of media influence and effect, however, may also depend on the different types of media outlets (Robinson, 2002). Evidence suggests that policy makers may outride critical newspaper coverage, whereas critical TV coverage is perhaps a more powerful influence on policy makers.1 Other studies point in the opposite direction, arguing that policy makers pay less attention to TV, and are instead more likely to be influenced by the quality press, especially editorials (Robinson, 2002). In the model, Robinson does not take the possible differences between newspapers and television news into direct account, but the model, and indeed the idea of a strong ‘CNN-effect’, is based on the inclusion of both types of media. Robinson (2002: 38) states that in terms of deciding what amount of coverage is necessary to create an effect at least ‘one front-page newspaper story per day and a major news segment on the evening news’ would be needed.
Robinson intends the model to provide a new ‘starting point for a research agenda’ that to a greater extent than earlier research will offer ‘a nuanced, two-way understanding of the direction of influence between media and the state’ (2001: 541). While he succeeds in outlining the possibilities of a theoretically more varied understanding of the media–state relationship, he does not address the fact that the model is, to a great extent, based on American and British research, and is therefore perhaps ‘only’ a model for the media–state relation- ship in these contexts. Balabanova (2004: 296), testing the model on Bulgarian media coverage of the Kosovo conflict, for example, concludes that ‘the assumptions on the basis of which the policy-media interaction model is built are not necessarily equally valid for Eastern Europe’. Indeed, it does seem obvious that any use of the model on countries other than the USA or Britain must take their national history and the social context of the country’s media–state relationship into consideration.
Returning to Hallin and Mancini’s three models, Denmark was placed within the Northern European or Democratic Corporatist model, whereas the USA and Britain were placed within the Liberal model. The most essential differences between the two models can be summed up as follows (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 67–8):
1) Differences in the media system: Denmark, like the other Nordic countries, has a tradition of state intervention that leads to protection of press freedom and press subsidies, and a strong tradition of public service broadcasting. Furthermore, Denmark is characterized by a high degree of journalistic professionalism, which in turn leads to a high degree of professional autonomy – despite the state subsidies (2004: 74). The press in the USA and, to a lesser extent, Britain are far more commercial, and the lack of state subsidies confers formal autonomy from government. The Liberal model, too, is characterized by a high degree of journalistic professionalism, though this – particularly in America – can be subject to commercial pressures (2004: 75).
2) Differences in the political system: Denmark’s press is historically strongly linked with political parities, and although this tendency is declining in favour of a more neutral and commercial press, clear affiliations remain between media operators and parties/ideologies. This in turn leads to a high degree of what Hallin and Mancini (2004: 29) call ‘external pluralism defined as pluralism achieved at the level of the media system as a whole, through the existence of a range of media outlets or organisations reflecting the points of view of different groups or tendencies in society’. America, on the other hand (unlike Britain, which is known for its partisan newspapers), is characterized by a neutral, information-oriented commercial press. This produces a high degree of ‘internal pluralism’, a term that refers ‘to cases where media organisations both avoid institutional ties to political groups and attempt to maintain neutrality and balance in their content’ (2004: 29).