HISTORY
There are two historical trends in particular that continue to drive Chinese society and politics.
The first is the dynastic system. Although many claim that the last dynasty was the Qing, the regimes that have followed—the National Party and the Communist Party—still exhibit a cyclical pattern found in the rise and fall of the previous dynasties.
Dynasties were overturned when the central leadership was incapable of taking care of the general populace. Once their authority declined, a new dynasty came in to take its place, refocusing the government on the current needs of the country and the populace. Within time, however, a bureaucracy would become entrenched and the elites would promote agendas that furthered their reign, and the cycle would be repeated. Although there were often external pressures that led a dynasty to this inevitability, the typical trend line remains the same.
Related to this is the second important historical trend: centralization and decentralization. As a result of China’s unique geography and demography, the country goes through cycles where either centralization or decentralization is necessary to garner the support necessary for continued rule. The disparate geographical landscape necessitates varying regions to develop their own economies based on their distinct needs. Nevertheless, once the decentralization becomes entrenched, these regions start to pull away from the central government, threatening the survival of the regime. Centralization ensues as the government pulls back control. Afterwards a bureaucracy again becomes entrenched, focusing on the needs of the central government and a handful of elites, which then allows a decentralization to once again transpire. Often this decentralization is also, in part, engineered by the state to gain the support of the regional governments and allow them to grow according to their specific needs. However, corruption of local officials has been endemic throughout history, turning the populace against the local government and necessitating the return of central control for the maintenance of the overall state.
The introduction of technology has done little to curb this trend. Instead of making central control easier through better communication channels, transportation, etc., it has increased the pace of the centralization-decentralization cycle. The intensity and frequency of communication has increased in both directions, which could ultimately lead to quicker destabilization.
The current government is currently trying to recentralize control as the people decry the local governments of corruption, an increasing wage gap and other social ills. After so many periods of this cycle, however, the “dynasty” is weakened and cannot regain the control it once enjoyed at the beginning of its era.
Appendix 1 – Timeline
Timeline of Chinese Dynasties
Qin: 221- 207 B.C
Han: 206 B.C – 220 A.D
Sui: 580 - 618
Tang: 618- 907
Song: 960- 1279
Yuan: 1279- 1368
Ming: 1368- 1644
Qing: 1644- 1911
Republic: 1911- 1927
oChinese civil war and WWII: 1927- 1950
PRC- 1950 – Present
Pretty and detailed version-
Early Imperial ChinaQin 221-207 B.C.
Western Han 206 B.C.- 9 A.D.
Hsing (Wang Mang interregnum) 9-25 A.D.
Eastern Han 25-220 A.D.
Classical Imperial China / Three Kingdoms 220-265 A.D.
Western Chin 265-316 A.D.
Eastern Chin 317-420 A.D.
Southern and Northern Dynasties 420-588 A.D. / Southern Dynasties
420-478 -- Song
479-501 -- Qi
502-556 -- Liang
557-588 -- Chen
Eastern Han 25-220 A.D. / Northern Dynasties
386-533 -- Northern Wei
534-549 -- Eastern Wei
535-557 -- Western Wei
550-577 -- Northern Qi
557-588 -- Northern Zhou
Sui 580-618 A.D.
T'ang 618-907 A.D.
Five Dynasties 907-960 A.D.
Ten Kingdoms A.D. 907-979 / 907-923 -- Later Liang
923-936 -- Later Tang
936-946 -- Later Jin
947-950 -- Later Han
951-960 -- Later Zhou
Later Imperial China / Song A.D. 960-1279 / 960-1125 -- Northern Song
1127-1279 -- Southern Song
Liao A.D. 916-1125
Western Xia A.D. 1038-1227
Jin A.D. 1115-1234
Yuan A.D. 1279-1368
Ming A.D. 1368-1644
Qing A.D. 1644-1911
Chinese history weighs in heavy in the Chinese sense of identity. Coined as the “middle kingdom”, the Chinese believe that China is the center of the world and even the character for China exemplifies this belief. Throughout its dynastical period, the Chinese believed that they were self-sufficient and did not rely heavily on trade from outside nations.
When invaders would occupy China, instead of engaging in warfare they typically absorbed the new culture, which morphed into the Chinese system. The Chinese did conduct warfare and of course, the Great Wall was an attempt to keep the Mongols out, resistance was minimal in relation to other states. The Chinese administrative system has survived throughout the dynastical period with only minor modifications and was adopted by foreign invaders.
The Chinese also rely heavily on Confucian thought, although Mao made an effort to destroy it. A few of Confucian precepts are still prevalent in Chinese society. First, the idea that outsiders are to be distrusted is still widespread. This was further entrenched by the Chinese Cultural Revolution, even though one of its principles was to actually break old ways and habits, often targeting Confucianism directly. During the Cultural Revolution not only did neighbors turn on neighbors, but also family on family. Between the scars of the Cultural Revolution and Confucianism, the Chinese mindset is very distrustful of those that are not part of the family or neighborhood societies.
Second, there is still a sense of duty to family and to the government, which was introduced in Confucianism. There is a hierarchy that is necessary for the proper functioning of both society and the government. Questioning authority is seen as improper and deleterious. Although this mindset is changing, there is still a general timidity towards speaking one’s mind, which again was entrenched by Mao’s “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom” campaign. This campaign allowed people to openly criticize the government under the assumption that they would help to build a great proletarian society. However, after the criticisms, Mao targeted those that dared to voice their opinions. The government is viewed almost as a secret society. They are the protectors of the people and their will should not be questioned: it is not for the commoners to know the complexities of the government. This view is still very much in operation throughout the country.
With the weakening of the Qing dynasty and the invasion of foreign naval powers, China as a country, began to realize its weakness in isolation. Prior to Mao Zedong and Communist China there were many debates on how to incorporate Western thought into China. There were periods were the Chinese adopted Western principles, wholly abandoning Chinese ideals, and then times when they tried to adopt Western principles with “Chinese characteristics.” The latter has prevailed through today. When Deng Xiaoping opened China to the outside world in 1978, he did so through a method he called “crossing the river while groping for stones.” He would adopt some foreign ideas, apply them to China and then move a tiny step forward to gauge the reaction. If it was successful he would move another tiny step forward. If unsuccessful, then back.
Despite all of the economic liberalization that Deng introduced and the successes of the Chinese economy, the history of the Communist Party still dictates much of the direction of the administration. Succession politics is still contentious and each leader works hard to instill his “thought” into the Chinese constitution to validate his rule. Each leader needs to consolidate his rule, which is a tedious process that involves bargaining and negotiations with entrenched leaders and interests. Factional politics has been a constant throughout the Chinese Communist Party’s history, highlighted by extensive bargaining protocols. The consensus-building nature of the CCP’s decision-making makes the process slow and has the ability to stall progress. The elites in the Politburo can take the initiative to override tedious bargaining and negotiations, but rarely do so since it could hurt delicate alliances.
Although the leaders of the CCP differ from the emperors of the dynastic period, their rule is still supreme. Consensus has taken over from unitary decision-making, but the will of the leaders is still able to shape political behavior, albeit in a limited and more protracted manner. In many ways, the rule of the CCP is seen as a continuation of the dynastic period; another dynasty that similar to the others will fall.
Dynasties fell when the central administration was unable to take care of the basic needs of the people. The disparities between the coast and the inland provinces have become so extreme that the current government fears another dynastic topple. The lessons of history have dictated the current regime’s emphasis on “social harmony” (similar to Confucianism), and a return of a strong centralized government (similar to in the heyday of Maoism) that protects the people.
Appendix 2 – Chinese perspective of their own history
- The importance of history to the Chinese
The Chinese care about history because they believe it tells the truth – when one cannot believe one’s leaders, and one cannot foretell the truth, then the next best is to use the past as a guide against obvious future pitfalls. The fact that the Chinese and Jap spend so much time haggling over history books, and how much kudos is given to the Chinese National Statistical Bureau as guardians of Chinese economic measurements (even though every few years they come up with some significant re-jigging of a key assumptions that consequently changes the whole Chinese economic picture) effectively demonstrate how so much effort is put into shaping/falsifying history.
Chinese leaders care about how they are viewed in history – look at the way Mao and Deng both sought to leave their legacies with “Mao Zedong thoughts” and Deng’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics thoughts” and Jiang’s “three represents theory” (party incl’s businessmen, national utilities, democracy).
History also ties in with Chinese culture of ancestral worship.
Chinese reasoning is based on the concept of cosmic order and balance. Thus when looking at an issue or problem, their instinct is to pay more attention to peripheral or related matters surrounding the core issue, to keep the bigger picture of balance in full view. History is one of the most key peripheral matters. This slows the Chinese process of decision making to an incredibly painful pace relative to the American norm.
- Role of nationalism in China
The Chinese are a proud people. Their best and their worst are shown in the elite. The people in general are prepared to be led because they respect their leaders (as “sons of heaven”) and are docile by nature (until the people decide that the incumbent leader has failed in looking out for their interest, in which case the “overthrow” within dynastic cycle described before kicks in). For the last two to three centuries, the Chinese existed as a conquered or defeated people, first under the Manchu, then under the Western Powers, and the Japanese. The fact that the Chinese nation has yet to get over its century of humiliation is evidenced starkly by the occasional outbursts of public emotion and continued use of this term by both the public and media (possibly encouraged by gov no doubt).[1]
They can forgive a lot of sins committed by the Communists because they were seen as the leaders who saved the nation from its century of humiliation.
Nationalism colours the Chinese psyche just as it does in other nations. That said, one should never belittle the influence of Western Culture over past and modern Chinese thinking. Note how past Chinese leaders have been affected (e.g. the early US and later Russian influence on Mao; the US influence on Chiang Kai-Shek), and how capitalism has gradually seeped into today’s modern concept of communism as Socialist capitalism.
- Four key drivers behind Chinese development
The Chinese written language, which has had continuous usage and development for three thousand years. Unites the Chinese as a people, helping to spread Chinese culture and political influence to its natural borders. Used as a key tool to communicate and spread its culture abroad – foreign students flocking to China to learn, and Chinese gov sending cultural teachers abroad to Latin America etc.
The Chinese civil service system which is based on meritorious advancement, in place since the Han Dynasty. Hence, the Chinese administration has essentially remained intact throughout successive invasion by foreign powers. Until the arrival of European presence, invaders like the Manchus had traditionally been absorbed into China. Civil service system breakdown may reflect deteriorating ability of central gov to control the edges if its empire over long distances as in days gone by.
The Western Culture being widely accepted as a superiorculture (in many ways by the Chinese since the fall of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911), hence paving the way to China’s acceptance of globalization.
The Cultural Revolution and its fall. The spiritual father of the Cultural Revolution is Marx who preached class struggle and eternal revolution, only for it to turn into a tool of internal political struggle at the hands of a crazed megalomaniac. Upheavals that followed burned an impression into the Chinese psyche never to trust an impulsive lurch to the left ever.
- Key changes from old Traditional to new Modern China
From passive “china as middle kingdom” to “Willingness to learn” – at individual and gov levels.
Chinese civil service system – no longer the only way up / higher echelons of power and wealth available, no longer based on merit.
The Chinese seemingly “docile” and indifferent political positivist has not arisen due to a preference for consensus decision (instead being a Japanese trade mark). To date, the Chinese have been afraid of decision-making due to the decades of policies that stifled original thought from Qing dynasty’s Empress Dowager Xicici to Mao. But this is changing fast.
Appendix 3 – Confucianism, Legalism and Daoism
Overview
Confucianism has without a doubt influenced Chinese culture significantly in the past,
and is oft quoted in the Western press. However, to the Chinese, Daosim
and Legalism have also played important roles. Confucian is known widely outside of
China, but Legalism (which was a subsequent offshoot) is rarely spoken of. All 3
philosophies sprung up during the Spring & Autumn Period (722 - 481 BC), although
Confucianism and Legalism have had the most lasting effects (as far as I know from
conversations with family).
Daoism is a can be a very frustrating philosophy to study. It is based on study of the
Dao, literally translated, "the Way." It's full of cryptic and paradoxical sayings, like
"The more the sage expends for others, the more does he possess of his own; the more he
gives to others, the more does he have himself." Daoism profoundly influenced the later
development of Cha'an (also known as Zen) Buddhism.
Confucius, who lived about five hundred years before Christ, basically believed that
moral men make good rulers and that virtue is one of the most important properties that
an official can have. He also believed that virtue can be attained by following the
proper way of behaving, and thus placed a great deal of stress on proper. Most of what is
considered 'Confucianism' was actually written down by a disciple named Mencius, who also believed that all men were basically good. Confucius also codified the status of the
ruler in Chinese political thought; the Emperor was the Son of Heaven (while Heaven in a Western context is a place, Heaven in the Chinese context is a divine/natural force) and
had the Mandate of Heaven to rule.
Legalism derived from the teachings of another one of Confucius' disciples, a man named Xun-zi. Xun-zi believed that, for the most part, man would look out for himself first and was therefore basically evil (remember, this is more than two thousand years before Adam Smith argued that self-interest is what makes markets work and is therefore good). Consequently, the Legalists designed a series of draconian laws that would make a nation easier to control. The fundamental aim of both Confucianism and Legalism was the re-unification of a then divided China, but they took difference approaches. Confucianism depended on virtue and natural order; Legalism used a iron fist. Legalism has been called "super-Machiavellian;" this is not unwarranted, as it called for the suppression of dissent by the burning of books and burying dissidents alive (maltreatment of the opposition is nothing new in China; because the system starts with the idea that the
Emperor is the Son of Heaven and has the Mandate of Heaven to rule, there is no such
thing as legitimate dissent and thus no concept of "loyal opposition"). Legalism
advocated techniques such as maintaining an active secret police, encouraging neighbors
to inform on each other, and the creation of a general atmosphere of fear. In fact, many
of the same tactics that the Legalists approved of were later employed by Hitler, Stalin,
and Mao.
Appendix 4 – Condensed version of China’s whole history