Factors Affecting Possibilities for Cooperation with Russia

Comments at the meeting of the Canadian network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Ottawa, October 24, 2016

Factors Affecting Possibilities for Cooperation with Russia

Joan DeBardeleben, Carleton University

I will address factors from the Russian side thataffect possibilities for cooperation between Russia and the West in dealing with broader international issues such as nuclear non-proliferation.

Recent years, especially since 2014 when the Ukraine crisis erupted, have seen a shift from Russia as a partner to control nuclear proliferation to a potential adversary that could reintroduce the danger of a nuclear confrontation. While the Russia still has the potential to partner with the West in relation to 3rd countries around the issue of non-proliferation (evidenced, e.g., in the Iran deal), this is gradually being overridden by the East-West tension, and the reality of the potential nuclear aspect of this crisis.

However there is still a shared interest in limiting the expansion of nuclear weapons to new actors on the Russian side. This has been a long-standing Russian commitment. The question is how to draw back from the escalating and poisoned relations between the two sides to allow this potential to be reactivated. The linkage to the current crisis is evident in Russia’s abrogation of the agreement in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum[1], which committed the UK, US, and Russia“to respect the independence and sovereigntyand the existing borders of Ukraine” and to refrain from the use of force to against that territorial integrity” as Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear power. The Russian actions in Ukraine make evident the primacy of Russian perception of national interest over interests of non-proliferation. I should add that I don’t think the Russian leadership consciously conceptualizes its priorities this way, but this is the underlying instinct. The abrogation of the Budapest Memorandum has potential consequences in (de)motivating similar agreements with 3rd parties.

The tension with Russia increases the tendency of a reliance on the nuclear deterrent or threats, by far at the highest level since the end of the cold war. It also involves a radical augmentation of the East-West security dilemma, including in Europe. The security dilemma points to a dynamic where, in an anarchic world system (where there is no enforceable international law), efforts by one side to ensure security can elicit reactions which further endanger that security. On the other hand, the failure to take those measures is also perceived to undermine security. It takes on the character of a no-win situation from a security viewpoint. The reality that has emerged in Europe since the Ukraine crisis fits this classic pattern, but the dilemma was already activated by the American commitment to install a missile defense system in Central Europe and the Russian interpretation of that decision. Russian leaders have long expressed the worry that their nuclear deterrent could be undermined by that missile defense system, whether or not that is the intention. Russia cites as of key significance the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002[2], as it disrupted security based on the logic of mutual deterrence and vulnerability. Putin has warned of “a sense of the impending danger” and the very serious nature of the threat posed by the disruption of the traditional balance.

This is the logic that governs relations now. Recent Russian military exercises in Kaliningrad, which presumably are in part a response to the decisions and discourse emerging from the NATO summit in Warsaw this past summer, are an example. The NATO decision and the rotation of NATO troops into NATO member states adjacent to the Russia border are in response to Russia’s Ukraine actions. The security dilemma is in full swing.

Fundamental issues must be addressed to overcome this impasse, and these require an understanding of the perspectives that Russia brings to the table, as well as a consideration of our own interests and values. Here are some of the key factors that underlie the current dilemma.

a)  Radical decline in trust on both sides. This is a ‘soft’ factor, often mentioned, but inadequately emphasized. A security dilemma is in large part based in perceptions of the actions of others, and these perceptions reflect underlying levels of trust or distrust. Likewise, any agreements rely on trust because there is no supranational enforcement mechanism. The successive withdrawal of both parties from various agreements, recently Russia’s likely withdrawal from the plutonium disposal treaty[3] and the earlier withdrawal from the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement, reflect this distrust. The situation in Syria, and the efforts of the US and Russia to work together, illustrate the difficulty of operating cooperatively in a situation where trust is low. Each action of the other is interpreted in an unfavourable light, which can reinforce the security dilemma.

b)  Importance of understanding the bases of distrust.

On the Western side, the Crimean annexation and Russian role in eastern Ukraine were the primary triggers for distrust, as well as lingering perceptions from the Cold War which provide a lens through which Russian decision are viewed. An example would be Secretary Hillary Clinton’s interpretation of Russia’s formation of the Eurasian Economic Union as an effort to revive the USSR.[4]

On Russian side the list of issues that drives distrust is long, but I’ll just mention three:

-Reaction to NATO expansion, and the Russia perception that Western leaders committed to no eastward expansion.[5] As best, this was a gentlemen’s agreement, but only with certain ‘gentlemen’ and not in written form.

-Perception of a Western role in destabilizing domestic affairs of neighbouring countries, particularly with the Orange Revolution, other coloured revolutions, and the Maidan. The broad application of Russia’s ‘foreign agent law’, directed at Russia NGOs that accept foreign money and engage in political activity, signals this distrust, which has popular resonance. This perception feeds a kind of conspiracy theory mentality, and gets reinforced through a ‘confirmation bias’ that affects both elites and the public, and contributes to the spiral of distrust.

-Above all the perception that the US and NATO (to a degree a US surrogate in many case) permits themselves to take unilateral actions in violation of international law, the Iraq adventure being a prime example, but actions in the late l990s in Kosovo as well. One explanation I’ve heard repeated by a respected Russian colleague is that with Crimea, Russian violated the US monopoly on the unilateral violation of international law. This feeds notions of hypocrisy and double-standards in interpreting Western discourse and actions.

c)  The inadequacy of the European security order, which is based in NATO. The Western Western rejection of the Medvedev proposal for a new European Security Treaty[6] in 2008-09 may have been a critical mistake. This suggestion might have provided the basis for fruitful discussions but was seen in the West as potentially undermining the transatlantic security community. Russia has not been allowed in, or invited in, in a meaningful way (despite the NATO-Russia Council and the OSCE), to a trans-Atlantic security community that addresses key Russian security concerns. This is what Medvedev was proposing, even if the details were faulty or contestable.

d)  The absence or weakening of neutral arbiters. ‘Neutral’ parties or international organizations to facilitate a de-escalation of the tension are unavailable, weak or lack necessary legitimacy on both sides. Available international organizations are generally too weak to fulfil this role in all but specific technical circumstances. The UN is inefficacious, among other reasons due to the Russian Security Council veto. The exclusion of Russia from some other fora, under the sanctions (e.g., the G7/G8), has reinforced the problem, even if the reason for the exclusion may be justifiable. The increasing alienation of Russia from other organizations such as the Council of Europe and EHRC judgements is also symptomatic. Parallel organizations have reemerged, (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Euraisan Economic Union) as well as proposals for new ones, e.g. , for a Eurasian Human Rights Group.[7] However, in some cases existing mechanism are still operating, e.g., WTO and the UNCLOS.

e)  The Russian psychological response to loss of great power status (1990s humiliation; economic rebound; reassertion of national identity and status) remains a very important underlying factor, also for the Russian public. There is a lingering perception in Russia that the West, or more specifically the US, has gloated over the Soviet decline and therefore has felt free to insert itself assertively into Russia’s sphere of influence. Beneath this is the underlying perception that Russia is not treated as an equal partner. Symbolically this was seen in the efforts to export a Western model to Russia in the 1990s, continued preaching to Russia about values (also by the EU), the fact that Russia has ‘joined’ preexisting organizations rather than helping to shape new ones, and also Russia’s own failure to project an attractive model to its neighbours and allies. The notion of ‘spheres of influence’ is an idea in contest as Russia seeks to reestablish its status.

The result:

Whereas tension between the US and Russia has been growing steadily (despite the US ‘reset’ attempt) since the early 2000s, this was , until the last couple of years, mitigated by somewhat better relations with the EU and some important EU member states. However, along with the Ukraine crisis, the overall security dilemma is the hardest nut to crack in the current situation. The EU has a security strategy and some instruments, but it is a relatively weak security actor and EU unity is frequently hard to achieve. The US is the necessary partner for dealing with security (and nuclear issues), whereas Europe is the most likely partner in reopening a political process that could mitigate tensions in other arenas.

However, now the basis of the EU/Europe-Russia relationship has also been undermined. Neither the EU nor key member state has been able to find a new modus operandi. Given preoccupation in Germany and many leading member states with other issues, prospects for movement do not seem that likely. The Normandy Format and the Minsk process seems to still be the favoured approach.

As a consequence, a new paradigm for the EU-Russian relationship (extending to the broader East-West relationship) is also potentially emerging, which is based on differing assumptions compared to previous paradigm.[8] Here are some of the key characteristics:

-rising militarization

-zero-sum mentality

-competing spheres of influence

-reduced economic and energy interdependence (especially with Europe; it has never been very strong with North America)

-value divergence

-selective inviolability of international law

-securitization of the relationship

Underlying value differences driving Russian and Western behavior are also increasingly evident and openly acknowledged. These include

-Russia’s focus on order and stability vs. a Western preoccupation (at least rhetorically) with liberal democracy and human rights

-Russia’s strong desire for status and equality, and the emergence of an ideology to explain Russia’s unique European character, based in conservative values

-Russian protectionism as a short term substitute for a real modernization program.

However there are dynamics pushing in the other direction as well. These include the continuing desire on the Russian side to maintain a partnership with the West, particularly with Europe. Important here is Russia’s need to modernize its economy, and, with that, the need for Western (primarily European) investment and know-how. There is still a congruence of civilizational values in many arenas (Christian base, even gender values), and Russians, for the most part, consider themselves European or want to be. Finally there are a range of common security threats (terrorism, managing instability in the Middle East, and nuclear profileration)

The minimalist objective may be, as the Russians themselves emphasize, to reestablish a geostrategic and security balance, unfortunately perhaps harking back to some variant of the approach during the Cold War. From there perhaps the foundation can be laid, at a minimum, for continued efforts to control nuclear proliferation to other countries. But all of this requires a mutual recognition that the security dilemma is non-productive and must be addressed head-on.

Unless there is a moment of epiphany on both sides the goal of a non-nuclear world is further than at any point since 1991.

1

[1] See http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/budapest-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/p32484

[2] E.g., Putin’s Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, Moscow, Dec. 4, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47173.

[3] Andrew E. Kramer, “Vladimir Putin Exits Nuclear Secuirty Pact, Citing ‘Hostile Actions’ by U.S.,” New York Times, Oct. 3, 2016

[4] Quoted in Clove, Charles (2012), “Clinton vows to thrwart new Soviet Union,” Financial Times, December 6, 2012

[5] On this controversy, see Mary Elise Sarottte, “A Broken Promise? What the West Really Told Moscow about NATO Expansion,” Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct 2015.

[6] ‘Draft of the European Security Treaty,’ nov. 29,2009, Website of the President of Russia, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/6152

[7] See “Russian human rights advocates propose alternative NGO for Eurasian states,” RT, Sept 1, 2016, https://www.rt.com/politics/357865-russian-activists-propose-independent-human/

[8] I call it a paradigm of ‘competing regionalisms’ in Joan DeBardeleben, “From Building an Integrated European Space to Competing Regionalisms?

Alternative Paradigms for EU-Russian Neighbourhood Relations” in Joan DeBardeleben and Tom Casier, EU-Russian Relations in Crisis: Understanding Diverging Perceptions (Routledge, forthcoming)