Emily Tarbuck, James Meehan, Jonathan Parker and Khadiga Khadr
Radicalisation in the Levant
By Emily Tarbuck, James Meehan, Jonathan Parker and Khadiga Khadr
Contents
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..….…1
Sectarianism…………………………………………………………………………………...... 1
Identity Incongruence………………………………………………………………………...... 2
State Sponsorship……………………………………………………………………………...... 2
Socioeconomic Conditions……………………………………………………………………………………………………3
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..4
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...5
Introduction
This guide intends to convey the multitude of radicalised non-state/state actors, groups and individuals located specifically in the Levant - namely Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Israel, and Jordan - and indeed identify and explain the key trends that contribute to the rise of such radicalisation. Indeed, the below findings will utilize the conceptual framework highlighted in a previous Radicalisation Research guide (http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/guides/francis-2012-causes-2/) on the causes behind radicalisation, in order to explain why certain individuals and groups in the Levant react in the various ways they do. Although each identified area of the Levant will have unique features of radicalisation relevant to its context, this guide finds overall that general trends that lead to radicalisation of actors in the Levant includes sectarianism, socio-economic conditions, identity incongruence and state sponsorship.
Sectarianism
Sectarianism is a contemporary theme that helps us comprehend the ascendance of radicalised actors and groups in the Levant. In Lebanon sectarianism is a permanent feature of politics, with the confessional system of government having been put in place in order to proportionally represent Lebanon's eighteen recognised religious sects and groups[1]. The National Pact states that the President must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of Parliament a Shi'a Muslim[2]. However, since the Ta'if Accord in 1989, more powers were transferred to the Sunni Prime Minister in spite of Shi'as outnumbering Sunnis in Lebanon, and thus the Shi'as feel a sense of marginalisation[3]. These feelings of alienation have seen the rise of the “radical” group, Hezbollah, which itself is seen as 'a structural, cumulative and local expression of chronic Shi'a marginalisation'[4]. Sectarianism also has a role to play in both Iraq and Syria and the subsequent rise of Islamic State (IS or ISIS). Particularly in Iraq, Shi'as were subverted to the margins of political and economic well-being under the Shi'a dominated government of then Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki[5]. Similarly in Syria, Sunnis also appear disgruntled at the domination of the Assad government by the Alawites[6]. As a result, IS has exploited this sectarian strife with the fact that 'thousands of embittered Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis fight under ISIS' banner'[7] and indeed this swell in its recruitment has only gone to augment the rise of this radical group.
Identity Incongruence
Much of the radicalisation occurring in the Levant is centered on instances of identity incongruence. Radicalisation amongst the Palestinian Arab population often stems, especially amongst Israeli Arabs, from their feelings of alienation from the national identity of the State of Israel- which is overwhelmingly Jewish in most respects; especially in terms of national symbols (the state flag etc.).This alienation has manifested itself in displays of violence, but also in the last legislative election in increased turn out amongst Arabs and good results for the Joint List, an alliance of Arab parties. Syrian nationalism has been crippled by emerging sectarianism and this has had serious implications for the maintenance of Syria as a strong state, in particular the Shi’a Sunni divide can be seen as one of the main causal factors of this fracturing of the Syrian state, “hardliners within rebel ranks have increasingly promoted a Syrian identity based on Sunni Islam, denying the national legitimacy of Alawite/Shiite populations.”[8] It has been increasingly argued that the identity incongruence within Lebanon and Iraq into tribe, religion and ethnicity are not new. It is however interesting to examine how these sectarian identities have managed to ‘spill over’ into Syria contrary to its “traditional role as a regional “firewall” able to contain sectarian spillover from Iraq and Lebanon.”[9]
State Sponsorship
State sponsorship in Lebanon has led the Lebanese government to treating Hezbollah as “a structural, cumulative and local expression of chronic Shiite marginalization in the country”[10]. As opposed to an instrumental proxy client for Iranian and Syrian interests in Lebanon”.[11] Meanwhile radicalisation in Israel often manifests itself in the electoral sphere; with recent elections show rises in support for the right wing secular nationalist Yisrael Beiteinu (whose leader is despised by Israeli Arabs for the infamous ‘Lieberman plan”), and the religious zionist The Jewish Home party, which represents Israel’s increasingly assertive and expanding national religious population[12]. Jordan, on the other hand, can serve as an example of how state sponsorship of an organised religion can limit the potential for radicalisation[13]. The Jordanian regime empowered the Muslim Brotherhood to act as the states branch of “official Islam” and to shape the religious debate within the country to counter the effects of 1990’s jihadist movements. By bringing moderate Muslims into the political sphere the Jordanian government tempered religious zeal with “realpolitik” [14]. Although Jordan did sponsor the actions of anti-Israeli Palestinian groups in the late sixties that emerged from Palestinian refugees this support faded as its relationship with the U.S. grew[15].
Socio-economic Conditions
The socio-economic situation of people in the Levant has contributed to the ascendance of radicalised groups. The high frequency of armed conflict in the region has had dire economic consequences. Many civilians in the region are in dire need of help (for example, in Syria 12.2 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance[16]), and local radical groups are taking advantage of poor living standards by offering their own social care packages national governments have failed to provide. For instance, Islamic State (IS) is said to offer economic incentives to its recruits as well as a measure of stability; and thus proves to be an attractive option to locals who want to better their own livelihoods[17]. As result, IS is growing in numbers as its takes advantage of the chaotic social situation in Syria and Iraq.
In Israel and Palestine many Palestinians are radicalised by the economic divide between the two major ethnic and religious groups- the populations of the West Bank and Gaza are notably poorer than that of Israel (and the Jewish settler population)[18]. This contributes to a rise in support for radical organisations such as Fatah, especially in the light of the economic damage caused the 2014 Gaza war and in previous conflicts[19]. The situation is replicated within the borders of the State of Israel, where Arab Israeli’s are notably poorer than Jewish citizens. In addition, the growing inequality of Israeli society, once considered one of the world’s most egalitarian[20], has been a factor in the rise of far right parties, who play on the anti-immigrant and nationalist fears of the working classes, who are often immigrants from the former USSR[21].
Conclusion
Ultimately, the Levant is home to a plethora of factors that contribute to the radicalisation of its people. The region is composed of layers of overlapping religious and national identities, which very rarely match the boundaries of states. Each state in the region comprises communities who feel alienated from the state of which they hold citizenship. Many who feel this way turn to radical groups who, in the absence of properly functioning democratic structures in much of the region, offer a way of fighting back against state structures they feel isolated from. The salience of these determinants is accentuated by the high frequency of armed conflict in the region, which destroys economic prosperity and damages the social fabric of societies, allowing radical groups to provide a sense of security and stability that states cannot often provide.
Bibliography
· Arian, Asher. Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, (Washington: CQ Press, 2005)
· Cockburn, Patrick. The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution. London; New York: Verso, 2015.
· Crisis Group. Towards a Lasting Ceasefire in Gaza (23.10.2014) (http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/b042-toward-a-lasting-ceasefire-in-gaza.aspx, accessed 27.05.2015)
· Encyclopedia Britannica, Yisrael Beiteinu (2013) (http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1267967/Yisrael-Beiteinu, accessed 28.05.15)
· European Commission. Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection- Syria Crisis (Brussels, 2015) (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf, accessed 27.05.2015)
· Gerges, Fawaz A. "ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism". Current History 113, no.767 (2014): 339-343. Accessed March 14, 2015. http://currenthistory.com/Gerges_Current_History.pdf.
· Ismael, Tareq Y., and Jacqueline S. Ismael. Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and Change. London; New York: Routledge, 2011.
· Karim Knio, “Structure, Agency and Hezbollah: a Morphogenetic View” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 5 (2013), accessed Feb 12, 2015, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01436597.2013.800741
· Lovatt Hugh “De-constructing national identities in the Levant.” Your Middle East, 2013, accessed 22 May 2015, http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinion/deconstructing-national-identities-in-the-levant_19231
· Plasse-Couture, François-Xavier (2013), ‘Effective Abandonment: The neoliberal economy of violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories’, Security Dialogue 44(5-6):pp. 449-466
· Robbins, Michael & Rubin, Lawrence(2013) The Rise of Official Islam in Jordan, Politics, Religion & Ideology, 14:1, 2013, accessed 20/03/2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2012.752359
· Tal Lawrence (1995) Dealing with radical Islam: The case of Jordan, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 37:3, pp, 139-156, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396339508442807
· Vitale, Heather Marie and Keagle, James M. "A Time to Tweet, as well as a Time to Kill: ISIS's projection of Power in Iraq and Syria", Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 2014 http://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/defensehorizon/DH-77.pdf
· Worman and Gray, “Terrorism in Jordan: Politics and the Real Target Audience “Global Security Studies, Summer 2012, Vol. 3, No. 3, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Worman%20Terrorism%20in%20Jordan%20Final%20Aug%2012.pdf last accessed 29 May 2015
6|Richardson Institute
[1] Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and Change (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), pg. 259.
[2] Ibid., pg. 261.
[3] Ibid., pg. 269.
[4] Karim Knio, "Structure, Agency and Hezbollah: a Morphogenic View", Third World Quarterly 34, no.5 (2013): pg. 857.
[5] Patrick Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution (London; New York: Verso, 2015), pp. 68-69.
[6] Fawaz A. Gerges, "ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism", Current History 113, no.767 (2014): 339, accessed March 14, 2015, http://currenthistory.com/Gerges_Current_History.pdf.
[7] Gerges, "ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism", pg. 339.
[8] Hugh Lovatt, “De-constructing national identities in the Levant.” Your Middle East, 2013, accessed 22 May 2015, http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinion/deconstructing-national-identities-in-the-levant_19231
[9] Ibid.,
[10] Karim Knio, “Structure, Agency and Hezbollah: a Morphogenetic View” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 5 (2013): 857, accessed Feb 12, 2015, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01436597.2013.800741
[11] ibid
[12] Plasse-Couture, François-Xavier (2013), ‘Effective Abandonment: The neoliberal economy of violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories’, Security Dialogue 44(5-6): pp 449-466
[13] Lawrence Tal (1995) Dealing with radical Islam: The case of Jordan, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 37:3, pp, 139-156, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396339508442807
[14]Michael Robbins & Lawrence Rubin (2013) The Rise of Official Islam in Jordan, Politics, Religion & Ideology, 14:1, 2013, pp59-60, accessed 20/03/2015http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2012.752359
[15] Worman and Gray, “Terrorism in Jordan: Politics and the Real Target Audience “Global Security Studies, Summer 2012, Vol. 3, No. 3, pg.96, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Worman%20Terrorism%20in%20Jordan%20Final%20Aug%2012.pdf last accessed 29 May2015
[16] European Commission. Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection- Syria Crisis (Brussels, 2015) (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf, accessed 27.05.2015)
[17] Vitale, Heather Marie and James M. Keagle, "A Time to Tweet, as well as a Time to Kill: ISIS's projection of Power in Iraq and Syria", Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 2014 http://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/defensehorizon/DH-77.pdf
[18] Arian, Asher. Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, (Washington: CQ Press, 2005) pg. 81
[19] Crisis Group. Towards a Lasting Ceasefire in Gaza (23.10.2014) (http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/b042-toward-a-lasting-ceasefire-in-gaza.aspx, accessed 27.05.2015)
[20] Arian, Asher. Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, (Washington: CQ Press, 2005) pg. 80
[21] Encyclopedia Britannica, Yisrael Beiteinu (2013) (http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1267967/Yisrael-Beiteinu, accessed 28.05.15)