Enjoyment
Enjoyment is a nexus at which important concepts meet, among them the concepts of feeling and reasons for action. We offer an account of enjoyment that combines and explains both the felt and reason-for-action aspects of enjoyment. The feeling of enjoyment varies greatly. Compare the watery relief of satisfying an urgent thirst; sexual gratification; a sudden whiff of perfume; learning that one has received a fervently hoped for grant; the thoughts, associations, and feelings aroused by reading the following lines from the end of Faust, spoken by the angels when they snatch Faust from Mephistopheles: “Werimmerstrebendsichbemüht,/Den könnenwirerlösen.” The variety of feeling does not, however, prevent enjoyment from playing a standard explanatory-justificatory role. When asked, “Why do you play so much chess?” one provides both an explanation and a justification by offering, as one’s reason, “Because I enjoy it.” We offer our account by completing the following biconditional:
x enjoys φ if and only if ... ,
whereφ is an experience or an activity of x.
The central idea is that enjoyment consists in a harmony between three elements: the relevant activity or experience; the features which this activity or experience causes you to believe it has; and a desire to for the activity or experience so conceived. The harmony consists in this: the activity or experience causes a desire which it simultaneously causes one to believe is satisfied. The belief and desire comprise the point at which the felt aspect of enjoyment and its explanatory/justificatory role meet. The belief/desire pair is typically a reason to act in way that ensure the existence or continuance of the experience or activity, and the key to characterizing the way it feels to enjoy something is to note that the relevant desire is a felt desire and the relevant belief an occurrent belief.
Experience and Activity
The restriction of values of ‘φ’ to experiences and activities may at first sight seem questionable. After all, you can enjoy a meal, a painting, and deep sea fishing. But, of course, you can enjoy the meal only if you eat it; the painting, only if you look at it; and, deep sea fishing only if you engage in appropriate activities. In general, where y is something other than an experience or activity, you enjoy y if and only if you enjoyφ, where φ is a suitable experience or activity involving y. But which way, if any, does the direction of explanation run? Do we explain our enjoying the meal by noting that we enjoy the taste, or do we explain the latter with reference to the former? Or, are they just distinct enjoyments neither one of which need explain the other? As we discuss in more detail later, when you examine explanations of the form “because he or she enjoys it”, you find that we treat as derivative the enjoyment of things other than experiences and activities. What is enjoyed is ultimately understood (explicitly or implicitly) to be an experience or an activity. It is this primacy in explanation that motivates our restricting values of ‘φ’ to experiences and activities.
To avoid misunderstanding, it is worth recalling that traditional empiricism uses ‘experience’ for a “passive receptivity” involved in perception. We mean nothing of the sort; indeed, we not endorse any particular philosophical account of the notions of experience and activity. Our talk of experiences and activities is just a convenient way to describe the range of items that is our primary concern. We merely have in mind the rough and ready distinction enshrined in ordinary talk and thought. Central examples of activities are publicly observable “doings” subject to intentional guidance and control. Central examples of experiences are “undergoings” presented to the one undergoing them in a way they are not presented to others. There is no sharp distinction here. We routinely refer to publicly observable objects when describing experiences—for example, “an experience of watching one’s daughter perform in a play.” Activities on the other hand have publicly unobservable aspects. An activity, as we are using the term, is an intentional action (swinging the golf club), or a sequences of such actions (deep-sea fishing, or growing roses, the latter being a sequence of temporally discontinuous sequences). Intentions are accessible to the agent in a way they are not accessible to others; further, activities, like deep-sea fishing for example, involve experiences, like feeling the fish strike the line, and one may describe the “experience” of imagining Warsaw in the snow as an “activity” even though one’s imaginative project is not publicly observable.
A final point: We understand ‘φ’ to range overindividual, non-repeatable instances of experiences and activities; thus, the definition is concerned with, for example, enjoying this particular experience eating of the meal or this particular activity deep sea fishing. This approach runs head on into questions about what one enjoys. Thus: Imagine Zoe describing the difficulties she encountered in running a marathon—the pain in her side, the pain in her legs, the soreness of her feet; she nonetheless says she enjoyed running the race. Exactly what experiences and activities did Zoe enjoy? There are answers of course, but giving a general account of how to arrive at the answers raises questions of how to individuate enjoyed experiences and activities. We will defer such questions; they are better raised in the context of a more fully developed account of enjoyment.
Enjoyment and Desire
We contend that one enjoys φ only if one desires φ. We understand ‘desire’ in the broadest possible sense to include such diverse sources of motivation as values, ideals, needs, commitments, personal loyalties, and patterns of emotional reaction. Further, the desire to φ need not exist prior to one’s enjoying φ. Imagine, for example, you are cornered by a talkative stranger with whom you have no initial desire to converse; however, you eventually enjoy conversing. Our claim is that as long as you enjoy conversing, you desire to do so. This will seem to be a mistake to those who think that one can only properly be said to desire that which one lacks; however, that is not our conception. We conceive of a desire as a state that not only causes one to seek what one lacks, but to persist once one finds it.[1]
To see that desiring to φ is necessary condition of enjoying φ, imagine you are listening to an indifferently performed piano piece. The pianist is your friend, and he will ask you if you enjoyed the performance. You know that that you will say you did, and, in hopes of avoiding an unconvincing lie, you are trying to enjoy it. Unfortunately, the indifferent performance leaves you indifferent—neither desiring to listen, nor desiring not to listen. The complete absence of any desire to listen to the music certainly seems sufficient to show you not are enjoying listening to it. The following considerations provide reinforce this conclusion. Imagine Smith was attending a party which he left after only staying a short while; he complains that he wanted nothing the party had to offer. He mitigates these complaints, however, by confessing that the party was not completely wretched, and that he actually enjoyed it a little. If this confession is consistent with Smith's claim that he wanted nothing the party had to offer, then Smith enjoys the party without any relevant desire. But why should one grant that the confession and the claim are consistent? Suppose we ask Smith what it was that he enjoyed about the party. Smith might refuse to answer this question, for he might insist that he just enjoyed attending the party without enjoying any particular aspect of the party. For the moment, however, let's suppose he answers us by saying that he enjoyed dancing, but he denies he wanted to dance, and he does not merely mean that he did not desire to dance prior to dancing, he means that, throughoutthe time he was purportedly enjoying dancing, he did not desire to dance. As in the indifferently-performed-music example, the complete lack of a desire to dance is sufficient to establish that Smith did not enjoy dancing. The same considerations would apply if Smith said that what he enjoyed was not dancing but talking with friends, or listening to music, or watching the people, or whatever. In fact, it is difficult to see how Smith can provide any convincing answer to the question of what it was about the party that he enjoyed. But, as we already noted, Smith may reject the question and insist that, while he, neither desired nor enjoyed any particular thing the party had to offer, he nonetheless enjoyed attending the party. Suppose that this is what Smith does, and suppose that he also insists that, even though he enjoyed attending the party, he did not want to be there at all. Is this sufficient to cast doubt on the claim that desiring to φ is a necessary condition of enjoying φ? Surely not. Smith at no time desires to attend the party, and does not have any desire for anything the party has to offer-dancing, music, conversations with friends, or anything else. This is a crystal clear example of not enjoying a party.
We conclude that one enjoys having an experience or engage in an activity φ only if one desires to have or do φ. This formulation does not, however, provide a sufficiently perspicuous specification of the required desire.
Desiring under A
To begin with, φ is an individual experience or activity about which one has a desire. We will express this by saying that one desires, of φ, that it should occur. Thus, if you are enjoying tasting bittersweet chocolate, we will describe you as desiring, of that experience, that it occur. This is simply an instance of the following the standard Quinean convention of corner quotes. Where ‘[’ and ‘]’ are the left and right corner quotes, a singular term [t] may be substituted salvaveritatefor a term [t'] in the context [...desires, of t, that . . .] given the true identity [t = t’]. We need one further refinement in our description of desires. To this end, imagine you are enjoying the experience of tasting bittersweet chocolate. The bitter sweetness creates and pervades a gustatory field that captures your attention, and it is this bitter sweetness that is the aspect of the experience that you desire. We will express this by saying that you desire, of the experience of tasting the chocolate, under the feature bittersweet, that it occur. The “of, under” device is cumbersome and unnecessary if one is simply describing particular instances of enjoyment (one can just say, for example, “It is the bitter sweetness of the taste that Jones enjoys and desires”). The device is essential, however, if we are to have a perspicuous way of talking in general about enjoyment and desire. We adopt the same conventions for belief for the same reason. When one of believes that a particular ongoing experience or activity realizes a certain array of features, we will say that one believes, of the activity, under that array, that it is occurring.
Our general claim is that when one enjoys having or doing φ, there is an array A of one or more features such that one desires, of φ, under A, that it occur. Take experiences first. The essential point is that to experience something is to experience as being some way. To experience the taste of chocolate is to experience it as bittersweet, or sweet, or as chocolaty, or whatever. One’s experiences always present themselves as experiences of a certain sort. There are no “raw feels,” no experiences that we have without apprehending them as experiences of a certain sort. Thus, to desire to have an experience is to desire to have an experience of a certain sort. In our terminology, it is to desire, of the experience, under some array A of features, that it should occur. A similar point holds for activities. Suppose you are enjoying singing along to a rendition of the choral finale of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. You hear the music and the singers, and, in a swirl of emotions, memories, and associations, you feel and hear yourself sing, “Freudig, wieein Held zum Siegen.” In short, you are aware of the activity has having a variety of features, and it is the realization of these features (or some subset of them) that you desire. Again, we express this by saying that you desire, of your singing activity, under the relevant array of features, that it should occur.
Enjoying Under A
To summarize, when one enjoys having or doing φ, there is an array of features A such that one desires, of φ, under A, that it should occur. We take it to be clear that when asked, “What did you enjoy about it?”, one answers by specifying (some of) the features in A. In such cases, we will say x enjoys φ under A (more precisely, in a subset of such cases—our view being that desiring φ under A is a necessary but not sufficient condition of enjoying φ under A). The “under A” simply provides an explicit representation of what is implicit in our day in day out description of people as enjoying experiences and activities: namely, that there is some desire array of features that are the enjoyers would identify in response to the question, “What do you enjoy about it?” We will therefore define enjoyment by completing “x enjoys φ under A if and only if ...”
Conceiving of enjoying as enjoying under Aprovides a satisfying way to describe the earlier marathon example. Zoe enjoys running the marathon under an array of features A that includes, for example, achieving an important goal, competing against other runners at her level, and beating her personal best, but does not include having a pain in her side, pain in her legs, and sore feet.
Desiring Under A Is Not Sufficient
It is a necessary condition of enjoying φ under A, that one desire, of φ, under A, that it should occur; it is, however, clearly not a sufficient condition. Suppose you desire to undergo dental treatment. In our canonical form: you desire, of your current experience, under the feature needed dental treatment, that it should occur. However, dental treatment is for you an ordeal of discomfort and anxiety. You desire to undergo your current experience only as a means to the end of adequate dental health, and you most certainly do not enjoy the experience. The obvious response is to distinguish between desiring something for its own sake and desiring something only as a means to an end. To desire that p for its own sake is to desire p and not to desire it merely as a contingently related means to an end; and, second, that to desire that p merely as a means to an end is for there to be an end E such that one would not desire p if one did not desire E and believe that p was a contingently related means to E. The “contingently related” qualification allows the following case to count as desiring something for its own sake. Victoria desires in general the experience of looking at impressionist paintings for its own sake; she is looking at Mary Cassatt’sLydia Leaning on Her Arms, which she correctly believes is an impressionist painting. She desires, of her looking at the painting, under looking atLydia Leaning on Her Arms, that it should occur for its own sake; however, she would not have that desire if she did not believe that the painting was an impressionist painting. One question remains: how should one understand attributions of desire for its own sake in our canonical form? What does it mean to say that one desires, of φ, under A, that it should occur for its own sake? What is the “it”? Our answer: φ’s realization of A. What one wants for its own sake is that φ should realize A.
A Preliminary Definition
Simplicity argues for the following account: one enjoys φ under A if and only if one φ’s, and one desires, of φ, under A, that it should occur for its own sake. The condition is not sufficient, however, as the following example shows.
The “In Spite Of, Not Because Of” Examples
You have never been deep-sea fishing, but have long harbored a desire to do so for its own sake, and are now in fact engaged in that very activity. That long harbored desire and your belief that you are now indeed deep sea fishing explain your desire, of your activity, under deep-sea fishing, that it occur for its own sake. You are not, however, enjoying the activity under the feature deep-sea fishing. You find the activity distasteful. You get seasick; you are disgusted by the crowded, noisy deck from which you must fish; you are repelled by the necessity of barehandedly catching the small, live fish used for bait, and you are even more repelled by the fact that, once you have succeeded in grabbing the bait, you have to impale the struggling fish by the gills on your hook. But your desire to fish survives this initial shock, and you continue to fish even though you admit to yourself that you are not enjoying it. You only continue to fish in the hope that you will enjoy it. In the present, however, your desire to fish is waning. It persists, but it persists despite your reactions, and it is only the hope that things will change that keeps it alive.
You can construct any number of examples along these lines. You just need (1) a preexisting desire to have an experience or engage in an activity of a certain type for its own sake; (2) the belief, of a particular instance of the experience or activity, under an array of features A, that it is now occurring; and (3) the resulting desire, of the experience or activity, under A, that it should occur for its own sake. One does not enjoy the particular instance, but one’s desire in (3) persists for a while “in spite of, not because of” the particular realization of what one desire in a general way. We take these examples to show that it is not sufficient to count as enjoying φ, under A that one φ’s and desires, of φ, under A, that it occur for its own sake.