Hurricane Katrina

Dr. Joseph Costa, DHSc., PA-C

Health Policy and Management

MPH 525

Adaku Otuonye

April 2014

Table of Contents

Chapter Page

1. Hurricane Katrina 2

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………. 2

Initial Response 3

2. The Rescue Team 5

Collaboration of different agencies 5

Roles of Volunteers 6

Public Health Agencies Response……………………………………………………….. 7

Actions of the Government……………………………………………………………..... 9

Federal Incident Management…………………………………………………………... 11

3. Texas Emergency Management Policy 12

Overview of policies 12

FEMA’S Policy Protection and Preparedness………………………………………….. 13

Community Impacts and their residents………………………………………………... 13

The New Policies……………………………………………………………………….. 14

4. Summary and Recommendation……………………………………………………………... 16

Summary………………………………………………………………………………...... 16

Recommendations……………………………………………………………………….... 17

References 19


Chapter 1

Hurricane Katrina

Introduction

Hurricane Katrinahas been recorded as one of the most destructive of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season in our living memory with recorded death of over 1,800 people and destroying about 92,000 square miles of the city. It was one of the strongest storms to impact the coast of the United States during the last 100 years. With sustained winds during landfall of 125 mph (110 kts) and minimum central pressure the third lowest on record at landfall (920 mb), the hurricane Katrina caused widespread devastation along the central Gulf Coast states of the US. Cities such as New Orleans, LA, Mobile, AL, and Gulfport, MS bore the brunt of Katrina's force and needed months of recovery efforts to restore normality.

Note. Adapted from “Hurricane Katrina: Facts, damages & aftermath by Zimmermann, K.A, 2012, Livesceience.com. Copyright 2014 by Tech media network.

Hurricane Katrina developed initially as a tropical depression in the southeastern Bahamas, strengthened into Tropical Storm Katrina the next day and moved slowly along a northwesterly then westerly track through the Bahamas, increasing in strength during this time. A few hours before landfall in south Florida on August 25th, Katrina strengthened to become a category 1 hurricane. As the storm moved southwest across the tip of the Florida peninsula, Katrina's winds decreased slightly before regaining hurricane strength in the Gulf of Mexico. Katrina became and remained a strong category 4 strength hurricane despite the entrainment of dryer air and an opening of the eyewall to the south and southwest before landfall on the morning of the 29th (Waple, 2005).

Initial Response

The Katrina disaster cannot be classified as a surprise. There were ample warnings of the coming disaster that to the surprise of the masses, it was met with insufficient preparation owing to the fact that the consequences of a major hurricane had been long-anticipated for New Orleans in particular, basically due to the dangers of a levee collapse for a coastal city built mostly below sea level.

Even before the storm shifted, FEMA activated its National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) and Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCC) They tracked the storm and began preparations to coordinate the response. Also, the state emergency management officials in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana also activated their Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) and began preparations. FEMA was said to have provided record levels of support to Hurricane Katrina victims, states, and emergency responders. However, there was lack of visibility in the resource ordering process, difficulty in deploying sufficient numbers of trained personnel, unreliable communication systems, and insufficient management controls for some assistance programs to demonstrate a need for improved response support capabilities and more effective delivery mechanisms for assistance. As soon as conditions permitted, life saving and life sustaining efforts began, and Rapid Needs Assessment teams assessed damage in the affected areas. There was a search and rescue missions activities performed, with an estimated 50,000 victims rescued. U.S. Coast Guard personnel conducted over 30,000 rescues during the first week after landfall.

In addition, FEMA began moving pre-staged trucks of water, ice, and MREs from federal operational staging areas into the disaster area and to various points of distribution. Additional commodities were ordered for daily delivery (US Department of homeland security, 2006).


Chapter 2

The Rescue Team

Collaboration of different agencies

Before Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast region, the reports on the intensity of the storm were inconsistent. Consequently, the general state of preparedness was ambivalent. Mixed signals were not only sent to the public at large, but also to the emergency and security responders as well. Under these circumstances, the police response was not clearly planned right from the moment when the storm was anticipated. With the anticipated collaboration among emergency responders, including the law enforcement agencies, there were no well-defined roles of what needed to be done and who would have to do it while the relatively shaky state of the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) before Katrina was also a big issue to tackle.

When Hurricane Katrina hit the city of New Orleans, the extent was shown to which the effects of natural disasters are mediated by social conditions. The conditions of the city’s residents who were unable to evacuate and were left stranded were compared to people living in a third world country. Among the most critical problems in the response to Hurricane Katrina were a lack of communication capacities and a lack of adequate transportation. With the usual technological communication facilities no longer operative during the hurricane, there was increased demand for collaboration among the different agencies as all responders including the NOPD officers were forced to communicate with each other mainly in person.

The improper coordination of Katrina response activities among the various levels of U.S. government structurally translated in cooperation and problems. Besides the NOPD, other law enforcement agencies that provided assistance during Katrina included the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the U.S. Marshals Service. These agencies provided personnel, equipment, and assistance in security, but their actions were not also reported to be well coordinated. Additional inter-agency cooperation during Katrina was multifunctional, crossing the boundaries of law enforcement and emergency response. For example, rescue workers, volunteers and local businesses worked in conjunction with the NOPD to provide aid to residents. Methods of cooperation were pragmatic rather than pre-coordinated (Deflem & Sutphin, 2009).

Role of Volunteers

The role of the numerous volunteers in Hurricane Katrina has been one of the most essential and positive. More than half a million Americans journeyed to the Gulf Coast to volunteer in hurricane relief and recovery efforts. Those who journeyed to the Gulf arrived solo and in groups -- people of faith, college students, retirees, and professionals. Once they arrived, they stayed in makeshift lodgings while they provided temporary shelter to evacuees, fed survivors, cleared debris, and gutted homes. The Red Cross organization alone marshaled 220,000 volunteers to the area.

The results of these volunteer efforts include:

·  40 million pounds of food distributed by Catholic Charities' Second Harvest Food Bank

·  6.6 million hot meals served by Salvation Army volunteers

·  18,725 displaced families supported by Traveler's Aid volunteers

·  Spring Break trips devoted to hurricane relief efforts brought 10,000 college students to the Gulf Region

·  Nearly 1,000 AmeriCorps National Civilian Community Corps members were deployed to the Gulf for most of their 10-month term of service.

A lot of other volunteers found ways to help from afar, by organizing fundraising drives, shipping supplies to those in need, and adopting evacuee families who relocated to new communities (PR Newswire services, 2014).

Stoesen (2005) indicated that though this was one of the worst disasters in our nation's history, the skills exhibited by the volunteers and social workers in assisting and offering all forms of help were never before.

Figure 2

A Red Cross volunteer comforts an evacuee in the Houston Astrodome. .

Note. Adapted from “NASW Responds to Katrina's Impact” by Stoesen, L., 2005, NASW News, Vol. 50, No 10. Copyright 2005 National Association of Social Workers

.

Public Health Agencies Response

There was clear indication that a lot if not all the public health agencies were needed in Katrina response. According to Lister (2005), given the scope of the public health disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina, virtually all agencies and offices in HHS are engaged in the response. Federal departments and agencies worked together in attempt to meet these challenges, beginning before Hurricane Katrina’s landfall and continuing long after. The health officials collaborated, maintained situational awareness for their respective agencies and hastened the direction of medical and public health assets. National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) teams also formed an integral component of the medical response to Hurricane Katrina, collectively treating over 100,000 patients (Townsend, 2006). There were needs for the immediate medical needs of persons who were injured, or whose care for chronic conditions lapsed when they were cut off from services. Roles played by different public health agencies are as below:

HHS Agency: The HHS Office of the Secretary was the point of coordination for public health and medical support functions. One immediate element of HHS response was the activation of Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) at HHS headquarters in Washington, DC and at numerous HHS agencies. This was done to ensure continuous communication and coordination.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

As of September 16, 2005, CDC had more than 150 staff in affected states and also in addition, the agency deployed more than 350 staff to its EOC response, the Strategic National Stockpile of drugs and medical supplies to affected states. Among those are:

1.  Thousands of doses of vaccines for tetanus/diphtheria, and hepatitis A and B

2.  Vials of insulin

3.  Pprescriptions pain medications

4.  Ventilator kits.

CDC also made numerous public health recommendations to address the anticipated and typical threats posed by Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath.

Food and Drug Administration. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued numerous recommendations regarding the handling of drugs, biologics and medical devices that may have been harmed by exposure to floodwaters or loss of refrigeration, as well as guidance in ensuring the safety of food.

National Institutes of Health. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) did set up a phone-based medical consultation service for providers treating victims or evacuees from the Hurricane Katrina disaster, and has mobilized bed capacity within its medical system, among other activities.

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) had as its mission to build resilience and facilitate recovery for people with or at risk for substance abuse and mental illness. SAMHSA’s Center for Mental Health Services (CMHS) is focused on providing resources to aid in the recovery process following Hurricane Katrina (Lister, 2005).

Actions of the Government

Hurricane Katrina prompted an extraordinary national response that included all levels of government—Federal, State, and local—the private sector, faith-based and charitable organizations, foreign countries, and individual citizens. People and resources rushed to the Gulf Coast region to aid the emergency response and meet victims’ needs. While their actions saved lives and provided critical assistance to Hurricane Katrina survivors, it is still being reported that the response to Hurricane Katrina fell far short of the seamless, coordinated effort that had been envisioned.

Traditionally, it is only after local, State, and mutual assistance resources are depleted, or prove insufficient, that the Federal government is requested to help. With several warnings about Katrina, the State and local governments began preparing their response and initiating evacuations. Gulf Coast States and localities began hurricane by activating their emergency response elements, issuing emergency declarations, prepositioning response assets, planning for evacuations and sheltering while the Federal government was continuing preparations to support State and local responders monitoring the storm closely.

Due to Hurricane Katrina’s continuing intensification and west-southwest track from Florida into the Gulf of Mexico. Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour declared states of emergency for their respective States. Also, the state agencies began putting their response plans into action.

FEMA headquarters in Washington, DC, conducted the daily video teleconference from their National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) to exchange information and reconcile response activities among the FEMA Regions, the NHC, liaisons from various Federal agencies and departments responsible for disaster support, representatives from the States projected to be affected by the storm, and States monitoring and providing mutual aid to support their neighbors.

Louisiana State agencies also began implementing Phase I of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan, which included public communications, staging of assets, and other activities. The State law enforcement officers were deployed along the routes and in communities to assist in evacuation operations.

Following Governor Blanco request, President Bush signed a Federal emergency declaration for the State of Louisiana and also went ahead to issue additional emergency declarations for Mississippi and Alabama the following day, after requests from the governors of those States. These declarations authorized Federal expenditures to assist State and local governments by providing resources and making other preparations to save lives and property from Hurricane Katrina’s imminent impact. These decisions were particularly important as they allowed delivery of pre-deployed Federal assistance. The issuance of a Presidential emergency declaration before landfall is extremely rare and indicative of the recognition that Katrina had the potential to be particularly devastating.