Bank of Hawaii, Appellant
v.
Peau Mulitauaopele, Appellee.
High Court of American Samoa
Appellate Division
AP No. 20-02
July 10, 2006
[1] Issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo.
[2] The District Court is not ordinarily a court of record, however, in cases where a stenographic record of its proceedings has been made, final decisions of the District Court may be appealed directly to the Appellate Division of the High Court. A.S.C.A. § 3.0309.
[3] In the absence of case law interpreting a statute, the traditional canons of statutory construction provide a guide to analyzing a statute. A number of factors are helpful in parsing a statute’s text, including language, structure, subject matter, context and history.
[4] A statute should be construed to give effect to all of its provisions.
[5] Court of record is simply a descriptive phrase, a moniker or term of art for a tribunal that permanently makes a record of or memorializes its proceedings.
[6] The Chief Justice has the inherent authority under A.S.C.A. §3.0306 to order that a record be kept in district court proceedings.
[7] A court should not read words into a statute that are not there.
[8] Construction of a statute should effectuate its intended purpose.
[9] Statutes of limitations exist to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.
[10] A court strives to avoid incongruous results in construing a statute.
[11] A statute of limitations defense must be specifically pleaded and proven, the failure to do so constitutes a waiver of that defense; and a court commits error in dismissing an action sua sponte if the statute of limitations defense has been waived.
Before: KRUSE, Chief Justice, McKEOWN,[*] Acting Associate Justice, CLIFTON,[**] Acting Associate Justice, MAMEA, Associate Judge, SAOLE, Associate Judge.
Counsel: For Appellant, Jennifer L. Joneson
For Appellee, pro se (no appearance at argument)
OPINION
McKEOWN, Acting Associate Justice:
Bank of Hawaii (BOH) appeals the district court’s sua sponte decision to dismiss as untimely filed the bank’s action to enforce a default judgment against Peau Mulitauaopele. We reverse the dismissal order and remand for further proceedings.
Background
In 1998, after Peau Mulitauaopele defaulted on a loan agreement, BOH filed a motion for a default judgment with the district court. Mulitauaopele appeared in court and agreed to make $50 monthly payments to service the debt. In August 1998, the district court issued an order in aid of judgment, reflecting the payment schedule and the debt of $1,684.84. The proceedings were recorded and there is a written record of the judgment.
In June 2000, BOH filed a motion for an order to show cause for contempt of court because Mulitauaopele failed to pay according to the agreed-upon schedule. Shortly after, BOH withdrew the motion, noting that it had reached a work out agreement with Mulitauaopele.
Two years later, in August 2002, BOH again moved for an order to show cause for contempt of court against Mulitauaopele. The court granted that motion. Mulitauaopele failed to appear in court despite being duly served with the show cause order, and BOH sought a bench warrant for Mulitauaopele’s arrest.
The district court quashed the order to show cause for contempt of court and denied BOH’s motion for a bench warrant, cautioning that it was “chary of interfering with [a] citizen’s liberty rights without just cause.”[1] The district court sua sponte dismissed, as untimely filed, BOH’s motion to enforce the 1998 default judgment. The district court applied the three-year “catch-all” statute of limitations under A.S.C.A. §43.0120(7). BOH argued that the district court should apply the ten-year statute of limitations for “actions founded on . . . a judgment of a court of record” under A.S.C.A. §43.0120(5). The district court reasoned that it was not a “court of record” for purposes of §43.0120(5), and thus that the judgment did not fall within the ten-year provision.
BOH filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that (1) the district court’s holding that it was not a “court of record” disregarded the Chief Justice’s 1989 memorandum requiring most district court proceedings to be recorded; (2) the district court erred in dismissing sua sponte for untimeliness because Mulitauaopele waived the issue; and (3) even if the three-year limitations period were applicable, it was tolled by Mulitauaopele’s partial payments. The district court denied BOH’s motion. BOH’s motion for a new trial and notice of appeal were timely.
Analysis
[1] The question we consider is which of two statutes of limitations applies to BOH’s claim against Mulitauaopele. We review de novo this issue of statutory construction. Anderson v. Fruean, 21 A.S.R.2d 95, 98 (App. Div. 1992) (“Questions of law are, of course, reviewed de novo by the appellate division.”).
In relevant part, the limitations statute reads as follows:
Actions may be brought within the following times after their causes accrue, and not afterward, except where otherwise especially declared: . . .
(5) actions founded on written contracts, or a judgment of a court of record, within 10 years; . . .
(7) all actions for which no limitation period is provided, 3 years.
A.S.C.A. §43.0120. The district court held that the three-year limitations period under subsection (7) applied by default because the judgment was not from a “court of record” and thus subsection (5) did not apply. Whether §43.0120(5) applies depends on whether the district court was a “court of record” in this proceeding. If so, BOH’s claim was timely filed.
[2] To answer this question, the district court turned to A.S.C.A. §3.0306, which provides that the district court “is not a court of record, but the Chief Justice may from time to time order that record be made of any individual proceeding or any class of proceedings.” The court observed that §3.0306 was passed in 1979, 17 years after the statute of limitations had been passed, and that in 1989, the Chief Justice of the High Court had issued an order requiring a record to be made in certain proceedings before the district court, including civil proceedings that were not small claims. See Chief Justice Memorandum and Order (Dec. 20, 1989). In relevant part, the order reads as follows:
The District Court is not ordinarily a court of record, however, in cases where a stenographic record of its proceedings has been made, final decisions of the District Court may be appealed directly to the Appellate Division of the High Court. A.S.C.A. § 3.0309....
The Judicial Branch currently has under its full time employ three certified stenographic court reporters, and no more than two of whom are required in the High Court at any one time. Since a reporter is, therefore, available at most times to keep a record of the District Court’s proceedings, . . . and inherent to the authority conferred by . . . A.S.C.A § 3.0306,
. . .
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: That a record shall be made in the following proceedings before the District Court: . . . all civil actions except small claims matters . . . .
(Emphasis added). After considering this background, the district court concluded that
. . . had the Legislature used slightly different language in A.S.C.A. §3.0306 . . . [BOH’s] argument might be persuasive. Yet, while authorizing the Chief Justice to order a record to be made in certain individual or classes of cases, the Legislature clearly declared the District Court was not a court of record. We so hold.
In other words, had the Legislature intended the district court to be a “court of record,” it could have drafted §3.0306 and §43.0120(5) to say this explicitly. The court discounted the effect of the Chief Justice’s 1989 memorandum that requires a record in most district court cases.
[3] The starting point of our statutory analysis is the text itself, United States v. Hackett, 311 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2002), and the central issue is the meaning of “court of record.” No controlling or persuasive authority illuminates the meaning of the statute. In the absence of case law interpreting §43.0120(5), we turn to the traditional canons of statutory construction to inform our analysis. A number of factors are helpful in parsing a statute’s text, including “language, structure, subject matter, context and history.” In re Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 984 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, we have little else to assist our analysis because there appears to be no legislative history that sheds light on the meaning of “court of record” or the relationship between §3.0306 and §43.0120(5).
[4] We begin with the principle that a statute should be construed to give effect to all of its provisions. See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974). The first half of A.S.C.A. §3.0306 provides that the “district court is not a court of record.” The district court appropriately identified this language as defining the default rule. But we must also factor in the second half of §3.0306, which provides that the Chief Justice can “order that record be made” in any proceeding or class of proceedings.
[5] The district court effectively excised the second half of §3.0306 because it appeared to construe the phrase “court of record” as a specific or special status (at least for purposes of the statute of limitations) that could only be conferred on a tribunal by an explicit decree of the Legislature.[2] But a “court of record” in this context is neither a specific court nor special tribunal; nor is “court of record” a status that only the Legislature has the power to confer. “Court of record” is simply a descriptive phrase, a moniker or term of art for a tribunal that permanently makes a record of or memorializes its proceedings.
From a historical perspective, both the United States Supreme Court, cf. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748 (1994), and Blackstone’s Commentaries embrace this understanding of the term:
A court of record is that where the acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled in parchment for a perpetual memorial and testimony, which rolls are called the records of the court, and are of such high and supereminent authority that their truth is not to be called in question.
3 Blackstone’s Commentaries 23, 24, cited in DeKalb County v. Deason, 144 S.E.2d 446, 447 (Ga. 1965). Here, because the Chief Justice ordered records kept for “perpetual memorial and testimony” in most district court proceedings, and because a record was kept in this matter, the district court was a court of record for purposes of §43.0120(5). In his 1989 order, the Chief Justice recognized that although the district court is “not ordinarily a court of record,” the Chief Justice had the inherent authority under A.S.C.A. §3.0306 to order that a record be kept. In other words, the Chief Justice exercised the precise authority contemplated by the statute.
[7] We also follow the principle that a court “should not read words into a statute that are not there,” United States v. Watkins, 278 F.3d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 2002). The district court’s analysis has the effect of reading additional words into A.S.C.A. §43.0120(5) that unduly limit its scope. Under the district court’s construction of §43.0120(5), the ten-year limitations period applies only to the statutory court of record, that is, “judgments of the High Court,” even though the statutory language reads more broadly as “judgments of a court of record.” (Emphasis added). It is true, as the district court observed, that the Legislature provided that “The High Court shall be a court of record . . . .” A.S.C.A. §3.0204. But this provision for the High Court to be a court of record does not exclude other courts from being courts of record for purposes of the statute of limitations. For instance, a judgment of a foreign court may be deemed a “judgment of a court of record” because the foreign tribunal operates as a court of record or is statutorily designated a court of record under the laws of a state of the United States or a foreign country. Nothing in §43.0120(5) or §3.0204 suggests that only the American Samoan Legislature may determine when a tribunal is a court of record. Put another way, the Legislature could have said explicitly that it alone would decide which courts (foreign or American Samoan) were courts of record for purposes of §43.0120(5). It made no such pronouncement. Instead, it explicitly granted the Chief Justice the leeway to exercise that power (at least over American Samoan courts). See A.S.C.A. §3.0206.
[8] Finally, our construction of a statute should effectuate its intended purpose. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 706 n.9 (2000) (“‘[N]othing is better settled, than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion”’) (quoting In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 667 (1897)).
[9] Significantly, §43.0120(5) provides a ten-year statute of limitations for both “written contracts” and “a judgment of a court of record.” The statute of limitations for a breach of contract action is usually longer than for other causes of actions, such as torts, because the focus of the dispute is a written document. Other disputes, such as torts, are often centered on unrecorded actions or occurrences in which evidence, memories and witnesses all fade over time. Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974). For purposes of the statute of limitations, it makes little sense to treat a private, written contract as more reliable than a judgment of the district court, recorded for posterity. Statutes of limitations exist “to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We effectuate these goals by interpreting §43.0120(5) in a way that treats breach of written contract claims as parallel to claims seeking to enforce a judgment from a court mandated to keep a record of its proceedings.