The Korean War (1950-53)

THE KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

IB Paper 2. (MN)

Causes of the Korean War

Long-term Reasons

The Korean peninsula had been part of the Japanese empire from 1910-1945. Foreign dominance and the humiliation heaped upon a proud people by their occupiers had made the Koreans particularly nationalistic in outlook. Lowe comments that they had been the “victims of racial discrimination”, but prior to the 20th century Korea had been a united nation for over a thousand years. One royal dynasty (the Yi) had ruled from 1392 until 1910, and the conquest by the Japanese. Like China, Confucianism heavily pervaded Korean society and attitudes, and the aristocracy (yangbon) were a dominant force. However, from the 19th century there had been enormous political and socio-economic upheavals, which had rather splintered the national consensus.

The Japanese, though fellow orientals, had been hard and divisive colonial masters. Syngman Rhee, the future dictator of South Korea, began his career with his vociferous opposition to the Japanese. However, many of his (right-wing) compatriots collaborated with the occupiers and this had created divisions in Korean society between pro and anti-Japanese elements. To many Korean nationalists, Japan had stimulated a burning patriotic zeal that could be extinguished only by the expulsion of all foreign interests in Korea.

The defeat of the Japanese, however, only led to further occupation and an unprecedented division of the country at the 38th parallel. This was to be a disastrous decision. The USSR would have control (‘trusteeship’) of the North, the US, of the South. Governments, even democratic ones, were still thinking in imperialist terms, in 1945.

Short-term Reasons

In many ways Korea was a victim of post-WWII tensions between the Soviets and the USA, but the two Koreas, themselves, were far from immune from blame for the War.

The end of Japanese occupation had led Koreans to think in terms of a new (left-wing) administration for their united country.

The Americans and Soviets, however, had other ideas. They were intent on consolidating their beliefs in their relevant zones and not allowing the country to unite on the principles of their opponents. The fiercely anti-Communist John Reed Hodge, in charge of the South, was never going to allow Korea to become a Marxist state. As the Cold War became frostier, US aid to the South increased and so did their determination to keep it out of the Soviet sphere of influence. Rhee contributed to this anti-Communist hysteria, manipulating the Americans for his own political ends. Along with Germany, Korea was an area where Soviet and US troops directly faced each other. Even so, the US’ policy towards Korea is described by Lowe, as dangerously “muddled and ambivalent”, especially when it is realised that the Americans started to withdraw some of their forces, in June 1949. Rhee himself was not universally regarded in favourable terms and we should not assume that the Americans were always prepared to fight a war over Korea.

Elections in 1948 in the South (ROK) were not recognised by the North and led to increased tensions. The ROK itself was hardly unified under President Rhee, who had problems with a rival right-wing party (KDP). The ROK was facing inflationary problems and its army was weak. Much needed land reform seemed only to accentuate divisions within the republic. A war might, therefore, be a useful diversion, and the Americans were always very aware, and worried, that Rhee might start one.

The North, under Kim Il Sung, saw an opportunity to capitalise on these problems. Kim was a Communist, but he was first and foremost a nationalist who wanted to unify Korea. In this, he shared his beliefs with the equally nationalistic Mao in China and Ho in Vietnam. Kim was certainly not a Soviet puppet, emphasises Lowe. Unification of the peninsula would also strengthen his precarious political position in the North (DPRK) and marginalize opponents like Pak Hon-yong (who would be purged and shot in 1953).

The Soviets and the Chinese undoubtedly contributed to tensions.

Stalin certainly supported, and probably encouraged, an attack by the DPRK on the ROK. He was convinced, perhaps, that any subsequent war would be localised, brief and successful. Mao was less of an instigator, but once the War started and the US became involved, China, which bordered North Korea, would intervene out of self-interest. Ideology, as usual with Chinese and Soviet realpolitik, played a subsidiary role only.

The Americans were increasingly determined that the ROK would not go Communist. Douglas MacArthur, the supreme military commander in the area, was re-building Japan and like his protégé, Hodge, hated Marxism, the Soviets and especially, the Chinese 9whom he saw as more of a threat than even the USSR). The thorny issue of Taiwan had heightened the tension between the PRC and the US. By June, 1950 the Americans were committed to defending Taiwan from Chinese aggression, and their whole policy in the Far East was becoming more rabidly anti-Communist.

The War, though, was begun by the DPRK, on June 25th 1950, when its troops crossed the border along the 38th parallel.

The Nature of the Korean War

In many ways, the DPRK looked like they would secure a quick victory. They had a bigger, better and more experienced army. Many of its over

100 000 troops had fought on the side of the CCP in the recent Chinese civil war and some had fought the Japanese in WWII. It had been Soviet trained and had an excellent air force.

The ROK, in stark contrast, lacked the military experience of the North, was suffering from a shortage of officers, while the US military mission (KMAG) had not progressed very far in its training of the republic’s army. It had no planes and no tanks, because Truman had not trusted Rhee enough to give him any!

In contrast, Soviet military advisers and planners were, initially, very conspicuous on the Northern side. More clandestinely, Soviet planes and pilots were also sent.

The initial confrontations went mostly the DPRK’s way, as the ROK’s armed forces showed themselves to be incompetent and poorly led. The premature destruction of the Han bridge, for example, trapped half the South’s forces on the wrong side.

Stalin was convinced the US would not intervene and that Kim’s superior forces would triumph. As in 1941 though, Stalin underestimated the resolve of his enemy. Truman, as is clear in the NSC (document) 68, was determined to stop the progress of Communism in Asia. Korea came not long after the Berlin Blockade, and it led to a further hardening of US attitudes. Stalin committed according to Lowe, the ‘mistake’ then of not vetoing the vote in the UN condemning the invasion. However, Lynch is convinced that Stalin knew what he was doing and simply didn’t care if the UN and the US became involved, confident as he was of victory.

The US, after it got its UN resolution ordering a DPRK pull-back, then mobilised a multi-national military force. Air and sea power, it was quickly realised would not stop the North, and ground troops would have to be committed. The UN would provide the resolution and justification, the US the material and will to achieve it. Plus ca change…?

Douglas MacArthur was put in charge by Truman (concerned to have a rival Republican involved in the War), though under a UN, rather than US, flag of command. MacArthur was an highly competent and experienced, but also ambitious general, who wished to be US president and saw the UN command in Korea as a means of achieving it. MacArthur also liked to act independently and often made decisions without consulting Truman. This would eventually cost him his job.

Besides, US forces, Britain sent two brigades and many other countries sent military detachments (Turkey, Thailand, Colombia, Australia, Belgium, NZ, Ethiopia, Canada, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Holland, the Philippines and South Africa) or medical teams, the latter including Sweden Denmark, Italy, Norway and India (Nehru had initially fully supported the UN and condemned the North’s aggression, but he later became highly critical of US arrogance and seeming determination to bully the UN into doing solely what America wanted).

Certainly, over 90% of the troops involved in the UNC were American and, though always described as a UN action, most of the fighting (and dying) in the UNC was done by American army and marine divisions.

The UNO was, perhaps, a little naïve in failing to see that the War was a civil conflagration, with Cold War overtones, preferring to look upon it as just a simple and blatant breach of the UN charter.

The NKPA had quickly pushed the ROK forces back to the south-east corner of the republic around Pusan by the early autumn of 1950. They had captured Seoul and commenced torturing and murdering their political opponents. Massacres were perpetrated by both sides and further brutalised an already vicious civil war. However, in their concern to capture the south-west of the country, the North had lost its chance at encircling and destroying the Pusan redoubt and, according to Farrar-Hockley, this strategic error ultimately cost the North the War. By failing to secure a quick victory within a few months of the start of the War, the North had lost the initiative.

Crucially for the North, Stalin was also coming to realise that he did not want direct military confrontation with the US, if only because the USSR was not ready for war yet (in Stalin’s mind it would be, in 1955-6; fortunately, he died in 1953!). He thus began to, very gradually, disassociate himself from the DPRK. He also sent the Soviet delegate back to the UN Security Council.

In contrast, the Chinese became more and more heavily involved. The highly successful amphibious landing of UNC troops at Inchon in September 1950 by MacArthur, and the subsequent driving of the NKPA back to the Yalu river and the border with China (‘rollback’), forced Mao to act.

MacArthur had wanted to unite the whole of Korea, supported and goaded by the unscrupulous and ruthless Rhee. The British and the UNO were more suspicious about Rhee’s ambitions and style of leadership. Mao was more concerned about having the Americans so close to China.

Mao’s decision to intervene, in October 1950, was supported by Peng De-haui, but not by the more cautious Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai. Mao was determined to teach not only the US and UN a lesson, but also to demonstrate to his ostensible Soviet and North Korean allies that China was now a force to be reckoned with. His actions would also put pressure on the international community with regard to the question of Taiwan and the seat on the Security Council.

Lowe says MacArthur’s advance to the Yalu river had been “too swift and reckless”. It over-extended his lines and ignored the fact that the NKPA was still an active force. He also seriously underestimated the Chinese will to resist and the commitment of the PRC. Mao eventually committed over a million ‘volunteers’ before long. They fought extremely well and pushed the UNC forces back from the Chinese border, eventually capturing Seoul.

The War had been similar, previously, to the campaigns of WWII, now, with PRC involvement, it tended to resemble more the mass frontal assaults and grim defensive tactics of WWI.

The British and the UNO became worried by this escalation and proposed a buffer zone near the 40th parallel. The US, however, was more determined to resist at all costs. The world was coming very close to a Third World War. Fortunately, Truman was a clever and pragmatic leader. The fanatical MacArthur, in contrast, wanted to use nuclear weapons against the North and even nuke Chinese cities! He was eventually fired in April 1951. He had been insubordinate once too often.

Fortunately, the military situation for the UNC forces improved in 1951, under their able new commander, General Matthew Ridgway, who set about improving morale, and then both of stopping the Chinese and NKPA advance, and forcing them back over the North/South border. UN sanctions against China would help in securing an armistice. The bravery of UNC troops like the British, Gloucestershire Regiment and the Turkish Brigade, would slow Northern advances. Insufficient transport, food and ammunition would eventually stall all Communist advances and counter-attacks, and bring them to the negotiating table.

Stalin delighted in all of this. His American enemy and Chinese rivals were exhausting themselves in the bitter fighting on the peninsula. The UN was in turmoil, and normally staunch allies like Britain and the US were experiencing strained relations (the British wanting a more conciliatory approach towards the PRC). Lynch has even argued that Stalin consciously manoeuvred to keep the PRC involved in Korea in order to exhaust it as much as possible.

Kim was determined anyway to keep the war going. However, his allies were finished and would sue for a cessation of hostilities. Likewise, Rhee was not overly keen on an armistice, and had to be bullied and bribed into acceptance by promises of US support for the ROK.

The protracted negotiations (lasting fully two years) eventually led to an armistice signed in July 1953, which returned each side to roughly where they had been when the War had begun. However, the agreements at Panmunjom were not a full peace treaty and technically the War continues to this day.

While the tortuous negotiations had been dragging on, millions continued to die in the conflict. The UNC forces bombed North Korean dams and power stations; the NKPA continued to be a formidable enemy. Both sides despised each other and were determined to negotiate from a position of strength.

There were particular disagreements about POW’s, as many DPRK and PRC POW’s did not want to go home. Many PRC prisoners were ex-GMD soldiers whom Mao had forced to ‘volunteer’ for the War, as expendable canon-fodder. UNC POW’s were very harshly treated by their Chinese, and especially North Korean, captors. Indoctrination and torture were the norm, and over half of US POW’s died in captivity.