RAP Sheet on Four Upstate New York Nuclear Reactors Barbara Warren

845-754-7951

Note: I have largely summarized and paraphrased NRC inspection findings except where I needed to use their technical language. Occasionally I make a comment – and my comments are italicized. For NM1 & 2, I focused on only 2015 and 2016 and found a selection of problems, but there are clearly fewer examples than for the other reactors. I can do more work if folks are interested. Barbara

Introduction

Aging Nuclear Reactors are Uneconomic largely due to increased capital expenses.

Safety can be sacrificed in the desire to keep these plants running.

Nuclear reactors in New York State became uneconomic in a competitive environment for the generation of electricity. The State’s Deregulation of electric markets was supposedly designed to deliver lower prices to consumers. However, nuclear generators are having increasing difficulty in competing with other lower cost options—especially energy efficiency, conservation and renewables. Nuclear energy has a long history of receiving various subsidies from the federal government and thus taxpayers. Both nuclear energy and fossil fuels have received decades of subsidies, far more than recent renewable subsidies. Nuclear waste first described by federal officials as an easy technological problem to solve continues to be “unsolvable.” There is no permanent repository and no plans for one. In the absence of a permanent solution for waste nuclear costs underestimate the true life cycle costs of nuclear power, because future waste costs are unknown and accrue in perpetuity.

With deregulation, utilities sold their nuclear generators. Today’s merchant nuclear reactors in New York were purchased cheaply because their so-called “stranded costs” were paid for by New Yorkers. Economic troubles for aging nukes are connected to plant maintenance, equipment replacements, staffing and safety. Reports from the industry’s Nuclear Energy Institute indicate that operating costs for US nuclear reactors rose by 60% over ten years, 2002-2012. More importantly capital costs are driving these increases, growing by 340%.[1] The reason for this is that US nuclear plants are aging, 40% are over 40 years old, the useful life and original license period. Major pieces of equipment and systems, like electrical and plumbing need extensive repairs or replacement. Nuclear owners will be weighing potential life threatening decisions about whether to replace very expensive equipment or to try to squeeze another year of profits out of an aging reactor.

Knowledge of Nuclear Safety Issues at Indian Point should have raised some level of concern regarding NY’s other four nuclear reactors

Indian Point clearly should be closed—even sooner than the new state agreement provides. However, safety problems are not an outlier for Indian Point only. A key driver of concern about the Indian Point facility is the enormous population density within 50 miles. It should be noted that the upstate reactors are also near major cities- Syracuse, Rochester and Buffalo—and significant populations.

The Governor has had a long time involvement in the safety problems at Indian Point as both the State’s Attorney General and now as Governor. Yet nowhere in the record of the case of the nuclear subsidies was the issue of Safety for the four upstate nuclear reactors even minimally explored, despite offering extraordinary subsidies of $7.6 billion. The PSC merely assumed that because they were still operating, they must be safe. These subsidies in fact make it far easier for a nuclear plant owner to make an unsafe and dangerous decision to run a nuclear reactor into the ground. Such a decision could be worth millions of dollars, but could risk catastrophe.

While Governor Cuomo has a long history of paying attention to Indian Point and its safety issues, the Governor has behaved as if the upstate reactors are a completely different technological marvel, although they have experienced many safety issues as well as age- related equipment degradation.It is particularly notable that the State’s negotiated agreement to close Indian Point includes safety provisions for state inspections of the reactors in addition to selected equipment issues, such as replacement of failed baffle bolts.The Governor has grappled with Entergy over Indian Point’s problematic issues for years. Entergy also owns and operates Fitzpatrick, the nuclear plant that first announced closure and started the state on this nuclear rescue plan. It was Fitzpatrick that received an NRC Confirmatory Order related to its safety violations that required multiple activities at all of Entergy’s reactors, as well as presentations for all nuclear operators in every region of the country, including NRC staff. However, despite offering billions of dollars of planned ZEC subsidies there is no plan for officials from any state agency to review and consider safety issues as a reasonable expectation in exchange for these subsidies. The provision of billions of dollars in subsidies is being allocated from the public purse, and the first minimal requirement should be that the plants are maintained in good operating conditions, with excellent safety standards. Just a minimal level of state oversight could avoid gross negligence by following up on NRC inspection findings to ensure corrective action actually takes place – rather than letting problems exist for 30 years. (See how Ginna ignored flooding potential) In addition, all NY’s operating reactors will need to undergo decommissioning—a process that takes several decades and often is not adequately funded by nuclear owners. New York may need billions for nuclear decommissioning in addition to what nuclear companies pay.

We have stated that the ZEC policy had no basis in fact, policy or law. The State never looked at all of the nuclear reactors as part of developing the State Energy Plan, and never adequately dealt with Article 6 requirements. The Energy Plan never discussed subsidizing nuclear reactors over other generators. The State and the PSC adopted deregulation in 1996 in order to support a competitive environment for generators with a goal and a promise of lower costs for consumers. Although the goal and promise have not been achieved, the PSC has never withdrawn deregulation/ electric restructuring policies. The PSC also never fulfilled the normal requirements of environmental review under SEQRA. In light of the earlier Deregulation policy and the 2015 Energy Plan, there should have been a much more extensive environmental review under SEQRA—since the subsidy proposal was a complete reversal of existing established policy.

Important NOTE: We have included a selection of findings for each of the 4 upstate reactors. I needed to focus on issues that were not extremely complicated and therefore difficult to summarize and for others to understand. However I did try to include significant issues whether or not NRC thought they were serious. BW.

The James A. Fitzpatrick nuclear reactor is unique in the nation for its long standing lack of essential equipment ( a hardened vent).

Location:Scriba, NY (6 miles NE of Oswego,NY) inNRC Region I Near Syracuse, NY

Operator:Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Operating License:Issued - 10/17/197443 yo in Oct 2017
Renewed License:Issued - 09/08/2008
License Expires- 10/17/2034
Docket Number:05000333

Reactor Type:Boiling Water Reactor
838 MW
Reactor Vendor/Type:General Electric Type 4
Containment Type:Wet, Mark I

Fitzpatrick has one of the earliest reactor designs—GE Mark I BWR, the same as those reactors impacted at Fukushima in Japan in 2011. The design for and expected life of nuclear reactors was 40 years. Fitzpatrick will be 43 years old in October 2017. No nuclear reactors in the world have reached 50 years old. Most close before then. Yet the NY contracts & subsidies are for 12 years, not shorter terms with renewable contracts. If Fitz can be held together for another 12 years it will be 55 years old.

Lack of a Hardened Vent.Fitzpatrick is the only reactor of its type without a Hardened Vent. All other GE Mark I Boiling Water reactors in the US have been retrofitted with a hardened vent. In the event of a severe accident a hardened vent relieves excess pressure by venting gases to the atmosphere.[2][3]This avoids a full scale explosion as occurred at Fukushima, however it releases radiation and exposes the public. The Fukushima disaster exposed the inoperability of these vents and other similar reactors must fix the problem. However, Fitzpatrick is unique in not having this vent at all, therefore the capital expense at Fitzpatrick will be greater. Instead – excess pressure is released by doors being blown open at ground level in an adjacent building.

Major Delays in Implementing Nationwide Safety Upgrades needed Post-Fukushima

Entergy was planning to close and therefore it sought and was granted delays in implementing multiple Post-Fukushima safety upgrades. Despite heavy ratepayer subsidies, New Yorkers will be less safe until these upgrades are completed.

A History of Major Safety Problems and an Unusual NRC Order

Fitzpatrick was cited for multiple serious worker safety violations and fraudulent recordkeeping between 2006 and 2011. Entergy and NRC entered into an alternative dispute resolution, ADR, and on Jan. 26, 2012 agreed to an extraordinary Confirmatory Order in lieu of monetary penalties. The Order required multiple actions at Fitzpatrick, at all nine Entergy plants, as well as presentations for managers at nuclear reactors and utilities in all four NRC regions in the US. In general the Order required multiple corrective actions to Safety Culture at Entergy’s nuclear reactors. Actions had to be completed in various time frames from 30 days up to 360 days and included:

  • An Investigation of the events at Fitzpatrick cited.
  • A Case Study of the Events and Lessons Learned with presentations for all entities listed above, including NRC resident inspectors.
  • Fleetwide training for Entergy personnel on the events and lessons learned.
  • Development of an Assessment plan and perform Independent Safety Culture Assessments for all nine Entergy reactors. All issues identified were to be entered into the corrective action program. Upon completion, NRC planned to perform confirmatory reviews.
  • Review of existing procedures with updates and corrections based on Lessons Learned and findings from plant assessments.
  • Commitment to complete and accurate records.
  • The addition of a tracking system dedicated to covering safety culture monitoring at all nine plants. [4]

The Year 2013 does not start well for Fitzpatrick.

At the beginning of 2013 Fitzpatrick would have been completing the final elements of the 2012 Confirmatory Order that were due within 360 days.

Unfortunately the First Quarter NRC Inspection report for 2013 cited Fitzpatrickfor 3 Severity Level ( SL) IV violations. Two of these are discussed here.

NRC “Violations:

  • are assigned a severity level, ranging from Severity Level IV for those of more than minor concern to Severity Level I for the most significant, or
  • are associated with findings assessed through the reactor oversight process's Significance Determination Process (SDP) that are assigned a color of Green, White, Yellow, or Red based on increasing risk significance.” (NRC website)
  1. Degraded Condition—potentially important implications for integrity of containment. Also failure to submit Licensee Event Report for a prohibited condition in technical specifications. SL IV, Type B finding, NCV (non-cited violation).[5]

Following a transformer fire and the need to conduct replacement of transformers, the plant was put into Cold shutdown, Mode 4 Nov. 11, 2012. However, after work was completed, both a valve and the containment vent and purge system were left open when the plant was switched to Startup and Hot Standby, Mode 2, Nov. 24th.This means containment was not closed to the outside. The error was caught after 7 hours and valve and vent and purge system were closed.

  1. Fitz changed Definition of Core Quadrant without obtaining NRC review and approval. SL IV violation NCV, non-cited violation. Green.[6]

During core alterations, movement of fuel or control rods within reactor vessel, it is necessary to have a neutron monitor in each of the 4 quadrants of the core. Fitz decided that 1 monitor of the 4 could be inoperable without NRC review. NRC inspectors required a technical review at headquarters and determined inadequate monitor coverage could hinder an early indication of subcritical multiplication that could be indicative of an approach to criticality. The company should have asked NRC for approval before implementing this change. ( This would seem to be more serious than a green level.BW.)

The first Quarter inspection in 2013 also involved detailed reviews of earlier incidents. We discuss two of them here.

Condensate Booster Pump Failure – Detailed follow-up inspection. No violation issued.[7]

The triggering event of pump failure occurred January 17, 2012. NRC performed an in-depth review of Fitz’s root cause analysis of this event and conducted a comprehensive evaluation of staff actions. When the pump was disassembled the diaphragm was loose and all 24 fasteners for holding pump in casing were broken or not in place. The diaphragm had damaged multiple other parts. The staff identified a missed opportunity because there was previous industry operating experience from multiple industry reports of corrosion cracking of the stainless steel screws (410 SS). Staff failed to identify other applications at Fitz for 410 SS parts. The vendor manual had madethe change for fasteners to 17-4 PH SS but Fitzpatrick’s vendor manual control program only applies to safety related components, so there was no follow-up on this recommendation. Condensate booster pumps are not safety- related components. Vendor manual also recommends pump overhaul every 12 years, which was not incorporated at Fitz. As a result of this problem the other 2 booster pumps had screws replaced with recommended fasteners. In addition a loose parts analysis was done to confirm that if lost parts were in pressure vessel they would not cause flow blockage for fuel bundles or other problems. Because the problem did not relate to safety equipment, it did not constitute a violation. However, NRC recommended pump overhauls.

NRC identifies a very limited set of safety- related components for reactors. This particular situation points out a significant problem with that practice. These pumps apparently could have distributed loose parts into the reactor core, hindering adequate cooling of fuel bundles but these pumps were not safety- related and so received limited maintenance attention.BW

Failure to test Control Rods before Refueling Outage 20. [8]No violation.

Fitz was supposed to test insertion of control rods within 14 days prior to shutdown for refueling, based on fuel vendor’s recommendation. This is due to the increase in friction that occurs over the fuel cycle from neutron emissions. The test is to insure that the control rods can be fully inserted during a SCRAM event. Fitz did not do the test. Following event where low reactor pressures prevented control rods from being inserted, Fitz had to declare 52 control rods to be inoperable. Fitz was able to correct problem and event was reported.

A 2013 Near Miss

Entergy’s Arkansas Nuclear One Facility, Unit 1 & 2, experienced a Near Miss Accident according to the Union of Concerned Scientists in 2013.[9]The collapse of a crane dropped equipment through the floor, killed a worker and caused a loss of grid power.

2014 Near Misses

The Union of Concerned Scientists identified 11 nuclear plants ( 9 facilities) as experiencing Near Misses in 2014. Two of these were Entergy plants: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station in Mississippi and River Bend Station in Louisiana, 22% of Near Misses for 2014. [10] These near misses were related to security issues and for that reason there is no publicly available information on the incidents.

2015 Near Misses

In 2015 the Union of Concerned Scientists singled out Entergy for special mention since 3 of the year’s 10 Near Misses occurred at Entergy plants: Indian Point Unit 3, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, MA and River Bend Station, LA –30% of Near Misses for 2015. For the Near Misses, 64% of the safety violations identified were given to Entergy reactors.[11]

Since it is relevant to NY we include the event at Indian Point. The safety issue at Indian Point Unit 3 is significant in that NRC did not require it to be fixed, despite a Near Miss. Faulty fire suppression equipment failed 3 times in tests over 5 years, but was not fixed. This caused flooding in area where electrical panels are located, which could lead to a station blackout, total loss of power. A secondary issue also was ignored—the drains in the room were seriously clogged, preventing drains from removing water, even though regular maintenance of drains is supposed to be done. An alarm was determined to be cost-beneficial, but NRC did not require it to be installed.

(Private insurance companies often inspect industrial companies and will often not insure dangerous conditions. They are far from perfect. However one has to wonder whether federal insurance under Price – Anderson allows unreasonable carelessness on the part of plant owners. BW)