BANNG UP TO DATE

Summer, 2017

An occasional newsletter for supporters of the Blackwater Against New Nuclear Group (BANNG)

Edited by Andy Blowers (Chair of BANNG)

Don’t be deceived by the silence on the Bradwell front. The project for a new nuclear power station at Bradwell is still very much alive although little information has been made public. BANNG remains as determined as ever to reveal what is happening and to oppose a project which threatens the safety and security of the Blackwater environment and the local communities. Please continue with your support for BANNG as we enter a new phase in the effort to stop Bradwell B.

1. Editorial

At the beginning of the year the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) announced it had received a request from the Government to commence a Generic Design Assessment (GDA) of the UK HPR reactor technology. This somewhat gnomic statement fires the starting gun for the China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN) and its partner Electricité de France (EDF) to begin the long process that may ultimately lead to new nuclear power reactors at Bradwell, the project now known as ‘Bradwell B’.

This long awaited news was met by BANNG and many others with a mixture of dismay and anticipation. Dismay, in the sense that it confirms Bradwell B is still a live project, still a possible if distant prospect. Anticipation, in the sense that the phoney war is over and there is now the promise of engagement in a real battle in which the stakes are high and the outcome fundamental to the wellbeing of the Blackwater environment and its communities.

In a very real sense this feels like Groundhog Day. Years ago, nine years to be precise, when BANNG was set up to oppose the Government’s identification of Bradwell as a site ‘potentially suitable’ for the deployment of new nuclear reactors, it seemed clear we were in for a long haul, years rather than months. And so it has proved. We fought long and hard in


every possible way to prevent Bradwell being nominated. We responded to consultations, held public meetings, enlisted supporters from far and wide, gathered signatures for a mass petition presented to the Minister for Energy, lobbied councils and MPs, pressured government and the nuclear regulators, provided press releases and articles for the media and assembled a carefully researched and authoritative set of papers. It is fair to say that BANNG has developed as a well regarded, professional and effective organisation.

Despite all our efforts Bradwell was one of the sites nominated by the Government in 2011. For a while it seemed that nothing was happening and that the site was so low on the list of possibilities that it might fall by the wayside. Until, in the Autumn of 2015, the President of the People’s Republic of China and the Prime Minister of the UK set out the terms of their future ‘golden relationship’. And, the jewel in the crown, at least for the Chinese, was involvement in the UK’s nuclear programme and the invitation to develop their own reactor design at Bradwell provided they could secure regulatory approval. The UK would thus secure Chinese inward investment while China would gain the passport, endorsed through a rigorous regulatory regime, to a platform for selling its reactors to a world market.

Seen from above, at the rarified level of government, it was a win-win situation; seen from below, where the environmental and safety impacts would be felt, it was a potential disaster for the Blackwater. There is little doubt this agreement, forged at the highest level, moves the Bradwell site higher up the pecking order in three ways. First, it is backed by a state with funds to invest abroad. Second, the Chinese see this as a prestige project and will not want to lose face in the event of failure. And, third, the other sites currently in the ring are each

meeting with problems. Hinkley Point C has been a disaster financially and serves as a warning to the others. With Toshiba and Hitachi seemingly falling by the wayside, Moorside in Cumbria and Wylfa in Wales still have a way to go in securing investors and overcoming other obstacles. And, up the east coast at Sizewell, EDF (and its junior partner, CGN) may get cold feet after their experience with Hinkley Point. So, Bradwell, though furthest away in terms of process, may make up ground given its Chinese backing.

So, are there reasons to be cheerful? Well, yes, there are several. One is that the Chinese reactor design does not appear to be ready for the GDA yet, so the process is likely to be delayed and protracted. Indeed it’s not clear what design is being put forward. Another is that the case for building big nuclear power stations gets weaker by the day. Energy markets are changing rapidly under a combination of the rise of an array of renewables, a greater focus on demand management through energy conservation, smoothing of peaks and troughs, new systems of storage and localised and integrated distribution networks combining heat and power. At the same time, nuclear’s costs keep rising, its technology keeps failing and its deadlines are routinely missed. By the time Hinkley Point C comes on stream (if it ever does) nuclear’s moment will be over. The behemoth will become a dinosaur.


Perhaps the biggest reason for optimism rests in the knowledge that Bradwell is an unacceptable site for new nuclear power and that the project can be defeated by determined and sustained opposition. It proved hard enough for the government to justify nominating the site and the National Policy Statement on Nuclear Energy was riddled with provisos, contradictions and uncertainties that left the proposal wide open to challenge. A site vulnerable to coastal change, harbouring dangerous spent fuel until at least the middle of the next century is no place to build a nuclear power station.

BANNG has set out its case and will continue its campaign to arrest this awful project. It seems like we are beginning all over again, though this time it is for real. The opposition is strong and determined and, sooner or later, it should prevail.

2.  What is going on? Is Anything Going on? (By Andrew Blowers)

Ever since the fanfares proclaiming the Chinese were ready and willing to try their luck in building their own reactor at Bradwell, there has been a rather eerie silence. It is difficult to detect how far or fast the project is moving forward. Behind the scenes a lot may be happening or, again, nothing much may be going on. The truth, as always, probably lies somewhere in between.

BANNG has made several attempts to prise some information out of the parsimonious team that calls itself the Bradwell B Community Help Desk. The two companies running the project in the persons of Mr. Zhu Minhong, General Manager of CGN, and Mr. Humphrey Cadoux- Hudson, Managing Director of EDF Energy New Build, have proclaimed that they welcome inquiries and public participation. In this spirit of openness and participation we have directed our inquiries to Messrs. Minhong and Cadoux-Hudson but we are always met with the same prevarication conveyed by the Bradwell B Project Team. We are told ‘it would be premature to enter discussions at this juncture’. While participation will be welcomed, to borrow a phrase, now is not the time.

What is there to hide? We have asked for some basic information such as how many reactors will be built, what methods will be used to provide cooling water, what are the outline plans for managing radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, on the site and what proposals are under consideration for mitigating environmental impacts? It seems, to us, inconceivable that information on these matters cannot be vouchsafed. But, we have been fobbed off by the claim that the project is at the very earliest stages, meaning that no proposals have yet been produced.

This is, to say the least, somewhat disingenuous. Perhaps, the lack of any proposals indicates they have encountered problems with the site which is making them hesitate. Are they already having second thoughts about pursuing their nuclear ambitions at such an evidently unsatisfactory, unsuitable and unacceptable site? Or is there more to it and they don’t want to reveal their intentions for fear of the public reaction they might get.

At this crucial point, the best we can do is to discourage them from proceeding further. BANNG’s advice to EDF and CGN is stop now and save yourselves a lot of time, trouble and money. BANNG is ready to oppose this foolish project for as long as it takes to see it defeated.

3.  Bradwell B the Baseload Behemoth (by Peter Banks)

The Government continues to justify its new nuclear build programme on the grounds that nuclear is the only low carbon energy that can meet the need for baseload supply. This is the permanent minimum load that the system must be able to deliver at any time. But in reality the Government appears not to be asking the very questions it needs to concerning its attitude and justification toward its new nuclear programme.

In this piece I am going to examine the implications of the prospect of Bradwell B being built on the Blackwater from two perspectives:

❑  Economic

❑  Strategic

Nuclear Power is becoming more expensive with time. Clearly there are a number of factors responsible for this. An important one is a lack of standardisation in an apparent deference to one of experimentation. Meanwhile alternatives, such as wind and solar, are benefiting from reducing costs as their scale and availability increase whilst meeting lower carbon emission targets.

This pattern follows the implementation of the first generation of Magnox reactors, including the former Bradwell A station, which were based on similar technology and similar output. The next generation were the AGRs (Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor) followed by Sizewell B so far, the only PWR

(Pressurised Water Reactor) to be built in the UK.

And now it becomes clearer by the day how vastly expensive the proposed new developments at Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C will be using yet another variation, the European EPR. This design has run into huge overruns of cost and delivery at Finland’s Okiluoto and France’s Flamanville sites. To date, the budget for Bradwell B is unspecified but will still be mind-boggling yet may get approval with funding from the Chinese keen to break into overseas markets.

Many of us growing up in the 50s and 60s and even later will remember power cuts. These were relatively frequent compared to today when they are both rare and random, usually triggered by extreme weather conditions.

Furthermore, the management of electricity provision was governed by the guaranteed, regular baseload generation at any given time.

This approach focused on supply from

large-scale fossil fuel and nuclear power stations.

The same principle applies with the new nuclear proposals which have output ratings that are vast compared to their predecessors. For example the Bradwell A Magnox station was originally quoted at 300MW of generating capacity while in practice operating at 246MW.

The prospective Bradwell B will use the Chinese designed Hualong 1 reactor with a capacity of more than 1,000MW (or 1


Gigawatt, GW). It is understood that there will be two such reactors at the Bradwell site, a combined capacity of more than 2GW, around ten times that of the former Bradwell station. This, ironically, will increase vulnerability to the very supply the government wishes to protect since, if one station were to go offline, then the percentage reduction in supply would be that much higher.

In addition, there is the requirement to comply with the Paris Agreement to reduce CO2 emissions. Government conveniently reports that electricity generated from the proposed new nuclear developments will be low carbon whilst overlooking the massive carbon emissions that will result from construction of these mega nuclear stations plus the impact of ongoing waste transport and storage.

The alternative approach to meeting the need for electricity, one which reacts to demand rather than supply, is where both the energy industry and the National Grid see the future. With the huge advances in software control it is now possible instantly to manage demand rather than rely on supplying sufficient capacity. This process, called Demand-Side Management (DSM) or Demand Side Control (DSC), also ably copes with fluctuations in renewable generation from wind and solar by smoothing the peaks and troughs. The baseload argument always made in favour of nuclear has effectively become irrelevant. The high strike price built into the Hinkley Point C contract assumes that nuclear energy will run continuously even if it is not needed. Under this scenario nuclear is an inflexible source of supply potentially excluding cheaper renewable sources from the market.

Every weekday the National Grid faces a critical supply 5 minutes, called a TV pickup, when millions of people switch on their kettles after the drums roll in the credits as Eastenders finishes. Typically, this 3GW surge is controlled by a Duty Manager who actually watches the programme to best predict the optimum time to increase supply. This immediate