Dealing with the new generation of jihadis—ISIL and beyond
Dealing With the NewGeneration of Jihadis: ISIL and Beyond
Arya Bhattarai
New College House
March 22, 2015
Arya Bhattarai is a Math and Economics double major from Kathmandu, Nepal. Outside of Junto, Arya is the president of the Benjamin Franklin Financial Services Honor Society, and the alumni chair of the Black Pyramid Senior Honors Society. Arya also works as awriting and math tutor on campus. Arya will be pursuing an opportunity in Investment Banking upon graduation. In the long run,Arya aspires to contribute to the economic development and progress of his home country, Nepal.
Last summer, agroup of radical militantsdrew global attention as they swiftly conquered vast swathes of land across Iraq and Syria, anddeclared the formation of a newstate. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria(IS/ISIS/ISIL), an Islamist organization that emerged out of the insurgency in Iraq,is today considered by many to be the most dangerousjihadi organization in the world,trumping eventhe reputation of itsnefarious predecessor, Al Qaeda.Over this past year,ISILmassacred severalreligious minorities, enslaved scores ofwomen and children, and brutallymurdered manyforeign nationals operating in their area. Reacting to the threats posed byISIL, both to the regional stability of theMiddle East and to the safety of their own citizens,severalnationsjoined a US-led coalition last August,in order to launch a coordinated military offensive against the extremist organization.So far, thisoffensivehas included airstrikes on key military targets in ISIL controlled territory, and strategic support to moderate Syrian opposition rebels and the Iraqi government(State of the Union, 2015).
While these tactics have been successful in curbing the advance of ISIL, theyhave not eliminated the larger threats posed by the organization, particularly those thatstretch far beyond the battlegrounds of Iraq and Syria. These threats include the possibility of terroristattacks in Western countries from returning ISIL fighters, attacks from‘lone wolves’—individuals who aren’t affiliated with ISIL, but maybe inspired by their propaganda, and finally, the growingthreats to national and regional security fromISIL offshoots that are rapidly emerging in different parts of the world.Sadly, these threats cannot be mitigatedusing military force alone;to eliminate these threats,what is needed in addition to the current military strategy of the US-led coalitionis a multi-faceted counterterrorism strategyoutside of the battlefield—onethatfocuses oncountering the ideology that ISILuses to spread its violence around the world. This strategy must be implemented on multiple levels, and mustfocusonpreventing radicalization at the grassroots, countering extremist narratives that are professed by groups like ISIL, and diminishing the appeal of not onlyISIL, but ofglobal jihaditself.
Before we delve intothis strategy, we must first understand the key threatsposed by ISIL outside of the battlefield. The first threat is relatedto the considerable presence of foreign fighterswithinISIL ranks.Recent estimates suggest that as many as 20,000 foreign fighters have left to join ISIL, a figure that already dwarfsforeign fighter recruitment numbers from previous conflicts like Afghanistan (CNN, 2015). And while most of these fighters come from countries in the Arab World, it is estimated thatat least3,400 fightersfrom Western Europe and the United States have also left to join ISIL(CNN, 2015).Western governments expect some of these fighters toreturn, and are concerned about theterrorist acts thatthey can commit if they manage to slip back into their home countries undetected. In one such event last summer, Mehdi Nemmouche, an ISIL returnee from Syria, managed to shoot and kill four people in a Jewish Museum in Brussels (The Telegraph, 2014). Whilethere have only been a few events of this nature so far,Intelligence Officials in the West are mindful of the damage that can be done by an ISIL returnee, especially one who is seasoned in combat (New York Times, 2015).
However, even if attacks from ISIL returnees are stopped, ISILinspired lone wolf attacks can continue to wreak havoc in the Western World.In September last year, a senior ISIL commander,Abu Mohammad al Adnani, urgedISIL supporters around the world to attack more ‘disbelievers’, especially those residing in Western countries (The Independent, 2014). Although a number ofISIL inspiredlone wolf attempts were foiled last year, including a plot to carry out a public beheadingoutside a well-known coffee shop in Sydney, Australia, some of them were successfully orchestrated.For instance, there were two separate lone wolf attackslast October that lead to the death of three soldiers outside the Ottawa parliament building in Canada. The perpetrators behind these attacks were recent converts to Islam, and are said to have been radicalized throughISIL related propaganda (The Telegraph, 2015). One of the attackers, Martin Rouleau-Couture, had even attempted to fly to Syria in July, but had been stopped by officials who were aware of his radicalization. The major problem withlone wolf attacks is that they are immensely difficult to prevent even with the advancedsurveillance and intelligence capabilities thatmany Western governments possess. This is because surveillance isn’t as useful in identifying individual perpetrators who may attack with knives or guns, as it is in identifying a larger group ofplotters who are constantly communicating with each other using mediums that can be intercepted, such as phone lines (The Telegraph, 2015). And while untrained lone wolf attackers are unlikely tokill a large number of people, experts agree thattheir attacks cangenerate great ‘tension, polarization, and terror’ among the masses, and can thus have a profound psychological impact on society (Time, 2014).
Yet, the biggest threat that ISIL poses to the regional and national security of many Western nations has to do with the pace with which the organization is gaining support in areas outside of its primary stronghold. Thedirector of the American Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Vince R. Stewart, made a statement earlier this month indicating that ISIL hasstarted assemblinga ‘global footprint’, as it has already received pledges of support from extremists in a number of countries,including,Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Afghanistan(The New York Times, 2015).The international community observed a manifestation of this phenomenon last week, as it witnessed anISIL affiliate in Libya abduct and behead 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians near the North African beach town ofSirte(IB Times, 2015).With ISIL at their doorstep, countries like Italyare now on high alert, as they fearinfiltration from ISILfighters who may enter their shoresin the guise of North African refugees, andgradually unleash havoc as they develop a critical mass of radicalized followers(IB Times, 2015).Yet, looking pastsuch country specific scenarios, political analystshighlight a broader concern that the US-led coalition may effectively be heading into a hydra-headed conflict, if it cannot contain ISIL’s expansion to new shores (New York Times, 2015).Indeed, if ISIL continues to spread its tentacles to other countries,it will becomeincreasinglydifficult to gain decisive victory over the organizationusing military force, as it will become practically impossible to launch airstrikes and send armies to deal with every singleISIL affiliatein existence.
So,considering the limitations of a military offensive in containing the spread of ISIL, and its ability to incite acts of violenceeven from non-members,members of the US-led coalition will have to adopt adifferenttype ofcounterterrorism strategy to safeguard the lives of their citizens from the numerous threats that are posed by the extremist organization.And the key to designing such a strategy is to first understand the main factors that have allowedISIL to attract as many followers, andcommand as much influence as it does today. A report by The Soufan Group—a New York based intelligence and security consultancy—claims that while there are a number of reasons that have motivated foreigners to partake in the Syrian conflict, and join extremist groups like ISIL, many of theseindividualsare motivated by what is often known as the jihadi narrative (The Soufan Group, 2014). This narrative is simply that Islam is under attack,and that it is areligious obligation for Muslims to protect their faith, and itsfellow believers from danger—something many ISIL militants believe they are doing in Syria and Iraq. And ISIL has been particularly successful in marketing this narrative, along with its other agendas, through its masterful use of borderless technologies, such as social media. In a recent testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee, Nicholas Rasmussen, current director of the National Counterterrorism Center, claimed that ISIL“has proven far more adept than core Al Qaeda—or any of Al Qaeda’s affiliates—at using new media tools to reach a broader audience.” (CNN, 2015)By effectively marketing its ideology through a well-crafted social media campaign, not only has ISIL drawn scores of recruits to the deserts of Iraq and Syria, but it has also attracted numerouspledges of allegiance fromaround the world.Given this situation, it seems unlikely that decimating the core leadership of ISIL, including its current leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, will slow down the advance of the extremist organization, unless the methods by which itrecruits and radicalizesaredismantled.Thus, the most important battle against ISIL may be one that is fought outside of the battlefield—one that focuses on diminishing the organization’s ideology, appeal, and recruitment tactics through a combination of local, national and global efforts.
The local aspect of this approach involves dealing with the initial grievances that may lead individuals towards radicalization.Martin Reardon, who is the senior vice president of The Soufan Group and a 21-year veteran of the FBI with a specialization in counterterrorism operations, asserts that the initial grievances that may push one to the path of extremism are almost always local (Al Jazeera, 2014). These may include poverty, lack of education, lack of opportunity, or alienation from a prevailing system or culture.Maajid Nawaz, a former extremist and current director of Britain’s first counter extremism think tank also attests to this idea, and describes‘perceived local grievances’ as one of the main contributors toradicalization (Real Time with Bill Maher, 2015).Therefore,it is critical for governments to understand the local grievances that are prevalent amongst theirpeople, and work to find ways by which they can be addressed effectively. This may include reforming laws or practices that sanction discrimination or, whether intentionally or unintentionally, serve to alienate vulnerable communities. However, if such changes aren’t made on theground, ISIL and similar jihadi groupscan continue to exploit existinglocal grievances to their advantage. For example, Sharia4Belgium, an underground group that was recently accused of funneling Belgian fighters to Syria, has repeatedlypointed to Belgium’s laws—such as its ban on full face-veils—as examples of the nation’s intolerance towards Islam (Stuff, 2015).Further, critics have even claimed that Belgium’sinability to fullyintegrate itsimmigrants—many of whom are Muslim, and feel alienated from the country’s largely Catholic culture—has contributed to making Belgium a hotspot for ISILrelated recruiting (Stuff,2015). Indeed, Belgium has already sent 350 jihadis to Syria, which is more than any other country in Europe on a per capita basis.
While it is critical to address the local grievances that can lead to radicalization,states must also strive to counter extremist narratives that are propounded byorganizations likeISIL. As mentioned earlier, the jihadi narrative that Islam is at war with the West, and that Muslims must, therefore, resort to violent means to defend their faith is one that has convinced several individuals to join or pledge allegiance toISIL. Undermining the legitimacy of this narrative is thus crucial in reducing the appeal ofISIL, and containing the spread of its ideology.Several think tanks have suggested ways in this can be done, including The Washington Institute, a think tank that focuses on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, whichpublished a report in 2010 highlighting a number of wayby which governments could successfully counter extremist narratives. Some of the suggestions of this reportmay be applied to deal with ISIL; these includehighlighting the inconsistency of ISIL’s ideals with Islam, and exposing the unglamorous life of being a soldier within their ranks (The Washington Institute, 2010).
Disillusionment regarding an extremist organization’s truemotives, and the morality of their methods has often been a reason for people to defect. For instance, Nazir Abbas, a former senior commander of Jemmah Islamiya, an Al Qaeda affiliate in Indonesia, left the organization afterhearingBin Laden’s fatwa, or edict, in 2000 that praised the killing of Americans and Jews, wherever possible, asthehighest of religious acts (The Washington Institute, 2015).After defecting, Abbassoonbegan working with Indonesiancounterterrorism officials, and started to openly denounce what he began to seeas the highjack of Islam by individuals like Bin Laden. Similarly, in today’s context, one way for governments todissuadepeople from joiningISIL, or pledging allegiance to them, may involveoffering a prominent voice toscholars of Islam, whocan expose the un-Islamic ideals and practices of the extremist organization. States may also be able to support ongoing initiatives by scholars and Muslim community leaders, such as theinitiative of 120 scholars of Islam from around the world, who wrote an open letter to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi last year, emphasizing how most of ISIL’s principle religious arguments were facile (Letter to Baghdadi, 2014).
It is also crucial for states to expose the harsh realities of life in theIslamic State, as ISILpropaganda often portrays a completely fabricated version of it.Along with messages that advocate for bloodshed, ISILpropaganda sites and social media pages are flooded with images that try to portray the normalcy of life in the caliphate, includingworkout videos, Instagram pictures ofcats and sunsets, and tweets with the most surreal, and absurd, hashtags, such as #jihadfitness (The Washington Post, 2014).There are also moresomber videos where active militants, including Western fighters,offer justifications forISIL’s brutality, and take pride in being part of a battle that they believe was prophesized 1400 years ago (The Washington Post, 2014).The Washington Group’s report indicates that the most effective way to counter suchpropagandais to demonstrate, through the voice of former defectors, how life in the Islamic State differs greatly from the picture that propaganda videos seem to paint.Judging from past experience with other terrorist organizations, even if ISILdefectorsfocusmainly on highlightingpetty concerns such as the financial constraints, andsqualidliving conditions that define life in the caliphate, they may be able toprompt a number of committed radicals to drop out (The Washington Group, 2010). Therefore, it is extremely important for governments to develop the intelligence capabilities to detect andidentify ISIL returnees, so that they can find and use defectors within the group to speak against the organization’s propaganda.
While states may be able to leverage their relationships with religious leaders and former ISIL defectors to counter the organization’s extremist narratives, such efforts alone may not be enough.ThoughISILhas spilled its hateful ideas on several social media sites, there aren’t nearly as many people who have used social media to speak against the extremist group’sskewed narratives. Martin Reardon of the Soufan Group states in an OP-ed article he wrote last year that it is time for the global community to start using thevery tools that organizations likeISIL have relied on—namely, social media sites, blogs, and online forums—as part of a global initiative to undermine thejihadi narrative (Al Jazeera, 2014). Maajid Nawaz of the Quilliam Foundation also emphasizes the need for a ‘global, grassroots, youth-led movement’ that utilizes borderless technologies to diminish extremist narratives, and establish that the greatest enemy of Islam isn’t the West—it is Islamic extremism (TED, 2014). Maajidalsoadds that ‘we’, implying the global community, need to work together to make‘Islamic extremism as unpopular, in terms of ideology, as Soviet styled communism.’(Real Time with Bill Maher, 2013)
ISILhas emerged today as a major threat to the national and regional interests of many nations around the world. Even as the organizationis stalled on the battlefield, its ideology continues to metastasizeat an alarming pace.And the organization’s growth poses great threats for the future, evenfor regions that are distant from the group’s primary strongholds in the Middle East. Therefore, it is imperative that the international community works together to degrade the organization, both on, and outside of the battlefield. However, in contrast to counterterrorism efforts of the past, now the emphasis must shift from a short-term strategythat just focuses on eliminating leaders, and destroying military targets, to along-termstrategythat uprootsISIL’s ideology, or at least diminishes it to point where it is no longer appealing, and thus can longer pose great danger to people around the world.And though this effort to undermine ISIL’s ideology consists of severallocal and state levelinitiatives, at the end of the day,this efforttruly needs to be a coordinated, global initiative.